Three forms of transcedence : a study of Heidegger and medieval mystical theology. by Sikka, Sonya
THREE FORMS OF TRANSCENDENCE: 
A STUDY OF HEIDEGGER AND MEDIEVAL MYSTICAL THEOLOGY 
SONYA SIKKA 
D. PHIL. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF YORK 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
JANUARY 1993 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
This study compares the thought of Martin Heidegger with that of a 
number of medieval mystical authors, in order to explore some aspects of 
the concept of God. It is divided into three sections, each consisting of 
two chapters. 
Section I examines issues related to the idea and apprehension of God 
as immanent within the world. Chapter One in this section compares the 
first two chapters of Bonaventüre's Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, on 
contemplating God in and through created things, with Heidegger's analyses 
of early Greek thought. Chapter Two compares Heidegger and Eckhart, 
focussing particularly on the dialectic of immanence and transcedence 
present in the writings of both. 
Section II examines issues related to the idea and apprehension of 
God as indwelling within the mind, or within some aspect of 'human being'. 
Chapter Three in this section compares the chapters of the Itinerarium on 
contemplating God through the mind with Heidegger's analyses of knowledge 
and understanding. Chapter Four compares the relationship between the 
soul and God in the sermons of Johannes Tauler with the relationship 
between Dasein and Sein in Heidegger's writings, mainly in Sein and Zeit. 
Section III examines the idea and apprehension of God as 
transcendent. Chapter Five in this section looks at the last few chapters 
of the Itinerarium, and compares Bonaventure and Heidegger with respect to 
their conceptions of being and goodness. Chapter Six compares Heidegger 
with Jan van Ruusbroec. It explores themes like rapture, transformation 
and illumination in the writings of these two, stressing how these notions 
suggest absolute dependence upon a superior power. 
This study is not attempting to argue for a specific position or 
doctrine. It is using a number of comparisons as a way of pointing out 
some possibilities for how one may think of God. It concludes with the 
observation that these possibilities' are, in a sense, metaphysical, and that 
Heidegger's thought can be seen as a contribution to metaphysics, rather 
than as a destruction of it. 
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NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS 
All quotations from primary sources in this dissertation are given both in 
the original language and in English translation, as are quotations from 
Latin sources like Augustine and Richard of St. Victor. In most cases, the 
translations simply reproduce the text of a published translation, where 
one exists, with only minor changes. I have consistently reduced the 
amount of capitalization (e. g. for terms like 'the good' and 'the one'). 
Heidegger's Sein and Seyn, as well as the Latin esse and ens have 
generally been translated as 'being'. Heidegger's Seiende has been 
variously translated as 'what-is', 'being', 'beings', 'entity' or 'entities', 
depending upon the context, together with the need to differentiate this 
term from Sein. Where no reference to a translation is given, the 
translations are my own. 
iv 
ABBREVIATIONS 
References to the works of Heidegger, Bonaventure, Eckhart, Tauler and 
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124/TP, 87 means that I am quoting or referring to Latin Volume II, p. 124 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is one of Heidegger's fundamental observations that the content 
and structure of any enquiry is essentially determined by its task, by 
what it seeks to accomplish. In that case, one way of explaining the 
nature of a particular investigation Is through the elucidation of its 
basic aim, the aim governing, for instance, its choice of material, its 
points of emphasis, and its methodology. Such an elucidation will also 
help to make intelligible the unity binding the various elements of the 
work into a coherent whole. 
With these points in mind, the first thing I want to make clear about 
the following investigation is that it is not a study of sources. Although 
I believe that Heidegger was in fact strongly influenced by medieval 
mystical texts, and by medieval theology in general, this study does not 
aim to establish the fact of historical influence, much less td examine the 
precise nature of that influence or the channels through which it may have 
been transmitted. The comparisons that will be drawn here between 
Heidegger and various medieval figures are guided, rather, by a quite 
different task, the task of thinking about God in the present age, which 
means responding to the need currently felt by the absence of God. 
By setting up a dialogue between Heidegger and a number of medieval 
mystical authors, St. Bonaventure, Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler and Jan 
van Ruusbroec, ' I will attempt to explore some possibilities of how the 
divine may be thought, given the current situation of God. It is this end 
that unifies the various ways in which the medieval and Heideggerian texts 
are compared in the following pages. Whether the comparison points out a 
similarity or contrast, or uses Heidegger either to deconstruct or to 
retrieve a metaphysical or theological notion, or uses a medieval text to 
criticise Heidegger, or vice versa - all of these ways in which the 
members of the dialogue are brought into relation with one another are 
oriented towards the primary task of thinking about how God may be 
thought in future, given what has occurred in the past. The appropriation 
of past thought which this involves is never a matter of simple repetition, 
but of transformative revision in the light of what needs to be thought at 
present. 
Thus, while I believe that placing Heidegger's writings beside these 
medieval texts helps to clarify both, this clarification is itself an 
intermediate, and not a final, objective. By means of it, I hope especially 
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to open some avenues for rethinking the relation between God and 
metaphysics. While Heidegger explicitly opposes the so-called 'God of 
metaphysics', a point to which I will return, his thought, and that of 
medieval mystical theology, can also help to retrieve this God by providing 
insight into the experiential ground of the theological and metaphysical 
terms which form the fundamental concepts of much philosophical theology. 
The often startling linguistic innovations of Heidegger and of the mystics 
are not designed to obfuscate the obvious, but to make the familiar 
strange, in a poetic manner. This often constitutes a poetic revision of 
the language of metaphysics and theology, based on insight into that which 
this language originally sought to articulate, that in response to which it 
was first uttered. For both Heidegger and the medieval mystics, 
particularly the mystics of the fourteenth century, this revision sometimes 
takes the form of a translation of metaphysical terms adopted from a 
foreign language, whose metaphoric import, and so basis in experience, is 
lost through such adoption, into the vernacular, so that the language of 
abstract thought and the language of concrete experience are no longer 
artificially separated. Looking at the insights offered by the language of 
the mystics and Heidegger in this regard can then help to reestablish the 
link between these abstract, terms and their origin in human experience, a 
necessary enterprise in an age in which the discourses of theology and 
metaphysics have been subject to radical question. 
However, while this may be enough to explain, albeit only in a 
preliminary and partial fashion, why I have chosen to examine the writings 
of Eckhart, Tauler and Ruusbroec in conjunction with Heidegger's thought, 
the choice to compare Heidegger's works with. Bonaventure's Itinerarium 
Mentis in Deum requires some further comment. After all, Bonaventure 
stands squarely within the metaphysical tradition, and his writings seem to 
contain many of the elements to which Heidegger specifically objects when 
he speaks critically of the God of metaphysics, and of metaphysics in 
general. But because Bonaventure's form of metaphysics is simulataneously 
a mystical theology, because, that is, his metaphysical expressions are 
grounded in a type of experience and are not merely a function of 
speculative reason, many of Heidegger's criticisms, I will argue, are not 
entirely valid against his thought. This suggests that Heidegger's 
critique of metaphysics does not cover the whole of what may fall under 
this term, that all metaphysics is not what Heidegger claims it must be. I 
am, in fact, using Bonaventure's writings partly to criticise some of 
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Heidegger's sweeping generalisations about metaphysics and about the form 
of theology associated with it, and to suggest that there is room for more 
than one interpretation of metaphysical formulations, perhaps because these 
are themselves ambiguous and prone to a certain kind of deterioration. 
That is not the only point of the comparisons between Bonaventure 
and Heidegger, though. I also want to set up a dialogue between 
Heidegger's thought atV Bonaventure's form of metaphysics to demonstrate 
that there is a sense in which Heidegger can himself be termed a 
metaphysician. Finally, I will* be using this dialogue to explore 
possibilities of metaphysics for the future, including ways in which it can 
be transformed and revised. Bonaventure's Itinerarium, because it 
addresses, in a concise and comprehensive manner, a large number of the 
key themes within medieval theology, is an ideal text for these several 
purposes. 
The study Is divided into three sections, each consisting of two 
chapters. These three sections examine three ways in which the 
understanding could be said to transcend both the empirical and the 
rational, where the category of the empirical covers sense-perception, and 
. the category of the rational covers the extension of this perception 
through deduction and inference. This transcendent understanding, and I 
maintain that it is a form of understanding and not some kind of 'feeling', 
may be termed 'mystical'. Corresponding to, these three forms of 
transcendent understanding are three forms in which the transcendent 
object, the noema of this form of noesis, manifests itself. The three 
sections of this study explore the manifestation of this transcendent 
noema with respect to: 1) the things that constitute nature and world, 
2) the faculties, capabilities and potentialities of the mind and the self, 
and 3) a priori categories or transcendentals, the 'names of God', such as 
goodness and being, and beyond all concepts and categories in the 'divine 
darkness', the abyss. 
This structure follows the three stages of contemplation in the 
Itinerarium, and the first chapter of each section (chapters 1,3,5) 
examines the chapters of the Itinerarium dealing with a particular stage 
of ascent, and then compares these with relevant themes in Heidegger's 
writings. The tripartite division in the Itinererium is a recurrent one in 
medieval mystical and theological writings, and is based primarily on a 
threefold distinction between the objects with which the human mind 
concerns itself. It is drawn by Richard of St. Victor. (d. 1173), among 
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others, in a passage in the Benjamin Minor where he speaks of three 'days' 
of knowledge. The first 'day' or type of knowledge is one where the mind 
is directed towards physical objects, so that its intention or focus is 
'outside' of itself. The second type of knowledge is reflexive; here, the 
mind's object is itself, and its attention is focussed 'within'. In the 
third type, the mind reaches beyond itself towards 'divine things', towards 
that which transcends it. ý 
Knowledge of God is not, however, confined to the last stage for 
Richard, as God is revealed to the mind in all three of the 'days'. The 
epistemological hierarchy expounded throughout the Benjamin Major and 
Benjamin Minor is not concerned with distinguishing between profane and 
sacred knowledge but with describing the orders of the latter, the degrees 
or steps in the mind's apprehension of divinity. The Itinerarium Mentis in 
Deum, Bonaventure's best-known work, takes up the same theme, and is 
strongly influenced by Richard of St. Victor. Bonaventure also describes a 
threefold path, divided on the basis of the objects of cognition, through 
which the mind ascends to God. The objects of knowledge, as with Richard 
of St. Victor, are divided into the material, the mental, and the divine, 
and there is a mode of knowledge corresponding to each. 
The ultimate object of knowledge with which Richard and Bonaventure 
are concerned, however, is only one - God. The three types of knowledge 
are actually only three ways of apprehending God: through the external 
world, through the mind, and above the mind. The mode of cognition is 
also ultimately only one. Since it is possible to know or to think about 
physical things, mental things, and even transcendent things without 
encountering God in the way Richard and Bonaventure describe, the three 
types of knowledge must have something in common to distinguish them as a 
whole from other cognitive modes. They can all be placed under the 
general title of 'contemplation'. Contemplatio, Richard says in the 
Benjamin Minor, est libera mentis perspicacia in sapientiae spectacula cum 
admiratione suspense ('the free, more penetrating gaze of a mind suspended 
with wonder concerning manifestations of wisdom']. ' It differs from other 
ways of knowing, like imagination, rational thought and meditation, because 
it is unified (sub uno visionis radio ad innumera se diffundit ('diffuses 
itself to innumerable things under one ray of vision']), 4 non-discursive 
(suspensa), and accompanied by a sense of the miraculous, a sense of 
admiratione. Proprium itaque est contemplations jucunditatis suae 
spectaculo cum admiratione inhaerere ('It is the property of contemplation 
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to cling with wonder to the manifestation of its joy']; ' in contemplation, 
the mind is semper ex admirationis magnitudine juxte aliquid suspendatur 
('always suspended near something because of greatness of wonder']. ' 
While God can be encountered at various stages, then, the state of 
the one who encounters remains in a certain way the same. And when the 
mind turns to contemplate the three objects apprehended in the three 'days' 
of knowledge, it discovers three aspects of one God. It finds an 
immanent God (discovered through the contemplation of nature), an 
indwelling God (discovered through the contemplation of the soul or mind), 
and a transcendent God (discovered through the contemplation of that which 
surpasses the mind). Just as these three 'gods' are in truth only three 
aspects of one God, so there is a unity behind the three ways of 
discovering them, a state that remains substantially identical through 
these three modes. 
The second chapter in each of the three sections comprising this 
study compares Heidegger's thought with elements in the works of Eckhart 
(chapter 2), Tauler (chapter 4) and Ruusbroec (chapter 6). Unlike the 
chapters dealing with the Itinerarlum, these do not address a particular 
stage of contemplation, but, focussing on the aspect of the divine under 
consideration in the section, take up a number of issues related to it. 
These chapters range across a wide spectrum of themes, stressing the 
interrelatedness of the various topics raised in this study. 
The comparisons with Heidegger proceed through an examination of 
passages in Heidegger's writings which address themes parallel to the ones 
taken up in the analysis of each medieval figure. The choice of texts 
from the Heideggerian corpus is simply determined by this, and does not 
follow the chronological order of his works. The zigzag pattern thereby 
formed with respect to chronological order has the added advantage of 
helping to illuminate the precise nature of the continuity between the 
early and the late works, a continuity relevant to my discussion in a way 
that will become clear during its course. 
Since each individual section begins with a few pages introducing its 
own contents and themes, there is no need to go into any further detail 
about these at this point. I should, however, mention one general feature 
of my approach. To put it simply, this approach does not move within the 
context of faith, if faith means adherence to a set of propositions or 
articles constituting a particular creed. This affects not only the manner 
in which the discussion proceeds, but also the selection of areas taken up 
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for discussion. With respect to medieval texts, I will not be examining 
those components which are strictly theological, in the narrow sense of 
being tied down to the specificity of a certain creed' in such a way that 
they cannot be legitimately thought about or spoken of in a language that 
does not presuppose adherence to that creed. 
I mention this especially because I do not want to give the 
impression of attempting to diminish the importance of these theological 
elements in the thought of Bonaventure, Eckhart, Tauler and Ruusbroec. 
Their exclusion is simply a function of the demands of my own project. I 
am not attempting to give a complete and wholly representative account of 
these figures, but only to appropriate those elements in their thought 
which show themselves as relevant in light of the aims of this study. 
This does not make the discussion quite as exclusive 'as one may at first 
think. A distinction must be drawn here between theology simply as logos 
of theos, as discourse about God, and theology as the clarification and 
sytematisation of specifically Christian existence. The latter conforms to 
Heidegger's express view of the nature of theology, ' and it defines what I 
am not doing. The former, on the other hand, is an appropriate description 
of the following discussion, and it does not exclude reflection on, for 
instance, the nature of the Trinity or the meaning of Christ. These, it 
could be objected, are specifically Christian ideas. That is of course 
true, but insofar as these ideas, and others, may. be analysed outside the 
context of faith, in the specific sense stated above, they are not being 
discussed in a manner that is theological according to the narrow 
definition. 
On the basis of these remarks, one might conclude that I intend only 
to look at the 'philosophical' elements in these medieval writings. That is 
not incorrect, as long as 'philosophical' does not simply equal 'rational', 
in that sense which extends mainly to deduction and inference according to 
the rules of logic. In this context, a distinction is sometimes drawn 
between natural and revealed theology where natural theology is really 
philosophical, i. e. rational, discourse about God. This study does not 
confine itself to that form of discourse. But it does not therefore belong 
to revealed theology, since that term is generally reserved for the 
discipline dealing with the particular revelations, set down in Scripture, 
that come to constitute the body of Christian belief. 
I would prefer to employ a different distinction, one drawn by Max 
Scheler in On the Eternal in Man. e Scheler points out in this work that 
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rational metaphysics must be distinguished from natural religion, and 
natural religion involves a natural immediate knowledge of God or the 
divine (pp. 131,141-2). This may seem to be a contradiction in terms, but 
Scheler only means by it an experience or intuition of God through a 
religious apprehension, as opposed to an inference to God on the basis of 
evidence which is not itself religious, not the intentional object of what 
Scheler calls a 'religious act'. As an example elucidating this distinction, 
he contrasts the process whereby one reaches the conclusion that there is 
an absolutely and infinitely rational being by inference from the nature of 
reason and of the world with 'the experience of infinite reason as it 
pours its light into finite reason and shines forth out of created things'. 
Augustine's notion of understanding all things in lumine Dei, for instance, 
expresses this sense of divinity, and is not the product of a metaphysical 
inference (pp. 167-8). 
This study is intended as a contribution to natural theology 
understood not as rational metaphysics but as the theology arising from 
natural religion as Scheler understands it. In fact, the revised 
understanding of metaphysics which I want to suggest is in part associated 
with the fact that certain forms of metaphysics are actually rooted in 
this kind of religion. Perhaps that is the same as saying that these 
forms of metaphysics are based on mystical experience. Indeed, Gregory 
Vlastos has made precisely this point about Plato's metaphysics, 9 and it is 
no coincidence that the unique quality of the strand of theology I am 
examining here -a strand which includes Augustine as perhaps its most 
eminent figure - owes so much to Neoplatonism. 
I 
John D. Caputo, in The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, says 
that the relationship between Meister Eckhart and Heidegger involves 'a 
similarity of structures, not of content'. ' ° He argues that 'the Sache in 
Heidegger and in Eckhart differ greatly', but 'the relationships that each 
thinker sees within his own concern are interestingly akin'. He is 
therefore not positing an essential identity in which both thinkers have in 
mind the same referent, the same Sache, but an 'analogy of proportionality', 
in which 'the relationship, the dialectic, the interchange, between God and 
the soul-in Meister Eckhart is similar to the relationship between Being 
and Dasein in Heidegger', but 'the terms of the relation - Being and God, 
Dasein and the soul' are themselves not related (pp. 143-5). I intend, on 
the other hand, to explore the relation between Heidegger's Sein and the 
/r 
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God of medieval mystical theology. This assumes, against Caputo, that 
there actually is a relation between the content or referent, the Sache, of 
these terms, not that what Is being said (das Geredete) is identical, but 
that what is being talked about (das Beredete) is in some sense the same 
(see SZ, 161-2). 
Some of Heidegger's own remarks would seem to settle the question of 
any relation between being and God in a definite way. In the Beiträge zur 
Philosophie, for instance, he says: 
Denn niemals ist das Seyn eine Bestimmung des Gottes 
selbst, sondern das Seyn ist Jenes, was die ötterung des Gottes braucht, um doch and vollends davon unterschieden 
zu bleiben. Weder ist das Sein (wie die Seiendheit der 
Metaphysik) die höchste and reinste Bestimmung des OEtov 
and Deus and des »Absoluten«, noch ist es, was zu dieser Auslegung gehört -das gemeinste and leerste Dach für jegliches, was nicht nichts »ist«. 
[For being is never a determination of God himself, but is 
that which the divinization of God needs, to remain yet 
completely distinct from being. Being is neither (like the 
beingness of metaphysics) the highest and purest 
determination of theion and Deus and the 'Absolute', nor is 
it -a notion which goes with this interpretation - the 
most general and emptiest covering term for everything 
that is not nothing. ] (B, 240) 
For the Heidegger of the Beiträge, being (Seyn) is the event of 
appropriation (Er-eignis), and this event is the source of God and gods. 
In that case, it is distinct from the 'beingness' which, according to 
Heidegger, is essential to the notion of being (e. g. lpsum esse) as a name 
of God. Being is rather what makes such a determination possible, the 
event that grants or sends the understanding of being. 
In truth, however, the question cannot be decided as easily as that. 
For one thing, the relation between being qua event and being qua 
beingness (where the former is supposed to give rise to the latter) must 
be clarified, and the issue of this relation is complicated by the fact 
that what Heidegger here calls Seiendheit he elsewhere calls Sein and 
takes as primordial. Once the meaning of these two notions of being, and 
the relation between them, has been clarified as far as possible, it must 
then be determined where the so-called 'metaphysical' notion of being 
stands in relation to them. Heidegger's own appraisal, which is itself not 
immediately perspicuous, cannot just be assumed, but must be tested. This 
testing must take into account whatever complexities, ambiguities and 
obscurities lie in the metaphysical conception, as well as the fact that, in 
the case of someone like Bonaventure or Eckhart, for instance, metaphysics 
and mysticism are bound together in such a way that 'seeing' what being 
itself means and entails is not simply a matter of forming the appropriate 
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concept. 
In the end, the question is best decided through analyses of 
Heidegger's various reflections on being in comparison with what has been 
said about God, and not through prior assumptions about the meaning and 
relation of being and God, even assumptions based on Heidegger's own 
claims, since these themselves require critical analysis. After all, 
Heidegger himself says that what God is to mean can only be decided from 
the meaning of being (Hb, 102/230). For Heidegger, 'God' is rooted in the 
understanding of being as the overpowering, the holy. In that case, to 
determine what God means, it is necessary to determine in what sense being 
'is' the overpowering and the holy, in what way this idea of being belongs 
to the understanding of being (see MAL 211, n. 3/165, n. 9). God, for 
Heidegger, is not the holy and is not being, but is an entity arising from, 
and beckoning towards, being as the holy. The gods are then the 
messengers of divinity, the beckoning messengers of the Godhead (Gottheit) 
(VA II, 24/150). 
But Heidegger's remarks on this issue are actually prescriptive 
rather than descriptive. As such, they are open to question. It is not at 
all clear that what Heidegger calls 'God' or 'gods' on the various occasions 
that he engages in God-talk is: a) what 'God' has always and everywhere 
meant in the Western tradition and b) all that 'God' may mean so as to 
determine necessarily what God is to mean in future, i. e. what is to be 
called God. The relation between what God is to mean and what God has 
meant is not a simple one. It may be, for instance, that some one item in 
the essence of God so far, in what God has meant to date, is so essential 
that it must be preserved through all conceptions and findings. This 
might require that many of the other attributes of God that have been 
taken to be essential be sacrificed, made accidental, for its sake. To give 
a simple example, it could be that the attribute of absolute priority or 
ultimacy, is so essential to the definition of God that if Heidegger's 
analysis of Sein as Ereignis convincingly presents an ultimate which in 
other respects does not look much like the traditional Western conception 
of God, that ultimate is nonetheless what is properly called 'God', and not 
the 'God' or 'gods' that Heidegger names. A decision must be made here 
about what is essential and what is accidental to God. The decision in 
this case might involve asking whether it is essential that God be 
ultimate or whether it is essential that God be an entity, if, that is, 
Heidegger's analysis convincingly demonstrates that the ultimate is not an 
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entity. 
Deciding whether or not Heidegger's analysis is to be deemed 
'atheistic' requires an elaboration based on such considerations. If it is 
decided that God has to be an entity and that belief in the existence of 
God is necessarily a belief in the existence of an all-powerful and 
ultimate entity, then the question of whether or not Heidegger's thought is 
atheistic will revolve around a number of further possible questions, where 
these will have to make further decisions about what God may and may not 
mean. If, in the question about belief in the existence of God, it is 
necessary that God be an all-powerful ultimate entity, and that God be 
single, the question will be: Is that which is ultimate and single for 
Heidegger, namely, being or the event, an existent entity? If God need 
not be single, and if believing in the existence of God can mean believing 
in the existence of gods, then the question might be: Can the 'gods' which 
the event sends be said to 'exist', and in what way? This means asking, is 
the way in which these gods are, and it is clear that they in some sense 
are, sufficient for asserting 'belief in the existence of'? In case both 
of these questions are answered in the negative, which I believe they must 
be, unless the terms 'existence' and 'entity' are being used in a highly 
extraordinary way, then the conclusion that Heidegger's thought is 
atheistic follows if and only if it is decided that 'atheism' is equivalent 
to 'not believing in the existence of an ultimate entity called God' so 
that a sense of the holy as the overpowering which does not lead to belief 
in the existence of an all-powerful entity in any ordinary sense amounts 
to atheism. 
The issue about 'belief in', then, demands some decisions about how 
far the term God can be stretched. When does God cease to be God? When 
may what is 'believed in', what is asserted as being in some sense true, no 
longer appropriately be called God? Being or the event are ultimate, but 
they are not entities, although they are not simply nothing, either. They 
cannot be said to be in any univocal sense of 'being'. For Heidegger, in 
fact, it cannot be appropriately said that they 'are' at all. Clearly, this 
in itself cannot decide the question about whether what Heidegger takes as 
ultimate can or cannot be called God, since the claim has been made within 
the Christian theological tradition that being cannot be applied univocally 
to finite entities and to God (e. g. Aquinas), and even that it cannot be 
properly applied to God at all (e. g. Eckhart), None of the traditional 
attributes of God apply in any ordinary sense to what Heidegger takes as 
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ultimate, but, again, that can be said of. a good deal of Christian theology 
as well. On the other hand, most voices within the Christian theological 
tradition would want to maintain that these attributes do apply in some 
remote sense, that the entity usually called God, whose properties can be 
listed, is not a completely fictional fabrication, but in some way points to 
or indicates the 'true' God, But that can also be said of Heidegger's gods 
as the beckoning messengers of divinity. Those gods could then be taken 
as finite entitative representatives of the one true 'God', the God that is 
not an entity, and is not representable an sich. They can be taken as 
mediations, both true and untrue, just as, within the theological tradition, 
every conception of God has to be seen as a mediation, as partially true 
and partially false. 
I am not claiming at this point that they should be so taken. It is 
the purpose of this study to shed light on these issues, and to reach some 
conclusions. Moreover, whatever may be the similarities between 
Heidegger's conception of being and the theological conception of God, the 
mere fact that Christian theology speaks of various conceptions and 
manifestations of a single God, while Heidegger speaks of gods that beckon 
to an 'Es' which he does not want to call God is significant. Even if 
Heidegger's decisions on this point often have more to do with the status 
of the term 'God' in the present age than with a real difference of 
content (which, once again, can only be decided through an analysis of 
content), the difference in stance is an important one. 
For Heidegger, this difference in stance is the essential difference 
between faith and philosophy. Philosophy is essential questioning. It 
asks, for example, 'Why is there something rather than nothing? ', a question 
that, from the standpoint of faith, is foolishness (EM, 8-9/6-7). 
Philosophy has no business meddling in faith (see Hw, 255/105), and 
because theology, as the begriffliche Interpretation der christlichen 
Existenz ('conceptual interpretation of Christian existence'J (W, 57/13) is 
the science of faith, it needs philosophy only to clarify the pre-Christian 
content of its basic concepts (W, 61ff. /17ff. ), and does not need any help 
from metaphysics. Like Heidegger's claims about God, however, these 
claims about the nature and task of theology are prescriptive rather than 
descriptive, and open to objection. In the use of Heidegger for philosophy 
of religion, there has been a tendency among some scholars to treat these 
and similar utterances as gospel, But, assuming that Martin Heidegger is 
not the son of God, one is surely not compelled to accept everything he 
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says on such issues as beyond question. 
The same point can be made with respect to the 'God of philosophy'. 
Heidegger most emphatically objects to this God, but, while there is a good 
deal of truth in his objections, they are not valid in an absolute and 
unqualified fashion. For instance, when Heidegger says that Causa sui is 
the just and appropriate name for this God (ID, 70/65) and intends this as 
a pejorative statement indicating, in the end, the godlessness of such a 
God, he articulates an old and to some extent valid opposition between the 
seemingly lifeless God of philosophy and the living God of faith. But the 
God of philosophy is not simply and always an empty logical construction. 
For instance, the notion of God as a first cause goes back to Aristotle, 
and here is how Abraham Edel describes this God: 
Pure, necessary full actual, eternal, unchanging, living, 
self-conscious thought embracin within itself the vibrant 
essence of the world, the ultimate source of physical 
movement and biological growth, the light that quickens 
human thought, the good that alone can order the whole and 
give eternal structure to things and processes - such is Aristotle's God. ' 
Although this conception of God has nothing to do with faith, it is not 
therefore necessarily divorced from all that may be called religion. 
Again, it is helpful to add Scheler's distinction between natural and 
revealed religion to the common distinction between rational theology and 
faith. Just as revealed theology is the conceptual clarification of faith, 
so natural theology can be the conceptual clarification of natural 
religion, the conceptualisation, that is, of a God whose presence and 
activity are very much manifest in the world. 
Curiously, while in his later works Heidegger repeatedly speaks 
against any contribution of metaphysics to the question of God and the 
theology of faith, he asks in 1928: 
Ob aber nicht der vermeintliche 6ntische Glaube an Gott im 
Grunde Gottlosigkeit ist. Und der echte Metaphysiker 
religiöser ist denn die üblichen Gläubigen Angehörigen 
einer )Kirche( oder gar die )Theologen( jeder 
1onfession? 
[But might not the presumably ontic faith in God be at 
bottom godlessness? And might the genuine metaphysician 
be more religious than the usual faithful, than the 
members of a 'church' or even than the 'theologians' of 
every confession? 7 (MAL, 211, n. 3/165, n. 9) 
The Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Logik, the work from which this 
passage is taken, was composed before Heidegger's disavowal of 
metaphysics, and in it he still speaks of 'the metaphysical essence of 
Dasein' (MAL, 197/155). This at least suggests an ambiguity in Heidegger's 
thought on the issue of metaphysics, an ambiguity which, I believe, 
remained present throughout his writings. 
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If it is argued that Heidegger has simply changed his mind with 
respect to the relation between God and metaphysics, in accord with his 
changed relation to metaphysics in general, one still needs to ask in what 
way he has changed his mind. This raises the question about the nature of 
the 'turning' between early and late Heidegger, a question I will address 
repeatedly in the following pages. As a preliminary remark, I would 
suggest that instead of taking all of Heidegger's pronouncements about 
being, God, and metaphysics at face value, one might question the extent to 
which what Heidegger chooses to say involves a decision about what it is 
advisable or inadvisable to say, given the historical moment. This 
decision is not just a matter of 'covering up' something, of choosing 
obscurity for practical reasons, for instance, out of fear of being 
misunderstood, but of what it is right or wrong to say, given the 
historically determined sense of the terms one employs. If, for example, 
Heidegger did say that 'being' could be understood as 'God', the question of 
what this would mean cannot be dissociated from the question of how it 
would be heard. If how such a statement is likely to be understood 
determines what it presently means, the statement is no doubt simply 
wrong. But that does not entail the conclusion that what Heidegger means 
by 'being' could not possibly be the same as what someone once meant by 
'God'. Given how 'God' is today likely to be understood, being is not God, 
but in that case what Eckhart calls God is not. 'God' either. In truth, 
what Eckhart calls God is not, in any age including his own, what the term 
readily means, how it is easily and immediately understood. His God is, 
after all, a dark saying, heard with much difficulty and struggle. Eckhart 
does still speak of God, but Heidegger may at times mean the same as him, 
while having decided that the historical situation of this term is such 
that it would be better today to remain silent about God as an object of 
thinking (ID, 51/47-8). 
Consequently, while Heidegger explicitly says that being is not God 
(e. g. Hb, 76/210), the sense of this statement is not obvious. The 
statement 'being is God' is, after all, itself ambiguous. It can mean: 
what is called God, is being, where the meaning of God is taken as primary. 
Or the statement can mean: what Is called being, is God. 12 In that case, 
the search for the meaning of being would also be the search for the 
meaning of God. This search would then not begin with a determinate 
sense of God, but would end by saying, 'and this we call God'. Heidegger 
rejects this possibility, but In so doing he makes a certain decision about 
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the meaning of God, or perhaps a tactical decision about what it is wise 
to say at this time, or both. And it is possible to disagree with him. 
The questions raised here are not just questions about how to 
interpret Heidegger, but impinge on the relation between Heidegger's 
analysis and the question of God in general. Heidegger's thought can be 
used to address that question in more than one way. In 'Topologie de 
1'etre et topographie de Is revelation', J. S. 0' Leary objects to what he 
feels is a misappropriation of Heidegger by, among others, Karl Rahner, 
Bernhard Welte, Heinrich Ott and* John Macquarrie. 13 In his view, this 
misappropriation arises from 'the temptation to establish a rapport 
between the Heideggerian being and God'. Macquarrie, he notes in 
astonishment, 'with great goodwill but without any scruple of fidelity to 
Heidegger's questions, goes so far as to present the divine Trinity as 
three modes of the presence of being! ' (p. 196) For 0' Leary, on the other 
hand, fidelity to both Heidegger and to the questions of theology requires 
that the distance between the message of Scripture and the message of 
Heidegger be recognized, that before making use of Heidegger's notion of 
Ereignis, for instance, it be noted that 'one may read the whole Bible 
without hearing the slightest murmur of Ereignis' (p. 201). 
These criticisms rest on an acceptance of Heidegger's own 
prescriptions about the nature and task of theology, as well as his 
judgements about metaphysics. Much of Western theology, on the other 
hand, has not been narrowly tied to what is contained in Scripture, but has 
involved an ongoing discourse about what God may mean, and what the 
nature of God may be. That discourse has traditionally incorporated 
philosophy and metaphysics. Heidegger rejects this incorporation, but, once 
again, the judgements on which his rejection is based are worth 
questioning. As Heidegger himself says, Einen Denker achten wir nur, indem 
wir denken ('We show respect for a thinker only when we think'], and 
thinking is not served by mere assent (-Iw, 250/99). 
One reason why Heidegger's judgements about metaphysics are worth 
questioning is that the kind of story he wants to tell about the history 
of Western philosophy decides which threads are drawn into the weave of 
his narrative, and which are not. Every story is necessarily exclusive, and 
Heidegger's story, the story of Western philosophy as the history of the 
forgetting of being, is no exception. It is guided from the beginning and 
throughout by the end it attempts to reach, and that means by the effort 
to explain how the predominant movement of Western metaphysics culminates 
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in the modern age, the age dominated and essentially determined by 
technology. This does not mean that the history constructed, or 
reconstructed, within Heidegger's account is 'wrong' or 'slanted' because he 
has a particular end in view. The end is a real end and the story may be 
a true one. But the end he has in view determines what Heidegger wants 
to explain, and what he wants to explain determines which of the multiple 
meanings of philosophical texts he chooses to highlight. There is room 
for alternative readings of these texts, with different points of emphasis. 
Moreover, while Heidegger'e interpretations may genuinely serve to indicate 
the dominant features of the philosophical tradition, those features, that 
is, which come to predominate so as to end in the present situation, there 
may be other interpretations which, rather than explaining how we got to 
where we are, suggest possibilities for where else we might be, or, which 
comes to the same thing, where we might go from here. 
To be sure, Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysics, and 
particularly his attempts to reinterpret early Greek thought, are also 
intended to suggest alternatives for thinking. These proceed, however, 
within the context of what he sees as the history of the forgetting of 
being, where the retrieval of early Greek thought is meant to contribute 
to the preparation for the'reversal of this forgetting. One needs to ask 
here what kind of recovery or retrieval reflection on the historical 
beginning actually. effects, where this is necessarily linked to the 
question of what kind of covering up, what kind of forgetting, the 
subsequent tradition involves or may involve. To what extent, and in what 
way are the characteristics of being, originally uncovered and maintained 
in that uncoveredness (cf. SZ on truth, e. g. 218,224) in the sayings of 
the early Greeks, 'lost' and 'forgotten' in what is said later? Is it 
necessarily the case that later formulations cover up what was originally 
uncovered in their sources, that they block access to what was talked 
about, what was held in view or gemeint in the original sayings of the 
Greeks? What does this talk of covering up and blocking access mean? 
Insofar as it means something like concealing, it may simply suggest, 
in accordance with Heideggers analysis of ambiguity as a characteristic of 
falling in Sein and Zeit (637), that what is said later tends to lose 
relation to the original, the real, phenomena, that the later talk tends to 
become uprooted, no longer rooted in the phenomenal basis from which it 
must derive the only genuine meaning that it has. In that case, it may be 
that the earliest language, being closest to the ground, as it were, is 
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less likely to cover up that phenomenal basis, more likely to provide 
original access to it because more likely to be genuinely rooted in it. In 
the later developments which have their source qua historical origin in 
early Greek thought, on the other hand, what was thought there - what was 
gemeint - may be forgotten. The original sayings, passed along as 
currency, may fall. They may become ambiguous in that, in the the way 
they are picked up, transformed, translated, interpreted and passed along, 
what was said in them, what they intended to uncover, may no longer be 
seen or heard. The concealing that thereby occurs would then involve a 
loss of meaning consisting in the degeneration of a genuine thought into 
the emptiness of a mere concept, -a concept that no longer refers to 
anything 'true', anything that may be truly uncovered. The attempt to 
return to early Greek thought would then not be a matter of 'nostalgia', ' ° 
but of trying to recover the genuine meaning of terms with respect to 
their roots in the phenomena. 
But this would not mean that no thinker after the early Greeks could 
possibly see what they saw in what they said about being, or mean what 
they meant. What is originally uncovered has its roots in what can show 
itself, the phenomenon. It therefore refers to, means, what can really be 
seen, while what is meant by a mere concept can in no case really be seen. 
It could be that, in every formulation and reformulation of what the 
Greeks said about being, access to the phenomenon, to what is originally 
uncovered and meant, is preserved in such a way that what is being pointed 
out may be seen, or not. This would be tantamount to saying that the 
original meaning may be authentically appropriated, or not. A thinker may 
then genuinely discover what the terms 'originally' intend, or may fail to 
do so, where 'originally' means not only first in historical order, but also 
first in the sense of phenomenally basic. Moreover, what is uncovered 
originally, e. g. being, may in truth be everywhere the same. If so, it can 
be said that the recovery of the beginning may be, in truth, a recovery of 
what is everywhere the same, of what is in truth always the same. It may 
then be a recovery of what someone may always uncover and discover, at 
all times and in all situations. The history of being, in that case, might 
not be best described as a history of the forgetting of being. Rather, it 
could be that being is, in many ages and with many genuine thinkers, 
constantly open to being both remembered and forgotten. It may be that 
what is spoken about being always involves a hard saying, something it is 
always hard to hear and to keep in view, hard even for. the early Greeks, 
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and perhaps no less hard for them than for later thinkers. 
If one then asks, for example, does Bonaventure, or Eckhart or 
Aquinas, 'hear' or 'see' what being itself means, and in the way that 
Heidegger does through his dialogue with early Greek thought, the answer 
cannot be 'no' just because they belong to the supposed history of the 
forgetting of being. It could be that what comes to light in the dialogue 
between Heidegger and, for instance, Anaximander, helps to illuminate what 
these later thinkers actually mean, or what they may glimpse on occasion, 
where the early Greeks may only have glimpsed this on occasion, too. One 
question about them might take the form, do they 'hear' that of which they 
speak, do they know what they are talking about, or are they just 
employing an empty concept devoid of any genuine meaning? In the case of 
sayings having to do with something that is not an object within the 
world, this question must involve the issue of insight into what must 
remain, for all reason, mysterious, the Issue,. that is, of 'mystical' (in a 
broad sense) intuition. It is true that, to be posited as existing, what 
is thus posited must be given to experience; it must be in some way 
intuited. It is also true that, to be intuited as an object, what is 
intuited must lie within the world. But all that comes to presence may 
not be an object, and all intuition may not involve intuition of what can 
be represented as an object within the world. The formation, and therefore 
the reference, of a. term which does not refer to-anything within the world 
can take a variety of forms. What Kant fails to see is that the very some 
notion may be an empty concept, or an attempt to capture, in a limited way 
and in the language of metaphysics, what is given in an experience that 
transcends the world as a spatio-temporal continuum, an intuition to which, 
ultimately, no categories apply. 
I will return to these issues many times in the following pages. The 
above comments are only meant to anticipate, in a general way, some of the 
basic objections that might be raised against the approaches adopted here. 
As a final word, I should point out that the task this study has set 
for itself, the task of exploring possibilities of 'God', guides its 
appropriation of Heideggerian texts as much as of medieval ones. Thus, I 
do not intend to give a complete and wholly representative account of the 
former any more than of the latter. Such a claim must never, however, 
become an excuse for misrepresentation, and I hope that, in my necessarily 
exclusive analysis of these texts, I have nonetheless remained true to 
both their letter and their spirit. 
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SECTION I 
THE IMMANENT GOD 
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The first chapter in this section compares the first two chapters of 
St. Bonaventure's Itinerarium Mentis in Deum with Heidegger's 
deconstructive analyses of early Greek thought, i. e. of the so-called - and, 
according to Heidegger, miscalled - 'pre-Socratics'. In this comparison, 
Heidegger's analyses will, to some extent, be used to deconstruct 
Bonaventure's metaphysical formulations so as to uncover what is most 
basic to them. However, I hope also to show that Bonaventure's 
metaphysical theology is rooted in an experience of being which, while it 
does stand worlds apart from the' experience of the early Greek thinkers, 
nonetheless still exhibits some similarities to it. In demonstrating this, 
I will suggest as well that many of Heidegger's criticisms of the God of 
metaphysics, and therefore of philosophical theology, are not entirely valid 
when directed at a mystical theologian like Bonaventure. 
The second chapter compares Meister Eckhart and Heidegger. It 
demonstrates the ways in which Heidegger appropriates and transforms some 
key metaphysical concepts through a dialogue with Eckhart's thought. 
Among other issues, this chapter will deal with traditional scholastic 
transcendentals such as being, truth, goodness and unity. While the 
concepts of being and goodness will also be discussed in Chapter Five, the 
analysis here focusses specifically on how the God named through these 
terms can be conceived as immanent, although this immanence necessarily 
involves an aspect of transcendence as well. Because the presentation of 
Eckhart's thought in these pages, and the comparison of it with Heidegger, 
is meant to lay a foundation for the comparison between Heidegger and 
Tauler in Chapter Four, and between Heidegger and Ruusbroec in Chapter 
Six, the discussion in this chapter is longer and more detailed than in any 
of the others. 
The order of discussion in Chapter One is: 1) an expository account 
of the first two chapters of the Itinerarium, and 2) an account of 
Heidegger's analysis of early Greek thought, incorporating a step by step 
comparison with Bonaventure. I have attempted to keep the exposition of 
Bonaventure as simple as possible, focussing only on those features of his 
thought relevant for the dialogue with Heidegger. I have consequently 
avoided lengthy discussions of, for instance, the complexities of his 
epistemological system, his doctrine of analogy, and so forth. This is 
only possible to a certain extent, however, and some detail on issues not 
strictly relevant for my purposes has been unavoidable in clarifying the 
issues that are relevant. 
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The order of discussion in Chapter Two is similar, with a 
presentation of Eckhart's thought first, and a comparison with Heidegger 
second. Many of the issues introduced here will be taken up from 
different perspectives in Chapters Four and Six, in accord with Tauler's 
and Ruusbroec's incorporation and adaptation of Eckhartian themes in their 
own writings. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BONAVENTURE'S PRESENT DIVINITY 
AND THE BEING OF EARLY GREEK THOUGHT 
1. Bonaventure on the God Known In and Through Creatures. 
The first two chapters of the Itinerarium Mentis in Deum seek to 
demonstrate the ways in which the mind is capable of grasping God in and 
through the things of the material, or 'sensible', world. Seeing God by 
means of this world constitutes, for Bonaventure, the first step in the 
mind's journey to God. ' It is the first rung of the spiritual ladder by 
which the mind ascends into God (It. 1.9,299/63). The mind does not grasp 
God in creatures of necessity. Rather, the ladder presents an invitation, 
and the soul has the power to accept this invitation, to ascend the ladder 
by presenting the world to itself in a certain way; namely, as a mirror 
reflecting God, in which God is visible. Thus, the world is itself not 
necessarily, but only potentially, a mirror of God, where the potentiality 
of the world to appear in this way corresponds to the potentiality of the 
soul to present it to itself as such, to see it in a particular light. 
Whether or not the world manifests God in its appearance, therefore, rests, 
in some sense, upon a decision on the part of the soul. 
The decision to ascend (ascenders) the ladder is the decision to 
cross over (transire) to God, to make the passage from created things to 
creator. In this passage, the soul journeys from one realm into another, 
from the land of bondage in which It is born (Egypt) to the land it 
inherits as a promise, from the world to the Father, from ignorance to 
wisdom (1.9,299/63). 
For Bonaventure, the realm of matter, the 'material world', is the 
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realm of those properties that are said to be apprehended through the 
bodily senses, and the things that belong to this world, physical or 
corporeal entities, are the things whose essential nature or substance is 
defined in terms of these properties. While all that is, excepting only 
God and what pertains to God, is a 'creature', since it stands in relation 
to God as to a maker (where this relation provides the ultimate 
explanation of its being, of both its existence, the fact that it is, and of 
its essence, its being so and so), the name of creature is especially 
applied to the things within this corporeal region of what-is, to 
substances exhibiting sensible properties. 
The exterior senses convey these sensible properties to the 'interior 
senses'. In so doing, they act as messengers announcing the attributes of 
God, for they serve the intellect in the operations whereby it comes to 
know God through creatures. Bonaventure mentions three ways in which 
they perform this function, corresponding to three intellectual processes 
(1.10,299/63-4). First, in 'contemplating intellectually', the intellect 
considers things in themselves (res in se ipsis). It considers, through 
the images communicated to it by the senses, the order and qualities of 
the physical world. From the attributes of the sensible world, Bonaventure 
claims, the intellect can rise up (consurgere) ex vesthri ad intelligendum 
potentiam, sapientiam et bonitatem Creatoris immensam ('as from a vestige . 
.. to knowledge . of the immense power, wisdom and goodness of 
the 
Creator'] (1.11,299-300/64). Without delving too deeply into the precise 
details of Bonaventure's description of the physical world, his basic point 
is that, from the nature of this world, from the order it manifests in its 
internal division, arrangement, and motion, the attributes of its creator, 
which are not the attributes of matter but of mind, are visible to the 
human mind in contemplation. For Bonaventure, the structure of reality 
precisely corresponds to the structure of mans in terms of its powers of 
apprehension and understanding, with physical properties corresponding to 
the bodily senses, and rational order to the intellect. It is in 
comprehending the rational order of things that the 'immense power, wisdom 
and goodness' of the mind which conceives and creates them is evident to 
the mind which apprehends them. 
Second, in 'believing faithfully', the intellect represents another kind 
of order to itself, the order of the universal course of things for the 
believer, the history of all that is, was or will be, as faith understands 
it. It considers the 'supreme principle' of the 
. 
world through a 
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consideration of the origin, process and end (originem decursum et 
terminum) of the world (I. 12,300/64). For faithful belief, the highest 
principle, considered in terms of the origin of the world, is the cause 
which brings all that is, understood collectively as 'creation', that which 
is created by the activity of the first cause understood as creator, into 
being from out of nothing. It is what effects the transition from nothing 
to being, where this transition is conceived as the creative process or act 
of creation. The intellect represents to itself the power of this supreme 
principle, the creator, in considering the power, the capability or 
potentiality (potentia), required to effect such a transition. 
The rectitude of the concept of creation itself, and, consequently, 
the appropriateness of the language of creation for representing what is 
the case with respect to the origin of the world (and it is important to 
keep in mind that this representation; in determining the relation between 
what is and what brings it into being, also determines the fundamental 
nature of what is as a whole), is not, for Bonaventure, a subject for 
question, since it is a matter of faith. It is evident from some of his 
other works, though, that Bonaventure holds that philosophy can trace a 
ratiocinative route to a first cause (Aristotle), to exemplary ideas 
(Plato), and to the location of these ideas in the divine mind 
(Neopletonists). ' Thus, reason unaided by faith can know: 1> that all 
that is, taken together, has a cause or origin, 2) that it is ordered in 
that origin in a 'logical' way, so that its inception is a conception like 
to the formation of ideas in the human mind, which asserts by implication 
that, in its origin, reality has a structure like to the structure of human 
thought and language, and 3) that it is conceived and generated by a mind 
to which the human mind bears a resemblance of analogy. To the notion of 
the Christian creator-God, however, the belief aptata esse saecula Verbo 
vitae, that the ages are prepared and brought forth by the Word of life 
(I. 12,300/64), belongs the idea of creation out of nothing by means of the 
Word, and this must be held by faith. 
In considering, next, the course of history through time, faithful 
belief sees an orderly progress of ages manifesting the providence of the 
same ordering mind that conceives all that will unfold in time at the 
beginning of time. For the Christian faith, the essential nature of this 
unfolding, the way it is to be divided and organised, is no more subject to 
radical question than is the essential nature of the beginning. History, 
for Bonaventure, manifests three ages: nature, scripture and grace. Each 
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has its own law, and each succeeds the other in an orderly, and ascending, 
fashion (I. 12,300/64). 
The logic of this history, the history revealed to Christian faith and 
manifesting the logic of the Christian God in time, culminates and ends in 
the final judgement. Because the world of faith is, in its development 
through time, ordered to this end, the logic of its history is visible only 
by reference to this event at the end of it. Although the full truth of 
this history, the understanding that sees face to face, becomes manifest 
only at its end, with the result that the full meaning of the time of 
faith can be known only at the still awaited end of this time, the basic 
nature of the eschaton, like that of the origin and progress of the world, 
is already revealed to faith. Faith sees the end of the world as just, 
and, in so doing, it sees justice as the ultimate principle according to 
which the structure of the world's temporal progress is determined. The 
justice of the end of the world necessarily manifests the justice of the 
supreme principle commanding the history of the world, but the fact that 
this end is just, so that the world, in the end, is just, is held not by any 
necessity of reason, but by the free decision of faith. 
A necessity of reason is claimed, on the other hand, for 
'investigating by reason', the third intellectual process in which the 
senses assist the understanding to pass over to God from the sensible 
world (1.13,300/64). Here, the intellect, having. seen, on the basis of the 
information conveyed to it by the senses, that the visible world exhibits 
degrees of perfection, moves from this to a being which has the ultimate 
degree of perfection with respect to the various forms of perfection 
apprehended. It thus moves from the world to God by way of gradation. 
Discussing this point, Bonaventure posits a particular hierarchy or chain 
of being, with God at the top. As in any hierarchical ordering, a system 
of valuation is presupposed. For Bonaventure, intelligence, spirituality, 
and incorruptibility have the maximum value, and the degree of perfection 
accorded to an entity is directly proportional to the degree to which it 
possesses these attributes in its mode of existence. Moreover, truth and 
value are directly proportional to one another and truth is equivalent to 
degree of being. Therefore, the highest reality, the mode of existence 
which is most 'true' and has the greatest degree of being, is that which is 
most perfect, where perfection is determined with respect to the 
aforementioned attributes. The true world is thus the realm of 
intelligence, spirit and immutability, realized absolutely in God, and the 
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false world, the world of appearance as opposed to truth, is the realm of 
ignorance, matter and corruptibility. In 'rational investigation', the 
intellect moves from the attributes of the imperfect modes of existence 
possessed by entities in the world of appearance to those of the perfect 
mode of existence possessed by God: Ex his ergo visibilibus consurgit ad 
considerandum Del potentiam, sapientiam et bonitatem Lit entem, viventem et 
intelligentem, mere spiritualem et incorruptibilem et intransmutabilem 
['From these visible things, therefore, one rises to consider the power, 
wisdom and goodness of God as existing, living, intelligent, purely 
spiritual, incorruptible and unchangeable'] (I. 13,300/64-5). 
Bonaventure next expands his consideration of how the attributes of 
God are manifested in the world of creatures by dividing that world into a 
sevenfold 'condition'. This sevenfold condition of creatures, in which they 
are considered with respect to their ro magnitude. multitude. 
pulcritudo. plenitudo. oe io et ordo ['origin, magnitude. multitude, ,, Q 
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beauty, fulness, activity and order'] (1.14,301/65), forms a sevenfold 
testimony to the power, wisdom and goodness of their creator. While such 
a testimony can only be received by the reflective processes of mens, it 
is not, of course, a fabrication of the form of those processes. Within 
this realist epistemology, the seven properties named are not products of 
the way the human subject experiences and organises the world in its own 
perceptions and analyses, but constitute the real state of things which 
mens apprehends. 
Through the full understanding of each of these conditions, mens is 
led, once more, to knowledge of the attributes of the being ultimately 
responsible for the structure of the world in its totality, and therefore 
also for the specific features of that structure. For instance, when 
considering the threefold origin of creatures, their beginning secundum 
creationem, distinction em et ornatum ['creation, distinction and 
embellishment'] (I. 14,301/65), mens passes over to the conception of the 
power of a being capable of producing all out of nothing (cunctis de 
nihilo), the wisdom of the being who divides and arranges this all into the 
great variety of creatures that exist, and the goodness of the being in 
virtue of which these types of creatures are provided with what is 
necessary for them and adorned with what is proper to them. This being is 
represented as the principle which not only created all that is, but which 
continues to create it, in that it continually gives rise to and sustains 
the being of all that remains in being: °It-ls--a immanent principle. In 
I urvtvtHSITY 
OF YORK 
.- 25 l. rtsHAHY 
Augustine's words, ipse Tacit haec ... Non enim fecit atque abiit, sed ex 
111o in 111o sent ['God created all things, not by letting them come about 
and then going on his way, rather he remained in them']. 2 Because of this 
immanence, Bonaventure can say, for example, that the magnitudo of created 
things manifeste indicat immensitatem potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis 
trini Del, qui in cunctis rebus per potentiam. praesentiam et essentiam 
incircum script us existit ['clearly manifests the immensity of the power, 
wisdom and goodness of the triune God, who by his power, presence and 
essence exists uncircumscribed in all things'] (1.14,301/65). 
Chapter Two of the Itinerarium deals mainly with the apprehension of 
this immanent principle, the God who exists within all things. Here, 
Bonaventure turns to the contemplation of God in, rather than through, the 
sensible world, claiming that, 
Sed quoniam circa speculum sensibilium non solum contingit 
contemplari Deum per ipsa tanquam per vestigia, verum 
etiam in ipsis, in quantum eat in eis per essentiam, 
potentiam et praesentiam; et hoc considerare est altius 
quam praecedens. 
[Concerning the mirror of things 
perceived through sensation, 
we can see God 
not only through them as through^his vestiges, 
but also in them 
as he is in them 
by his essence, power and presence. 
This type of consideration is higher than the previous one. ] 
(11.1,303/69) 
The God who resides within the 'sensible mirror' in terms of essentia, 
potentia et praesentia forms the answer to the 'limiting questions13 about 
the. being, the motion, and the presence of the things that constitute the 
world of sense-perception. God is the being of beings, in the sense that 
God is the being from whose infinite being the finite being of all 
creatures is derived, and by which that finite being is sustained. God is 
also the absolute power behind the limited and dependent power of 
creatures, the prime mover originating the motion of beings, and, finally, 
God is the ultimate presence within all present beings. The sensible 
mirror reflects this immanent God insofar as the mirror of mens reflects 
God to itself in reflecting the sensible world. The essence, power, and 
presence of God are always existent in the world of creation, but they 
shine through this world - are truly reflected, manifest, in it - only when 
mens mirrors the world in such a way as to mirror the God within it, which 
means: in such a way as to-discover the world itself as a mirror of God. 
It is, once more, the exterior senses that provide the most basic 
information by means of which the the God within the world is known, since 
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these five senses are the 'doors' through which the sensible world first 
enters the mind (II. 2,304/69). They act as passageways through which 
sensibilia exteriors ('exterior sense objects'] enter the mind non per 
substantias, sed per similitudines suas ('not through their substance, but 
through their likenesses'] (II. 2,305-6/71). Through their mediation, the 
elements that make up the greater world, the macrocosmos, are 
reconstituted within its reflection in the lesser world, the minor mundus, 
of the soul. All sensibilia, and so tutus iste sensibilis mundus ('the 
entire sense world'] enters into- the soul per apprehensionem ('through 
apprehension'] (II. 4,305/71). While apprehension is not itself sense- 
perception, but consists in the activity of the purely interior 
'apprehensive power' (potentia apprehensive), its achievement is dependent 
upon the information supplied to it by the senses. 
If what is encountered by apprehension is 'agreeable' (conveniens), in 
a quite literal sense, to the one who apprehends, the result is pleasure 
and delight. The original cause of this delight, the one simple ratio 
forming the basis of all of its modes, is actually 'proportionality': omnis 
... delectatio est ratione proportionalitatis ['all enjoyment is based on 
proportion'] (11.5,306/71). The reasons for delight can be reduced to 
forms of proportionality, and must be so reduced in providing an adequate 
account of this event if proportionality is its original, its most basic 
and simple, reason.. The abstracted similitude or likeness through which 
the senses take delight in an object possesses (tenet), if it is 'suitable', 
three 'reasons' for delight, and each of these manifests a form of 
proportionality. When the sensible species whose apprehension causes 
delight is considered respectum ad principium, a quo manet ['in relation to 
the principle from which it flows'], proportionality is considered in terms 
of form, et sic dicitur speciositas ['and then it is called beauty'], as in 
sight. When the species is considered with respect to the medium, per 
quod transit ['medium through which it passes'], proportionality is 
understood in terms of power, the intensity of the species in the medium 
in which it is generated, and the consequent degree of force it exerts 
upon the senses; suavitas ['sweetness'], as in smell and hearing, consists 
in the agreeable proportion between the senses, which tristatur in 
extremes at in medics delectatur ['are pained by extremes and delighted in 
the mean'], and the power acting upon them. Finally, when the species is 
considered with respect to the terminum, in quem agit ['term on which it 
acts'], proportionality is regarded with a view to operatio, to efficacy for 
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the receiver. Where the operatio of the agent fills a corresponding need 
on the part of the patient, proportionality is seen in salubritas 
['wholesomeness'], as in taste or touch (II. 5,306-7/71). In this way, just 
as sense-perception apprehends sensibilia exterioria, so that the senses 
are doors through which the sensible properties of external objects pass 
into the soul by means of a generated likeness, so pleasure apprehends 
delectabilia exteriora, and is seen as the means by which the 'delightful' 
properties of objects enter the soul (II. 5,307/71-2). 
After apprehension and pleasure comes judgement (diiudicatio), in 
which one inquires after the reason for pleasure, ' and finds that it lies in 
proportio aequalitatis ['the proportion of harmony'] (11.6,307-8/72). In 
producing an account of pleasure where it is reduced to forms of 
proportionality, Bonaventure has already, according to his own definitions, 
moved out of the region of pleasure and into that of judgement, since he 
has inquired after and given the ratio of delectabilia. This ratio, which 
is the basis of all harmony, is the unified ground of all delectabilia; it 
is the reason-principle lying behind or within the objective properties 
that cause the various forms of delight. It is important to keep in mind 
here the ontological status of this ratio, the object of judgement. A 
reason-principle, a ratio, is, for Bonaventure, a constitutive feature of 
world, and not the construction of a human faculty. It is not a mental 
model bearing some. form of structural or analogical similarity to what is 
the case in the world, but is itself a component in the structure of world, 
not a physical component, of course, since a ratio is not a physical entity, 
but a metaphysical, a 'spiritual', component. 
A ratio is an abstract entity, but, for Bonaventure, this does not 
mean that it is the product of a mental process of abstraction. It is a 
real entity which itself abstracts from the conditions that determine 
particularity and corporeality, viz. time, space, and motion, and the 
activity of the power of judgement does not produce it, but reveals it 
(11.6,306/72). Judgement does purify and abstract, but, in so doing, it 
only uncovers the ratio in its own purity and abstraction, in its 
'spiritual' nature.. 'Spiritual' does not describe an attribute of human 
consciousness in this case, but is a kind of being possessed by certain 
types of entities within the world. It is an aspect of world. 
This aspect of the world leads the mind back, finally, to the 
'rational', the principial, source of the world. To understand the way in 
which this is supposed to occur, it is again necessary to keep in mind the 
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ontological status of the ratio as the real object of the power of 
judgement. Bonaventure claims, basically, that the relationship between the 
power of judgement and its object is like that between the power of 
sense-perception and its object. The processes involved can be clarified 
with the help of a diagram; 
apprehension (corporeal generates image impressed on 
of sense- object -----i in the tedium -----a sense-or an 
object t-------------MN- -----------------------Ithis impression I back to (sensible species) 
knowledge lultimate spiritual--agenerates spiritual-aunited to 
of ratio ob ect (God) image (Word, Son) rational faculty 
-------------- --- ----- ----------------lunited entity I reads back to (ratio) 
The ratio in the mind, united to 'an individual of a rational nature', 
meaning, simply, to that creature whose nature is such as to allow it to 
abstract rationes, i. e. mans, leads back to the object which generates that 
ratio and of which the ratio is an image, in the same way that the 
abstracted sensible species leads back to the physical object which 
generates it and of which it is a representation. Moreover, just as the 
physical object generates its image in a medium, from which it is then 
impressed upon the physical organs of wens, so the ultimate spiritual 
object of mens (God) generates its own image in a spiritual medium (Christ 
as-the Word), through which it is then apprehended by the rational powers 
of wens. The Word, a kind of divine logical space in which the archetypal 
ideas, the rationes, of all things actual and possible are contained, then 
functions as a mediator between wens and the primal mind which generates 
these ideas, just as the image generated in the medium mediates between 
wens and the physical object. God is thus the fontale principium et 
objectum ('fountain source and object'] with respect to ideas (rationes), as 
is the physical object with respect to sense-percepts (sensibilia) (11.7, 
308-9/72-3). 
This way of speaking is somewhat misleading, however, since, for 
wens, rationes, and consequently the God who gives rise to them through 
the mediation of the Word (the God of creation, who is known a posteriori), 
are themselves mediated by sensibilia, since they are abstracted from the 
sensible species. The order of ascent occurring in this process of 
abstraction corresponds to the order of descent in the process of creation, 
God generates the ideas of things in the Word, and these ideas are then 
incarnated in particular creatures; mens climbs up this chain of being from 
particular creatures to their ideas to God. 
Although the rationes of creation, contained in the supreme ratio of 
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the Word, are, in a sense, remote from both the sensibilia and the 
delectabilia of the particular entities that make up the created world, 
they are also intimately conjoined to, and manifested by, these. The 
distance, the space of difference, between the 'uncreated' rationes and 
these 'created' properties must, of course, be understood metaphysically. 
They inhabit different regions of being (where 'being' is, in this case, to 
be understood as a covering word for all that is), regions that are 
brought together and yet held apart in the multi-faceted things of the 
created world, in creetura 
Given this relationship between the ratio and that of which it is the 
ratio, and given that the ratio, as the Word, is consubstantial with God 
and is God, it follows that God is actually the ultimate ratio of creation. 
As such, God is the ratio of the pleasurable properties of creatures, the 
proportion and harmony from which all delight arises and in which it is 
contained (It. II. 8,309/73). From this, according to Bonaventure, manifeste 
videri potest, quod in solo Deo est fontalis et vera delectatio, et quod ad 
ipsam ex omnibus delectationibus manuducimur requirendam ('it is obvious 
that in God alone there is primordial and true delight and that in all of 
our delights we are led to seek this delight'] (11.8,309/73). 
The last two points in Bonaventure's consideration of how God is 
manifested in creatures involve the' immutability and eternity of the 
reason (ratio) by which the mind judges, and the seven different kinds of 
number or harmony (humerus) present at the level of the deep structure of 
things. With respect to the first point, Bonaventure proposes that the 
ratio by which the mind judges, and in which the rules or laws (leges) of 
certain judgement are comprehended, must be unchangeable, unlimited and 
endless, since it abstracts from place, time, and mutability. Because, for 
Bonaventure, the only being of which these attributes can be predicated is 
God, it follows that the ratio according to which judgement proceeds, the 
ratio which allows the mind to abstract the rationes of things, is itself 
God. The laws comprehended in this ratio are located in the mind of God; 
they are non factas, sed increatas, ' aeternaliter existentes in arte aeterna, 
a qua, per quam et secundum quam formantur -formosa omnia ('not made, but 
uncreated, existing eternally in the eternal art, by which, through which 
and according to which all beautiful things are formed'] (II. 9,310/74). 
These laws grant certain truth because they are the laws both according to 
which the mind judges and according to which things are made. 
Bonaventure is not claiming here that either first principles or the 
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ideas of things are innate, but that the knowledge of these, acquired 
through abstraction from the sensible species, proceeds according to 
certain immutable laws. These laws are themselves invisible to judgement. 
They transcend mens, and yet it is only by virtue of their regulative 
force that judgement is capable of understanding, through abstraction, the 
rationes of things. They are the rationes aeternae present to the mind 
which enable it to comprehend the rationes aeternae of the created world. 
This point will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
With respect to the seven types of number, Bonaventure's general 
point is that numerical proportion, the harmony in the various aspects of 
the world, expressible in terms of mathematical relation, is the basic 
feature in the structure of the world: ac per hoc «n umerus est praecipuum 
in animo Conditoris exemplar» et in rebus praecipuum vestigium ducens in 
Sapientiam ['thus "number is the foremost exemplar in the mind of the 
Creator, " and in things, the foremost vestige leading to Wisdom'] (II-10, 
312/75). The remarks about number reinforce and expand the notion that 
the heart of reality consists in and is expressed by proportion, for 
proportio primo sit in numeris ['proportion exists primarily in numbers'] 
(11.10,312/75), and that, in understanding this proportion, the mind is led 
from its manifestations in the sensible world to its source in God. As in 
the discussion of proportionality, God is said to be known in the physical 
world through the three forms of number corresponding to apprehension, 
delight, and judgement: in cunctis corporalibus et sensibilibus, dum 
numerosa apprehendimus. In numerosis proportionibus delectamur et per 
numerosarum proportionum leges irrefragabiliter iudicamus ('in all bodily 
and sensible things when we apprehend the numerical, delight in numerical 
proportions and judge irrefutably according to the laws of numerical 
proportion'] (II. 10,312/75). 
The fact that Bonaventure's consideration of all of these aspects of 
the God known in and through creatures is worked out and presented in the 
language of philosophical theology should not lead one to conclude that 
the points he makes are remote from everyday experience, and that the God 
of which he speaks, the so-called 'God of the philosophers', is only a very 
distant relative of the God actually encountered in the world of 
experience. Bonaventure's reflections do not describe a 'speculative' God, 
but work out the truth of the ways in which the 'real' God (meant here not 
in the sense of 'objectively true' but in the sense of 'present to, or 
within, experience') is encountered in and through the, world. They can 
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therefore function as a survey, and a quite comprehensive one at that, of 
the experiences of the world in regard to which the word 'God' is spoken. 
They then help to clarify the meaning of the God of creation. They must 
not, on the other hand, be taken as proofs, if by 'proof' is meant not the 
demonstration, the working out, of the content of experience - in this 
case, of the God present within the experience of the world - but the 
establishment of this content outside the experience itself. 
As George Boas points out, knowledge, for Bonaventure, and that 
includes knowledge of God, is' not, ultimately, based upon rational 
argumentation, but upon direct experience or vision: 
Throughout the Itinerarium Saint Bonaventure emphasizes that knowledge in the last analysis comes down to seeing, to contemplation, to a kind of experience in which we know 
certain things to be true without further argument or demonstration. On the lowest level, this occurs in sensory 
observation, on the highest in the mystic vision. ' 
Bonaventure's natural theology in the first chapter of the Itinerarium, for 
instance, is based on a kind of immediate observation. The God of this 
natural theology is seen in the world, and not inferred from it, or proven 
on the basis of it, in contrast with, say, the God of Aquinas' 
demonstrations in the Summa Theologise. For this reason, Boas remarks 
that 'Saint Bonaventura seems to have as his purpose a demonstration of 
God's existence and of His traits which is not irrational but nonrational' 
(p. xvi). Because the knowledge of which Bonaventure speaks is immediate, 
the simple man of faith, the man of religion rather than theology, is as 
capable of it as the learned theologian. But this does not mean, for 
Bonaventure, or for the medieval Christian theologian in general, that one 
should not try to give a rational demonstration for what may be known 
immediately by faith. Rather, 'what Kant was to say of the relationship 
between concepts and percepts, the Christian could have said of that 
between faith and reason, or religion and philosophy: faith without reason 
is blind, reason without faith empty' (Boas, p. xviii). 
If Bonaventure's remarks about the contemplation of God in and 
through creatures are viewed from this vantage-point, they are not proofs 
but articulations of experience. Then then suggest a number of 
apprehensions of the natural world which evoke the word 'God', and which, 
in so doing, determine the experiential content or meaning of that term, 
They suggest, for instance, that 'God' is evoked by the sense of order in 
the world, by the sense that the internal distinction, arrangement, and 
activity of what-is as a whole, which the human mind does not invent but 
discovers, manifests a logic or ratio, and, through this, the activity of an 
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originating mind. They suggest, too, that this sense of order is also felt 
with respect to the history of the world, its beginning, progress, and end, 
and that the logic of the same originating mind is thereby manifested 
through the structure of what is as a whole considered in its temporal 
extension. From the sense of order in these two forms, the mind is 
inclined to pass to certain attributes of the ordering mind, e. g. power, 
wisdom, and benevolence, and to the notions of providence and justice at 
work in the world. 
The sense of this mind is especially, for Bonaventure, felt in the 
movement of the human mind to 'abstract' truth, to the knowledge of the 
deep structure of reality where the ideas of things and the principles of 
the world's structure are present. Thus, proportion, number, and harmony, 
the mathematical relations at the basis of all phenomena: these, too, 
evoke what is called God. 
Bonaventure demonstrates this harmony through a series of logical 
steps, but this does not mean that it is itself known only at the end of a 
chain of reasoning. Rather, Bonaventure sets out, systematically, the way 
in which such a harmony shines out through the world, in beauty, 
sweetness, and wholesomeness, in natural things, music, and art. The sense 
of whatever is contained In the concept of God, whatever is meant by God, 
is associated, then, with all of these phenomena. 
It is also associated with the transcendent nature of the laws of 
judgement by which the mind is led to truth, with the passage of the mind 
from the degrees of imperfection it sees in the world to the notion of 
perfect being, and with the sense of an ultimate object of delight as well 
as of reason. Behind all of these experiences of God within the world lies 
the assumption, and this assumption is itself part of the experience and 
revealed within it, that mens, the human mind or soul as a totality, 
mirrors the real in such a way as to be the place where the truth of 
things is manifested. In all of its passages from the world to God, mens 
experiences itself as being drawn towards an objective truth which is 
nonetheless revealed inwardly to it. This sense of the objectivity of the 
transcendent mind as it presents itself to mens in logic, history, beauty 
and so forth, which Bonaventure sets out most clearly and systematically 
in his analysis of how God is known in pleasure and reason,, is absolutely 
fundamental to the experience of this kind of God in general, and to all 
talk based upon this experience. It is part of the grammar of this God. 
It is important to emphasize that the experience itself out of which 
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this conception of God arises is not a 'neutral' one. Helen S. Lang, in a 
paper entitled 'Bonaventure's Delight in Sensation', demonstrates that 'the 
notion of delight ... appears at each moment of Bonaventure's account of 
sensation'. ', Delight, for Bonaventure, is not a subjectivising mood, not a 
colour of the subject which then colours the 'true' nature of the object. 
It is, rather, a response to the ultimate and sacred nature of the object, 
for delight is based on proportions, and 'since proportions are nothing 
other than the presence of God in things through number, delight is but 
our natural response to the presence of God' (p. 88), It is this delight 
that motivates the question, why? Seeking the answer to this question, 
the reason for delight, is an indirect way of seeking God (p. 90). Thus, 
the God of creation is apprehended in delight, and sought on the basis of 
delight. 
Not surprisingly, Germain Kopaczynski describes the role of wonder in 
St. Francis' thought in similar terms: 
Where St. Thomas makes a distinction - wonder begins 
naturally but ends beyond the natural - St. Francis sees 
with a unitary vision ... Here the vision and the wonder 
remarkably dovetail, and we have a hard time 
distinguishing the two. If God is the ultimate source of 
wonder as well as its ultimate end, the very phenomenon of 
wondering itself is really at bottom a pining for God. ' 
Bonaventure himself retains this sense, so important to the founder of his 
order, that wonderment in the face of the world reveals the presence of 
God, and contemplation, for Bonaventure as for Richard of St. Victor, is a 
rapt wondering that discloses God. 
It could even be argued that some of the finer points of 
Bonaventure's unique epistemology are rooted in this sense of a delightful 
and wonderful apprehension of divine presence in the world, an 
apprehension which is primarily receptive. For instance, Bonaventure's 
conception of the senses as doors through which the world enters in, 
rather than as windows through which the soul looks out, a conception 
that, Lang points out, is Aristotelian and Thomistic rather than 
Augustinian and Platonic (pp. 73-5), may be influenced by his sense that 
the mind directly perceives those properties of the object (the formal, 
'immaterial', properties reproduced in the similitude) that indicate the 
presence of God within it. And the fact that this perception is not 
really the function of an activity of the mind abstracting from matter, as 
it is for Thomas (Lang, p. 81, n. 32), but of the reception of an 
abstraction, may articulate the same basic sense of the relation of mens 
to the relation of world and God. 
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The fundamental nature of this relationship between God and the 
physical world, as mens apprehends it, is expressed in condensed form in a 
passage near the end of the Itinerarium: 
omnes creaturae . illius priori principii potentissimi, sapientissimi et optimi, illius aeternae on iris, lucis et 
plenitudinis, illius, inquam, artis efficientis, exemplantis 
et ordinantis sunt umbrae, resonantiae et picturee, sunt 
vestigia, simulacra et spectacula nobis ad contuendum Deum 
proposita et signa divinus data; quae, inquam, sunt 
exernplaria vel pdtius exemplaty, proposita mentibus adhuc 
rudibus et sensibilibus, ut per sensibilia, quae vident, 
transferantur ad intelligibilia, quae non vident, tanquam 
per signa ad signata. 
(For these creatures are 
shadows, echoes and pictures 
of that first, most powerful, most wise, and most perfect 
principle, 
of that eternal source, light and fulness, 
of that efficient, exemplary and ordering art. 
They are 
vestiges, representations, spectacles 
proposed to us 
and signs divinely given 
so that we can see God. 
These creatures, I say, are 
exemplars 
or rather exemplifications 
presented to souls still untrained 
and immersed in sensible things 
so that through sensible things 
which they see 
they will be carried over to intelligible things 
which they do not see 
as through signs to what is signified. ] 
(II. 
g1,312/76) 
The language in which creatures are defined in this passage is rich in 
Platonic metaphors. All of these have in common the idea of something 
that imitates or indicates a reality in which it therefore in a sense 
participates, but which is also other from it. With the exception of 
resonantiae. ['echoes'], the metaphors are at root visual. Creatures are 
umbrae ['shadows'], picturee ['pictures'], vestigla ['vestiges'], simulacra 
['representations'], spectacula ['spectacles'], signs ['signs'], and exemplata 
['exemplifications']. Insofar as these metaphors express the fundamental 
nature of physical entities, their essential being, that nature is conceived 
as constituted by a relation to God. The epistemological consequence of 
this ontological condition will be that mens can only be said to 
comprehend the fundamental nature of a physical entity when it understands 
that entity in its relation to God. For Bonaventure, this amounts to 
seeing it as a creatura. 
The divine, considered in its creative aspect, is what gives rise to 
these entities. God the creator is, first, the primum principium, the first 
principle or Word, the logos that incarnates itself in, and rules over, all 
that is. The description of God's creative aspect as 'light', another 
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originally Platonic metaphor, and one much favoured by Bonaventure, is 
related to this concept of logos via the Gospel of John. The divine nature 
in cunctis creaturis relucet ('shines forth in all creatures'] (III. 1, 
314/79), and to see this light with which they are resplendent is to be 
illustratur by rerun creaturarum splendoribus ('enlightened' by the 
'splendour of created things'] (1.13,302/67). According to the Platonic 
metaphysic, this means apprehending things by the light of their forms, a 
light immanent in the mind and yet also transcending it. God, then, as the 
principle of all forms, is both the light shining through all things and 
the light in the mind by means of which all things 'appear' to the eyes of 
the understanding, the Johannine 'Light that lighteth every man that cometh 
into this world'. 
God is also the origo or 'source' of all creation, and has absolute 
priority. According to Augustine, God is a being that has priority 
aeternitate ('in eternity'], incommutabiliter mutabilie facientem, ac per hoc 
priorem ('creating things that are subject to change yet never suffering 
change itself and thereby being prior to them all']. ' While Augustine, 
however, draws a distinction between 'priority in eternity, ' belonging 
exclusively to God, and 'priority in origin' (origine), logical priority 
applied to concepts other than God, ' Bonaventure collapses these to make 
God 'eternal origin' or source. 
God is also plenltudo ('fulness']; the principle of all forms must 
contain within itself, in some fashion, the totality of all that is. God is 
the one that comprehends the all. 
Bonaventure also describes the creator/creation relationship through 
the metaphor of the creator as artist, with creation as the divine art. In 
this case, the Platonic idea of creation according to an ideal form or 
exemplar is mingled with the language of Aristotelian causality, so that 
creatures are the result of the artis efficientis, exemplantis et 
ordinantis ('efficient, exemplary and ordering art'] of the creator. 
As effects of a cause, and as exemplifications of an exemplar, 
creatures are signs, and when the mind sees through them to what is 
signified, it reads God in the book of creation. This requires a shift on 
the part of the observing mind from the type of comprehension that 
constitutes the 'worldly' world, the world of things considered as 
independent, to that which constitutes creation, the world related to God. 
It requires that the mind learn to read, as it were, that it learn the 
signification of the signs in this this book, and so come. to see all res as 
vestigia dei. Augustine says of signs: 
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Quoniam de rebus scriberem, praemisi commoaens ne quis in 
eis attenderet nisi quod Bunt, non etiam si quid aliud 
preeter se significant; versim de signis disserens hoc 
dico, ne quis in eis attendat quod aunt, sed potius quod 
signs sunt, id est, quod significant. Signam est enim res, 
praeter speciem quam integerit sensibus, alius aliquid ex 
se faciens in cogitationem venire: sicut vestigio viso, transisse animal cujus vestigium est, cogitamus; et fume 
viso, igne subesse cognoscimus ... 
[Just as I began, when I was writing about things, by 
warning that no one should consider them except as they 
are, without reference to what they signify beyond 
themselves, now when I am discussing signs I wish it 
understood that no one should consider them for what they 
are but rather for their value as signs which signify 
something else. A sign is a thing which causes us to 
think of something beyond the impression the thing itself 
makes upon the senses. Thus if we see a track, we think 
of the animal that made the track; if we see smoke, we know that there is a fire which causes it .. . ]y 
To consider all things as vestigia del is to reconstruct the invisible 
transcendent referent from the signs, the visible evidence, which testifies 
of its cause or source. It is to rise, as Richard of St. Victor says, per 
visibilium rerum . speciem ad invisibilium cognitlonem ['by means of the 
appearance of visible things to knowledge of invisible things']. M' 
It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that the world is only 
potentially a mirror of God, and that whether it appears as such depends 
upon a decision on the part of mess. The world looks in different ways, 
depending upon how mess looks at it, and the transformation in which the 
essential constitution of the things that make up the world is altered so 
that they appear as vestigia del corresponds to a transformation of the 
vision for which and in which things appear. Thus, the nature of the gaze 
cast upon the world by mens, the light it casts, determines the light in 
which things appear, the aspect they manifest. 
The decision to look with the gaze for which the world manifests God 
is not, for Bonaventure, a matter of holding this or that arbitrarily 
constructed belief. It requires, rather, that mens hold itself in a certain 
way in and before the world, that it achieve a certain stance with respect 
to things. For this stance, creatures are allowed to manifest themselves 
in their relation to the transcendent source of themselves, thereby 
mediating that source itself. In requiring such a stance of his reader, 
Bonaventure describes it in the following way: 
Aperi igitur oculos, eures spirituales admove, labia tue 
solve et cor tuum appone, ut in omnibus creaturis Deum 
tuum videas, audias, laudes, diligas et colas, magnifices et 
honores, ne forte totus contra to orbis terrarum consurgat. 
Therefore, open your eyes, 
alert the ears of your spirit, open your lips 
and apply your heart 
so that in all creatures you may 
see, hear, praise, love and worship, glorify and honor 
your God 
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lest the whole world rise against you. 
(I. 15,303/67-8) 
The stance required here involves a form of openness and application on 
the part of the observor. For Bonaventure, 'rightness' with respect to the 
world means achieving this stance, this form of noesis for which the noema 
is the creature mediately manifesting God as its source. Because how the 
world appears is a function of this stance, and because the stance itself, 
as a way of determining and being determined by the things of the world, 
is a possibility that can be chosen or not, Bonaventure can attribute fault 
to a person who does not see what the stance reveals: 
Qui igitur tantis rerum creaturarum splendoribus non 
illustratur caecus est; qui tantis clamoribus non evigilat 
surdus est; qui ex omnibus his effectibus Deum non laudat 
mutus est; qui ex tantis indiciis primum principium non 
advertit stultus est. 
(Whoever, therefore, is not enlightened 
by such splendor of created things 
is blind; 
whoever is not awakened by such outcries 
is deaf; 
whoever does not discover the first principle 
from such clear signs 
is a fool. ] 
(I. 15, '302-3/67) 
The state of ignorance described in this sentence is not just seen as 
pitiable, but as reprehensible. It is a state of spiritual blindness 
arising out of a refusal to see. 
Spiritual vision, on the other hand, consists in the ascent that moves 
from the thing to its transcendent referent. In this ascent, the nature of 
the world receives its full, metaphysical, explanation, an explanation 
consisting not in the production of a rational account, although it may 
also be so expressed, but in the seeing in which heart, will, and intellect 
are united. The referent that mens catches sight of in this vision, 
though, is unlike any other in that it is not an object within the world, 
but is a light shining through the things of the world, a light in which 
these things shine forth. This referent is never clearly visible, 
conceivable, or expressible as it is in itself. The pointing of creatures 
to it is an indication grasped not clearly and distinctly, but in an 
obscure manner. 
Moreover, what is indicated in this ponting can never be subject to 
empirical demonstration or proof, since it lies outside the empirical world. 
This does not mean that it is never present to 'experience'. On the 
contrary, the root of all that Bonaventure says concerning the immanent 
God lies in an intuition which in some way undergoes the experience of the 
transcendent, the presence of the absent. This may not be immediately 
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apparent, given the seemingly largely intellectual and rational nature of 
Bonaventure's demonstrations. But it should be evident from the foregoing 
analysis of the Itinerarium that Bonaventure's basic sense of the 
objectivity of reason and order, which goes hand in hand with a sense of 
the presence of mind and spirit in the world, is itself not a 'rational' 
affair. It is not a function of ratiocination, if that means means 'giving 
a ground for', so that the rational is what is grounded, i. e. understood in 
terms of something else that serves as its ground, and, in so doing, 
provides its justification. The presence which, for Bonaventure, is 
grasped in and by the light shining both in the world and in the mind, the 
presence which is this light, is justified by nothing but itself, in its own 
appearance. For Bonaventure, what is primarily intellectual and rational is 
this light, since it is the light of all understanding, the light that 
enables understanding and is its source. The manifestation of this light, 
for a person who not only sees within it, which any creature of a 
'rational' nature must do, but who also sees It, constitutes the original 
apprehension of divinity. 
The metaphor of seeing a light is, of course, just that -a metaphor. 
With respect to the things of the world, the essence of such a vision 
perhaps consists in the intuition which Evelyn Underhill once described as 
finding 'an added significance and reality in the phenomenal world', 
involving not 'the forsaking of the Many in order to find the One', but 
'the discovery of the Perfect One ablaze in the Many. "' It is the sense 
of a presence within the empiricial which is yet not the empirical, 'the 
glimpse, ' to quote another classic work on mysticism, 'of an Eternal, in and 
beyond the temporal and penetrating it, the apprehension of a ground and 
meaning of things in and beyond the empiricial and transcending it'. 12 To 
this apprehension, the phenomenal world appears invested with a sense of 
the 'numinous' or 'holy' (Otto, passim. ), a sense of a divinity that is in 
one sense wholly other, as the noumenal reality behind phenomena, but in 
another sense wholly near, an Immanent reality revealed in phenomena. 
Such an apprehension and what it reveals cannot be tested by a different 
kind of apprehension having a different kind of object. Its truth can be 
known only from within it, since the reality of that to which it testifies 
is present only to it. 
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2. Xeidegger's Analysis of the Early Greek Experience of Being. 
The history of Western metaphysics is rooted, according to 
Heidegger, in the question, Warum ist Uberhaupt Seiendes and nicht 
vielmehr Nichts? ('Why is there any being at all and not rather nothing? '] 
(WM, 22/277). As the fundamental question (Grundfrage) of metaphysics, 
this question does not simply. stand as an event at the beginning of the 
history of metaphysics. It is an enduring event, one that continues to 
occur as long as metaphysics does, for the occurrence of this question is 
the constant origin of all metaphysical thought. 
The occurrence of this basic Warumfrage of metaphysics is, moreover, 
rooted in the 'occurrence', the nihilation, of nothing (des Nichts), and 
therefore in the event of transcendence, the transcendence, that is, of 
what-is as a whole (das Seiende Im Ganzen). The experience of not-being 
(Nicht-Seiende), as the wholly other to all beings (schlechthin Andere zu 
allem Seienden) is the condition for the possibility of addressing any 
question to what-is as a whole, for in order to ask anything about the 
totality of what-is, that totality must first be brought into view as such. 
It must then be transcended to an 'outside of', but the outside of all that 
is presents itself, in the first instance, as nothing. Thus: Das Wesen 
des ursprünglich nichtenden Nichts liegt in dem: es bringt das Da-sein 
allererst vor das Seiende als solches ('The essence of nothing as original 
nihilation lies in this: that It alone brings Da-sein face to face with 
what-is as such') (WM, 35/369). 
When, on the basis of this passage from beings to the original 
nothing in which what-is as a whole is suspended, the Warum frage of 
metaphysics arises, it does so as a movement back from nothing to being. 
The event of this movement, the disclosure of what-is as a totality in the 
passage from nothing to beings, enabled by the original transcendence of 
what-is as a whole in the passage from beings to nothing, is the event of 
being (das Sein). The question about what-is in totality asks about the 
being of beings, and does so on the basis of a primordial projection into 
nothing, although it does not ask about being, or nothing, itself. 
Metaphysik says Heidegger, ist das Hinaus fragen Uber das Seiende, um 
es als ein solches and im Ganzen fUr das Begreifen zurUckzuerhalten 
['Metaphysics is an enquiry over and above what-is, with a view to winning 
it back again as such and in totality for our understanding'] (WM, 38/375). 
It is an overcoming, a crossing beyond (Übersteigen) of what-is as a whole. 
This is transcendence, and, for the Heidegger of Was ist, Metaphysik?, it is 
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essential to human existence, for it is das Grundgeschehen im Dasein ['the 
ground phenomenon of Dasein'], and is Dasein itself (WM, 41/379). 
Metaphysics has this status because every Warum? (( is ultimately grounded 
in the wonder (Verwunderung) in the face of beings awakened by the 
strangeness (Befremdlichkeit) of beings, and this strangeness is made 
possible by the primordial projection into nothing of transcendence. 
If Bonaventure's conception of creatio ex nihilo, as well as his 
notion of going over from the world to the source of the world, God, are 
seen in the light of this analysis, they appear at first to be an obvious 
example of this fundamental happening (Grundgeschehen) of metaphysics. 
And so they are, insofar as Bonaventure is a scholastic philosopher. 
However, insofar as he is a believer, he cannot, Heidegger thinks, truly ask 
the fundamental question of philosophy, sWarum ist überhaupt Seiendes and 
nicht vielmehr Nichts? «, since, for faith, this question has been answered 
even before being asked: Das Seiende, soweit es nicht Gott selbst ist, ist 
durch diesen geschaffen. Gott selbst siste als der urgeschaffene Schöpfer 
['Everything that is, except God himself, has been created by him. God 
himself, the increate creator, "is"']. This does not mean, for Heidegger, 
that the biblical revelation of God as creator, the revelation to which 
faith holds, offers one possible answer to the question of philosophy. The 
words of the Bible cannot answer the question because they are in no way 
related to it. The security of faith, as one way of standing within truth, 
is utterly opposed to the stance of questioning proper to philosophy, and 
a believer cannot adopt the stance of philosophy without ceasing to be a 
believer. From the standpoint of faith, the question of why there are 
beings rather than nothing is 'foolishness', and, if asking this question is 
fundamental to philosophy as essential questioning, then philosophy is this 
very foolishness. The notion of a 'Christian philosophy' is, therefore, 
self-contradictory; a 'Christian philosophy' is a 'round square' (EM, 8-9/6- 
7). 
On the other hand, in his Habilitationsschrift (1915), Heidegger had 
spoken of 'the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages'. '-' The firm 
division he later draws between the realms of faith and philosophy 
involves a rejection of the Greek metaphysical element in the tradition of 
Western theology. This is a rejection of the metaphysical God, which 
Heidegger opposes absolutely to the God of Christian faith. I will return 
later to the question of this distinction, which Bonaventure's thought does 
not, of course, respect. Whether or not the distinction, as Heidegger 
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characterizes it, is tenable, it should be noted that the Christian doctrine 
of creatio ex nihilo by God, even when it is wholly dissociated from Greek 
philosophy, still has to be ultimately rooted in Dasein as meta-physical. 
For Bonaventure as a believer, the question of why there should be beings 
rather than nothing is indeed, in a way, already answered, but it is not 
answered, nor could it ever be, without a relationship to nothing. It is 
the understanding that beings might not be, that nothing might be, which 
grants the possibility of creatio ex nihilo as answer, the answer that 
nothing brings into existence and sustains the world except God. After 
all, without the understanding that nothing might be, no question about the 
origin of all that is could arise, and the notion of creation, which is 
essentially bound up with nothing, could not itself be. The answer of 
faith is not a possible answer to a philosophical question, since faith 
does not question philosophically, but the origin of the propositions of 
faith still rests. in the experience of Dasein, and the ideas of faith are 
no less structured by the universal determinations of this experience than 
are the ideas of philosophy. This does not mean that faith is matter of 
universal experience, reducible to such experience. The content of faith 
is not universal, but specific. However, existentialia, insofar as they are 
the general conditions of existence, must condition, and thus be visible 
within, this specificity as much as any other. 
Among the existentialia that Sein and Zeit uncovers are 
Befindlichkeit ('disposition')' 4 and Stimmung ('mood' or 'attunement'). As 
determinations of the being of Dasein, these determine, equiprimordially, 
the being of beings, the way beings are discovered to be. Was ist das - 
the Philosophie? develops this notion, suggesting that human beings can 
be attuned (gestimmt) to the appeal of being at a variety of frequencies, 
so to speak. The frequency of their attunement - the pitch of their mood, 
to put it differently - gives one feature of the manner in which they are 
determined (bestimmt, also 'tuned' and 'decided') by beings, the manner in 
which they reverberate with beings, and the manner in which beings are 
determined by, and reverberate with, them. Attunement gives one feature, 
therefore, of the manner in which human beings correspond to being (WP, 
75-9). 
Philosophy is characterised, in this work, as das gestimmte 
Entsprechen ('tuned correspondence'] (WP, 78-9). Heidegger points out that 
Plato and Aristotle already drew attention to the fact that philosophy and 
philosophizing belong in that dimension of man called Stimmung by naming 
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astonishment (das Erstaunen, Gk. thaumazein) as the particular pathos of 
the philosopher. Conceiving pathos as Stimmung, Heidegger goes on to 
describe the pathos of astonishment as a stepping-back from the being of 
beings which is at the same time drawn to and held fast by that from 
which it steps back. This is the attunement, he claims, within which the 
Greek philosophers were granted correspondence to the being of beings (WP, 
84-5). 
For Bonaventure, the highest form of correspondence to truth occurs 
in contemplation, which, it will* be remembered, Richard of St. Victor 
describes as 'the free, more penetrating gaze of a mind, suspended with 
wonder concerning manifestations of wisdom', a mind 'suspended near 
something because of greatness of wonder-Y' What is revealed in 
contemplation is always, for Bonaventure and Richard of St. Victor, 
divinity. Admiratio uncovers what-is as miraculum, as a marvel to be 
wondered at, and it is in and through the marvellous nature of the 
mireculum, discovered as such within admiratio, that the presence of God 
makes itself manifest. The wonderment of the medieval thinker does not 
unfold in quite the same way as that of the Greek philosopher, since 
however much the world of the former may have been influenced by 
philosophy, it is still a world of faith as distinct from philosophy. But 
it is important to see that Bonaventure's thought, like that of the Greek 
philosophers, as Heidegger understands them, arises out of a certain 
attunement, and that he sees this attunement as essential to the 
revelation of divinity. It is also important that contemplation is a gift; 
it is something by which the mind is seized and enraptured (reptus), just 
as a pathos is something one suffers, something that comes over one. In 
both cases, the attunement, and the way it gives correspondence to the 
being of beings, is granted. And in both cases, it does not 'colour', but 
reveals. 
The most astonishing thing for the Greeks, that before which the 
philosophos, the one who loves the wisdom (sophon) that says hen pants 
('One (is) all'], is especially astonished is the gathering together of 
beings in being - the logos For Heraclitus, according to Heidegger, to 
'love the wisdom of hen panta, to love the sophon, means*to correspond to 
the logos so as to speak in the way it speaks. This correspondence is 
accordance (Einklang) with the sophon, where accordance is harmonia (WP, 
46-9). The philosophos, then, is one who harmonises with the sophon, and 
one whose speaking corresponds to the speaking of the logos, of being as 
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the gathering and uniting principle of what-is, through this harmonisation. 
In Einführung in the Metaphysik Heidegger gleans these points from 
an interpretation of two fragments of Heraclitus that speak about the 
logos 
Vom Xöyoc wird gesagt: 1. Ihm eignet die Ständigkeit, das 
Bleiben; 2 er west als das Zusammen im Seienden, das 
Zusammen des Seiend, das Sammelnde; 3, alles was geschieht, 
d. h. in das Sein kommt, steht da gemäß diesem ständigen 
Zusammen; dieses ist das Waltende. 
[It is said that 1) permanence and endurance are 
characteristic of the logos, 2) it is to etherness in what- 
is, the togetherness of all"that is, tha which gathers; 3) 
everything that happens, i. e. that comes into being, stands 
there in accordance with this permanent togetherness; this 
is the dominant power. ] (EM, 136/127-8) 
Logos is then the Sammlung ['collection'], which means both das Sammeln 
['collecting'] and the Gesammeltheit ['collectedness']. It means here die 
sammelnde Gesammeltheit, das ursprünglich Sammelnde ['collecting 
collectedness, the primal gathering principle']. It is the ständig in sich 
waltende ursprünglich sammelnde Gesammeltheit ['the original collecting 
collectedness which is in itself permanently dominant'] (EM, 136-7/128). 
For the most part, men, although they have hearing and hear words, do 
not hear or follow (hören, also 'listen', 'pay attention' and 'obey' or 
'heed'), the logos, which is not audible (hörbar) in the way that words are. 
True hearing consists in the heeding that follows: Das echte Hörigsein hat 
... nichts mit Ohr und Mundwerk zu tun, sondern besagt: Folge leisten 
gegenüber dem, was der k6yoc ist: the Gesammeltheit jýU Seienden selbst 
('True hearing has nothing to do with ear and mouth, but means: To follow 
the logos and what it is, namely the collectedness of what-is itself'] (EM, 
138/129). Those who do not heed the logos do not understand or com- 
prehend (begreifen) this collectedness. They do not encompass the logos in 
that they do not apprehend as one what is collected together into one. 
They do not bring together what is permanently collected together, and so 
do not follow the collecting collectedness of the logos. 
As the ständige Sammlung, the in sich stehende Gesammeltheit des 
Seienden ['the steady gathering, the intrinsic togetherness of what-is'], 
the logos is das Sein, being, and those who do not heed it are those who, 
losing themselves perpetually among beings, and supposing that beings are 
just beings and nothing further, turn away from being and thereby alienate 
themselves from it. Such people are awake to beings but asleep to being, 
which is hidden from them (EM, 139/130). They are asleep, therefore, to 
truth. 
These sleepers are axynetoi, 'those who do not comprehend' (EM, 
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139/130), where xynon, that which is not comprehended by the 
uncomprehending, means das edv, das Seiend ('eon, beingness'] as gesammelt 
Anwesen ('collected presence'] (EM, 139/131). Such collected presence is 
not das »Allgemeine« ('the 'universal"], nicht solches, was Ober allem 
schwebt and keinen faßt ('not something which hovers over all and touches 
none'], but das alles in sich Versammelnde and Zusammenhaltende ['that 
which in itself collects all things and holds them together'], the 
ursprünglich einigende Einheit des Auseinanderstrebenden ['the original 
unifying unity of what tends apart']. An example of a xynon, Heidegger 
says, is the nomos for the polls, die Satzung fsetzen als zusammenstellen], 
der innere Gefüge der n6X%q ['the statute that constitutes or puts 
together, the inner structure of the polish] (EM, 139-40,131). 
In Bonaventure's realist epistemology, the one who comprehends is the 
one who sees the intrinsic structuring principle of what-is, the one who 
sees the ratio. That ratio, whether or not it gets called a 'universal', 
does not hover over things but incarnates itself within them. In so doing, 
it gives, is, the unifying unity of beings, and a kind of ordering law 
(nomos) that holds beings together in their being. To be sure, Bonaventure 
often associates this incarnate Word with seeing rather than with hearing, 
and thus displays one of. those shifts in the Western conception of 
understanding that Heidegger often laments. But the metaphor of seeing 
still stands for an understanding that follows. It is a kind of reading 
which 'sees' what is being said in the text, where the text, for 
Bonaventure, is read, both seen and heard, as the 'book of creation'. Of 
course there are presuppositions in such a reading. Of course 
Bonaventure's presuppositions are different from those of Heraclitus. But 
in their shared sense that understanding the being of beings is a matter 
of following a noiseless speaking that binds, structures, and unifies 
beings, a sameness also makes itself manifest. 
Bonaventure also shares with Heraclitus the sense that following this 
speaking requires paying heed. It requires attendance. where attendance 
can be conceived es a way of looking, if looking is thought of not as a 
function of some visual apparatus but as a gathering together, a con- 
centration, of concern involving the totality of one's capabilities. While 
contemplation is a gift, this attendance is a decision. Through it, mens 
becomes receptive to the truth of beings. And the reception of this truth 
is, for Bonaventure like Heraclitus, a kind of awakening. It is an 
illumination, a being illumined by that which shines through beings. 
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The collecting collectedness of the original Greek logos gathers 
together and assembles things which strive apart, and it holds them 
against one another in this assemblage. The restraining and mastering 
(Bändigung) of what strives apart into a constant unity in which the 
striving elements are held against one another is, for the Greeks, beauty 
(Schönheit). Since being is the original and most constant gathering 
power, the logos, das Sein alles Seienden ist das Scheinendste, d. h. das 
Schönste, das in sich Ständigste ['the being of all that is is the supreme 
radiance, i. e. the greatest beauty, that which is most permanent in itself'] 
(EM. 140/131). 
For the Greeks, being in this sense is physic, the ruling power that 
holds sway or prevails over all beings, and whose prevailing presence is a 
constancy standing in opposition to becoming and appearance: 
Sein ist als cpvvtS das aufgehende Walten. In der Gegenstellung zum Werden zeigt es sich als die Ständigkeit, die ständige Anwesenheit. Diese bekundet sich 
in der Gegenstellung zum Schein als das Erscheinen, als die 
offenbare Anwesenheit. 
[Being in the sense of physis is the power that emerges. 
As contrasted with becoming, it is permanence, permanent 
presence. Contrasted with appearance, it is appearing, 
manifest presence. ] (EM, 134/125) 
The gathering power of being as logos and physis never just places 
beings together in a haphazard way. As a power reigning over and through 
all beings, it draws what strives apart and against into a unity in which 
the elements that stand opposed to one another also belong to one another. 
The gathering thus neither levels and flattens into a mere equality, nor 
just jumbles disparate things together into a confused pile. Being, the 
penetrating power of the logos (physis) binds into a unity characterized 
by neither equality nor confusion, but by a holding back and holding 
together of opposition in tension (EM, 142/134). It is as a binding and 
holding which has this nature that being is harmonia, Einklang. It is a 
sounding of many as one, a unison, but one in which all the notes are 
gathered together and preserved in their relations of difference to one 
another, and not one in which they are simply equalized into a monotone. 
It is the harmony of a consonance that gathers and encompasses every form 
of dissonance within itself without thereby denying it. In contrast with 
mere equalization, the accordance of this kind of unison is not obvious, 
but hidden: 
das Sein, der Logos, als der gesammelte Einklang, [ist] 
nicht leicht und in gleicher Münze für jedermann 
zugänglich, sondern entgegen jenem Einklang, der jeweils 
nur usgleich, Vernichtung der Spannung, Einebnung ist, 
verbor en: 'apgov(e acavlq caveptjc XpEtttov, »»der nicht (unmittelbar und ohne weiteres) sic zeigende Einklang ist 
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mächtiger denn der (allemal) offenkundige« (Heraclitus, Frg. 
54). 
[being, the logos as gathering and harmony, is not easily 
accessible and not accessible to all in the same form; 
unlike the harmony that is mere compromise, destruction of tension, flattening, it is hidden: harmonld aphands phaneres kreittdn, 'the harmony that does not (immediately and 
easily) show itself is mightier than that which is (at all times) manifest'. ] (EM, 14£/133). 
Bonaventure, too, locates beauty in the harmonious symmetry given by 
the way that things are put together and held together by the logos, or, 
in Bonaventure's case, by the incarnation of the eternal ratio or Word of 
God. For Bonaventure, insofar as this ratio structures all things, all 
things are in some way beautiful, and they are so in virtue of the 
visibility of the ratio 'within' them. Moreover, the supreme 
proportionality and harmony lies in the source of the proportionality which 
is visible in all things and yet requires effort to be seen. It lies in 
the Word itself, the permanent structuring principle. For the Greeks, 
Heidegger says, what is most beautiful is being as logos, which is 
simultaneously the permanent gathering and structuring principle, and the 
the permanent gatheredness, the structure, of what-is. 
For the Greeks, furthermore, the originating power that reigns over 
all things is being, logos, as physic , 
For Bonaventure, it is the power of 
God, understood again on the basis of an implicit understanding of nothing, 
as this power manifests itself in opposition to nothing. It brings beings 
into being from out of nothing and sustains them in being against nothing. 
It is manifest not only in the existence, but also in the essence of a 
being; it rules over not only the 'thatness', the quodditas, of a being, but 
also its 'whatness', its quidditas, since it brings each being into the 
structure of what it is, as well as ordering it into its place in relation 
to all that is. It thereby gathers and orders the structural symmetry of 
the unity of beings, bringing about and maintaining the harmony of 
creation as a well-ordered whole. The medieval theological notion of 
creatio ex nihilo nonetheless stands in opposition to the Greek notion that 
ex nihilo nihil fit, but in both cases there is the sense of an ordering 
principle that is in some way the origin of what-is. Once again, while 
. there 
is undoubtedly a great difference between these two conceptions, 
there is a significant measure of identity as well. 
The hidden harmony is not, in the Greek conception, open to all and 
sundry. That the more powerful harmony is only open for the more 
powerful as the ones whose greater discernment is capable of wresting it 
from hiddenness suggests that to the openness of being, and so to truth, 
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belongs rank (der Rang). Das Wahre ist nicht für jedermann, sondern nur 
für die Starken ('The true is not for every man but only for the strong'] 
(EM, 142/133), and the fact that there are various stations or positions, 
the fact that there is an order of rank with respect to the truth of 
being, is a sign of the way in which being as logos gathers. It is a 
sign of the fact that dominance and predominance belong to the logos in 
its gathering, and, therefore, to the disclosure of being (EM, 141/133). 
On this point, there is a clear difference between the ancient Greek 
and the medieval Christian views. Bonaventure believes that everyone is in 
principle capable of discerning the hidden yet manifest Word, although 
everyone does not do so. It is not a matter of some people having a 
superior intrinsic capability that allows them to see what is hidden to 
others. Rather, as one later Greek thinker says, the task lies in calling 
upon a vision which is the birth-right of all, but which few turn to use. ' 
On the other hand, what-is as a whole is, for Bonaventure, hierarchically 
structured, so that here, too, an order of rank is in some way intrinsic to 
the arrangement of being. It is intrinsic to the Word that opens beings 
and maintains them in their openness. 
At the conclusion of his discussion of logos in this particular 
section of Einführung in the Metaphysil4 Heidegger also comments briefly 
on the difference between logos as conceived by Heraclitus and the logos 
of the New Testament. He points out that, in the New Testament, logos 
does not mean the being of beings, as it does for Heraclitus, but one 
particular being, the Son of God, and in his role as mediator between God 
and man. In the Greek translation of the Old Testament, it signifies the 
'word' in the definite meaning of command and commandment. The logos is 
then the messenger who hands down commands and commandments, and the 
logos of the cross is Christ, the logos of eternal life, logos zOEs. Eine 
Welt, Heidegger ends, trennt all dieses von Heraklit ('A whole world 
separates all this from Heraclitus'] (EM, 145/135). 
It is, for Bonaventure, an element of the specific content of the 
Christian faith that the world is created by a personal God, and that its 
truth, its coming into existence as well as its revelation to human beings, 
is mediated by that God in the person of Christ. This person, and this 
person alone, is the logos of the Christian faith, a particular being, as 
Heidegger says, and one that Christian theology comes to understand as 
consubstantial with God. Such a logos is necessarily separated by a world 
from that of Heraclitus, since it belongs to a different world, the world 
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of the Christian faith, but, as Heidegger knows only too well, the world of 
Greek thought and the world of medieval Christian theology (where the 
latter is not, of course, identical with the world to which the authors of 
the New Testament belong) are closely connected. 
Because the dialogue with Greek philosophy plays such a major role in 
determining the course and evolution of Christian theology, it is not 
always easy to see where one leaves off and the other begins. In the case 
of Bonaventure's ratio, however, the conception of it as idea and 
archetype, and thus as something intellectual, something noetic, and the 
consequent location of it in a transcendent intellectual sphere - all of 
this clearly belongs to the history of Greek thought and none of it is 
specifically Christian. What is specifically Christian, and therefore not a 
matter of philosophy but of faith, is the identification of this Greek 
logos with Christ as the Word and Son of God. With this identification, 
the Greek logos is naturally transformed, and so, too, is Christ. 
To the extent that this transformed logos-Christ is a product of 
Greek philosophy, the deconstruction of the concept of logos within that 
philosophy is also a deconstruction of this logos, and can yield something 
of its essence. Such a deconstruction will not uncover or communicate 
anything of the specifically Christian meaning of the word, the meaning it 
has when sublated within the experience of faith, and it must not pretend 
to do so. The understanding of this meaning is the peculiar provenance of 
faith, and its explication is a matter for the theology of faith. 
Philosophical analysis can uncover only the philosophic content of a term, 
and Heidegger is in a way right to say that the task of phenomenology, 
when applied to the language of theology, is only to uncover the 'pre- 
Christian' meaning of the terms of that language (W, 64/19). 
However, when these forms of analysis are applied to a theological 
tradition in which the articles of faith are themselves understood, rightly 
or wrongly, through a dialogue with philosophy, the case is naturally 
complex. Given such a case, the extent to which the methodology of 
philosophy and the language of the philosophical tradition are appropriated 
for the understanding of the articles of faith, the extent to which these 
articles are understood philosophically, also gives the extent to which the 
meaning of the final product of this understanding is exhausted by 
philosophical analysis and by phenomenological deconstruction. Because 
medieval theology is to a large extent theo-logic, as opposed to 'theology 
of faith', or, to speak more precisely, because, as a consequence of making 
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no clear distinction between these two, it freely and widely borrows both 
the language and the methodology of philosophy so as to transform not 
only what it borrows but also itself, the extent to which it can be 
appropriately subjected to philosophical analysis and critique is also 
large. 
In the Introduction, I made some brief comments about Heidegger's 
views on the relation between philosophy and Christian theology. A 
lengthy critical analysis of the question concerning the rightness or 
wrongness of the philosophical approach to theology, however, lies outside 
the scope of the present discussion. To pass judgement on the issue of 
whether or not Christian theology should ever approach its subject-matter 
in this way, whether or not there is a basic and irreconcilable opposition 
between faith and philosophy which sets severe limits to the possibility 
of any rapprochement between them, involves making a decision about the 
essence of theology in such a way as to delimit that essence for the 
future, thereby delimiting, implicitly, the, task of theology in the future. 
The prescriptive critical stance from which such a delimiting judgement 
proceeds may have its own value, but it is not the stance from which this 
study proceeds. 
To return to the point at issue, in his deconstruction of the logos 
of Greek philosophy, Heidegger traces it back to Heraclitus, for whom, 
according to Heidegger, it is understood as collection in the sense of both 
collecting and collectedness. Originally, then, logos is both the collecting 
and the collectedness of what-is, and, because it gathers into a unity of 
belonging together, it is associated with hen, with 'one' as a principle of 
unification. Bonaventure's logos, on the other hand, is the ratio in the 
mind of God and consubstantial with that mind, which both incarnates 
itself in all that is and regulates the understanding of all that is. 
Superficially viewed, these have little in common. However, the ratio of 
God contains the rationes of things, and these rationes are the eternal 
ideas of God, the exemplars exemplified in creatures as exemplifications. 
In order for creatures to be seen as exemplifications of an exemplar, as 
instantiations of an idea, they must first be collected into an articulated 
unity. Only if they are so collected can that unity, the logical structure, 
or way in which a thing is put together, be conceived as a subsisting 
exemplar or idea according to which a thing is made, where this conception 
originates the notion of the ratio in the mind of God according to which a 
creaturum is constructed. The collectedness into the unity of an 
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articulated structure is thus basic to the notion of the divine ratio 
incarnating or instantiating itself within that which is, and the collecting 
into such a unity is basic to the notion of its revealing its operation in 
the understanding of that which is. 
The gathering principle, for the Greeks, is the unifying law of the 
being of a being, the law that constitutes and reigns over the inner 
structure of a being so as to make it what it is as a unitary entity. 
Because the manifestness of that which is, the being of a being - its 
truth - is given in this gathering, it is the gathering principle that 
gives truth and is the origin of truth. The gathering of the logos is the 
truth or manifestation of being, then, without which no thing could be. 
This manifestation, in the sense of both manifesting and manifestness, of 
being, i. e. the logos, is not something other to being. It is not an 
external medium of revelation, but the unified-unifying principle of being, 
identical with being. What is gathered and revealed in the gathering is 
nothing other than being, the collectedness of what-is, and what gathers 
into the gathering is also nothing other than being, the collecting of 
what-is. 
Whatever it may have meant in the beginning, the Johannine notion of 
Christ as the logos or Word of God comes to be identified, to some extent, 
with the ratio of God containing the rationes of things, through which God 
is mediated to the. world and 'spoken', revealed, in and by that world. To 
this extent, the conception of the logos as the gathered-gathering 
principle of revelation is original to the conception of the Christ-logos. 
If being were not primally gathered and gathering in such a way that its 
manifestation consisted in the law, the binding and unifying log-ic, of 
this gathering, no such conception could be founded. When Bonaventure 
seeks the ultimate ratio of things, that by which and from which (quare), 
they are what they are, what he seeks is not an empirical cause, but 
precisely this gathering and unifying principle which holds all creature 
together. 
For early Greek thought, the nature of the order of rank established 
by and within the overpowering power of being as physis and logos is 
given, according to Heidegger, in the Greek word dike To translate this 
word in the customary manner as Gerechtigkeit ['justice'], where 'justice' is 
understood in a juristic, moral sense, is, for Heidegger, to lose its 
fundamental metaphysical content. Heidegger translates it instead with the 
term Fug, and, in giving his definition of this term, he exploits the 
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connotations it can have, or be given, by virtue of its association with a 
cluster of other terms that contain it as a root: 
Wir verstehen hier Fug zuerst im Sinne von Fuge and 
efüge; sodann Fug als Fügung, als die Weisung die das Uberwalti 
ende seinem Walten gibt; schließlich Fug als das 
fügende Gefüge, das Einfügung and Sichfügung erzwingt. 
[Here we understand Fug first in the sense of joint and 
framework; then as decree, dispensation, a directive that 
the overpowering imposes on its reign; finally, as the 
governing structure which compels adaptation and 
compliance. ] (EM, 168/160) 
Dike is the overpowering decree and the decree of the overpowering power. 
It gives the directive that orders the structure of beings and orders 
beings into that structure. The word thus belongs, along with physis and 
logos, to the delimitation of being corresponding to the experience of 
being among the early Greek thinkers. Das Sein, the f6atg, Ist als Walten 
ursprüngliche Gesammeltheit: A6yos, ist fügender Fug; Sixq ['Being, physis, 
as power, is basic and original togetherness: logos, it is governing order: 
dike'] (EM, 169/160). Such words give, or are, the correspondence between 
being and early Greek Dasein. 
What is the same for this Dasein and the medieval Dasein of 
Bonaventure on this point is the notion of an imposing order which is both 
structure and command. Bonaventure's Word, too, is a directive and 'a 
governing structure which compels adaptation and compliance', and it 
functions in this way in every region of being, since it is the overarching 
ordering principle of what-is in totality. 
The understanding of this harmony, which gives the whatness of all 
that is, also involves an implicit understanding of nothing, since it could 
not arise without the understanding of the possibility that things could 
not be what they are, and so that the whole of what is could not be what 
it is in its harmonious order. There are laws that determine it to be 
such, but there could also not be such laws, and there could be dis-order. 
That, at the level of the deep structure of each thing, the level, also, of 
the overarching structure of all things, there is not disorder but order, 
is, for Bonaventure, a function of the power that orders the being of 
beings, and so orders it to be such as it is and not otherwise. 
One word that stands opposed to dike for early Greek Dasein is 
technas. Heidegger interprets the essential meaning of this word to be not 
art or craft or skilled making of any sort, but knowledge (Wissen). As 
knowledge, technO5 is a power which opposes, in the sense of confronts, the 
overpowering power of being as dike in any given being. It is, moreover, 
the capability to bring that power to a stand, and thereby into appearance, 
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by setting it into (al work: Wissen ist das Ins- Werk-setzen-ktnnen des 
Seins als eines je so and so Seienden ('Knowledge is the ability to put 
into work the being of any particular being') (EM, 168/159). Art is 
especially techne well das Kunst das Sein, d. h. das in sich dastehende 
Erscheinen, am unmittelbarsten fin einem Anwesenden Um Werk)J zum Stehen 
bringt ('because art is what most immediately brings being (i. e. the 
appearing that stands there in itself) to stand, stabilizes it in something 
present (the work)'] (EM, 168/159). However, the conflict of power (deinon) 
in which the violence of techne breaks out against the overpowering power 
of dike, is never of such a sort that techne could be said to master or 
rule over dike, for dike, as governing order, always orders techne as well 
(EM, 169/160-1). This confrontation can occur at all only insofar as 
Dasein occurs, since the power of techne, the ability to bring the being of 
beings to a stand and thus into manifestation by setting it into a work is 
only given with the entity that stands before beings in such a way that 
their being is manifest for it. That this entity should occur, though, is 
itself the work of being. Dasein, as the space for the disclosure of 
being, is a mortal breach (Bresche) which is itself posited by the superior 
power of being in order to reveal itself as what-is, i. e. in beings (EM, 
171-2/162-3). 
Bonaventure's mens is also, although in a different way, posited by a 
superior power for. the sake of its own revelation in beings. It is 
created by God as a minor mundus reflecting the world as a reflection of 
God. Insofar as an 'artificial' product of mens, for instance, music, 
reveals the being of beings, and in so doing, reveals the superior power 
that reigns over and through beings, it is enabled to do so because it is 
itself structured by the structure of being, the structure whose relations 
are given, for Bonaventure, in number. Every revealing act of man - and, 
for Bonaventure, every act of man must in some sense be a revealing - is 
disposed over by the commanding order of the Word, and this includes all 
making, all setting into work. The notion of violence, though, plays no 
part in Bonaventure's conception of either the power that decrees and 
orders, or the (human) power that responds and corresponds to this order, 
and receives its own power from it. The commanding power is all-powerful, 
but it is not violent, and the human power commanded by it reveals not by 
confrontation and opposition, but by joyful and patient, although by no 
means effortless, reception. 
Heidegger's discussion of the reciprocal relation between techne and 
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dike, which proceeds through an analysis of the first chorus of Sophocles' 
Antigone, takes place in the wider context of a reflection upon 
Parmenides' saying, to gar auto noein estin to kai einai, commonly, and, 
Heidegger says, crudely and inappropriately, translated as Dasselbe aber 
ist das Denken und das Sein ['thinking and being are the same'] (EM, 
145/136). Discussing how this translation misinterprets the saying, 
Heidegger points out: 1) that noein is not 'thinking' as the activity of a 
human subject, but Vernehmung ['apprehension'] as aufnehmendes Zum-stehen- 
bringen des sich zeigenden in sich Ständigen ['the receptive bringing-to- 
stand of the intrinsically permanent that manifests itself'], 2) that to 
auto does not mean leere Einerleiheit ('empty indifference'], but Einheit 
('unity'] in the sense of Zusammengehörigkeit des Gegenstrebigen ('the 
belonging-together of antagonisms'], and 3) that einai is not being as 
objectivity, the representation of the thinking power of man, but physis as 
the emerging power to which Vernehmung belongs and in whose power 
Vernehmung participates, so that Vernehmung geschieht umwillen des Seins 
('apprehension occurs for the sake of being'], and not vice versa. Being is 
only there when there is disclosure, and Vernehmung occurs for the sake of 
the disclosure of being and by means of the power of that disclosure (EM, 
146-7/137-9). Vernehmung is thus not a power (Vermögen) or attribute 
(Eigenschaft) which man has, but a happening (Geschehnis) which 'has' man 
(EM, 149-50/141). 
When Heidegger returns to this saying of Parmenides after his 
discussion of the first chorus of Antigare, he claims that the bond, the 
belonging together (Zusammengehörigkeit), of noein and einei spoken of in 
the saying is nothing other than the relation between dike and technd (EM, 
174/165). In dem dichterisch gesagten Wechselbezug von 5(xq und rLeXvq, he 
says, steht Sfxq für das Sein des Seienden Im Ganzen ['In the poetic 
relation between dike and technd, dike stands for the being of what-is as 
a whole']. For Parmenides, das Sein ist als Sfxq der Schlüssel zum 
Seienden in seinem Gefüge ['being as dike is the key to what-is in its 
structure'] in that das Seiende eröffnet nur, indem der Fug des Seins 
gewahrt und bewahrt wird ['what-is discloses itself only insofar as the 
structure of being is guarded and preserved'] (EM, 175/166). In noein, on 
the other hand, in der Vernehmung als dem hin-nehmenden Vor-nehmen das 
Seiende als solches aufgeschlossen wird und so in the Unverborgenheit her- 
vor-kommt ['in apprehension as ac-cepting anticipation what-is as such is 
disclosed and so comes forth from concealment'] (EM, 175/167). Moreover, 
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Vernehmung characterised as Aufnahme-stellung für das Erscheinen des 
Seienden ['a receptive attitude toward the appearing of what-is'] is kein 
bloßer Vorgang, sondern Ent-scheidung ['apprehension is no mere process, 
but de-cision'] (EM, 176/167). It is a differentiating discernment, fOr das 
Sein gegen das Nichts and somit Auseinandersetzung mit dem Schein ['For 
being against nothing and thus a struggle with appearance'], and this de- 
cision must use violence im Vollzug and Aushalten gegen the ständig 
andrängende Verstrickung im Alltäglichen and Gewöhnlichen ['if it is to 
persevere against the continuous pressure of involvement in the everyday 
and commonplace'] (EM, 177/168). Thus, noein is a kind of technd. It is a 
violent struggle with einei as dikA with being as the overpowering power 
that establishes the power of knowledge for the sake of its own disclosure 
and brings that power into confrontation with itself, while yet remaining 
master over it so that the disclosure might occur in an appropriate way. 
The disclosive power of knowledge is established, for Bonaventure, by 
the Word of God. It is established by the ratio aeterna that grants the 
laws of both mens and world. Understanding proceeds according to the rule 
of this ratio, and, as in Heidegger's interpretation of Parmenides' noein, it 
is not an autonomous power of man, but a receptive discernment of 'the 
intrinsically permanent that manifests itself'. But what is most permanent 
for Boanventure is the ratio aeterna itself, the ratio of all rationes. 
This means that understanding proceeds by the power of the Word for the 
sake of the Word. Since the Word is the revelation of God, it can be said 
that thinking is made appropriate or proper to God through the Word and 
for the sake of God's self-disclosure. God, for Bonaventure, is being 
itself, and the Word of being itself commands both wens and that which 
mens apprehends. Basically, the similarity between Bonaventure and 
[Heidegger's] Parmenides here lies in the notion that the power of 
disclosure is not something human standing apart from being, but is itself 
made possible, and ruled over in its structure, by the power and governing 
order of being. Thinking belongs to being. 
Thus, the prior disclosure of the structure of being necessary for 
the revelation of beings is not a function of the a priori structure of an 
isolated subject. Indeed, Bonaventure's ratio aeterna is too 'prior' to be 
determined as an a priori structure of the subject, because it will 
necessarily determine any such determination. There is no stance from 
which it could be determined as 'subjective', since it always rules over 
the subject, and the object, being prior to them both. This prior 
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disclosure permits the revelation of beings, and it belongs to and within 
the order of being. 
In addition, true apprehension requires, for Bonaventure as for 
Parmenides, a receptiveness which is not wholly passive but de-cisive. 
The decisiveness consists in the struggle against the everyday appearance 
in which the truth of beings is hidden, in which the being of beings is 
not explicitly differentiated from beings and discerned in its nature 
through the difference. Without the discernment granted by this 
differentiation, Bonaventure's God cannot appear. Once again, this 
discernment does not, for Bonaventure, involve violence, but it does involve 
application and struggle. 
Heidegger elaborates upon the point that noein as a kind of techne is 
a struggle with einei as dike by examining another sentence of Parmenides. 
Chre to legein to noein t'eon emmenal. At this point in Einführung in the 
Metaphysik, Heidegger translates this sentence as: ))Not tut das 
gesammelte Hinstellen sowohl als das Vernehmen von diesem: das Seiend 
fist) Sein« ('Needful is the gathered setting-forth as well as the 
apprehension of this: what-is (is) being']. Needful, then, are logos and 
Vernehmung, but logos must, in this case, be differentiated from logos as 
physis, the collecting collectedness of being. The logos is in this case 
the power that gathers together the gatheredness of being. It does this 
by collecting itself out of, and thus turning away from, dispersion into 
the impermanent and confusion in appearance, while gathering itself 
together upon, and thus turning towards, Fug, dike, the governing order of 
being. This gathering is logos as need "(Not), as opposed to logos as 
physic (EM, 178/169). However, insofar as it is dike that brings about the 
concentration of this power towards itself, and insofar as that which is 
concentrated upon is itself the logos (the collectedness of being as 
physis) and insofar as man is hurled into the need that constitutes his 
essence as Dasein by the superior power of being, it is the need of being 
as logos, dike, physic which makes needful the legein, techne, noein of man. 
The ratio of mens, in Bonaventure's conception, apprehends the ratio 
of being. This apprehension requires, precisely, that mens gather itself 
out of customary dispersion in beings and concentrate upon what is 
permanently one in beings. The gathering together into one on the side of 
mens is what enables the apprehension of what is permanently gathered 
into one on the side of being, but, more fundamentally, it is the 
primordial gathering of being itself, the Word, which. calls forth and 
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enables the self-gathering of mess. 
In his discussion of Parmenides in another, considerably later, work, 
Was heißt Denken?, Heidegger translates the chrd of the sentence Ghre to 
legein to noein t'eon emmenai not as Not tut but as Es brauchet ['It is 
useful'] (WhD, 115/188). Brauchen, to use, is here: Einlassen in des 
Wesen, ist Wahrung im Wesen ['to let <something> enter into its essential 
nature, to keep it safe in its essence'], and der Brauch is der Anspruch, 
daß etwas in sein Wesen eingelassen werde and das Brauchen nicht davon 
ablasse ['the summons which demands that a thing be admitted to its own 
essence and nature, and that the use keep to it'] (WhD, 114/187. Authentic 
use, Heidegger says, is not a matter of mere utilizing and needing. It is 
rarely manifest, and is generally not the business of mortals. Rather, im 
günstigen Fall sind Sterbliche vom Schein des Brauchens bescheinen 
['mortals are at best illumined by the radiance of use'] (WhD, 115/187). 
In Der Spruch des Anaximander, Heidegger also translates 
Anaximander's to chreon, usually translated with Notwendigkeit, 'necessity', 
as der Brauch, 'usage'. Here usage is said to be a granting or 
apportioning (Erteilen) of shares or portions (Anteile), in which what is 
present is granted the portion of its Weile ['while' or 'lingering'], the 
share of its duration between arrival and departure. Usage orders or 
enjoins (verfügt) present beings into the 'jointure', (Fuge) of their while, 
i. e. into the 'between' of the twofold absence of arrival and departure, and 
thus delivers them into their presence. As the apportioning of the portion 
of Jointure, usage is das zuschickende Fügen: the Verfügung des Fugs ['the 
fateful Joining: the enjoining of order'] (Hw 363/54). It is the sending 
which ordains and decrees the jointure of each being, and the joining of 
beings one to another. It is the destining of dike 
This_ destining bounds and confines, de-termines and de-limits (be- 
endet and be-grenzt) what is present with respect to its presence. Usage 
is then the handing out of the limits or boundaries (Grenze) of the being 
of beings. It delimits the Wesen, the abiding presence, of beings, the 
'essence' of beings when being is thought through time. The essence of 
usage consists in its destining the fitting limits delimiting what-is at 
any given time, for it sends die Grenze der Weile dem je-weilig Anwesenden 
[the 'boundaries of the while to whatever lingers awhile in presence']. 
Because usage itself comes to, and abides in, presence as this fateful 
dispenser of delimiting limits, usage is itself delimited as unlimited. It 
is ohne Grenze ['without boundaries'] (Hw, 363/54). 
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Since the 'whiling', the enduring in presence, of beings, gives their 
being in essence, their essenc-ing, and since usage, to chreon, sends and 
preserves, destines, this essenc-ing, usage is das Wesende Im Sein selbst 
['essential presencing in being itself'] (Hw, 363/53). Understood in this 
way, Anaximander's to chreon birgt in sich das noch ungehobene Wesen des 
lichtend-bergenden Versammelns ['harbors the still hidden essence of the 
gathering which clears and shelters']. It is the gathering, the logos, from 
whose essence the essence of being is determined as the unifying one, the 
hen. 
Parmenides thinks the unity of this unifying one as moire, and moire 
is itself hidden in to chreon as apportionment. Moira is the dispensing of 
portions to which both gods and men are subordinated and subject (Hw, 
364/55). For Parmenides, it is the destining of being, the fateful 
gathered-gathering apportionment of presence, the in sich gesammelte und 
also entfaltende -Schickung des Anwesens als Anwesen von Anwesendem ('the 
dispensation of presenting, as the presencing of what is present, which is 
gathered in itself and therefore unfolds of itself') (VA III, 48-9/97). 
Here, 'being', eon, is the duality of being as the presenting of what is 
present, a duality into which being is destined by moire. As 
apportionment, moire dispenses, provides and presents, through the 
destining of this duality. 
In that the disclosure of this duality, the destining of being into 
the duality, is what permits or bestows the presenting of what Is present, 
it is also what permits the disclosure of truth. Truth is the opening 
within which the being of a being, the being in its being, is revealed and 
becomes visible, and it is therefore dependant in its origin upon the 
unfolding of the twofold of being given by moire. This does not mean, 
however, that in the event of the unfolding of the twofold, the event 
itself is revealed as such. On the contrary, in the destiny of being, 
according to Heidegger, the event of this unfolding, and so the origin of 
truth, remain veiled. 
Im Geschick der Zwiefalt gelangen jedoch nur das Anwesen 
ins Scheinen und das Anwesende zum Erscheinen. Das 
Geschick behält die Zwiefalt als solche und vollends ihre 
Entfaltung Im Verborgenen. Das Wesen der AX9Oeta bleibt 
verhüllt. Die von ihr gewährte Sichtbarkeit läßt das 
Anwesen des Anwesenden as »Aussehen« (stbo) und als 
»Gesicht« (t5ga) aufgehen. Demgemäß bestimm sich die 
vernehmende Beziehung zum Anwesen des Anwesenden als ein 
Sehen (etUUvat). Das von der visio her geprägte Wissen und 
dessen Evidenz können auch dort ihre esensherkunft aus 
der lichtenden Entbergen nicht verleugnen, wo die Wahrheit 
sich in die Gestalt der Gewißheit des Selbstbewußtseins 
gewandelt hat. Das lumen naturals, das natürliche Licht, 
d. h. hier die Erleuchtung der Vernunft, setzt schon die 
Erstbergung der Zwiefalt voraus. Das Gleiche gilt von der 
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augustinischen and von der mittelalterlichen Lichttheorie, die, von ihrer platonischen Herkunft ganz zu schweigen, nur im Bereich der schon im Geschick der Zwiefalt waltenden AXE6eta ihren möglichen Spielraum finden können. 
[In the destining of duality, however, only presenting 
attains a shining, and only what is present attains 
appearance. Destiny altogether conceals both the duality 
as such and its unfolding. The essence of <aletheiay 
remains veiled, The visibility it bestows allows the 
presencing of what is present to arise as outer appearance < eidos>, and aspect <idea>. Consequently the perceptual 
relation to the presencing of what is present is defined 
as 'seeing' <eidenai>, Stamped with this character of 
vislcý knowled a and the evidence of knowledge cannot 
renounce the[r essentials derivation from luminous disclosure, even where truth has been transformed into the 
certainty of self-consciousness. Lumen naturale, natural light, i. e. the illumination of reason, already resupposes the disclosure of the duality. The same holds 
true 
of the Augustinian and medieval views of light - not to mention their Platonic origins - which could only develop under the tutelage of an < aletheia> already reigning in the destiny of the duality. ] (VA III, 48/97) 
As already indicated, the ordering power of the Word in Bonaventure's 
understanding gives the order of what-is as a whole, so that there is no 
region of being which has not been ordered by it. Consequently, the order 
of every aspect of the world manifests this power. The same ordering 
power is thus manifest in the essences of things and in the history of the 
world, which Bonaventure sees through the eyes of faith. The way that 
beings have been ordered to be, in whatever region they are considered, is 
said to manifest the 'wisdom' and 'goodness' of this ordering power, the 
providence of God. The qualities belonging to the notion of providence then 
articulate the principle of the ordering power, evident in all that is 
ordered, which is to say, in all that is. This evidence is not immediate. 
The ratio of history, identical with the ratio of all that is, binds the 
view which sees through to the end. Such a view is given, for 
Bonaventure, only in revelation. Faith holds to it as the substance of 
what is hoped for, and the evidence of what is not seen. 
For the early Greek thinkers, on the other hand, the governing order 
of being is dike, which Heidegger translates not in the customary way as 
'justice', but as Fug, the rule and directive given by the overpowering 
power which decrees the structure of all that is and compels compliance 
with that decree. It is this same directive that rules over the coming 
and going of beings, their temporal and historical order, and it is 
enjoined by chreon, the apportioning of portions, by moire, the destining of 
being. The Christian notion of providential design is clearly a long way 
from these Greek conceptions of necessity and destiny. But common to both 
is the idea of an overpowering power which enjoins and sends, destines, 
59 
the order of beings, an, order in which the apparent disorder of beings is 
itself ordered, and thus surpassed and subsumed. Through such destining, 
this power reveals itself in beings, but as other to them. 
With respect to the dispensing of portions in which what is present 
is granted the while of its presence, and is thus delimited or bounded 
into the fittingness of this while, the otherness of that which dispenses 
manifests itself under the characteristic of the unbounded, the unlimited. 
For Bonaventure, the being that dispenses to beings the proper boundaries 
of their being in every respect, thereby bringing them into the appropriate 
limits of their bounded, finite, essence, reveals itself in opposition to 
these beings, and therefore through them, as infinite. Insofar as this 
infinitude is thought with a view to time, such a being is also conceived 
as eternal, 'Eternal' can, in turn, be conceived either as infinite 
perdurance or as timelessness. In the former case, it might be thought 
that the being possessing the most being is also the one that lasts the 
longest, the being with the greatest while, so that the greatest 
conceivable being is the one with the greatest conceivable while, i. e. is 
'everlasting'. In the latter case, the greatest conceivable being, as the 
one which gives to each thing its time or 'while', does not itself have a 
time, but is 'beyond' time, timeless. 
The view of time involved in the original differentiation of the 
duality of presence. and what is present, a differentiation which Heidegger 
seeks to make visible through an appropriative analysis of the earliest 
Greek thought, lies, according to Heidegger, at the basis of the temporal 
regionalisation of being in the entire history of Western thought. It is 
because being is conceived as presence, and because presence is thought of 
as persistence, endurance in time, that that which endures the longest 
comes to be conceived as that which is most in being. The evaluation of 
beings according to the magnitude of their being as duration, the length 
of their while in presence, is prepared for originally in the distinction of 
rank and power according to permanence and predominance of presence, and 
according to the capacity to see what predominates in permanence of 
presence. 
Because of this distinction, the identity of structure which gives the 
unity of a kind of being in that it yields the common look, the eidos that 
maintains itself through the changes and variations and so has a kind of 
permanence, comes to have a priority of being over the various beings that 
manifest the look. This permanence, the manifest steadiness of the look 
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that appears time after time, as opposed to the unsteadiness of the things 
that can be seen to come and go in time, forms the starting point for the 
differentiation between the 'timeless' idea, the 'universal', and the 
'temporal' thing, the 'particular', and the identification of permanent 
presence with being originates and sustains the ontological evaluation of 
the members of this duality. Insofar as the regions of 'created' and 
'uncreated' are identified with these two regions, then, the differentiation 
between them, as well as the evaluation of them with respect to one 
another, rests upon the original' evaluative differentiation of this basic 
temporal duality. 
The look that appears time after time, in various instances, 
eventually becomes the universal that gathers particular things into the 
unity of a group. Without this primal gathering, given by the repetition 
of the look in distinction from what presents the look, the particular 
thing could not be named in its being. It could not be defined. The 
gathering of the fleeting thing into the steadiness of what comes to be 
called the universal is thus what enables the thing to be comprehended and 
spoken of as what it is. If this is the case, the unconcealment of beings 
in their being requires this differentiation, this duality, in which the 
while of the steady look is distinguished from the while of what presents 
the look in passing. The steady look is originally given, however, by the 
gathering of being as logos, The gathering is therefore original to noein 
and legein. It is the original 'speaking' of being which calls forth or 
evokes the corresponding word of human being. 
For Bonaventure, what grants the intelligibility necessary for naming 
and definition is the archetype in the mind of God, instantiated in the 
thing and comprehended by the intellect according to the infallible rules 
of the ratio aeterna. This archetype is, in its universality, the ratio of 
God. It is the knowledge and speech of God, the logos as the Word. The 
most universal is the ratio comprehending all rationes, the ratio which, as 
has been said, is visible in the world as proportionality, the permanent 
and everywhere visible structure of the world whose relations are given in 
number. This, for Bonaventure, is the most predominant and the steadiest, 
for it manifests itself and recurs in all that is, in the things of nature 
as well as in knowledge, art, and music. 
Because the gathering of the logos sustains knowledge, and because it 
comes to be associated with the idea as the common structure known by 
the intellect, the gathering itself comes to be conceived as something 
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intellectual. For Bonaventure, a ratio is a mental entity, although not 
yet something 'subjective', and the ratio of God, consubstantial with the 
being of God, is purely intellectual and wholly 'spiritual'. The region of 
the spiritual is not here primarily the region of human consciousness, but 
the region of those entities which, while involved with change and 
particularity, and thus with 'matter', to the extent that they manifest 
themselves in conjunction with entities subject to mutation and decay, are 
yet other to these and 'incorruptible', in that they do not themselves move 
and change in the same way as 'material' beings. The delimitation of the 
spiritual as the unchanging and incorruptible itself rests, then, upon the 
temporal duality spoken of above. 
As Heidegger sees it, the history of this duality, a duality into 
which being is destined, is, however, one in which the original difference 
is forgotten. One mode of this forgetting can be seen, according to 
Heidegger, in the transformation into a being of that which maintains 
itself as other to beings in the difference. In this case, the 'other' 
becomes the highest being, the divine being, and its characters become the 
'attributes of God'. Without passing any judgement at this point 
regarding Heidegger's own view of this kind of representation as a 
forgetting of being, it is- clear that, to some extent at least, this is 
precisely how Bonaventure conceives the otherness of this other. For 
example, with respect to the temporal distinction mentioned above, the 
characteristics which Heidegger thinks are originally the temporal 
characteristics of being as presence, viz. duration and steadiness, are 
represented as the properties of God, so that God is conceived as 
unchanging and eternal. Whatever then manifests these properties, for 
instance, the unchanging ratio of that which is not itself unchanging, is 
understood as in some way identical with the being of God. 
This point can be made with. respect to all of the names and 
attributes of the God known through the world as other to the world, e. g. 
essence, presence, power, plenitude, origin, principle, and light. The 
conception of God under these determinations rests, originally, upon the 
basic duality or differentiation that Heidegger describes. Only if such 
determinations can be distinguished from beings in such a way as to appear 
other to them, without yet necessarily coming to presence apart from them, 
is it possible to attribute them to a divinity that manifests itself, under 
these attributes, within beings while remaining different from them. The 
difference between God, conceived in this way, and creatures rests, then, 
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upon the differentiation of being from beings, as Heidegger suggests. Only 
if it is possible to distinguish being, for instance, as essence, power, or 
presence, from beings, is it possible to pose the question of the being of 
beings in such a way that God can appear at its limits as existing 
uncircumscribed in all things by essence, power, and presence. Only on the 
basis of this distinction, furthermore, can a relationship between the two 
be posited, for instance, of causality or exemplification. But the notion 
that God is in this case represented as a being is questionable. While 
Bonaventure, along with other medieval theologians, does sometimes speak 
of God as a being, he also claims that God is actually being itself. I 
cannot expand upon this point here, except to indicate that it forms the 
subject of 
.a 
later chapter. 
It is also questionable whether, in conceptions like those of 
Bonaventure, the 'difference' between being and beings is 'forgotten'. 
Heidegger thinks of this difference historically, as a 'destiny' in which 
the members of the duality are interpreted in various ways over the course 
of time. This kind of thinking, which Heidegger calls seinsgeschichtlich, 
is obviously quite foreign to the medieval mind. Having said that, 
however, I fail to see how, at any time when the relation between the one 
and the many has been- a matter of thought within the Western 
philosophical tradition, as it often has, it can be said that the 
'difference' between being and beings does not come to light. The tendency 
to reify being, to turn it into a being, may obscure this difference, and 
obscure as well the kind of identity which forms the other moment in this 
dialectic. But that reification is not so much a specific historical 
phenomenon as a basic tendency of the human mind, a tendency against 
which many Western thinkers have struggled. " I also fail to see how the 
Platonic theory of illumination, and the Augustinian and medieval notions 
that originate from it, are so very different from Heidegger's own notion 
of truth as 'luminous disclosure'. In this instance, then, Heidegger's 
analysis appears to be more of a retrieval than an overcoming. I do not 
mean to suggest that Heidegger is just repeating what some of these other 
thinkers have said, that his thought is unoriginal. It is, I believe, both 
original and highly valuable, but one can maintain this while still 
challenging the notion that Heidegger's break with the tradition is so 
radical at every point that he is no longer involved in the same 
philosophical conversation. 
On the other hand, I also do not want to deny. that many of the 
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traditional philosophical and theological notions which Bonaventure, for 
instance, maintains are now unacceptable and, at the very least, in need 
need of revision. My point here is only that, in the task of thinking 
about God and being in the present, the early Greek thinkers do not have a 
monopoly on buried possibilities. There are many more suggestive and 
potentially fruitful thoughts within the philosophical tradition than some 
of Heidegger's grand (and often grandiose) evaluative overviews of the 
history of philosophy would seem to imply. 
Turning now to the issue of man's relation to the twofold, if the 
sentence chre to legein to noein t'eon emmenai is heard as Heidegger hears 
it, and if it is kept in mind that the sentence simultaneously concerns the 
essence of being and the essence of man, then, with respect to the essence 
of man, the sentence says that the use of man which determines his 
essence, the use to which he is destined by the destining in which usage 
sends him into his essence and preserves that essence, is the legein and 
noein, the gathering and apprehending, of the twofold: eon emmenai, 
beings: being. This usage delimits man as the being he is, the being that 
stands in the clearing of the twofold, the clearing of truth. Since this 
clearing appropriates the essence of man so as to bring to presence and 
preserve the truth of being, i. e. truth itself, essential truth, the destiny 
of man and the destiny of being are one. They belong together in 
essential correspondence within the unfolding of the duality of 
beings: being, the unfolding that bestows the revelation of truth. Truth is 
given and preserved in the speaking of language, in the legein of the 
logos, where human legein is the echo of the legein of being, a hearing 
corresponding to the claim of being as logos. For this reason, the destiny 
of being and man are bound up with the destiny of language, and the 
essence of man as the one used for the truth of being belongs to the 
speaking of language as the speaking of being. 
In Heidegger's interpretation of early Greek thought, the 
differentiation of the regions supported by the difference is considered as 
a need involving the essence of man. This need places man in a perpetual 
decision, a decision for being against appearance. The hearing 
correspondence to the logos, the receptive and accepting anticipation of 
noein, and the bringing-to-stand by setting-into-work of techna are all 
responses to this need, a need imposed upon the essence of man by the 
power which establishes it for the sake of its own appearance. For 
Bonaventure, the passage from the world to the source, of the world, God, 
64 
also requires a decision, and it is a decision to which wens is called by 
the power which makes it and the world what they are. This power is 
manifest in the world and calls upon the mind to see it there in its 
immanence and transcendence, in its presence in, and difference from, what 
it has made to be. In its own way, it, too, like the logos of Heraclitus, 
calls for the comprehension as one of that which is permanently collected 
as one, for it calls for the vision of that which is the same in all. 
The disclosure of the essence of man as the one who corresponds to 
the claim of being as logos stands at the beginning of Western history and 
is decisive for that history. In Einführung in the Metaphysik Heidegger 
had summarised the essence of man as revealed in the words of the early 
Greek thinkers in a formula of his own devising: physis = logos anthröpon 
ech7n: das Sein, das überwältigende Erscheinen, ernätigt die Sammlung, die 
das Menschsein (acc. ) innehat and gründet ['being, overpowering appearing, 
necessitates the gathering which pervades and grounds being-human']. The 
decisiveness of this determination for the West does not consist in its 
being handed down in its original form, however, but in the profound shift 
that takes place in the consequent definition of man as das vernünftige 
Lebewesen, 'the rational animal'. This determination is summed up in the 
formula, anthr6pos = zOion logon echon: der Mensch, das Lebewesen, das the 
Vernunft als Ausstattung hat ['man, the animal equipped with reason'] (EM, 
185/175), in which the logos becomes a faculty of man as the best kind of 
animal. The logos eventually becomes ratiq and ratio comes to be seen as 
a court of judgement deciding over being. 
In Bonaventure's understanding, man is certainly the rational animal, 
and the distinctiveness and superiority of being human rests in this. 
However, reason is nonetheless not, for Bonaventure, a court of judgement 
deciding over being, but is itself still decided over by being. Human 
reason apprehends the Word, to which the human word is a corresponding 
response, an echo. And reason, as a human faculty, is not autonomous and 
isolated, not something standing in itself over against being in itself, but 
is a power whose power is constantly granted, and ruled over, by the same 
Word that it apprehends, by the governing order of what-is as a whole. 
The distinctiveness of being human, then, resides, for Bonaventure, in a 
revealing and bringing to word enabled, ultimately, not by human reason, 
but by that which sends reason and sends itself to reason in revealing and 
speaking itself. Man is brought into the truth of his essence through 
correspondence to this sending, and this correspondence requires both an 
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effortful turning-away, and a concentrated turning-towards. No violence is 
involved in this usage, though, in the way that the superior power 
governing the world calls the mind to the manifestation of itself in and 
through the world. What is required in response to the draw, the pull, of 
this power is also not violent, but is simply an open concentration of all 
the powers of the soul, of vision, hearing, and passion, of eye, ear and 
heart. It is to this form of receptivity, which is yet not passivity, not 
sleep but 'wakefulness, that the correspondence to the Word definitive of 
the human essence is granted. 
Ratio also comes to be seen, of 'course, as ground or cause, the 
reason that something is and is the way it is, and philosophy, as 
metaphysics, becomes the rational search for the ground of beings. 
According to Heidegger, it then becomes onto-theo-logic, looking towards 
the the ground of beings as that which is common to every being (onto- 
logic), and looking towards this ground in terms of the highest being as 
the first cause and ultimate reason of all beings (theo-logic) (see ID, 56, 
69/52,63). The- search for ground in the latter sense signals, for 
Heidegger, the entry of the concept of God into philosophy. This is theo- 
logic as the 'science of God', the speculative knowledge of God as ultimate 
ground which Heidegger distinguishes from theology as the 'science of 
faith', the conceptual knowledge and articulation of that which is 
disclosed in faith. 
As already stated, the God of onto- theo- logic, the God of philosophy, 
which metaphysics represents as the highest and self-caused cause, the 
causa su. Z has, for Heidegger, nothing to do with the God of faith, or, for 
that matter, with the göttliche Gott before which human beings worship and 
pray. 
Zu diesem Gott [i. e. the God of metaphysics] kann der 
Mensch weder beten, noch kann er ihm opfern. Vor der 
Causa sui kann der Mensch weder aus Scheu ins Knie fallen, 
noch kann er vor diesem Gott musizieren und tanzen. 
[Man may neither pray to this God, nor may he sacrifice to him. Confronted by Causa sui man may neither sink onto his knees nor could he sing and dance. ] (ID, 64/65) 
The God which the Western metaphysical tradition represents as the summ um 
. ens and ultima ratio 
is, then, an ungodly God. This ungodly God has, in 
turn, arisen as a result of the oblivion of being (Seinsvergessenheit) in 
the West, which is simultaneously a forgetting of the ontico-ontological 
difference, the difference between beings and being. In the 
ontotheological representation of God, this forgetting manifests itself in 
the transformative deterioration of the ontico-ontological difference into 
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the difference between God, as the highest being - the being which is, to 
be sure, 'most in being, but which, for all that, is still a being and 
therefore an object capable being represented - and all other beings. This 
is the difference between the one object represented as a Gauss sui 
causing all things, and the remaining objects that make up what-is as a 
whole, represented as effects of the one self-caused cause. In 
Heidegger's view, such a God is neither worthy of belief, nor capable of 
being worshipped, and, insofar as the 'death of God' means, among other 
things, the deterioration of God into this concept, a concept under which 
God cannot live, it is precisely those theologians who dabble in 
ontotheologic that have brought the event about. 
Bonaventure's God is decidedly, in some sense, an ontotheological God. 
It is a first cause. It is pure mind, and it contains exemplars. The 
prime exemplar it contains is number, so this is even a mathematical 
metaphysical God. What could be worse? And yet this metaphysical God is 
apprehended in delight and wonder. Through this apprehension, the God is 
seen, not inferred, beheld, not proven. The language of seeing cannot 
simply be dismissed as a misconception, because it is not simply a 
conception, but articulates an experience. Before the God of this 
experience, it is by all means possible, and appropriate, to fall to one's 
knees in awe, to pray and worship, to offer and to sacrifice. Indeed, for 
Bonaventure, thought itself. even as science, even as metaphysical science, 
is a kind of sacrifice, a religious duty and a form of piety. 'E' As for 
playing music and dancing, what could be a more fitting, a more 
corresponding, response to a God who makes all things beautiful and 
delightful by making them rhythmical? If this is a metaphysical God, it is 
one that is neither pale nor lifeless. Rather, like Aristotle's original 
uncaused cause, this God has a pulse, is pulse. 
Thus, Bonaventure's God, as seen in and through the visible world, is 
a godly God, a sacred God, because this God is known from within a form of 
disclosure appropriate to the uncovering of the sacred and the holy, 
namely, from within that rapture in which mens is held before the world 
while yet transported beyond the world to its other. That Bonaventure 
speaks of this other in terms that bring to mind Heidegger's criticisms of 
the God of a certain kind of theology does not mean that he speaks from 
outside of this transportation, that his understanding is 'speculative' 
rather than 'experiential', or, alternatively, 'rational' rather than 
'mystical'. Whatever philosophy and theology may become. in a later age, in 
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the Middle Ages, as Heidegger points out in a very early work, such a 
divide is not appropriate: 
Besinnt man sich auf das tiefere, weltanschauliche Wesen 
der Philosophie, dann muß auch die Auffassung der 
christlichen Philosophie des Mittelalters als im Gegensatz 
zur gleichzeitigen Mystik stehender Scholastik als 
prinzipiell verfehlt herausgestellt werden. Scholastik and 
Mystik gehören fUr die mittelalterliche Weltanschauung 
wesentlich zusammen. Die beiden Gegensatz"-paare: Rationalismus-Irrationalismus and Scholastik-Mystik decken 
sich nicht. Und wo Ihre Gleichsetzung versucht wird, beruht sie auf einer extremen Rationalisierung der 
Philosophie. Philosophie als vom Leben ab elöstes, 
rationalistisches Gebilde ist machtlos, Mystik als 
irrationalistisches Erleben ist ziellos. 
[If one reflects on the deeper essence of philosophy in its 
relation to a world-view, then the conception of the 
Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages as a scholasticism 
standing in opposition to the contemporaneous mysticism 
must also be exposed as fundamentally inappropriate. For 
the medieval world-view, scholasticism and mysticism 
belong essentially together. The two pairs of 'opposites, ' 
rationalism-irrationalism and scholasticism-mysticism do 
not coincide. And where their equivalence is sought, it 
rests upon an extreme rationalization of philosophy. 
Philosophy as a rationalist construction, detached from life, is powerless: mysticism as an irrationalist 
experience is purposeless. 3"51, 
As previously stated, one of my aims in looking at Bonaventure's 
descriptions of the immanent God through Heidegger's deconstructive 
analysis of early Greek thought is to penetrate to what is most original, 
most basic, in this conception of the God discovered in and through the 
world. The hope has been to perhaps yield a glimmer of what binds 
together the worlds, the thought and experience, of these two very 
different forms of Dasein with respect to the question posed and in the 
light of the Western tradition. Through this, it may be possible to catch 
a fainter glimmer of some elements that might be the same in the thought 
and experience of many forms of Dasein on this question, some elements 
that might then bind together the other of many worlds. This is not to 
say that the conceptions of the being of beings examined so far are 
'universal', but only that, by considering these conceptions in their unique 
and historically specific identity and difference, the identity of that 
which holds the possibilities of what can be conceived may draw a little 
closer. The examination of these historically founded delimitations can 
thus help to make visible that same Sache which is being delimited thus, 
and which forms the origin or basis of these finite and particular 
conceptions. 
In the preceding examination, the sameness of the original Sache 
which binds together the conceptions of the early Greek thinkers and 
Bonaventure has been explored through a variety of formulations, but the 
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question of what 'original' and 'basic' mean in this context has not been 
explicitly addressed. I have assumed that Heidegger's interpretations of 
the early Greek thinkers name what is in some sense original, and my 
analysis has proceeded through these, but this raises the question of what 
kind of origin Heidegger seeks to bring to light, and what kind he does in 
fact bring to light, where these may not be the same. It must, in the 
first place, be noted that Heidegger's hermeneutical stance does not 
represent an attempt to think in precisely the same way as the thinker he 
is confronting. He attempts, rather,, to appropriate the thought of that 
thinker more originally, to experience the ground that sustains it and is 
made visible by it, while yet remaining unthought in itself. That the 
essential origin of logos lies in 'collection', for example, and that this 
origin is made visible in the writings of Heraclitus, does not necessarily 
mean that Heraclitus 'meant' this, or, if it does, then the meaning of 
'meant' is itself a question. What it evidently does not mean is that 
Heraclitus reflected upon the meaning of the term and represented it to 
himself with some other word naming 'collection', in the same way that 
Heidegger does. The extent to which Heraclitus explicitly understands 
something like gathering or collection when he says logos is debatable, but 
the meaning of a term, and the meaning, the so-called 'intention', of the 
person using the term, is not exhausted by such explicit understanding. 
The meaning of collection may be original to what Heraclitus conceives as 
logos, without his having experienced this original meaning explicitly. The 
'correctness' of Heidegger's interpretation of the term will then obviously 
depend in part upon what kind of meaning he attributes to Heraclitus in 
making the claim that he meant 'collection'. He may, however, be wrong 
even in this judgement, while yet being right that 'collection' is, in some 
sense, a sense which perhaps remains unclarified, original to the meaning 
of logos. 
But if it is said that the meaning of 'collection' is in some way 
original to the many permutations and translations the term undergoes in 
its history, and that it is therefore original to Bonaventure's ratio and 
Verbum, too, the question arises about the sort of priority this 
historically original meaning maintains through the variations, the way in 
which it imposes itself within the variations. In the claim that 
'collection' Is original to the twofold meaning of ratio, this originality 
may imply logical or temporal priority, and, with respect to the latter, 
historical or experiential priority, where these are not mutually exclusive 
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but interconnected. The issue of the interconnection between these forms 
of priority has already been discussed in general (see Introduction, pp. 
15-16). Applying the conclusions reached in that general discussion to the 
particular case of ratiq as well as to the other concepts explored so far 
in this section, it would be maintained that, in the meaning that has 
historical priority, an original experience is delimited in such a way that 
it also forms the original experience of the subsequent transformations in 
usage. It then has a continuing priority in terms of experience. The 
priority of the original experience imposes, moreover, a logical, or, 
perhaps phenomelogical, priority upon the concept, in that the meaning 
formed in accord with that experience is also phenomenologically prior in 
the concept. It is the basis of every particular conception. In the case 
of Bonaventure's ratio, this would suggest that the experience or 
understanding of 'collection' is still, as opposed to 'was once', 
phenomenologically basic and essential, and so 'prior' to the specific way 
in which the term is conceived. If this is the case, the original meaning 
continues to inform the concept, without necessarily being experienced as 
such, recalled to mind and remembered, whenever the term is used. The 
original meaning informing and sustaining the concept in its historical 
development may be progressively forgotten, and it is this forgetting 
which tends to block both the appropriate and original understanding of 
the conception, and . the possibility of a different one. 
Heidegger's appropriation, through deconstructive analysis, of the 
original meaning of some of the basic concepts of Western thought is 
essential to the project of his own thought. The work of this 
appropriation is seen not only in the writings, or sections of writings, in 
which Heidegger deals directly with one thinker or another, but in the way 
that certain elements of the tradition are subsumed and transformed in his 
own reflections on being. The independence and originality of these 
reflections does consist in a certain breaking free of the tradition, but 
this freedom is gained not by a simple denial or rejection of the tradition 
(which would be the surest way to remain bound to it), but by thinking 
through to the ground of certain ideas. The next chapter in this study, 
which discusses and extends the dialogue between Meister Eckhart and 
Heidegger, will attempt to bring to light some key elements within this 
process of deconstruction and appropriative transformation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ECKHART AND HEIDEGGER ON BEING AND BEINGS 
1. Eckhart's Dialectical Theism' 
It is a basic tenet of Meister Eckhart's metaphysics that eadem 
sent principia essendi et cognoscendi ('the principles of knowing and of 
being are the same'] (LW III, 21/ES 130). Like Bonaventure, Eckhart 
conceives these same principles in terms of the Word, and he equates 
principle and Word with ratio, which for him is the Latin equivalent of the 
Greek logos (LW I, 491, LW III, 22/ES, 101,130). The principle, Word, 
ratio, or logos, he claims, is both prior and posterior to particular 
things; it is prior as the ratio located in the mind of God, and posterior 
as the ratio received by the intellect through abstraction (LW III, 22- 
3/ES, 131). As a prior ratio, it is a kind of cause (LW III, 22/ES, 131), 
not a cause that departs from its effect, but one which remains with the 
thing while yet remaining with God. It is the simultaneously immanent 
and transcendent ideal reason according to which a thing is created, and 
through which it is what it is. This ideal reason gives the logical 
structure, the essence or quidditas (LW I, 187/ES, 83), of a particular 
thing, and unlike that thing, it is uncreated and immutable. 
The same immutable ratio that gives the 'whatness' of a created thing 
. and is the principle of its being 'shines' (lucet) in that thing and is the 
principle of its intelligibility. Strictly speaking, according to Eckhart, 
nothing shines in a thing, nothing illuminates it except this ratio or 
quidditas, for a thing is known only in its reason or idea. The divine 
Word or ratio is then 'the light of men' as rational beings, beings capable 
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of comprehending the reasons or ideas of things. The locus of its shining 
is the intellect, since the light by which ideas are known, the light that 
enables them to shine out, is the light of that faculty which grasps the 
intelligible structure of a thing. It is this faculty that permits a thing 
to be defined by a name, since the name of a thing signifies nothing other 
than the intelligible structure which is its idea and definition. With 
respect to the kind of cause that. an idea or essence is, therefore, 
explanation consists in definition, and such definition is the full 'proof' 
(demonstratio) of the thing to be known (LW III, 10-11/ES, 125-6). Given 
that a name signifies an essence, the essence explicated in a definition, 
the name constituting the human word is, ultimately, a response to the 
divine Word through which and in which a thing is created. For this 
reason, it corresponds to the prior idea in the mind of God. Consequently, 
the ideas in the mind of God inform both things and concepts. They 'look 
to a double being' (respiclunt duplex esse), to intellectual being in the 
soul and to material being outside the soul (LW I, 204/ES, 91). 2 
According to Eckhart's anthropology, it is natural for human beings, 
as rational beings, to seek knowledge of things, where this means primarily 
seeking to understand things in their causes. With respect to the things 
of the world, the soul's knowledge is not innate but acquired, proceeding 
through received images. When presented with the image of a thing that it 
does not understand, the soul is led to wonder about it, and this 
wondering spurs it to pursuit, for, having perceived clearly that something 
is, the soul wonders about the 'how' and the 'what' of this existence. It 
seeks to understand the being of the thing with respect to cause and 
essence. Since its knowledge of the being of things is never complete and 
since it is natural for it to seek this knowledge, it constantly wonders 
about things and its pursuit of them never comes to a rest (Pf, 8/W I, 8- 
9). 
If reasoning as seeking to know things in their principles is proper 
to human beings, then an essential property of this being is that it seeks 
to understand things with respect to essence, as a kind of cause. For 
Eckhart, the understanding of this kind of cause is the task of 
. metaphysics. Like mathematics, metaphysics does not deal with exterior 
causes, with the efficient and final causes of things, but considers ens 
inquantum ens It considers a thing in terms of quod quid est, in terms 
of its quidditas, to which the question of existence bears no relation (LW 
II, 340-1/TP, 148). It considers a thing with respect to its principium 
72 
essendi, cognoscendi, amandi et operandi ['principle of being, knowing, 
loving and working'] (LW III, 287). In such a consideration, the 
understanding that constitutes metaphysical knowing must pass beyond the 
physical entity to its esse, which is not physical but rational. The 
passing of this knowing is then definitive for the animal rationale, for 
man, culus ... rationem [petit] purissimum, rationem scilicet rerum ('whose 
rational part seeks what is most pure, namely the idea of all things'] (LW 
III, 501 /TP, 192). 
As already suggested, the ideal reasons of all things, their esse with 
respect to formal structure, are immanent in God and God is immanent in 
them. They are with God and are God in that eternal beginning 
(principium) in which all things are created not actually but rationally. 
This beginning is the Son, qui est imago et ratio idealis omnium ('who Is 
the image and ideal reason of all things'] (LW I, 188/ES, 84). In that this 
ideal reason is the image both of God of the world, it stands in an 
intermediating relation to the two, mediating one to the other. It is 
actually the primal speech, the first articulation of the simple unity of 
God, through whose mediation that unity is translated into and expressed 
as the world of particular things. It is also the principle of unity 
immanent in the world, unifying and simplifying things into the ideal 
reasons in which the divine being is mirrored and spoken. 
However, in the ideal reason and image in which the divine being 
speaks itself, the reasons forming the essences of things are not distinct. 
This speech is a wholly simple and single one, comprehending all things 
within itself in an indistinct way: 
Der vater sprach ein wort, daz was sin sun. In dem 
einigen worte sprach er alliu dinc. War umbe ensprach er 
niht wan ein wort? - Dar umbe, wan im alliu dinc 
gegenwertic sint. 
[The Father spoke a Word; this was his Son. In this single 
Word he spoke all things. Why did he only speak one Word? 
Because all things are present to it. ] 
(DW III, 455/TP, 335) 
Thus, all creatures are conceived in unity in this eternal Word. This is 
the Word of the divine understanding, a word neither brought forth nor 
thought out, but continually being conceived by, and eternally remaining 
" within, the speaker (DW I, 157/TP, 259). 
Consequently, while all things are 'in' God, they are not what they 
are qua distinct creatures in God. They are, rather, one in God, and are 
then the one which is God: 
sub pallio unius unitur deus et est in omnibus, et sub 
pallio et proprietate unius res amnia capit deum e 
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converso. In illo uno eibi sociantur deus et anima, quin 
ammo deus et omnia. 
Mod is united and is in all things under the covering of 
the one, and vice versa under the one's covering and 
property each thing grasps God. In that one God and the 
soul, indeed God and all things, come together. ] 
(LW II, 443/TP, 160). 
For Eckhart, this one. in which all things are united is not a number, nor a 
thing which is numbered, but is the principle of any number or numbered 
thing insofar as that number or numbered thing is itself, as a unitary 
entity, one and single. As the principle of unification, the source, 
therefore, of all forms of unity, unum sive Unitas non dividitur nec 
numeratur in numeris sive numeratis, sed numeros et numerate in se 
colligit et unit ['the one or unity is not divided or numbered in numbers 
or in the things that are enumerated, but gathers and unites numbers and 
what is enumerated into itself'] (LW I, 486/ES, 99). The one is then the 
principle of the unity of units, the primal all-comprehending and all- 
gathering monad. It is, in fact, the act of unifying. 
One, moreover, is, according to Eckhart, the same as indistinct, for 
everything distinct is two or more, and everything indistinct is one (LW 
II, 482). It follows that the one, as the principle of unity, is also the 
principle of indistinction. On the one hand, this means that, since the one 
comprehends all things in indistinction within itself, and since this one is 
God, nihil tam unum et indist. inctum quam deus et omne creatum ['nothing is 
so one and indistinct as God and every created being'] (LW II, 155/TP, 169). 
But, on the other hand, since, precisely in being utterly indistinct, the 
one is distinguished from every distinct being, deus est distinctissimus ab 
omni et quolibet creato ['God is most distinct from each and every created 
thing'] (LW II, 489/TP, 169). God, sub ratione units, is distinguished by 
indistinction. 
The indistinction and unity of God are in turn connected with the 
nature of the divine being as unlimited and infinite. In accord with an 
idea that dates back to Plato's Parmenides, the nature of every specific 
being is defined, delimited, against that of other beings. Therefore, every 
being is what it is through negation, through the exclusion and lack of 
what it is not. Eckhart expresses this idea in saying that every finite 
being, every creature, is also not being (non ens). Outside the one, on 
the other hand, there is nothing. In that case, there is nothing against 
which the one may be delimited, so that nothing limits the one and nothing 
distinguishes it. To arrive at the one is consequently to negate all 
distinctions, but since every distinction is itself a negation of the one, 
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the negation of all distinctions is the negation of all negations. The 
one, therefore, is the negation of negation, which is also pure affirmation, 
plenitude and superabundance (LW II, 485). 
This idea that the negation of negation is the negation of all not 
being suggests that the one is actually pure being, exluding all not being. 
In fact, Eckhart claims that unum is convertible with ens (LW I, 487), and 
that unum respicit per essentiam esse ipsum sive essentiam, et hanc unam 
['the one essentially refers to being itself or to unitary essence, for 
essence is always one'] (LW IV, 265/TP, 224). With respect to creatures, to 
be one is to be an entity, where being an entity means being possessed of 
a single defining essence. The essence gives the unity of an entity and 
the borders of the essence are the borders of that entity. They are the 
borders of this or that unit defining it against other units and thereby 
circumscribing it into its own range of being. That which bestows itself 
in bestowing the finite unity and being of a given entity, however, the 
one, or being itself, is uncircumscribed. It has no range of being, but, as 
being itself, is indistinct being, and includes all being through this 
indistinction. 
So, like the indistinction of the one with which being is 
interchangeable, the indistinction of being itself is what distinguishes it 
from any entity: 
. ratio enim entis est quid abjectum et 
indistinctum et 
ipsa sua indistinctione ab aliis distinguitur. Quo etiam 
modo deus sua indistinctione ab aliis distinctis 
quibuslibet distinguitur. 
[The idea of being is something commonplace and indistinct 
and distinguished from other things by its very 
indistinction. This is the way God is distinguished by his 
indistinction from any other distinct thing. ] 
(LW III, 489/TP, 187) 
As ipsum esse, God is the esse omnium, and indistinct from any entity 
insofar as it 'has' being, but as the unity and fullness of being, God is 
simultaneously wholly distinct from any finite being. As being, then, God 
is both within and beyond all creatures (DW I, 143/TP, 256). 
These concepts of God as unity and being itself belong to Eckhart's 
dialectical conception of God. Bernard McGinn, in his introduction to 
Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and 
Defense, points out that 'Eckhart's teaching about God really needed a way 
of speaking about the divine nature that would combine the negative (! e. 
transcendent) and the positive (1e. Immanent) moments, or the simultaneous 
thinking of contradictory determinations, into some higher positive unity'. 
The language of distinction and indistinction with respect to being forms 
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part of this dialectic, yielding 'a way of talking about God as 
simultaneously totally immanent to creatures as their real existence and 
by that very fact absolutely transcendent to them as esse simpliciter or 
esse absolutum' (ES, 33-4). 3 
The notion of God as being has a long pedigree in the Christian 
theological tradition. Bernard of Clairvaux, for instance, says that, as 
the being of all things, God is in se absolutely transcendent and 
unknowable, and yet, as the being of any thing, God is also wholly near and 
present. 
Non quod longge ab unoquoque sit qui esse omnium est, sine 
quo omnia nIhil: sed, ut tu plus mireris, et nil eo 
praesentius, et nil incomprehensibilius. Quid nempe cuique 
rei praesentius, quam esse suum? Quid cuique tarnen incomprehensibilius, quam esse omnium? 
[Not that he is far from anyone, he who is the being of 
all, without whom all things are nothing; but, to make you 
wonder even more, nothing is more present than him, and 
nothing more incomprehensible. For what is more present to anything than its own being? Yet what is more incomprehensible than the being of all? ]" 
For a Christian theologian, that God is the being of all cannot mean that 
there is no substantial distinction between creatures and God, and Bernard 
immediately qualifies the above statements to exclude the possibility of 
any such misconception: 
Sane esse omnium dixerim deum, non quia ills Bunt quod est ille; sed quia ex ipso, at per ipsum, et in ipso aunt omnia. 
Esse est ergo omnium quae facts sunt apse factor eorum, 
sed causale, non materiale. 
[But indeed I say that God is the being of all things, not 
because they are what he is, but because all things exist 
from him and through him and in him. He who is the maker 
of all is therefore the being of all that is made, but with 
respect to cause, not matter: ) 
God is not some sort of prime matter out of which creatures are shaped, 
but is the cause of the being of all that is, the factor of all facts. God 
is then the being that gives rise to and supports the being of all that 
comes to be and is. 
For Eckhart, too, following Aquinas, God as esse is the cause of the 
being of all that is, in that everything except God has being from 
something or somewhere other than itself, and, ultimately, from God as 
creator. Creation is the conferring or bestowal (collatio) of being, and 
the being of all that is created, all entia, is bestowed by God (LW I, 
197/ES, 87). But God is also not other than that which is conferred in 
creation, since what is conferred is being, and what confers is also being, 
ipsum esse, which is God. Creation is then the act in which being itself 
gives itself, and thereby gives rise to beings. It is the act in which the 
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self-bestowal of being first allows beings to be. 
The substantial distinction between God and creatures is not thereby 
dissolved. The esse omnium as ipsum esse is not identical with any finite 
thing, insofar as that thing is considered as the necessarily limited thing 
which it is. If, on the other hand, the consideration of the understanding 
moves from the finite thing to its being to being itself without 
qualification, distinction or determination, what it then finds in and 
through the creature is indeed identical with God, but then the encounter 
is no longer with the creature qua creature. Precisely in virtue of being 
not the all but the unity, in the sense of unification, of the all, God is 
distinct from any 'this' or 'that', any creature as well as any 
determination of any creature. A distinction must be drawn, then, between 
the finite being of any determinate thing, its essence, and being itself 
which 'contains' all essences in an indistinct way. 
What distinguishes the two, finite beings or entia on the one hand 
and the being of all or ipsum esse on the other, is negativity or not 
being. God is only being; creatures are both being and not being (ens et 
non ens). That God is only being means both that God is nothing other 
than pure being (nihil est aliud nisi purum esse) and that God is the 
fullness of being and full being (plenitude esse et plenum esse) (LW II, 
77/TP, 68). Creatures, insofar as (inquantum) they are and are one, 
insofar as they are entities and units, participate In and manifest being 
itself and the one, but insofar as they are finite and limited, they are 
distinguished from the purity and fullness of being itself and the one. 
This distinguishing finitude is the admixture of not being which 
differentiates the being of creatures from being itself, and which 
differentiates the limited unity of any unitary entity from the unbounded 
unity of the one. Thus, just as every unitary entity participates in the 
one in virtue of its being one, so that, insofar as it is one, it is in the 
one, so every being participates in being in virtue of the fact that it is. 
But every single being is also distinguished from being and the one by the 
fact that it, as finite, must also be not, not this and not that, excluding 
this and that unit and this and that entity, lacking this and that 
determination. As the fullness of being and the unbounded unity of the 
one, God lacks no determination, but what lacks no determination also lacks 
anything against which it may be determined and is therefore 
indeterminate. It is this very indeterminacy which determines the being of 
God, that is to say, the being of being, against the being of any entity. 
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God as being is wholly exclusive and wholly inclusive, totus intre, tot us 
extra (LW II, 143/TP, 93), a puritas et plenitude essendi. 
The lack of determination and definition in God, the lack of any 
terminus or finis, is the lack of any negativity, for it is the lack of 
those borders that de-termine and de-fine the being of a being in terms 
of the determinations of being which it is not, the predicates that cannot 
be predicated of it. The determining differentiation of this 'not', this 
negativity, also gives rise to the number and multiplicity characterizing 
finite beings. Therefore, because, there is no differentiating 'not' in God, 
as being itself, there is also no number or multiplicity in God (LW II, 
449/TP, 163). Moreover, the 'not' that determines the thing into its 
essence, its quidditas; gives the name of that thing. In the absence of 
this 'not', there can be no name, and so God, as being, which includes all 
names within itself in an indistinct way (LW II, 146/TP, 96), has no name. 
The being named only in saying 'I am that I am' is unnameable because 
omninameable. The lack of multiplicity, number and name in God, then, is 
rooted in a lack of the differentiating not, in the fact that there is in 
God no negation except the negation of negation, which is the purest and 
fullest affirmation (LWII, 77/TP, 68). 
It is a logical consequence of the definition of God as being itself, 
the negation of negation, that no being (ens) can truly be counted 
alongside God (LW IV, 29/TP, 210). Everything apart from God as being is 
not a being (LW II, 124/TP, 87), for nothing can be without being (LW III, 
44/ES, 141). Since nothing that is is without being, and since being 
excludes nothing, alliu dinc mit got enist niht m6 dan got aleine fall 
things together with God are not more than God alone'] (DW II, 101/TP, 
293). For this reason, those who know God alone also know created things 
(DW V, 116/ES, 245). The way that God, as pure being excluding nothing, 
gives rise to beings so that they are not without being and are yet 
utterly distinct from it in itself, forms that part of Eckhart's dialectic 
in which it is said that God flows into all creatures but remains 
untouched (unberüeret) by them (DW III, 217/TP, 321), and that all flow out 
from God and yet remain within. 
Because everything apart from God is not a being, creatures, 
considered in themselves, are, in a sense, pure nothing (ein 10ter niht) (DW 
I, 69/TP, 250). If, after all, the being (wesen) of creatures depends upon 
being itself in such a way that outside being there is nothing, then apart 
from God, apart from being, creatures simply are not. In this case, God 
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alone Is (LW II, 29/TP, 49) and creatures are only insofar as they are not 
without God. Here, being is conceived as the name which includes all 
names and is therefore above them, the most general and universal name, 
common to all names and things but by that very fact beyond them. 
Understood in this way, the name is proper to God alone (LW II, 146/TP, 
96). On the other hand, if being is conceived in such a way that it can be 
applied to creatures, if creatures can be said to be, then God cannot, 
since no name applying to creatures can, strictly speaking, be applied to 
God. Thus, God is above being and is not a being, which does not mean 
that God is in no sense being, but only that God is not being in the same 
sense that creatures are: 
Got würket über wesene in der wite, d8 er sich geregen 
mac, er würket in unwesene; 6 denne wesen wire, d6 worhte 
got; er worhte wesen, dO niht wesen enwas. Grobe meister 
sprechent, got si ein 1Qter wesen; er ist als h6ch Ober 
wesene, als der oberste engel ist Ober ein mucken. Ich 
spreche als unrechte, als ich Got hieze ein wesen, als ob ich die sunnen hieze bleich oder schwarz. Got enist weder diz noch daz. Und sprichet ein meister: swer d6 swwret, daz er got bekant habe, und bekante er iht, so enbekante 
er got niht. Daz ich aber gesprochen hen, got ensi niht 
ein wesen und si Ober wesene, hie mite enh8n 'ich im niht 
wesen abgesprochen, mer: ich han ez in im gehcehet. 
[God works above being in vastness where he can roam. He 
works in nonbeing. Before being was, God worked. He 
worked being when there was no being. Unsophisticated 
teachers say that God is pure being. He is as high above 
being as the highest angel is above a gnat. I would be 
speakin as incorrectly in calling God a being as if I 
called 
the 
sun pale or black. God is neither this nor 
that. A master says: 'Whoever imagines that he has 
understood God, ' if he knows anything, it is not God that 
he knows. ' However, in saying that God is not a being and 
is above being, I have not denied being to God; rather, I 
have elevated it in him. ] (DW I, 146/T?, 256) 
God is above every finite essence and every actually existent. thing, and 
God's activity is both prior and superior to the being of all such 
entities. Again, the difference between being as applied to creatures and 
being as applied to God rests in negation and in the negation of negation. 
God is a wesen ane wesen ['being beyond being'], because Got ist en solch 
wesen, daz in im treget alliu wesen ['God is that kind of being which 
contains within itself all beings']; that is, because God, as being itself, 
enhet keine wise ['has no limited mode'] (DW III, 230-31/TP, 324-25) but is 
the 10ter absolücio des vr. fen wesens ['the pure absoluteness of free 
being'], diu blaze isticheit, diu da beroubet ist aller wesens und aller 
isticheit ('bare beingness which is, deprived of all being and all 
beingness'] (DW III, 133/W II, 175). This isticheit is the 'essence' of God 
as being itself, the pure is-ness proper to God in contradistinction to the 
esse hoc et hoc appropriate to creatures. 
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When, in the Parisian Questions, Eckhart does seem to deny being to 
God in favour of the term intelligere, this must be understood in the 
light of his dialectical understanding of being. At the end of the first 
question, he says: 
I also assert that being does not belong to God, nor is he 
a being, but he is something loftier than being. Aristotle 
says that the power of sight must be colorless so that it 
can perceive all colors, and that the intellect is not a 
natural form so that it can know all forms. So also I 
deny being itself and suchlike of God so that he may be the cause of all being and precontain all things. 
(PQ, 50) 
God is here not an actual being, but the the possibility of everything 
actual and possible, precontained in the idea, the logos or Word. The most 
appropriate term for that which contains the possibility of all being, 
however, is not 'being', but intellect. Since the divine intellect is not 
receptive but productive, its understanding is the cause'of being, the act 
that gives rise to being and is therefore in itself empty of being. 
Eckhart calls this emptiness of actual being containing the possibility of 
being a puritas essendi ('purity of being'], and he says that 'being does 
not befit God, unless you call this purity being' (PQ, 48). But at other 
points this purity is precisely what Eckhart calls ipsum esse, and even in 
the Questions he says, 'Of course if you wish to call understanding being I 
do not mind' (PQ, 48). Given the sense in which the purity of being in God 
can be called being, esse and intelligere are the same in God. 
As pure being, God is also both the first and the final cause of 
creatures, both that which gives rise to them, and that which they seek as 
their goal. This first and final cause is the answer to they 'why' of all 
creation: si quaeratur quere dens creavit omnia, mundum scilicet 
universum, respondendum: tit essent ('if someone asks why God "created all 
things", that is, the whole universe, the answer should be "that they might 
be"'] (LW II, 346/TP, 149). Every creature aspires towards this cause and 
answer. Being is what everything thirsts and hungers for, what everything 
desires (LW II, 274/TP, 175), for all things desire and intend their first 
cause (LW II, 279/TP, 177). Every creature seeks to sustain and fulfill 
its being, and is unrestful and in motion until it does so. Being is 
therefore the principle of motion and becoming with respect to creatures, 
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the prime mover as the cause and end of all striving. All creatures 
except man, however, are made according to some idea in God, and they seek 
likeness to this idea and find rest in achieving that likeness. But man is 
made according to the the image of the whole substance of God, and is not 
satisfied until he achieves that substance. He is not satisfied, in that 
case, until he achieves the one which is infinite being lacking no 
determination (LW III, 479/TP, 183). Man's hunger for being, which is a 
hunger for absolute completion and sufficiency, is thus a hunger for 
infinity (LW II, 272/TP, 174).. The intellect and the will, the 
potentialities of man, move towards the totality of being (LW III, 496/TP, 
190), and are in restless motion until they find that totality in the 
substance of God. 
Given that no being (entium) has the being (esse) for which it longs 
from itself, every being is in itself bare and in potency towards being (in 
se nude et potentie ad esse), where this potency is the desire and thirst 
for being itself (quae potentie appetitus est et sitis ipsius esse) (LW II, 
274/TP, 175). For entia, esse is both a need and a gift or loan; Alle 
crdaturen in dem daz sie lint, da sint sie als ein ni. ht; swenne sie 
itberschinen werdent mit dem 11hte, in dem sie it wesen nement, d8 sint sie 
iht ('All creatures as such. are nothing; but when they are illumined from 
above with the light from which they receive their being, they are 
something'] (DW II. 1,369/W I, 225). Beings are wholly receptive towards 
being. Being is a possibility for them, and one they do not command. 
Being itself, by contrast, is the superior power that includes all 
possibilities of being; God's kingdom consists of all possible worlds (DW 
III, 143/W II, 166). For being, then, nothing is impossible (LW II, 35-6/TP, 
51), and everything possible lies within it. This power, the power of 
infinite being itself, bestows possibilities of being upon beings and 
enables their realization. And for the being that desires being itself and 
is satisfied with nothing less, the realization of being which it seeks can 
be nothing less than the achievement of all that can be, the achievement 
of infinite being. 
This means that the first and final cause of all things, the principle 
. and goal of being, is also the summum bonum of all that is. God as being 
is also the good. The good, in turn, is love (caritas), and is the name 
under which God is taken in love. This name, for Eckhart, articulates the 
nature of God as both diffusive and unifying (LW IV, 51/TP, 212). God qua 
love is diffusive in that dei nature, esse et vita subsistit In se 
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communicando et se . lpsum se totum dando ['God's nature, existence, and life 
consist in sharing himself- and giving himself totally'] (LW IV, 55/TP, 213). 
It is the nature of the good to share itself in this way; the good, a name 
proper to God alone, shares what is its own, shares itself, by giving 
itself in all of the gifts that creatures receive (DW I, 149/TP, 257). But 
the good, which is love, is also unifying because what it gives in all of 
these various gifts is in essence simple and single, and common to all (LW 
IV, 51/TP, 212). 
The unifying nature of the good also consists in its action of 
drawing all beings towards itself, and therefore towards the unity of God 
as the one. This is its active power as a final cause, the God for which 
nature in its innermost self seeks and secretly strives, but which is also 
in some way already within it (DW III, 172/TP, 313). As the final cause 
of all creatures, this good is the last end of being, the end in which all 
being is perfected in the incomprehensible essence of God. According to 
Eckhart, the principle that orders and directs being toward this end from 
the beginning comes to rest only here: 
'In principio' daz sprichet als vii ze tiutsche als ein 
angenge alles wesens, als ich sprach in der schuole; ich 
sprach noch ma: ez ist ein ende alles wesens, wan der 
erste begin ist durch des lesten endes willen. Jd, got der 
ruowet selbe niht da da er ist der erste begin; er ruowet 
da, dA er ist ein ende"und ein raste alles wesens, niht daz 
diz wesen ze nihte werde, mar: ez wirt dd von volbraht in 
sinem lesten ende nach stner hasten volkomenheit. Waz ist 
daz leste ende? Es ist diu verborgen vinsternisse der 
Awiggen gottheit and ist unbekant and wart nie bekant and 
enwirt niemer bekant. Got blibet da in im selber unbekant, 
and daz lieht des ewigen vaters hat dd dwicliche 
Ingeschinen, and diu vinsternisse enbegrifet des liehtes 
niFt. 
[In principlo means in German as much as a beginning of 
all being as I said in the school. I said more: It is an 
end of all being, for the first beginning is for the sake 
of the last end Yes, God never takes rest where he is 
the first beginning- he takes rest there where he is an 
end and a repose of all being, not that this being should 
perish, but rather it is there perfected in its last end 
according to its highest perfection. What is the last end? 
It is the hidden darkness of the eternal divinity, and it 
is unknown, and it was never known, and it will never be 
known. God remains there within himself, unknown, and the 
light of the eternal Father has eternally shone in there, 
and the darkness does not comprehend the light (Jn. 1: 5). 
(DW I. 389/ES, 196) 
Perfection, then, rests in the essence of God, an essence ultimately 
. beyond any concept and so unknowable, 
but articulated and thereby mediated 
to the understanding as being itself, the one, and the good. Only on the 
basis of this conception of perfection is-the notion of evil as privation, 
as not being and nothing, comprehensible. For Eckhart, peccata vero et 
universaliter mala non sunt entia ['sin and evil in general are not beings'] 
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(LW III, 43-4/ES, 140), but this does not mean that there is in no sense 
evil in the world or that evil is merely virtual. It means, rather, that 
evil is the negation of being as perfection, and is therefore a lack or 
absence, a defect, of being: Mala enim non sunt nec sent facta, quia non 
effecta save effectus, sed defectus alicuius esse ('evil things are not and 
are not made because they are not produced as effects, but as defects of 
some being'] (LW III, 44/ES, 140). Evil is a negation of the perfection of 
being to which creatures are ordered, and which is possible for them. It 
is a defect of the ideas that constitute the perfection of finite essences. 
God does not have power over evil, because God, as ipsum esse, has power 
only over the things that are, and evil things Sint nihil et non entia, sed 
Sint privatio omnis entis ('are nothing and not being ... are privations 
of all being'] (LW II, 38/TP, 53). To have power over evil is to have power 
over nothing. God is the perfection of being that has power over 
everything, not over nothing. 
If perfection rests in the essence of God as being itself, the one, 
and the good, furthermore, it must be the negation of negation, and all 
that is not the negation of negation, all that is 'outside' the one and 
pure being, must always be imperfect. The negativity and limitation 
characterizing particular entities, the finitude of this and that excluding 
this and that, as well as the finitude of not being identical with the 
perfect idea in God, necessarily places all actual distinct beings within 
the realm of imperfection, distant from the realm of perfection as infinite 
being lacking nothing, and as the one excluding nothing. Consequently, 
all the things that are numbered among the things that are, 'fall' from the 
one into the 'guilt' of the all (LW II, 64/TP 63). God has power over the 
things that are insofar as esse ipsum is the source, origin and cause of 
all entia, their ground, but being is this ground only to the extent that 
beings have being as an effect of being as an efficient and final cause, 
and not insofar as their conception includes the defects of imperfection, 
of not being. God is der boden, der reif aller creaturen ('the ground and 
the encirclement of all creatures'] (DW I, 225/W I, 193), but only with 
respect to what they are - that is, with respect to the being (perfection) 
. which is effected in them - and not with respect to what they are not, not 
with respect to the not being that defines them as defects or 
'incompletions' of being. 
This notion of God as ground must be differentiated from the notion 
of the ground of God, where the latter is the divine essence in itself. As 
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the ground of all that is, the ground, one might say, of the nature quae 
creatur et crest and quae creatur et non crest, God is understood under 
the property of originating and making. God as ground is then the cause 
of creatures as effects, the nature quae crest et non creatur. In the 
verborgenen stilheit ['hidden stillness'] of the divine essence, however, God 
is sunder werk ['without effects'] (DW III, 381-2/TP 333), and this is the 
ground of God beyond God as ground, the nature quae nec crest nec 
creatur. s 
For Eckhart, the ground of God as opposed to God as ground is the 
Godhead as opposed to God. God is active and productive; the Godhead is 
not. Got unde gotheit hat underscheit an würken and an niht-wUrken ['God 
and Godhead are distinguished by working and not-working'] (Pf. 181/W II, 
82). The God that works, the God of creation, is only when creatures are 
as effects, so it can be said that God comes to be or 'becomes' (Wirt) only 
when creatures 'speak' of their creator. But creatures say 'God' only when 
the creature that knows God in creatures comes to be. Thus, it can also 
be said that d6 ich fl6z, d6 sprachen el crdatdren got ['when I flowed 
forth, all creatures said "God"']. Of the Godhead, however, nothing speaks, 
since allez dez, daz in der gotheit ist, dez ist ein, unde da von ist niht 
ze sprechene ['everything that is in the Godhead is one, and of that there 
is- nothing to be said']. In the Godhead, there are neither creatures as 
effects nor God as cause, for there there is no activity of production and 
no distinction between producer and produced. Because 'God' is only in 
this activity and therefore in relation to creatures, there God unbecomes 
('entwirt) (Pf, 181/W II, 81-2). This does not mean that in the ground of 
God there is 'nothing' in any sense, but that there is in that ground 
nothing but the Godhead, the hidden essence of God, and that all that is 
there is simple and indistinct, identical with the simplicity and 
indistinction of the being of God. Hie sind alle graB bletlein and holtz 
and stein and alle ding ein ['Here all blades of grass, wood, stones and 
all things are one' (DW Il. ii, 470/W II, 251). Here, all things are the one, 
and nothing else. 
The distinction between God and Godhead is central to many of 
Eckhart's more 'pantheistic' passages, especially those which appear to 
collapse the distinction between the being of God and the being of human 
being. The following passage from Sermon 52 in the Kohlhammer edition is 
one of the most well-known of these: 
Wan in dem selben wesene otes, d9 got ist obe wesene and 
ob underscheide, dd was ich selbe, d5 wolte ich mich selben 
and bekante mich selber ze machene disen menschen. Her 
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umbe so bin ich min selbes sache nach minem wesene, daz 
ewic ist, and niht nach minem gewerdenne, daz zitlich ist. . 
. In miner geburt, da wurden alliu dinc geborn, and ich was Bache min selbes and aller dinge; and haste ich gewolt,. ich 
enweere niht, noch alliu dinc enweeren niht; and enweere ich 
niht, so enweere got' niht. Daz got got' ist, des bin ich 
ein Bache; enweere ich niht, so enweere got niht , got'. 
[For in the same being of God where God is above being 
and above distinction, there I myself was, there I willed 
myself and committed myself to create this man. Therefore I am the cause of myself in the order of my being, which 
is eternal, and not in the order of my becoming, which is temporal ... In my birth all things were born and I was the cause of myself and of all things; and if I would have 
wished it, I would not be nor would all other things be. 
And if I did not exist, 'God' would also not exist. That God is 'God, ' of that I am a cause; if I did not exist, God too would not be 'God. '] (DW II. ii, 503-4/ES, 202-3) 
The idea that God is not God before the coming to be of the 'I' as 
distinct from God has already been discussed, but here Eckhart makes the 
more radical claim that this 'I' is the cause of God, as well as of itself 
and all other things. If the coming to be of the distinct 'I' is a 
condition for the possibility of 'God' as distinct from it, then, in one 
sense, the 'I' is obviously the 'cause' of God. But in the above passage, 
Eckhart seems to be asserting that the I is the cause of God in a more 
profound sense, in that it is the cause of its own coming to be, with 
which God and all things also come to be. It is then a self-caused cause, 
but this determination belongs, traditionally, only to God. 
One must distinguish, however, between the I that comes to be and 
which, in coming to be, differentiates itself from God, and the I in the 
indistinct ground of God. In that ground, the I is identical with the 
essence of God. Thus, all that God chooses, wills and is capable of here 
is also what the I chooses, wills and is capable of. It is not quite 
correct to say 'also' in this context, in fact, for the I in this indistinct 
ground is nothing other than God, not God qua 'God', that is, from which 
the I must always be distinct, but God qua Godhead, in which the 
distinction between I and God is so wholly dissolved that there is here, in 
truth, no I and no God. 
It is this I in the indistinct ground of God, then, the I qua Godhead, 
which is a self-caused cause that freely chooses to create all that is, 
including the distinct self that comes to be in the order of becoming. 
Only in this ground is the I absolutely free, for only in this ground is it 
determined by no cause outside of itself. The absolute freedom of God 
rests in this self-determination, in the fact that the divine being, and 
only it, has no ground other than itself. It should be emphasized that 
this determination of God's activity as absolutely free in no way suggests 
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that it is arbitrary. Rather, the activity of God is wholly free in that it 
is determined only by the nature of God. The gifts creatures receive from 
this activity, the gifts of their being in the sense of both essence and 
existence, both what they are and that they are, proceed only from the 
nature of God, which is to say that they are freely given by God. 
Eckhart's notion that God has no 'why' (quare, war umbe) is associated 
with this notion of God as an absolutely free cause, a ground of being 
having no ground external to it. The principle which is the end and 
beginning of all things does not. have a 'why'; it is a 'why', of everything 
and for everything: Non habet quare, sed ipsum est quare omnium et 
omnibus (LW III, 41 /ES, 139). The reason, principle or goal of all things 
cannot itself have a reason. God, the principle of the creature, is then a 
principle without principle, the only being not from another and having 
nothing from another (LW III, 496/TP, 189). Only this kind of being non 
ha bet quare ... sed propter se 
'ipsum, sui gratia, liberum ('has no 
"wherefore", but exists for itself as spontaneous and free'] (LW IV, 58/TP, 
214). 
Such being is actually not, to speak appropriately, a 'kind' of being, 
since the being that comprehends and fulfills all kinds of being cannot be 
defined as one kind of being among others, having one way of being among 
others. The God that is the last end of being and is infinite and 
measureless being is thus also without mode or manner (modus), without a 
'way' (wise). And the human soul, since it is created according to and for 
this infinite being and highest good, can never rest in any mode (wise), 
but hastens past all modes towards its end (DW III, 64/W II, 77), towards 
the wise ane wise ('modeless mode'] (DW III, 124/W II, 95) which it seeks. 
The modelessness and simplicity of the being of God are also 
definitive for the temporality of God, and necessarily so. The 
temporality of God is eternity, and Eckhart understands eternity as a now, 
(nunc, nO), in which omne tempus et eius differentia includitur aequaliter . 
.. non minus praeteritum et 
futurum quam preesens ('the whole of time and 
its differences are found in equal fashion ... the past and future no 
less than the present'] (LW II, 145/TP, 96). For Eckhart, the 'now' of 
eternity includes all parts and modes of time. It contains (begrffet) 
within itself all time (DW I, 143/TP, 256), comprehended in a simple unity. 
This is the 'fullness of time' where all time is gathered up (DW II. i, 230/W 
I, 216). However, just as being itself, which includes all being, is also 
above being and is not a being (is 'beingless being', not this and not 
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that), so 'all time' is above time and is timeless. And just as the fulness 
of being itself is the incomprehensible source of all being, so the fulness 
of time in the now of eternity is the timeless source of time. 
If God is modeless and all-comprehending being, ipsum esse, then the 
temporality of God has to be as Eckhart describes it. What comprehends 
all being in a simple unity must also comprehend all time in a simple 
unity, for it then comprehends all that is, was, or will be. In eternity, 
above time, all things are therefore present (DW I, 78/W I, 109); here, all 
things are as ipsum esse. Because there where all things are, nothing can 
come to be or pass away, there can be no change or motion in the now of 
eternity, and so no time as the measure of motion. And yet this now is 
not something else besides time, any more than being itself is something 
else besides beings. In the same way that beings are not outside of being 
or other than being, time is not outside of the now or other than the now. 
But just as being itself is beyond any being precisely because it is the 
simple unity comprehending all beings and giving rise to them, so the now 
is beyond any kind of time in virtue of being the simple and modeless 
unity of time, a unity which is also the source and origin of all the parts 
and modes of time. 
Since, in the now of eternity, all time is gathered up together, there 
is, in this condition, or lack of condition, no before and after, no past 
and future. Futhermore, given that this gathered unity of time, the now of 
eternity, is the temporality of God, it follows that all that God ever has 
done or will do is always being done at once here (DW II. i, 262/TP, 298). 
All the works of time are contained in this eternity, and so every act of 
God, regardless of the 'when' of its occurrence, rests there in the single 
activity of pure being. 
Paradoxically, this simple now of eternity, the temporality proper to 
the being of God, is also the 'then' of creation, the moment in which both 
God and world come to be what they are in distinction from one another. 
Because God is not 'God' without creatures, without the beings in which the 
divine being is spoken, Eckhart can say: 
Non enim imaginandum est falso, quasi deus steterit 
exspectans nunc aliquod temporis futurum in quo crearet 
munduni. Simul enim et semel quo deus fuit, quo filium 
sibi coaeternum per omnia coaequalem deum genuit, etiam 
mundum creavit. 
[It is false to picture God as if he were waiting around 
for some future moment in which to create the world. In 
the one and the same time in which he was God and in 
which he begot his coeternal Son as God equal to himself 
in all things, he also created the world. ] 
(LW I, 190/ES, 85) 
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God is only when God speaks, where the speaking of God is also the acting 
and making, the creating, of God. The 'when' of this creating speaking is 
the same primum nunc simplex aeternitatis (LW I, 190/ES, 84), in which all 
that comes to pass in time is conceived and held together in one. 
All that unfolds in the course of time, then, every finite act and 
deed from the beginning to the end of time, is comprehended and conceived 
in this moment. It is 'seen' by God in sibem ersten ewigen anblicke - ob 
wir einen ersten anblik d8 nemen solten ('in his first everlasting glance - 
if we can think of his first glancing at anything'] (DW V, 415/ES, 289). 
Every occurrence is thus 'foreseen' by God in the 'first' simple moment of 
eternity in which the world comes to be, and so got wurket nihtes niht von 
niewem, wan ez ist allez ein vorgewurket dinc ('God does not undertake 
anything whatever afresh, because everything is something already 
accomplished'] (DW V, 416/ES, 289). So there is nothing new here under the 
sun, and yet there, in the moment of eternity, where being is and coming- 
to-be is, where all things are always in God as God, everything is ever 
new. Since nothing there is subject to time, swaz d9 ist, daz enmachet 
kein zit alt ('time can age nothing there'] (DW IM, 349-50/W I, 168). 
This dialectic of being and becoming parallels Eckhart's dialectic of 
divine revelation and hiddenness, expression and non-expression. The God 
that is eternally at rest beyond all time (God qua Godhead) must also 
remain eternally unexpressed and inexpressible, but the God that comes to 
be in, the moment wherein all time comes to be (God qua 'God'), is 
expressed in that moment, in all the acts and works that occur in time. 
God, therefore, is both gesprochen and ist ungesprochen ('spoken and 
unspoken'] (DW Mil, 529/ES, 204). In the divine nature, Got ist ein wort, 
ein ungesprochen wort ('God is a word, a word unspoken'] (DW II. ii, 529/ES, 
203), but in the works and effects of creation, uttered through the 
mediation of the Son as logos, Got ist ein wort, dar sich selben sprichet 
('God is a Word that speaks itself'] (DW Il. ii, 529/ES, 204). In the 
speaking of this Word, God utters all creatures, and yet utters only the 
divine nature. It is this nature which, in the utterance, communicates, 
bespeaks, itself to all things and in all things. It utters itself totally 
. in and through the 
Word that brings all things into being. God speaks to 
all things and speaks all things (loquitur ... omnibus et omnia) (LW I. 
621/ES, 115) in the command that orders the being of all things. The 
'response' of creatures to this command, their correspondence to it, is 
fleri save creari eut produci a deo ('to become, to be created and to be 
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produced by God'], and this is the same as audire praecipentem et 
ohoeldire, item respondere, loqui et colloqui dicenti ['to hear him 
commanding and to obey, as well as to answer, speak to and converse with 
him when he speaks'] (LW I, 631/ES, 120). Within the conversation of 
creatures with God, therefore, the response of creatures to the speaking 
of God consists in their hearing and obeying the Word that commands their 
being and thereby becoming what they are. 
Becoming what it is, a creature 'speaks' with its essence in God. 
This Is an immediate speech and conversation between superior and 
inferior, between the principle that bestows and disposes the being of a 
creature, and the creature whose being is granted and ordered. It is, for 
Eckhart, the truest form of speech, of which exterior discourse is but an 
imperfect trace, for the correspondence of thing and essence in the 
utterance of the 'exterior' word Is only an echo of the immediate colloqium 
perpetually taking place in the innermost depths of every thing that is 
(LW I, 617/ES, 114). 
Because alle creaturen sint ein sprechen gotes ['all created things 
are God's speech'] (DW II. 11,535/ES, 205), ein ieglichiu cr@atOre ist vol 
gotes and ist ein buoch ['every creature is full of God and is a book'] (DW 
I, 156/TP, 259). As utterances of the divine being, creatures must speak 
that being. They speak it through their essence and their existence, their 
being as the utterance of being itself. They speak it through their unity 
reflecting the one as the unifying principle of their being, and through 
their activity manifesting the good as the beginning and end of all their 
being and becoming. Got ist in allen crdatOren gliche 'nahe' ... got hat 
sin netze üzgebreitet, sine stricke Of' alle crdatdren, daz man in einer 
ieglichen vinden mag ('God is equally near in all creatures ... God has 
set his nets and lines out over all creatures, so that we may find him in 
any of them'] (DW III, 144/W II, 166). 
However, with respect to the divine substance in its own truth, the 
essential nature of God, no creature is a sufficient expression. In the 
other moment of the dialectic, therefore, all creatures strive to express 
God, but no creature can truly do so: 
Alle crdatoren wellent got sprechen in allen Irn werken; 
sie sprechent alle, so si nahest mugen, sie enmugen in 
doch niht gesprechen. Sie wellen oder enwellen, ez si in liepp oder -leit: sie wellent alle got sprechen, und er 
blibet doch ungesprochen. 
[All creatures want to utter God in all their works; the 
all come as close as they can in uttering him, and yet they cannot utter him, Whether they wsh it or not, 
whether they like it or not, they all want to utter God, 
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and yet he remains unuttered, ] (DW Il. ii, 531/ES, 204) 
The first cause of all things, while visible in all things, is yet beyond 
them. It is therefore beyond words, since all language is in some way 
tied to things. Whether a person speaks of what is above things, or 
through a likeness to things or in terms of the operations of things, the 
speech is still rooted in things and cannot wholly surpass them. But 
these things, the things of the world, are not the cause of the world and 
are inadequate to declare that cause (DW I. 329/W I, 236-7). 
Thus, because no creature can utter the essence of God, because that 
essence, the Godhead rather than 'God', is wholly remote from creatures, 
God is truly God where all creatures come to an end: DA diu creature 
endet, dA beginnet got ze sinne ['Where the creature stops, there God 
begins to be'] (DW I. 92/ES, 184). God is first 'God' when creatures come 
to be, but God is truly what God is where creatures cease to be. 
Ultimately, the 'what' that God truly is, unspoken and unspeakable by 
creature or word, is nameless, not good, not wise, and not being (LW III, 
441-2/ES, 206-7), having nothing in common with anything, sharing no genus 
or species, no category or kind, with anything, so that no comparison or 
likeness can be drawn between it and anything else (LW II, 44/TP, 55). It 
is impossible, therefore, to speak truly of God, to utter the truth of God 
in words. The only appropriate response to this truth, the response that. 
corresponds to the nature of God, is silence, for God is mA ein swigen dan 
ein sprechen ['more silence than speech'] (DW II. 1,189/W I, 274-5). At the 
most radical point of this negative moment in Eckhart's dialectical way, it 
is said that even 'God' does not express this truth, and whoever seeks it 
should relinquish 'God': 
Her umbe s6 biten wir got, daz wir gotes ledic werden und 
daz wir nemen die wdrheit und gebrtTchen der dwicliche, dd 
die obersten engel und diu vliege und diu sale glich sint 
[So therefore let us pray to God that we may be free of 
'God, ' and that we may apprehend and rejoice in that 
everlasting truth in which the highest angel and the fly 
and the soul are equal ... ] (DW 11.11,493-4/ES, 200) 
The absolute unity of the Godhead is not God; it is not anything at all. 
It is therefore nothing. Götlich wesen enist niht glich, in im enist 
noch bilde noch forme ['The divine being is equal to nothing, and in it 
there is neither image nor form'] (DW I, 107/ES, 187). God is ein vber 
swebende wesen vnd ein vber wesende nitheit ['a being transcending being 
and a transcending nothingness'] (DW III, 442/ES, 207). But God is also 
something, for Got ist ein Hint, and got ist ein iht ['God is a nothing and 
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God is a something']. God is nothing only in the sense that God is a 
neizwaz ('an I-know-not-what'] beyond every 'something' that may be 
conceived (DW III, 23/TP, 323). The nothingness of God here must be 
differentiated from the nothingness of creatures. The nothingness of 
creatures characterises the condition of their being as limited by not 
being, in the twofold sense of exclusion and deficiency, and as wholly 
immanent within and contingent upon being itself (God). Creatures are 
nothing, first, because their finite being excludes this and that predicate; 
second, because their being is always deficient, never fully achieving the 
perfection of essence; third, because that being is not outside of being 
and so, considered in itself apart from being, is nothing; and fourth, 
because the being of creatures is not their own, but is wholly supported 
by God as being itself, without whose support it would slip into 
nothingness. The divine being is nothing, on the other hand, because it is 
neither this nor that. It is no thing. Being no thing and being wholly 
remote from any thing, nothing can be predicated of it, and so it is 
utterly dark to the understanding. 
Consequently, in order to conceive God appropriately, the mind must 
become nothing. It is within this nothing, Eckhart says in one of his most 
striking passages, that God. is born: 
Es dühte einen menschen als in einem troume - ez was ein 
wachender troum -, wie ez swanger würde von nihte als ein 
vrouwe mit einem kind, and in dem nihte wart got gab dam 
der was diu vruht des nihtes. Got wart. geborn 
nihte. DA von sprichet er: 'er stuont Of von der erden, 
and mit offenen ougen sach er niht'. Er sach got, d9 alle 
crdatüren niht ensint. Er sach alle creaturen als ein 
niht, wan er hat aller crdatOren wesen in im. Er ist ein 
wesen, daz alliu wesen in im Mt. 
[It seemed to a man as though in a dream - it was a 
waking dream - that he became pregnant with nothing as a 
woman does with a child, and in this nothing God was born; 
he was the fruit of the nothing. Cod was born in the 
nothing. Hence he says: 'He rose from the ground and with 
eyes open saw nothing. ' He saw God, where all creatures 
are nothing. He saw all creatures as nothing because he 
(God) has -the being of all creatures in himsef. He is a 
being that has all beings in itself. ] 
(DW III, 224-5/TP, 323) 
God is nothing because God excludes nothing by excluding the 
differentiating 'not' that delimits the being of finite en tie. The divine 
being, because it excludes this not, is no thing, and is seen only when no 
thing is seen. But, in that case, the seeing of no thing is the seeing of 
every thing as ipsum esse, and this ipsum esse is also, in a way, 
something. 
Insofar as the exclusion of the 'not' that defines distinct en tie 
yields nothing, the divine being is equal to nothing, and the human self 
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must be formed into nothing, and nothing must be formed into itself, if it 
is to genuinely conceive that being, 'to be placed into' (gesast in) it (DW 
III, 322/TP, 329). However, insofar as the negativity of creatures in the 
four senses indicated above is understood as nothing, deus est oppositio 
ad nihil mediatione entia ('God is the opposite of nothing by means of the 
mediation of being'] (LW IV, 52/TP, 213), and the self must separate itself 
from not and nothing to reach God (DW II. 1,382/TP, 305). The 'transcending 
nothingness' and the negatio negationis are one and the same. 
So if the nothingness of God, as the opposite of the nothingness that 
pertains to entia, places God beyond any name (super omne nomen), this is 
not because God is unnameable (innominabile) in the sense that the divine 
being contains none of the perfections which are bestowed upon beings and 
which beings therefore manifest but in an imperfect way as a result of 
their forms of nothingness. It is, rather, because God is omninameable 
(omninominabile) in the sense that the divine being precontains (praehabet) 
every possible perfection of every possible being in a more excellent way 
(excellentlus), a way that excludes all the forms of nothingness in which 
the being of finite beings is involved (LW II, 41/TP, 53-4). What is seen 
in seeing the nothing of God, then, is the perfection of everything, and it 
is seen there where everything is always already accomplished in 
perfection, in the Godhead. The one who sees this is ein war-sehender, ein 
, w8rer Israel, daz ist, ein sehender man Got', wan im enist niht verborgen 
in der gothelt ('a "true seer", a "true Israel", that is, a God-seeing man, 
for nothing in the Godhead is hidden from him'] (DW III, 322-3/TP, 329). 
Keeping in mind the temporality of the Godhead, what is seen here must 
also include all that comes to pass in time, all that has occurred, is 
occurring and will occur, not as this and that event, though, but enfolded 
into the unity of all time in the now of eternity. 
On the one hand, then, God is present in all creatures and all 
creatures are present in God. On the other hand, God is nothing and no 
thing has anything of God in it. With respect to knowledge, this means 
that on the one hand God dwells in remoteness from created things and the 
vision of God requires a corresponding darkness to those things, while on 
the other hand God is visible in all things for those who have eyes to 
see. But for those who truly have eyes to see, these two moments are 
reconciled, as the genuine vision of God consists in finding all things in 
God and God in all things. To see in this way is truly to see as God 
sees, since the knowledge of God as absolute unity is a knowledge that 
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finds itself in all things and all things in itself. 
The seers in possession of this Godlike vision, Eckhart says, are 
those people who have God 'essentially present' to them: 
Der of also in wesenne hat, der nimet got götlichen, und 
dem 
Buhtet 
er in allen dingen; wan alliu dinc smeckent im 
götlichen, und of erbildet sich im t1z allen dingen. In im 
blicket got ale zit, in im ist ein abgescheiden abekeren 
und ein 
got 
sines geminneten gegenwertigen gotes. 
[The man who has God essentially present to him grasps 
God divinel , and to him God shines in all things; for 
everything 
tastes 
to him of God, and God forms himself for 
the man out of all things. God always shines out in him, 
in him there is a detachment and a turning away, and a 
forming of his God whom he loves and who is present to 
him. ] (DW V, 205-6/ES, 253) 
For the person to whom God is essentially present, God is imaged in all 
things, and so such a person, dwelling in the midst of creatures, yet 
dwells only with God. Eckhart does say here, though, that the forming of 
God out of all things, which must mean in some sense the transformation of 
all things into God, involves 'a detachment and turning away'. If, however, 
a person in this condition is still-with things, still in the midst of them 
and dealing with them and so still active in the world, such detachment 
and turning away cannot mean physical withdrawal from the things of the 
world, but must mean a different way of being with them, a different kind 
of being towards them. 
This different way of being with things, which is at the same time a 
constant being in the presence of God, forms a central theme in many of 
Eckhart's vernacular works, and a number of his most important Middle High 
German terms, terms like abegescheidenheit, gel9zenheit, dne warumbe, 6ne 
wise, Ane mittel and 8ne eigenschaft, are connected with it. Common to all 
of these terms is the suggestion of a transformation of will involving 
some form of relinquishment and renunciation. The last of these terms, 
6ne eigenschaft, is the opposite of mit eigenschaft, where mit eigenschaft 
expresses the way people ordinarily are. Frank Tobin, in his article, 
'Eckhart's Mystical Use of Language: The Contexts of eigenschaft', gives 
three definitions for this word as it appears in Eckhart's writings: 
'1/possession or possessiveness; 2/bondage or servility; 3/proprietas or 
qualitas, namely a characteristic inherent in a substance'. 6 In the notion 
of being mit eigenschaft, these three meanings of eigenschaft express 
three facets of this way of being. First, being mit eigenschaft is an 
essentially concupiscent mode of existence, encountering things in the 
world from out of a form of desire that seeks to master its object in 
ownership. It is thus possessive and self-seeking in. a straightforward 
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sense. Second, such a mode of existence is, ironically, a form of bondage. 
Through it, the human soul, attempting to be master, enslaves itself, for 
it binds itself to the things it seeks to possess and hold, and places 
itself in thrall to those things. It also binds itself to a certain vision 
of those things, one which prevents the vision of God. Third, this form of 
encounter grasps that which it encounters with 'property' in the sense of 
proprietas, i. e. through predicates and categories. In so doing, it 
obstructs the apprehension of that to which no property is proper, the 
apprehension of pure truth and being itself. 
The term eigenschaft usually carries all of these connotations in 
Eckhart's writings, with varying degrees of emphasis. As Tobin illustrates, 
Sermon 1 in the Kohlhammer edition of Eckhart's works, Intravit Jesus in 
templum et coepit eiecere vendentes et ementes, provides a good example of 
this. In this sermon, Eckhart first likens the koufllute ('businessmen'] 
buying and selling in the temple to those people, who do good works daz in 
unser herre etwaz dar umbe gebe ['so that our Lord might give them 
something in return'] (DW I, 7/TP, 240). Such people wellent also koufen 
mit unserm herren ['want to make a business deal with our Lord'] (DW I, 
7/TP 240), as they perform their actions only for the sake of a self- 
concerned end or purpose. . 
Eckhart adds that, alle the wile der mensche 
ihter IN suochet in allen s. fnen werken von allem dem, daz got gegeben mac 
oder geben wil, sO ist er disen koufliuten glich ['as long as a person in 
any of his works seeks anything at all of that which God can or shall 
give, he is like these businessmen'] (DW I, 9/TP, 240), and he urges his 
listeners to free their souls from all such koufmanschaft ['mercantilism']. 
When he then uses the phrase mit eigenschaft, it carries, in the 
context of these immediately preceding passages, its usual Middle High 
German sense of 'ownership', as well as the more specialized sense of 
'property' or 'quality' that corresponds to the term proprietas in Eckhart's 
Latin works: 
Ich hen ouch me gesprochen, daz unser herre sprach zu den 
liuten, die dA tiTen veile hAten: 'tuot diz enwec, tuot diz 
hin! ' Die Rute entreip er niht Oz noch enstrAfte sie niht 
sere; sunder er sprach gar güetliche: 'tuot diz enwec! ' als 
ob er sprechen wolte: diz enist niht boese, and doch 
bringet ez hindernisse in der 1Qtern wdrheit. Dise liute 
daz sint alle guote liute, die iriu werke tuont 10terliche 
durch of and ensuochent des irn nicht dar an and tuont 
sie doch mit eigenschaft, mit zit and mit zal, mit vor and 
mit ndch. 
[I have already mentioned that our Lord said to the people 
who were selling doves: 'Put that away, get rid of that! ' 
These people he did not drive out or punish very much. 
Instead he spoke very_ kindly: 'Put that away! ' as though 
he wanted to say: This is not really bad, but it does 
cause obstacles for pure truth. These people are all good 
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people who perform their works purely for God's sake and 
seek nothing of their own in them, and yet they still do 
them with possessiveness, in time and in number, with a before and after. ] (DW I, 10-11/TP, 241) 
Mit eigenschaft refers in this case to the appropriation, the 'own-ing', of 
any mode of existence that still apprehends mit zit and mit zal ['in time 
and number'], and so not in accordance with the apprehension of God, not 
sub specie aeternitatis. Clearly, anyone who acts through calculation and 
for the sake of a preconceived end, however elevated that end may be, is 
still involved in this and that, in before and after, in multiplicity and 
time. Such involvement obstructs the apprehension of 'pure truth', which, 
being one and simple, is free from all divisions and categories, of space 
as well as of time. To free the soul of all eigenschaft, therefore, is to 
cast out from it any thought or representation that involves it in time 
and number, where this requires freeing it from all thought of return or 
reward as well as from any manner of calculation. 
Indeed, being äne eigenschaft, being without eigenschaft in the 
various senses of the word, means being without representations, without 
images and conceptions (bilde). And yet Eckhart says: 
Waere ich also vernünftic, daz alliu bilde vernUnfticllche 
in mir stUenden, diu alle ie enpfiengen and diu in gote 
selber sint, waere ich der Ane eigenschaft, daz ich 
enkeinez mit eigenschaft haete begriffen in tuonne noch in 
lAzenne, mit vor noch mit nAch, mA-r: daz ich in disem 
gegenwertigen nO vri and ledic stUende nAch dem liebesten 
willen gotes and den ze tuonne Ane underlaz, in der 
wArheit sö waere ich juncvrouwe Ane hindernisse aller 
bilde als gewaerliche, als ich was, do ich niht enwas. 
[If I were so rational that there were present in my 
reason all the images that all men had ever received, and 
those that are present in God himself, and if I could be 
without possessiveness in their regard, so that I had not 
seized possessively upon any one of them, not in what I 
did or what I left undone, not looking to past or future, 
but I stood in this present moment free and empt 
according to God's dearest will, performing it withou 
ceasing, then truly I should be a virgin, as truly 
unimpeded by any images as when I was not. ] 
(DW I, 26/ES, 177) 
This passage from Sermon 2 clarifies the imageless nature of being Ane 
eigenschaft by suggesting that being mit eigenschaft is rooted more 
primordially in will than in understanding. Images form an obstruction in 
the way of pure truth only when they are grasped, taken hold of and 
understood (begriffen), mit eigenschaft, with the own-ness of vision in 
which the self looks to itself with concern for itself. In so doing, it 
looks to itself as it is in time, and it then looks to the this and that 
with which it is involved in time. Being Ane eigenschaft means not being 
concerned with, not willing and not conceiving, the self in this way, and 
consequently not willing and not conceiving this and that from such 
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concern. It means casting off all care (sorge) (DW Il. ii, 163/W I, 207-8) 
so as to be mit der sorge, niht in der sorge ['near care but not in care'], 
which also means being bt den dingen, niht In den dingen ['near things, not 
in things'] (DW III, 488/TP, 341-2). In achieving such a state of 
detachment, a state of still being in the world but Sne eigenschaft, a 
person still acts in time, is still in a time and at a place, and yet has 
transcended the way these categories ordinarily bind the soul. The human 
self is then unattached and pure, a juncfrouwe. Being this way, it is 
conformed to the divinity it seeks, standing vri and ledic in the no of 
eternity. 
Returning to Sermon 1, eigenschaft has here, too, this sense of a 
bondage from which the soul must free itself in order to to be conformed 
to its highest end. In its first appearance In the sermon, eigenschaft 
gains this sense partly through its association with koufmanschaft, of 
which Eckhart has said the soul must be free, and partly through the 
immediately following sentence, in which, Eckhart claims that those who 
work mit eigenschaft, sint ... gehindert der aller besten w9rheit, daz sie 
solten vrt and ledic sih, als unser herre resus Kristus vrl and ledic ist 
['are kept from the best truth, that they should be free and empty as our 
Lord Jesus Christ is free and empty'] (DW I. 11/TP, 241). Eckhart does not 
say here that people who work mit eigenschaft are kept from any kind of 
truth, but from the best truth; they are kept from being in the way Christ 
is, both in the world and out of it, both active and contemplative. They 
are kept from the perfection of that way of being with things and in the 
presence of things which is simultaneously a way of being with and in the 
presence of God. 
The mode of existence that keeps them from this perfect 
reconciliation of action and contemplation actually involves a dual form of 
bondage, a bondage of both noema and noesis; On one side, what is 
encountered is bound, circumscribed by the understanding that arises from 
being mit eigenschaft. On 
, 
the other side, the understanding itself is 
bound, limited by and to this way of being. What is understood is then 
limited to being that which can be seen in the vision determined by 
. possessiveness and property, and 
that vision is itself, of course, limited 
to seeing what can be seen by it. The understanding of this vision, as 
arising from being mit eigenschaft, is rooted in a self-willing where the 
self that wills makes what it sees its own by translating it after the 
possessive desire of its nature. It then twists the forms of things in 
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accord with itself as possessive. But it is also held in thrall to itself 
as a possessive willing, and is then in bondage to the objects of that 
willing, although this is at root still a bondage to itself. ' This dual 
bondage prevents accordance of will and understanding with God. 
It therefore becomes apparent that the three senses of eigenschaft, 
corresponding to three features of the state in which the soul ordinarily 
encounters reality, also describe three features of the reality 
encountered. Eigenschaft as ownership and bondage describes both the way 
the soul encounters reality and. the way reality encounters, or reveals 
itself to, the soul. Both are owning and owned, both master and slave. 
The soul is master in that its approach is appropriating, but it is a slave 
in that this approach places it in bondage to the objects of its 
appropriating will. The object, then, the reality encountered, is both the 
master of its subject, and itself subjected by it. 
Freedom from this form of bondage means being 8ne eigenschaft. In 
the simple sense of eigenschaft as ownership, this means that wir suln 
alilu dint haben, als ob sie uns gelihen sin and niht gegeben, dne alle 
eigenschaft, ez sS lip oder sale, sinne krefte, Ozerlich guot oder ere, 
vriunde, m6ge, hOs, hof, alliu dint ['we ought to have everything as if it 
were loaned to us and not given, without any possessiveness, whether it be 
our bodies or our souls, our minds, powers, worldly goods or honors, 
friends, kinsmen, houses, lands, all things'] (DW V. 296/ES, 281). A person 
who enh8t niht eigenschaft ['has no possessiveness'] at this level niht 
enbegert noch enwil haben ('covets nothing and wants to have nothing'] (DW 
V, 299/ES, 282). Such a person has achieved inwendigiu armuot ('inward 
poverty'] (DW II. ii, 486/ES, 199). The renunciation of possessions, 
Ozwendigiu armuot ('external poverty'], is but the outward manifestation or 
sign of this inner renunciation that has already occurred. Spiritual 
poverty actually consists in a letting go of the desire for ownership, a 
letting go and forsaking of possessive desire altogether. 
Such letting go and forsaking, gel6zenheit, is also a letting be, for 
it lets be whatever comes to be. This does not mean being indifferent to 
all events, but being Ane eigenschaft towards them. A person who is in 
this way sees and works as God does, in seeing only the good and working 
only for the good, and thus seeking the perfection of being in an 
undifferentiated way. The self that sees and works in this way is also 
6ne mittel, 'without means'. It is without possessiveness or property, 
without a specific goal in reference' to which anything might be 
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constituted as a means, and without the properties and qualities by means 
of which, in the sense of 'through the medium of which', it generally sees. 
Geläzen in this way, Me eigenschaft and Ane mittel, a person sees without 
mediation, without mode, manner or medium, and this vision corresponds to 
the vision of being itself, the one and the good, the vision of God. 
A person who is in this way is also Me war umbe ['without a why'], 
for this person exists - thinks and acts - for the sake of nothing. 
According to Eckhart, only such a person acts in the right way and justly. 
Acting without a why, without forming any reason or seeking any end, is 
will-less action, and such action is Godlike, but it is not performed by 
representing God as an end. In order for actions to be truly right and 
just, Eckhart says, they must have no end, not even God (DW II, 253-5/TP, 
296). 
Thus, the truly just man acts in a Godlike fashion by acting without 
any why or end at all. Because the divine being, as the why of all things, 
has no why itself, it acts from itself and for itself as its own end. To 
act as it acts, to will as it wills and thus come into accord with 'the 
will of God', is to will it as it wills itself, but this means to will the 
'itself' which is the perfect end of being. That end is neither this nor 
that, neither God nor anything else. To work as this end works is to work 
from within in such a way that one works for the sake of nothing that can 
be thought, no end that can be formed and represented. Die gerehten 
enh&nt zem, le keinen willen ('The just have no will at all'] DW I, 102/ES, 
186), and this does mean that they will as God wills, but in order to truly 
will as God wills, a person has to possess a poverty that is free both of 
self and of 'God': daz Si ein arm mensche., der niht enwil ervUllen den 
willen got es, m&r; daz er alsß lebe., daz er also ledic sf beidiu sines 
eigenen willen and des willen gates, als er was, dd er niht enwas ('a man 
is poor who does not want to fulfill God's will, but who lives so that he 
may be free both of his own will and of God's will, as he was when he was 
not'] (DW II. 11,499/ES, 201). Der gerehte mensche endienet weder gote 
noch den creaturen, wan er ist vri ('The just man serves neither God nor 
creatures, for he is free'] (DW II. i, 62/W I, 143). Truly right action is, 
like the action of God, Ane war umbe and worked from within. Its moving 
force, its motive, is both groundless and wholly interior. 
To the extent that this motive is identified with the will of God, 
the will of God has to act as an interior rather than an ulterior motive. 
It - is enabled to act in this way whets all self-will is relinquished into 
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God's will (DW V, 282-3/ES 277). Acting in accordance with God's will 
cannot, in this instance, mean 'figuring out' what Gqd wants and then doing 
it. Such a process would involve calculation. It would require that a 
person look to a before and an after, an end and a means. It would thus 
be neither Me eigenschaft nor 6ne mittel nor Me warumbe. In order that 
one 'mean' (meinen) got IOterlichen and aleine, by contrast, in order for 
the intention to be purely and only for God (DW V, 202/ES, 252), that will 
must be wholly in den willen gotes gebildet and geformieret ['formed and 
shaped into God's will'] (DW V, 218/ES, 257). To effect this, wir suln ... 
erledigen uns selber in allen dingen [we should empty 'ourselves of self 
in all things'] (DW V, 281/ES, 276); der mensche muoz aller bilde and sin 
selbes Ozgan and dem allem gar verre and gar unglich werden ['man must go 
out of every image and out of himself and out of everything, he must go 
far off indeed, and become quite unlike all this'] (DW V, 114/ES, 243), 
'Going out' in this way does require renouncing all things, being 
allen dingen tet ['dead to all things'] (DW II, 255/TP 296), but only in the 
sense of renouncing the 'interested love', as Evelyn Underhill called it, " 
of all things, achieving a condition where the stance towards things is one 
of detachment - Eckhart's abegescheidenheit, a term similar in meaning to 
6ne eigenschaft. Abegescheidenheit, like 6ne eigenschaft, is in essence a 
detaching of self from self, a letting go of 'self-love'. Letting go of 
'the world' is grounded in this: Alliu minne dirre werlt gebOwen Of 
eigenminne. Haetest du die gel6zen, s6 haetest dO al the werlt geldzen 
['All the love of this world is founded on self-love. If you had forsaken 
this, you would have forsaken the world'] (DW I, 107-9/ES, 187). 'Love of 
the world' is that kind of love for things within the world which is built 
upon self-love. It is love mit eigenschaft, in distinction from the 
diffusive, unifying and undifferentiated love of God as the Good. 
'Worldliness', in the theological sense, is then that form of absorption in 
the world which is founded on being mit eigenschaft, founded on 
eigenminne. 
Abegescheidenheit is also similar to being 6ne eigenschaft in the 
sense of 'without property'. The self-emptying it describes involves a 
. letting go of 
images and concepts as well, yielding a letting-be of the 
'pure truth' that cannot be captured through eigenschaften or bilden. In 
this respect, terms like abegescheidenheit, geldzenheit, dne mittel, and äne 
war umbe carry the sense of relinquishing a will whose appropriating and 
self-referring intention grounds its imposing of properties upon what is 
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without property. Being mit eigenschaft is then possessive in a more 
subtle way, as it seeks to master and possess the truth of that towards 
which it comports itself by imposing upon it modifications inappropriate to 
'pure truth', to being itself. Because the God constructed in this way is 
no true God, the appropriating activity of the will at this level is 
responsible for a form of idolatry. It causes the soul to make a God from 
things and' to take that God as true, thereby confusing an idol of its own 
making with the truth of ipsum esse. 
Abegescheidenhelt on the other hand, bringet mich ... dar zuo, daz 
ich nihtes enpfenclich bin wan gates ('Detachment leads me to where I am 
receptive to nothing but God'] (DW V, 403/ES, 286), because dem menschen, 
der sich selber vernihtet hat in im selben and in gote and in allen 
craatOren: der mensche hat the niderste stat besezzen, and In den 
menschen muoz sich got alzemale ergiezen, oder er enist niht got ('the man 
who has annihilated himself in himself and in God and in all created 
things ... has taken possession of 
the lowest place, and God must pour 
the whole of himself into this man, or else he is not God'] (DW II, 415/ES 
197). A state of detachment is a state of pure emptiness, a state of pure 
receptivity in which mind and heart seek nothing and impose nothing. 
Being this free of created things and this close to nothingness, a person 
can apprehend nothing except that which is itself a transcending 
nothingness remote from created things: D6 von ist abegescheidenheit 
nihtes enpfenclich dan gotes ('and so detachment can apprehend nothing 
except God'] (DW V, 404/ES, 286). What is something must be received by 
something, but what is no thing can be received only by nothing. 
Once more, then, to receive this nothing, the soul must accomplish 
nothing in itself. To hear the word of God, it must accomplish silence, 
becoming deaf to the tumult of 'the flesh' that gives rise to the tumult 
of creatures (LW III, 68/ES, 152). To see God, it must become blind, 
entering the darkness in which no thing is visible. But this darkness is 
still something, for it is a mtigelich enpfenglichkelt ('potential 
receptivity'], a capability of being erfttllet mit vollem wesene ('filled with 
all being'], and that is the highest possibility for human beings (Pf, 26/W 
"I, 41). As a potential and a possibility, 
it is something the soul 
possesses, something it has, and yet Eckhart claims that the soul must be 
empty of all it has in order to receive God. The paradox is captured in 
Eckhart's analogy of the eye and colour. Sol ich geverwet sin, Eckhart 
says, so muoz ich an mir haben, daz ze der varwe hceret ['If I am to receive 
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color, I have to have something about me that belongs to color'] (DW III, 
175/TP, 314). Likewise, in order to receive God, the soul must have the 
potential to do so, and it must then have something about it that belongs 
to God. But Eckhart also affirms Aristotle's claim that daz ouge in sfner 
grcesten lüterkelt d8 ez keine varwe enhdt, dd sihet ez alle varwe ['the eye 
in its purest state, when it is free of all color, sees all color'] (DW III, 
229-30/TP, 324). And the soul in its purest state, when it is free of all 
beings, sees God des wesen alliu wesen ist ['whose being is all beings'] 
(DW III, 230/TP, 324). Detachment. brings a person into the pure emptiness 
and receptivity of this vision, into the Godlike potential for knowing 
nothing while knowing everything immediately within this nothing. This 
nothing of the soul corresponding to the nothing of God is the nothingness 
of the intellect. It Is intelligere, the potentiality for all being which 
is both the ground of being and the purity of being. 
Pure detachment, in which nothing is imposed between the self and 
what it sees, apprehends God because it encounters this purity of being 
immediately, that is, dne mittel (DW III, 165/TP, 312). A person who sees 
6ne mittel also seeks God Me wfse, 'without a way', and finds the God who 
is without way or mode. This person seeks nothing but to be, and finds 
nothing but being. He finds the life that lives out of its own ground, 
having no why and seeking no why: 
Wan swer got suochet in wise, der nimet die wise and lAt 
got, der in der wise verborgen ist. Aber swer got suochet 
ne wite, der nimet in, als er in 'im selber ist; and der 
mensche lebet mit dem sune, and er ist daz leben selbe. 
Swer daz leben vrAgete tüsent jAr: war umbe lebest dQ? 
solte ez antwOrten, ez spraeche niht anders wan: ich lebe 
dar umbe daz ich lebe. Daz ist dd von, wan leben lebet 
Ozer sinem eigenen grunde and quillet Ozer einem eigen; 
dar umbe lebet ez Me warumbe in dem, daz ez sich selber 
lebet. Swer nO vrAgete einen wahrhaften menschen, der dd 
wUrket Oz eigenem grunde: war umbe wUrkest dO diniu werk? 
solte er rehte antwOrten, er spraeche niht anders dan: ich 
wUrke dar umbe daz ich wUrke. 
[Whoever is seeking God by ways is finding ways and losing 
God, who in ways is hidden. But whoever seeks for God 
without ways will find him as he is in himself, and that 
man will live with the Son, and he is life itself. If 
anyone went on for a thousand years asking of life: 'Wh 
are you living? ' life, if it could answer, would only say: 
live so that I might live. ' That is because life lives out 
of its own ground and springs from its own source, and so 
it lives without asking why it is itself living. If anyone 
asked a truthful man who works out of his own ground: 'Why are you performing your works? ' and if he were to 
give a straight answer, he would only say, 'I work. so that 
I may work. ') (DW I, 91-2/ES, 183-4) 
To work as life lives means working out of one's own ground. It means 
working without why, without forming the questions that ask for grounds, 
for answers in the form of reasons. To work out of one's own ground, 
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then, is to to stop seeking grounds, but in this groundlessness, the work 
is yet self-grounded. It is grounded in that which is without ground 
because it. is its own ground. 
It can be thus grounded because the ground of itself 'is' the 
groundless ground of God. This groundless ground is the immediate, in the 
sense of unmediated and undifferentiated, being of the self, and it stands 
within ipsum esse. Therefore, anima vero per suum esse stet In esse del, 
in deo ('through its own being, the soul stands in God's being, in God'] (LW 
IV, 243/TP, 221). In and through. the ground of its being, God is present 
to the soul, but the God present here is not different from the God that, 
as ipsum esse, is present in all things. The human soul, however, is in a 
different situation from every other being because it has the capacity to 
know itself, and to know thereby the being and life in which it dwells, and 
which dwells in the heart of itself. The realisation of this capacity 
constitutes the fulfillment of human being: Niht enbin ich da von sxllc, 
daz got in mir Ist and daz er mir nahe ist and daz ich in hAn, mer: da von, 
daz ich bekenne, wie nahe er mir ist and dez ich got wtzzende bin ('I am 
not blessed because God is in me and is near me and because I possess 
him, but because I am aware of how close he is to me, and that I know 
God'] (DW III, 142/W II, 166). 
The soul's capacity for knowing is the power of the intellect, and 
when this power becomes aware of God, it becomes the knowledge of God, 
and this is the Son. The knowledge of God is the image of God, and if it 
is dependent upon the knowledge of the being that can know God because it 
is made in the image of God, then vergienge daz bilde, daz nach gote 
gebildet ist, 0 vergienge ouch daz bilde gotes ('if the image that is 
formed according to God were to perish, God's image would perish, too'] (DW 
III, 178/TP, 314-5). The image of the God who is being, unity, goodness, 
and truth is present only in and for that creature bearing the capacity to 
understand these, within itself and without. To the extent that this 
creature realises its capacity for the knowledge of God, , it is the vessel 
of God carrying God with it in the world, Swa ich bin, da ist got; sG bin 
ich in gote, and swd got ist, da bin ich ('Where I am there God is; and 
then I am in God, and where God is, there I am'] (DW III, 100/W I, 51). The 
soul stands in God's being through its own being in a special way, because 
it can know the principle of being that it carries about within itself. 
Because it has an inner ouge ... daz In dez wesen sihet and sin wesen 
von gote 6ne allez mitel nimet ('inner eye ... that sees into being and 
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takes its being from God without anything else mediating'] (DW I, 165/TP, 
263 ), it can know the being that originates, moves, and sustains its 
being, the power that allows it to be and without which it would not be, 
and it can know it as it knows itself. For, in being and knowing, got der 
enkan sich niht verstan dne the sdle and the sdle dne got; als gar ein sint 
sie ['the soul is so completely one with God that one cannot be understood 
without the other'] (DW II. 11,632/TP, 309). 
In the final analysis, the soul's potential for true knowledge of 
things, its' potential for knowing the being of things and so knowing God 
in all things, is grounded in this knowledge of the being at the heart of 
itself. In order to grasp things as they truly are, in order to find 
nature unveiled (blaß), the soul must grasp all things beyond any likeness 
in the one (DW II. ii, 473/W II, 252), but to grasp things in the one, it 
must grasp them in and from itself as one and in the one. This is the 
morgenbekantnisse ['morning knowledge'] in which a person bekennet got and 
crAatOre in einem ['knows God and created things in one'] (DW V, 116/ES, 
245). It is the inner bekennen ['inward knowing'] of a life in which sint 
alliu dinc ein, alliu dinc gemeine al and al in al and a1 geeiniget ['all 
things are one; all things together, all and all united in all and all'] (DW 
III, 317/TP, 328). It takes place beyond all division in regione 
intellectus, ubi procul dublo in quantum huiusmodi nec aliter sunt omnia in 
omnibus ['in the region of the intellect where without doubt all things, 
insofar as they are intellect and not other, are in all things'] (LW IV, 
270/TP, 226). Returning to this region, the soul returns all things to 
their simple ground. This reditus ['returning'] is the durchbruch 
('breakthrough'] and widerruk ['turning back'] to the place from which the 
Ozbruch ['breaking out'] and Ozfluz ['flowing out'] of the soul and all 
creatures proceeds, and it is, in Eckhart's view, nobler than the 
procession: 
Ein grOz meister sprichet, daz sin durchbrechen edeler si 
dan sin Qzvliezen, and daz ist war. DO ich Oz gote vlOz, 
d9 sprachen alliu dinc: got der ist: and diz enmac mich 
niht smlic machen, wan alhie bekenne ich mich cr6atQre. 
Mar: in dem durchbrechen, dA ich ledic stan min selbes 
willen and des willen gotes and aller einer werke and 
gotes selben, sö bin ich ob allen creatt"en and enbin weder 
got noch creature mgr: ich bin, daz ich was and daz ich 
blfben sol nQ and iemerme ... Alhie enfindet got keine 
stat in dem menschen, wan der mensche erkrieget mit dirre 
armuot, daz er ewicliche ist gewesen and iemerme blfben 
Sol. Alhie ist got einz mit dem geiste, and daz ist diu 
nmste armuot, die man vinden mac, 
[A great authority says that his breaking through is 
nobler than his flowing out; and that is true. When I 
flowed out from God, all things said: 'God is. ' And this 
cannot make me blessed, for with this I acknowledge that I 
am a creature. But in the breaking-through, when I come 
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to be free of will of myself and of God's will and of all his works and of God himself, then I am above all created things, and I am neither God nor creature, but I am what I 
was and what I shall remain, now and eternally ... Here God finds no place in man, for with this poverty man 
achieves what he has been eternally and will evermore 
remain. Here God is one with the spirit, and that is the 
most intimate poverty one can find. ] (DW Il. ii, 505/ES, 203) 
Existing in this knowing, a person knows all and God, while knowing 
nothing but the self in one being with God. In fact, this knowing is 
nothing but being one with God, for it is identical with the self-knowing 
and the being of God. Such a knowing, the knowing of the being of God, 
means becoming the Son of God, but a person cannot become the Son of God 
unless he has the same being as that Son (DW III, 316/TP, 328), 'has' it, 
that is, as a potentiality to be realised. The soul could not become God 
unless it already 'was' God, unless being God, and being one with all 
things in God, were a possibility for it. As long as this possibility is 
not yet achieved, though, daz enist noch nicht offen, waz wir werden ['it is 
not yet revealed what we shall become']. We shall become one wesen and 
substancie and nature ['being, substance, and nature'] with God because we 
'are' this, in potentia, aber dez enist nO niht offen ('but this is not yet 
evident']. It will be evident wane wir in sehen, als er got ist ('when we 
see him as he is God'] (DW III, 320/TP, 328), when we are in actuality what 
we already are in the potentiality that constitutes the truth of our 
essential being, when we become what we most truly are. 
What the soul -truly is where it is one being and one knowing with 
God is what it is in its ground. Eckhart calls this 'what' by many names. 
He calls it a vilnkelih ('little spark'], a btlrgelln ('little town'] (DW 1,39, 
42/ES, 180-1), a zwic ('sprout'] , and a tröpfeln verntlnfitcheit ['drop of 
understanding'] (DW It 151/TP, 257) in the soul. He describes it as ein 
kraft in der sale that nimet got b16z zemfle in siren istigen wesen ['a 
power in soul' that 'seizes God naked in his essential being'] (DW I, 220- 
2/W I, 190-1), that enhat mit nihte niht gemein ['has nothing in common 
with anything'] and that machet von nihte iht and al ['makes anything and 
everything out of nothing'] (DW I, 182/W II, 159-60). It is ein kraft in 
dem geiste, diu Si' aleine vri ['a power in the spirit that alone is free'] 
(DW I, 39/ES, 180), neizwaz gar heimliches and verborgens and verre dar 
enboben ... da Ozbrechent the krefte verndnfticheit and wille ('something 
completely mysterious and hidden in the soul existing far above where the 
powers intellect and will burst forth'] (DW I, 123/TP, 254), etwaz in der 
661e ... dez gote alsd sippe ist, dez ez ein ist and niht vereinet 
['something in the soul that is so closely related to God that it is one 
104 
[with him] and not just united'] (DW I, 197/TP, 269). It is a huote 
['guard'] or lieht ['light'] of the spirit (DW I, 39/ES, 180), the innigste 
['innermost'] and the hceste ['highest'] of the soul (DW II. 1,95/TP, 292), a 
vlnkeliin der vernüfticheit ['spark of intellect'] which is als viel als ein 
vünkelln götlicher nette, ein götlich lieht, ein zein und ein tngedr(Jcket 
bilde götlicher nature ['none other than a tiny spark of the divine nature, 
a divine light, a ray and imprint of the divine nature'] (DW II. 1,211/W I, 
229). 
Like all descriptions of the being of God, however, these descriptions 
are ultimately inadequate, and what the soul truly is in its ground no 
human ingenuity can discover (DW I, 123-4/TP, 254). Got, der one namen ist 
- er enh3 t enkelnen namen - ist unsprechelich, and diu sdle in irm grunde 
ist ouch unsprechelich, als er unsprechelich ist ['God, who has no name - 
he has no name - is ineffable, and the soul in her ground is also 
ineffable, as he is ineffable'] (DW I, 284/W I, 172); als wenic als man gote 
eigenen namen finden mac, als wenic mac man der sele eigenen namen vinden 
aleine dA grdziu bunch von geschriben sin ('just as no one can find a true 
name for God, so none can find the soul's true name, although mighty tomes 
have been written about this'] (DW II. 1,237/W I 218). The innermost being 
of the soul is in truth weder diz noch daz ['neither this nor that']; ez ist 
von. alien namen vri and von alien formen blaz, ledic and vrl zemý41e, als 
got ledic and vrf Ist in Im selber ['it is free of all names, it is bare of 
all forms, wholly empty and free, as God in himself is empty and free' (DW 
I, 39-40/ES, 180). In a way, the ground of the soul is actually not the 
soul, just as the ground of God, the Godhead is not 'God'. It is something 
in the soul daz über daz geschaffen wesen der sdle ist ['which transcends 
the created being of the soul'], ein elende and ... ein wüestenunge ... 
and ungenennet, dan ez name habe ... and unbekant den ez bekant si ['a 
strange and desert place ... rather nameless than possessed of a name .. 
. more unknown 
than it is known'] (DW II-i, 66/W I, 144). In the end, it is 
just 'something' (etwaz) (DW II. i, 88/TP, 290) corresponding to the 
'something' (was) which is the divine being (DW I, 254/ES, 191). 
But just as God is nameless because omninameable, so the spark of 
divine nature In the ground of the soul is no thing because it is all 
things. As the point where God is essentially present to the soul, it is 
what God is, a puritas et plenitudo essendi including all that is in the 
unity of ipsum esse. It is thus the one that comprehends the all, and in 
which all is eternally present, the unifying unity of the being of God. In 
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this unity, the unity of the hidden ground of the soul, all truth is 
contained, and this truth draws the soul towards itself; geruowet the 
vernunft niemer denne alleine in der wesel. fchen w6rheit, diu alllu dinc in 
ihr beslozzen hdt ['the intellect cannot rest except in the essential truth 
that embraces all things'] (Pf, 21/ W I, 32), '" and this means that it 
cannot rest until it goes beyond itself into this hidden ground, so that 
what lies in this ground is also its highest good as a rational soul. As 
the good of the soul, the being, truth and unity lying enfolded in the 
ground form both the source from which the multiple powers of the soul, 
with all that they know and can know, break forth and flow out, and the 
goal to which they seek, with all that they know and can know, to return. 
The words and deeds of a person issue from this ground, so that the 
relationship between the exterior effects of a person and the inner unity 
of the ground of the soul is like that between the effects and the unity 
of God. When God creates and acts, that which is created and enacted, the 
exterior word, is a concretisation of the inner Word, the Son, generated in 
the heart of God the Father. This inner Word is consubstantial with and 
is an expression of the essential being of God; it is an expression of the 
Godhead, of what God is in the ground where all the things that come to 
be are present in a unified and preeminent way. Human speech, the spoken 
word, stems from and expresses what is present in the ground of the soul 
in a similar fashion: 
Ich sprach einest: swaz eigenlich gewortet mac werden, 
daz muoz von innen komen, m8r: von indewendic sol ez her 
Oz komen. Daz lebet eigenliche in dem innersten der stile. 
Dä sint der alliu dinc gegenwertic and inner lebende and 
suochende and sint an dem besten and sint an dem hcesten. 
[I once said whatever can be expressed properly in words 
must come forth from within and must have movement from 
an inner form; it cannot enter in from without but must 
come out from within. It lives actually in the innermost 
[part] of the soul. There all things are present to you 
are living within and seeking, and are in their best and 
highest [state]. ] (DW I, 66/TP, 249) 
It is in this innermost part of the soul that every word which mediates 
between the unity of being and the multiplicity of beings, and which in so 
doing echoes the eternal Word that is the offspring of God, is conceived. 
It is born here in the intellect, before taking shape in thought and then 
. 
being spoken out loud (DW II. i, 229/W 1,215). 
Every true word is a response corresponding to the eternal Word in 
which the forms of all things actual and possible are contained, the primal 
idea through whose generation the unity of the being of God first becomes 
two. The eternal and living Word supporting all things speaks in the soul, 
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and the soul responds with the living word (DW I, 305/W I, 265-6). But 
this Word, expressing the ratio of God under the aspect of intellect, also 
expresses the end of God under the aspect of will. It is the good that 
God both seeks and is, the good which is nothing other than the being 
itself of God. In the same way, the eternal and living word speaking in 
the soul expresses the end of the soul. It expresses what the soul wills 
and inclines towards in the unity of the desire which is shadowed in the 
multiplicity of its desire for creatures. What is desired is being itself, 
which needs nothing and receives. nothing because it already contains all 
things within it. What is desired is life, whose principle flows into and 
works and is present in the heart, the centre of life that contains all 
things, and touches all things while remaining untouched itself (DW III, 
218/TP, 321). The word spoken in the summit of the intellect is also 
spoken in the depths of the heart. The words that echo this word 
correspond both to what is known and to what is loved, for it is true both 
that the spoken word expresses what is present as known, and that the 
mouth speaks of that with which a person is concerned, of that which fills 
the heart (DW I, 219/W I, 190). 
When the inclination of the life of the soul, the aspiration of the 
spark of divinity within it which is satisfied with nothing less than 
infinite being, finds itself as it is in the ground where it is not itself 
but God, then only God fills the heart. The soul then comes to the hidden 
end of itself. However, because this hidden end is always present within 
itself as a beginning, as the unknown source of being, in it the soul's 
being is, and always has been, in and from another (DW I, 418/TP, 285). 
When the soul arrives here, where this arriving is a returning to its 
beginning, the essential being of God, God qua Godhead is comprehended. 
What comprehends that being, though, is not really the soul itself, but the 
God within it: Der unmezllche got, der in der sole ist, der begrifet den 
got, der unmezlich ist. Dd begrifet got got and wOrket got sich selben in 
['The immeasurable God who is in the soul is the one who comprehends the 
God who is immeasurable. There God comprehends God, and God fashions 
himself in the soul and forms it like himself'] (DW III, 463/TP, 336). This 
ground is so gar ein and einvaltic., als got ein and einvaltic ist, daz man 
mit dekeiner wise dar zuo geluogen mac ['so utterly one and simple, as God 
is one and simple, that man cannot in any way look into it'] (DW I, 40/ES, 
180), so all that is 'man' must be left behind in its vision. But if all 
that is 'man' must be left behind here, so must all that is 'God', for 'God' 
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only is when man is. Since in den grunt der sole enmac niht den 10ter 
gotheit ['nothing can come into the ground of the soul but the pure 
Godhead'], dennoch enmac got dar in niht, im enwerde abegenommen allez, daz 
im zuogeleget ist ['even God cannot enter unless he is stripped of 
everything that that is added to him'] (DW I, 361/TP, 281). 
Being drawn into this ground, the soul is drawn into the boundless 
and modeless unity of the Godhead. It Is then placed in the wfte, in daz 
mer, in ein ungrüntlich mer ['into vast regions, into the sea, into 
uncharted depths'] (DW I, 121/TR, 253) for it then takes God in sfner 
einunge and in sin er eincade; at nimet got in siner wilestunge and in sfnem 
eigenen grunt ['in his oneness and in his solitary wilderness, in his vast 
wasteland, and in his own ground'] (DW I, 171 /TP, 265). It takes God in 
the unity where all difference is subsumed and comprehended, the 
indistinction in which no thing can be distinguished, not one thing from 
another, and not itself from God. Its finite being is dissolved into 
infinite being like a drop of water into the sea, and it becomes divine, 
remaining an gote, als got an im selber blfbet ('In God as God remains in 
himself'] (DW III, 387/TP, 334). 
Clearly, when it enters into the being of God, the soul must enter 
into the time of God as well, the fullness of time in which all time is 
contained. For Eckhart, it is capable of entering into this time, into 
eternity, because, in standing between God and creatures, between the 
boundless and the bounded, between being itself and entities, it stands 
between eternity and time: 
Diu sale ist geschaffen als in einem orte zwischen zit and 
dwicheit, die si beide rUerende ist. Mit den obersten 
kreften rüeret si die dwichelt, aber mit den nidersten 
kreften rUeret si die zit. 
[The soul is created as if at a point between time and 
eternity, which touches both. With the higher powers she 
touches eternity, but with the lower powers she touches 
time. ] (DW II. i, 405/W I, 183) 
The lower powers are involved with time because they are involved with 
particulars, with the 'this' and 'that' of multiplicity. The higher powers 
work in the unity which, in comprehending this multiplicity, comprehends 
its time in eternity. The oberste teil der sEle ['highest peak of the 
soul'], where it is one with God, stat obe zft en enweiz niht von der zft 
noch von dem lfbe ['stands above time and knows nothing of time or of the 
body'] (DW II. i, 24/W I, 97). Here, schepfet got alle dise werlt ('God 
creates this whole world'), including allez daz vergangen ist, and allez, 
daz gegenwertic ist, and allez, daz kUnftic Ist ['everything that is past, 
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everything that is present, and everything that is future'] (DW II. i, 96/TP, 
292-3). When the soul gathers itself into this innermost and highest 
point of itself, it gathers all time into the present presence embracing 
the fullness of time and being. This gathering brings itself and all the 
many into the point of time, the moment, in which all multiplicity is 
restored in unity (DW I, 246/ES, 190). 
The person who is established in this moment, the person who dwells 
within and lives from the fullness of being and time in the innermost and 
highest unity of the soul, is the one to whom God is essentially present 
in all things and all acts. For the person who lives in this inwardness 
diu izercheit der bilde ensint ... niht üzerlich, wan alliu dinc sint den 
inwendigen menschen ein inwendigeu gätlichiu wise ('the outwardness of 
images is not outward because to inward men all things possess a divine 
inwardness'] (DW V, 277/ES, 275). This person, living in and from the 
ground whence all life flows, without possession and without why, becomes 
the Son of God, ein einiger Ozfluz ... mit dem ewigen wort ('a single 
flowing-out with the eternal Word'] (DW II. i, 379/TP, 304), an adverb 
(biwort) to the Word (DW I, 155/TP, 259) in all acts of thought and speech. 
In the moment in which this is achieved. the moment in which such a person 
lives, world and God are reconciled, for in this moment all things are in 
God and God in all things. 
2. The Metaphysical Element in Heidegger's Mysticism. 
One of the greatest differences between the region of the modern 
philosophical world to which Heidegger belongs and the world of medieval 
scholastic metaphysics undoubtedly rests in the uniquely modern realization 
of the finite and relative nature of all conceptualisation, which goes hand 
in hand with an understanding of the historical contingency of every form 
of language. John Caputo, in Heidegger and Aquinas, says 'I do not in fact 
believe that any Heideggerian would be moved by the "existential" 
metaphysics of St. Thomas because he would take esse to be an 
objectivistic and ahistorical notion', whereas Heidegger's notion of 
aletheia, of truth as 'destined' revealing, 'belongs to a phenomenological- 
-historical kind of thinking which would be altogether impossible for a 
thirteenth-century man'. '' Assuming that this judgement is largely 
correct, there are a number of possible stances towards the scholastic 
metaphysics of someone like Thomas, or Eckhart, once the lack of a 
historical dimension in their formulations has been recognised. 
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One stance consists in simply viewing this species of metaphysics, 
like any other, as part of the tradition that Heidegger's Destruktion seeks 
to overcome. Its conceptions are then wholly subject to Heidegger's 
critique, and, ultimately, to be rejected. Another approach, and the one 
that Caputo himself adopts, attempts to discover through deconstruction a 
non-metaphysical element behind the 'metaphysical casing'. In the case of 
Aquinas according to Caputo, this consists in 'the mystical-religious 
experience of life which animates his works' (pp. 247-9). Caputo claims 
that 'one need only find the, quiet spot in [Aquinas') metaphysical 
treatises, that point in his metaphysical theology at which he himself 
unmasks the pretension of ratio to absolute validity, in order to see that 
this metaphysics, unlike all post-Cartesian systems, invites deconstruction' 
(p. 250). He locates this spot especially in the record of an experience 
near the end of Aquinas' life which is supposed to have put an end to his 
met aphysical-theological writing (p. 248). 
To the extent that Eckhart's writings involve, as Oliver Davies has 
suggested, a kind of 'conceptual poetry' and a 'poeticization' of theological 
language, 12 a deconstructive attempt to discover a 'non-metaphysical' 
dimension in his thought does, on the face of it, promise to be fruitful. 
Not only do his works 'invite' deconstruction - and at every level of his 
speculation, not merely at the points where ratio breaks down in a unitive 
experience - rather more than do the writings of Aquinas, but it could be 
argued that Eckhart's poetic transformation of theological language is 
already a form of deconstruction. A comparison between Eckhart and 
Heidegger proceeding from this perspective might search out the 'poetic' 
elements in their thought, and examine the way that these represent an 
overcoming of metaphysics. 
On the other hand, it should be apparent from the preceding 
exposition of Eckhart's thought that it contains nothing like a 
thoroughgoing rejection of ratio or metaphysics, but, on the contrary, 
manifests a profound sense of their importance in the revelation of truth. 
Eckhart's poeticization of the tradition, which sometimes involves no more 
(and no less) than the resurrection of dead metaphors through the 
translation of Latin scholastic terms into the vernacular, is no more a 
deconstruction than it is a reconstruction, a recovery of basic meanings 
that have become flattened and concealed. It is true that Eckhart 
acknowledges the inability of ratio to penetrate the nature of the Godhead, 
and the insufficiency of any name to capture that nature, but it is also 
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true that he believes firmly in the validity of ratio as an approach to 
truth, and in the adequacy of transcendental categories as an articulation 
of that approach. He believes in scholastic metaphysics as approximation, 
although, in the attempt to reach what is proprius rather than proxime to 
truth, it must be left behind. 
The following comparison between Heidegger and Eckhart does not 
immediately set aside the metaphysical aspect of Eckhart's thought in 
favour of the 'mystical' and 'poetic' one. Rather, a major portion of this 
comparison will focus precisely on those elements that define Eckhart as a 
scholastic metaphysician. How, it might be asked, can there be any such 
comparison, if Heidegger has succeeded in his task of destroying 
metaphysics through historical thinking, if Heidegger's own thinking is 
radically historical in a way that medieval scholastic metaphysics could 
never be? This can be answered fully only in the course of the 
discussion. As an anticipatory answer, however, I would maintain that 
Heidegger's deconstruction, too, is simultaneously a reconstruction. This 
does not entail any simple acceptance of traditional metaphysics, but is, 
as suggested at the end of Chapter One, a transformative appropriation. 
The transformation involves, inter alia, an understanding of historicality, 
and one might say there is in Heidegger a kind of temporalised meta- 
metaphysics. What Fergus Kerr says in commenting on Max MUller's 
Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart also expresses in 
brief the view of Heidegger's relation to scholastic metaphysics which 
informs my discussion in the rest of this chapter: 
it is not a matter of its being 'wrong' or out-of- 
date. It is rather that traditional- metaphysics itself, in 
the existence of so original a metaphysician as Heidegger 
appears to Müller to be is demanding from within as it 
were, to display and thus surmount its present limitations. 
Nothing is being abandoned, nothing is being destroyed. 
Everything is being deepened and enlarged, and there is 
thus need- for genuine re-vision. 13 
First and foremost, this revision requires that traditional metaphysical 
concepts be expanded through an understanding of the historicality and 
finitude of existence. Kerr notes that Heidegger found such an 
understanding not in the Greek, but in the biblical, conception of man (p. 
403). 
In the last discussion of Was Ist Metaphysik?, it was pointed out 
that, according to Heidegger, the question Warum? is ultimately grounded in 
Dasein as transcendence, since Dasein can only raise questions about the 
being of beings because it can pass beyond beings to nothing. Thus. every 
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why-question, including all of those that inquire in any way into the 
grounds and causes of things, has its original source in Dasein as meta- 
physics (WM, 41/379). The question into the ground of metaphysics, on the 
other hand, the question Was ist Metaphysikll inquires, insofar as it is 
still a metaphysical question, into the ground of the climbing over of 
transcendence. If it is transcendence which grounds the Warum? in general, 
the question about the ground of metaphysics will be the question about 
the ground of grounds, the reason for reasons. Heidegger's answer in Was 
ist Metaphysik? is: nothing, which als das Andere zum Seienden ist der 
Schleier des Seins ['conceived as the pure "other" than what-is, is the veil 
of being'] (WM, 52/392). 
Being and nothing, therefore, belong together. As the wholly other to 
beings, being, in relation to beings, is, in a sense not-being (Nicht- 
Seiende). It is therefore nothing. But this nothing 'is' (west) as being 
(Sein), because the experience of nothing permits the experience of the 
vastness, the clear and expansive openness (Weiträumigkeit), of that which 
gives all that is (alles Seiende. ) the 'grant' (Gewähr) to be, namely, being 
itself Was Sein selbst). The being of all that is depends upon and is 
grounded in the granting of being itself, whose own ungrounded essence 
(abgründiges Wesen), i. e. coming to presence, is granted, darkly, by nothing: 
Ohne das Sein, desen abgründiges, aber noch unentfaltetes Wesen uns das 
Nichts in der wesenhaften Angst zuschickt, bliebe alles Seiende in der 
Seinslosigkeit ['Without being, whose unfathomable and unmanifest essence 
is vouchsafed us by nothing in essential dread, everything that 'is' would 
remain in beinglessness'l (WM, 46/384). 
Suspending for a moment various questions that naturally arise about 
the profound, or seemingly profound, differences between Heidegger and 
Eckhart on this issue, it is first possible to note some obvious 
similarities. For Eckhart. as for Heidegger, being (ipsum esse) is other to 
beings (entia), and, as such, in relation to beings, is nothing. This 
nothing outside of beings, however, 'is' also, again as for Heidegger, what 
grants being to beings. The nothing in relation to beings is being itself, 
which grants itself in granting the being of beings. Moreover, while, for 
. Eckhart, entia are nothing 
in relation to esse, nothing without esse, in 
relation to nothing, they are, and their being in relation to nothing 
grounds the notion of creatio ex nihilo, the 'active upsurge', as Caputo 
says (Heidegger and Aquinas, p. 101), of that which is from nothing, ' a just 
as the relation of beings to nothing founds the being of beings in 
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Heidegger's conception. 
In the Beitrege zur Philosophie (composed 1936-9), some of these 
similarities are clearer. Here, Heidegger claims that if it is said that 
what-is is, then being (Seyn) 'is' not, but west (B, 7,286). In truth, 
however, it is bieng that truly is, while what-is 'is' not (B, 472). Thus, 
as for Eckhart, the applicability of 'being' to the ground of beings 
depends upon the sense of this term, and it can be said that for 
Heidegger, too, 'being' is predicated of that ground, of being itself, in a 
preeminent sense. 
Turning now to the differences between Eckhart's notion of being and 
that of Heidegger in Was ist Metaphysik?, which tend to be more in 
evidence in the text of the original 1929 lecture than in the Einleitung 
and Nachwort, both of which were written much later, " the first point to 
consider is that Heidegger does himself take up the issue of how Christian 
dogma formulates the being of beings in relation to God, and explicitly 
distances himself from this formulation. The nihilo of the Christian 
creatio ex nihilo, he claims, involves the notion of the absence or non- 
being (Abwesenheit) of all being outside God, and nothing then becomes the 
opposite of God as the authentic being, the summ urn ens as the " ens 
increatum. While an interpretation of nothing is presupposed in this 
conception of being (Seiende), as it is in metaphysical discussion, the 
questions of being and nothing, according to Heidegger, remain unasked in 
both cases. Dogma then does not have to confront the difficulty that the 
absolute is supposed to exclude from itself all nothingness (Nichtigkeit), 
and yet God must have some relation to nothing in order to create out of 
it (WM, 39/376). 
Eckhart's God is not, properly speaking, an ens, but ipsum esse, as 
puritas et plenitudo essendi, does exclude nothing. However, Eckhart's 
ipsum esse is not precisely the being of beings, and therefore not, I would 
argue, the 'being' of Heidegger's 1929 lecture. Although, in Sein and Zeit, 
Heidegger- says, Sein ist jeweils das Sein eines Seienden ('being is always 
the being of an entity'] (SZ, 9), in the Beitrdge he distinguishes between 
being as the being of beings, which he writes as Sein, and being itself, 
which he writes as Seyn. Sein and Seyn, he says, ist dasselbe and doch 
grundvershieden ('the same and yet fundamentally different'] (B, 171). 
Thus, R. S. Gall is right to point out that Heidegger uses 'being' sometimes 
in the sense of the presencing of what is present, and sometimes in the 
sense of that which makes the presencing of what is present possible. It 
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is in addressing the letter notion, Gall notes, that Heidegger speaks 
sometimes of the essence, truth, or meaning of being, and eventually of 
Ereignis. " But when, in the 1929 text of Was ist Metaphysik? Heidegger 
says that Hegel is right to Identify being and nothing, though not because, 
as Hegel thought, these are the same in their indeterminacy and immediacy, 
but because being is essentially finite and therefore hangs together with 
nothing (WM, 40/377), it seems to be the former sense that he has in mind. 
In that case, the nothingness at the basis of Dasein revealed in essential 
dread grants to it the experience of the sheer contingency of being, the 
contingency of the fact that what-is is, and is not nothing. This 
experience of contingency grounds, explicitly or implicitly, the projection 
of possibility. However, the claim put forward in the 'Postscript', that 
the experience of nothing allows the experience of being itself as that 
which grants being to all that is, rests on the conception of being not as 
contingent but as ungrounded, where these are not the same. Being is not 
here a contingent event, but the ungegr(ndete Grund from which das 
Seiende originates (WM, 44/382), the abgründiges Wesen that makes it 
possible for beings to be. It still hangs together with nothing, but now 
not because it is finite and contingent, but because, as the possibility of 
everything actual, it 'is', in. itself, not any thing. 
Eckhart's ipsum esse corresponds to this latter conception of being. 
The being of beings, on the other hand, including the being of omnia, is, 
for Eckhart, too, always finite, always incomplete and imperfect, exclusive 
and contingent, always pervaded and defined by forms of not being. The 
being Hof beings never includes all possibilities of being nor is it 
absolute being, but being itself, as the pure affirmation that grants every 
possibility of being, does and is. It is the opposite of nothing through 
the mediation of beings (entia). 
In Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Heidegger points out that 
medieval mystical theology involves a peculiar speculation which the Idee 
des Wesens überhaupt, d. h. eine ontologische Bestimmung des Seienden, die 
essentia entis, zu einem Seienden umbildent and den ontologischen Grund 
eines Seienden, seine Möglichkeit, sein Wesen, zum eigentlich Wirklichen 
macht ['transforms the idea of essence in general, which is an ontological 
determination of a being, the essentia entis, into a being and makes the 
ontological ground of a being, its possibility, its essence, into what is 
properly actual']. Because of this, Eckhart's God, as des allgemeinste 
Wesen ['the most universal being'], is the reinste noch unbestimmte 
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Mäglichkeit alles Möglichen, das reine Nichts ... das Nichts gegenüber dem 
Begriffe aller Kreatur, gegenüber allem bestimmten Möglichen and 
Verwirklichten ['the purest indeterminate possibility of everything 
possible, pure nothing ... the nothing over against every determinate 
concept of every creature, over against every determinate possible and 
actualized being']. There is in this, Heidegger notes further, eine 
merkwürdige Parallele zu der Flegelschen Bestimmung des Seins and der 
Identifizierung mit dem Nichts ['a remarkable parallel to the Hegelian 
determination of being and its identification with nothing'] (GP, 127-8/90- 
1). Eckhart's God is actually the essence of essenc-ing, the essence that 
makes the realization of any essence possible, in that ipsum esse holds 
within itself, in a unity, the essential possibilities of all that comes to 
be. Only if Heidegger, in the postscript to Was ist Metaphysik? conceives 
of being in a similar way can it make sense for him to say that im Sein 
hat sich anfänglich jedes Geschick des Seienden schon vollendet ['in being 
all that comes to pass in what-is is perfected from everlasting'] (WM, 
52/392). And while possibility is not, for Heidegger, what is properly 
actual, he does say, in Sein and Zeit, that possibility is higher than 
actuality (SZ, 38) 
The nothing at the heart of being in Heidegger's earlier conception, 
then, corresponds not to the nothing which, for Eckhart, is ipsum esse, 
but to the negativity of creatures as contingent, and, in a peculiar way, 
also to the not being that closes every determinate being into its 
finitude. That finitude involves both the imperfection, the incompleteness, 
of its actual being with respect to its ideal essence, and the exclusivity 
that de-fines it in that essence. In that Heidegger conceives nothing as 
essential to being, essential to the disclosure of what-is, there is, again, 
a formal similarity between his thought and that of Eckhart, since the 
determination of the (necessarily finite) being of any being requires, for 
Eckhart, too, a delimitation against not being. Thus, there is a formal 
correspondence between the essential belonging together of being and 
nothing in the disclosure of truth which Heidegger sometimes describes in 
terms of the simultaneity of hiddenness and unconcealment, and the 
'mixture' of being and not being, which, for Eckhart, defines the being of 
any creature, where a creature, an ens creatum, is any finite being. 
Heidegger thinks of such definition historically, while Eckhart, of 
course, does not. With respect to the question of metaphysics, while, for 
Eckhart, the understanding of being in the sense of understanding that 
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something is, leads the soul to raise questions about how and why it is, 
where this gives rise to metaphysical inquiry about essence, he thinks the 
finitude of any such inquiry synchronically rather than diachronically. 
That metaphysical speculation, insofar as it is determinate and rational, 
must, for Eckhart as much as for Heidegger, be finite, and must fall short 
of the essence of truth, is clear, and this has formed the basis for much 
of the comparison between Heidegger and Eckhart. There is a point at 
which, for Eckhart, the intellect does reach the essence of truth, but at 
this point it also ceases to grasp anything strictly determinate, and this 
point is beyond the reach of metaphysics as a rational discipline. It is 
indeed a point of return to the ground of metaphysics, where metaphysics, 
as the search for the truth of essence, is the search for the essential 
determinations of being (not in the sense of what is actual, but in the 
sense of what can be with respect to essential - ideal, and thus possible 
- attributes), and is therefore grounded in that which makes it possible 
for anything to be at all, Ipsum esse. 
But Eckhart obviously does not, and could not, think of the essence 
of metaphysics in terms of finite historical possibilities, as Heidegger 
does. For Heidegger, while every metaphysical determination of the is-ness 
of what-is seeks to delimit the being of what-is as a whole (and in so 
doing, to be absolute knowledge, as knowledge of the absolute), each 
historical disclosure of metaphysics is bounded by the not being of 
excluded possibilities, the possiblities it has not yet realised, and by the 
exclusivity proper to the delimitation of its essence as rational inquiry, 
which, by definition, cannot think its own ground' because it must 
presuppose it. That ground is, as for Eckhart, the abyss of being itself. 
For Heidegger, too, it can become visible in itself only at the 'end' of 
metaphysics, but that end is, for him, a historical moment. " 
What has been said about being (presencing) and not being in terms 
of the essence of metaphysics in general also applies to the fundamental 
terms, the 'definitions' of being, which metaphysics arrives at in its 
search for essence. For the scholastic tradition to which Eckhart belongs, 
metaphysics is supposed to consider the immutable ideas, the fixed logical 
forms of things, and to give expression to these in its words. For 
Heidegger, on the other hand, the metaphysical speculation of a given age 
fixes, in its own specific vocabulary, what it considers to be the 
essential truth of beings, in accord with historically determined and 
variable possibilities. This is well known. But the point also needs to 
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be made that if Dasein is thought to be a Lichtung of being, and a 
necessarily finite and historical one, the thought that thinks the essence 
of Dasein in this way, if it is true to itself, is unlikely to consider 
linguistic unconcealments (including those belonging to the metaphysical 
tradition) as 'false' or 'mistaken' in any simple sense, and certainly not 
for the reason that they are 'merely' finite and historical - except, that 
is, insofar as they take themselves not to be finite, meaning insofar as 
they do not recognize the nothing that belongs to the being of beings, the 
hiddenness that belongs to every form of unconcealment. 11' Again, while 
Eckhart thinks synchronically of the necessary mixture of being and not 
being in the definition of any stable finite essence, Heidegger thinks this 
diachronically, in terms of the instability of a historically evolving (in 
the sense of changing, not progressing) vocabulary. 
Before going on to discuss further the nature of the thinking that 
goes beyond metaphysics while going back into the ground of metaphysics, 
it is necessary to address the all-important fact of Heidegger's locating 
the origin of the 'not' of being in the nothing revealed to Dasein not 
through logic, but through a mood, Angst. In the 1929 lecture, this mood, 
in revealing nothing and thereby revealing the contingency and finitude of 
being, reveals that which, originally, makes possible the understanding of 
possibilities of being. As in Sein and Zeit, it reveals Dasein itself as 
possible, as free for possibilities. Only through such freedom can Dasein 
have a relationship to itself and to what-is (WM, 35/370). It is because 
it has such freedom, and because it is finite, that Dasein, in Sein and 
Zeit, is originally and essentially being-guilty. Dasein is essentially a 
mixture of being and not being, because any possibility it chooses and 
realizes is a finite affirmation of being which excludes possibilities of 
being, since it is bounded by all the forms of negation that delimit a 
determinate choice in a determinate situation. Dasein's temporal self- 
achievement is the process whereby, in choosing to realise itself, it 
realises possibilities of its being, thereby disclosing itself in a 
determinate and finite way. Once again, disclosure requires determinacy, 
and therefore finitude, the de-finition of not being. When thought in 
terms of the temporal disclosure of the essence of Dasein, that nothing 
belongs to being in the revelation of truth means that Dasein discloses 
itself in the realization of finite possibilities that constitutes its 
becoming what it is. Infinite possibility, on the other hand, is nothing, 
not not being, but being itself as the source of all possibility. 
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Considered in itself, this source is the negation of negation, the pure 
affirmation of being. Insofar as Dasein understands anything like a 
possibility of being, it must stand in an essential relation to this source. 
For the early Heidegger, who thinks of 'world' as a Wie of the being 
of Dasein (e. g. WG/50), a horizon projected in the transcendence through 
which Dasein achieves its being - the existential version of a 
'transcendental horizon' - what is within the world is discovered in terms 
of the project of Dasein's being. In reference to this project, logical 
negation, as Heidegger says, is not the only, and not even the chief, mode 
of nihilation. He mentions, as stronger forms, the Härte des 
Entgegenhandelns, the Schärfe des Verabscheuens, the Schonungslosigkeit des 
Verbietens, and the Herbe des Entbehrens ('the harshness of opposition', 
'the violence of loathing', 'the pain of refusal', the 'mercilessness of an 
interdict', and 'the bitterness of renunciation'] (WM, 37/373). Along with 
the notion that in the nothingness of dread Dasein uncovers the original 
sense of itself as thrown project (geworfener Entwurf), or, as Kierkegaard 
puts it, 'the alarming possibility of being able, '9 there is here a hint of 
the Fichtean notion that the origin of the not-A rests in a kind of Anstoß 
delivered to the self through the consciousness of itself as finite and 
free, and that the being of what-is is constituted in terms of the 
decisive action through which self-realisation takes place. But the 
realisation of finitude presupposes an essential relation to infinity. The 
finite ego is aware of itself as such only in relation to the infinite ego 
(Fichte); 'sin' is before God (Kierkegaard). 
For Heidegger, only because Dasein understands its own finitude in 
relation to possibilities of being is it capable of understanding the 
finitude of beings, their contingency and their possibilities, where these 
are uncovered in terms of the contingency and possibilities of the being 
of Dasein as thrown project. This understanding is what gives rise to the 
nothing of not being. On the other hand, only if Dasein has a relation to 
possibility can it understand the finitude of its being, and this is a 
relation to the nothing which is the veil of being itself, as pure 
possibility. In that case, being itself (pure possibility) is the 'ground' 
of essences because it is that in relation to which what-is is constituted 
in its possibility, its 'ideal', against which its actuality may be measured. 
What-is is constituted and measured in reference to what is wanted, and 
what is wanted is being. The essence of the hammer is determined in 
terms of a destination (SZ, 69), and'the destination of destinations is 
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being itself. This is another instance of the way the return to the 
ground of metaphysics is also a retrieval of metaphysics, for being itself 
is then, in the final analysis, the ground of Sollen, and, as such, agathon, 
the pure form of the good. 
Thus, just as, for Eckhart, the preeiminence of human beings lies in 
their capacity to reach, within and through their own finite being, the 
source of every possibility of being, being itself which is also the good, 
so the preeminence of Dasein lies in its ability to relate, through a 
relation to finitude, to the hidden origin and destination of what-is. Yet 
this is not ontotheology, not even if the hidden origin and destination is 
conceived as the the negation of negation, the negation of the not being 
of every imperfection and incompletion, not even if it is named as being 
itself as pure affirmation because 'it' is still not anything vorhanden, 
anything representable or objectifiable. 'It' is not, in fact, any thing at 
all, and every determination is inadequate to it, precisely in virtue of 
being a determination. If omnis de. terminatio est negatio (Spinoza), no 
determinatio can be proper to what is the negatio negationis, not 'God' or 
'good', not even, in the end, being itself. Nothing is secured in such 
thinking, since what is pointed out is brought into view only as that 
which cannot be brought into view - as the mystery. There can be no 
question here of philosophy's finding the 'answer' to the meaning of being. 
Purely formal determinations like the good and being itself can 
finally do no more, but also no less, than point to the mystery as the 
inexhaustible source of all that is. They do then 'refer' and 'mean', but 
in the manner of beckoning to what is hidden. They indicate the mystery. 
Since what is indicated here can only be disclosed in a finite manner, the 
word that reveals can only do so in the manner of concealing. It both 
names and does not name. The word is then, with respect to the mystery, 
essentially poetic, and since all indicating is, in this region, a poetic 
beckoning, the one who beckons may be a poet as much as a thinker, or he 
may, like Eckhart or Heidegger, be a poetic thinker. If such beckoning is 
'mystical', it is so not out of a desire to be obscure, but on account of 
the obscurity of that to which it addresses itself. It is mystical because 
" it has to do with the mystery, because it closes its eyes to what-is= ° in 
order to see the other that is hiddenly revealed in what-is. Where this 
other is 'known' and 'named', it is nonetheless preserved in its 
rätselhaften Unkenntlichkeit ('enigmatic unknowableness') (WM, 49/388), 
preserved as other to what is known and named. Where it is not preserved 
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as other, and this, for Eckhart, is possible, it is also not known and not 
named, not comprehended or comprehensible, although it is precisely here, 
where nothing is determined or disclosed, that the heart of the mystery is 
found. 
Whereas the early Heidegger tends to think of the being of beings in 
terms of a project of Dasein, the later Heidegger, after the so-called 
Kehre, is more inclined to think of Dasein as a project of being, and to 
think the being of beings accordingly. This does not mean the world now 
ceases to be a Wie of the being. of Dasein, but the possibilities of that 
Wie are enlarged to include, and indeed as a most elevated form, a 
'sacrificial' way of being, in which Dasein renounces all purposive projects 
for the sake of being itself, for the project of being. In this way of 
being, being itself, as the wholly other, is the 'purpose' of Dasein, so that 
Dasein has no purpose in terms of itself and what-is. The 'turn' involves, 
to some extent, a shift of focus from what-is as creative product of 
Dasein - 'product' in the widest sense, to include all forms of 'objective 
spirit' - to what-is as 'nature', not the nature that natural science 
studies, but the nature In which the poet, and sometimes also the 
philosopher, discovers being as the holy, the nature of, for instance, 
Hölderlin or Schelling. But 'nature' in this case, as the realm of things 
in -which being as the holy is presented, also includes many of the 'made 
objects' of the Lebenswelt. It includes not only tree, pond, heron and roe, 
but also jug, bench, footbridge and plow (VA II, 55/182). In the end, it 
is not a matter of techna vs. physic, but of the way of being of 'poetic 
dwelling' rather than the way of being of Stellen, of self-referring 
positing and manipulation. 
Being and Dasein belong together, and to this shift in the essence of 
what-is there corresponds a shift in the essence of Dasein. The thrown 
project of Dasein now becomes truly a Lichtung, a space for the 
unconcealment of what is other to beings. In terms of this essence, 
Dasein realises its 'ideal' to the extent that it clears itself for this 
other, and expends itself for the sake of its unconcealment, its 'truth'. 
With respect to the historical disclosure of the essence of being and 
" Dasein, while the early Heidegger thinks 'from the side of Dasein' of the 
temporal disclosure of the essential possibilities of Dasein's being in and 
through its choice of what to be, the later Heidegger thinks 'from the side 
of being' of the temporal disclosure of possibilities of being in and 
through the freedom of Dasein's being as Lichtung. 
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This is not a shift from action to contemplation. Sacrifice, as a way 
of being, is also a way of acting. Although it takes its departure 
(Abschied) from beings on the way to the preservation (Wahrung) of the 
favour of being, it does not renounce Werken und Leisten Im Seienden 
('doing and working in the midst of what-is']. But it is not consummated 
there; rather sein Vollzug entstammt der Inständigkeit, aus der jeder 
geschichtliche Mensch handelnd - auch das wesentliche Denken ist ein 
Handeln - das erlangte Dasein für die Wahrung der WUrde des Seins bewahrt 
('its consummation comes from the. inwardness out of which historical man 
by his actions - essential thinking is also an act - dedicates the Da-sein 
he has won for himself to the preservation of the dignity of being'] (WM, 
50/390). As an act, such originative thinking (anfängliche Denken) is a 
thanking (Danken) which, through the departing nature (abschiedliche Wesen) 
of sacrifice, brings to human word what the silent speaking of the 'word 
of being' gives to be thought. It is the act which occurs when the 
thinker has become strikingly like a biwort to the wort: 
Das anfängliche Denken ist der -Widerhall der Gunst des Seins, - in der sich das Einzige lichtet und sich ereignen 
läßt: daß Seiendes ist. Dieser Widerhall ist die 
menschliche Antwort auf das Wort der lautlosen Stimme des 
Seins. Die Anwort des Denkens ist der Ursprung des 
menschlichen Wortes, welches Wort erst die Sprache als die 
Verlautung des Wortes in die Wörter entstehen läßt. 
[Originative thinking is the echo of being's favour wherein 
the unique clears a space for itself and occurs: that 
what-is is. This echo is man's answer to the word of the 
soundless voice of being. The speechless answer of 
thinking is the source of the human word, which is the 
prime cause of language as the enunciation of the word in 
words. ] (WM, 49-50/389)21 
The word of the thinker, therefore, corresponds to the word, the truth, of 
being, if, that is, it is adequate to that truth. And if it is adequate, if 
it is right in the sense that It 'rings true', then it is beckoned on by the 
voice that brought it forth (WM, 51/391). The source of the human word 
that rings true is an ongoing correspondence, an ongoing attempt to be 
adequate to being. 
One could say that essential thinking, as a mode of being, is truly 
adequate when it is abgeschieden and Ane war umbel when it parts or 
detaches itself from what-is and when it has no purpose, since the Sucht 
nach Zwecken verwirrt the Klarheit der angstbereiten Scheu des Opfermutes, 
der sich the Nachbarschaft zum Unzerstörbaren zugemutet hat ['the search 
for purpose dulls the clarity of awe, the spirit of sacrifice ready 
prepared for dread, which takes upon itself kinship with the imperishable'] 
(WM, 50-1/390). Readiness for dread endures the terror of the abyss, and 
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this enduring grants the possibility of awe. Awe is before the experience 
of being, the experience that what-is is, which is also the experience of 
the vastness of that which lets what-is be (being itself). The courage 
for dread knows im Abgrund des Schreckens den kaum betretenen Raum des 
Seins, aus dessen Lichtung erst jegliches Seiende in das zurückkehrt, was 
es ist and zu sein vermag ['in the abyss of terror, the all-but untrodden 
region of being, from whose 'clearing' everything that 'is' first returns 
into what it is and is able to be'] (WM, 47/386). 
This hardly entered region of being bestows the lighting that allows 
beings to be what they are and what it is possible for them to be. Its 
clearing establishes the space of disclosure or unconcealment. But the 
clearing within which unconcealment takes place is Dasein itself. Thus, 
this region of being, in clearing, must bestow the essence of Dasein as 
clearing. The abyss, then, in granting awe as the experience that what-is 
is, and so the experience of being as the other to beings, grants the 
possibility of understanding what beings are and may be, where that 
understanding gives the essence of Dasein. This is not to say that Dasein 
is first granted its essence in the experience of the abyss, but that, in 
this experience, it comes to know what grants its essence. Enduring the 
abyss, Dasein comes to know, in awe, the hidden source of itself as 
clearing, which is also and simultaneously the source of the being 
(presence) of beings. This source is the kaum betretenen Raum des Seins 
from whose lighting all that is returns into itself. 
For Eckhart, the source of both intelligibility and being is, 
ultimately, the nothing as the trackless abyss of the Godhead. This is the 
undifferentiated unity in which all things are contained in principle, and, 
as such, it also the simplicity of the divine intellect, identical with the 
pure idea. It is the emptiness in which the Word is eternally being 
conceived. In itself, it corresponds to the region (regio) of the intellect 
where 'all things are in all things' (sunt omnia in omnia). In union with 
God, the intellect, in breaking through to this region, returns all things 
to the unity of their hidden ground. Eckhart does not describe the abyss 
of the Godhead as terrifying, although wüste and einäde are hardly 
comforting terms, but breaking through to the abyss of the Godhead does 
require that the soul endure the nothing which is absolutely other to all 
that is, that it surpass every ratio under which the ground of beings may 
be conceived. In this surpassing, the soul passes into a hidden region 
where everything returns to itself in pure inwardness. This inwardness is 
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nothing 'subjective', but is the essential ground of all being, the 
condition for the possibility of being in the sense of esse hoc et hoc. 
That condition is the empty space of simple unity, known to the intellect 
bold enough to venture into the desert, to venture beyond all names to the 
naked being of God. This is the durchbruch and widerruk, the reditus in 
which the intellect takes all with it into its unity, into the pure abiding 
in itself of simple truth. 
The place to which the intellect then returns, however, which is also 
the simple and empty space of itself as the ground of all being, as well 
as the source of freedom and the place where the soul receives grace, is 
the unity from which all division, and primordially, the division between 
being and understanding, between that which is, and that which, in knowing, 
receives and conceives what is ('subject' and 'object'), breaks out. In 
this breaking out, the unity is broken up, and through the break 'truth' is 
both hidden and revealed. The initial break of the ground's identity, its 
original division into two, first bestows the nothingness of the intellect 
standing In a receptive difference from being. Here God, as the esse 
omnium, is first God, and here all creatures come to be, for only where the 
intellect is differentiated from the esse omnium; while yet being related 
to it in its ground, can anything that in any sense 'is' 'be' what it is; 
only then is it unconcealed as such. That includes 'God', even as ipsum 
esse, As Fichte knew, any determination of the infinite, including even its 
determination as infinite, immediately destroys its infinite indeterminacy. 
And yet nothing breaks out, nothing becomes manifest, without this 
destruction. 
As that in which manifestation takes place, the intellect, as the 
innermost essence of the soul, is, like Dasein, a clearing in which what-is 
comes to be, not only in its actuality but also in its possibility, since 
the intellect, in grasping being, grasps the ideas of things. It grasps 
what they may be in addition to what they are, or, rather, it grasps what 
they are in essential relation to what they may be. From the perspective 
of the 'Postscript', that the nothingness in which omne ens qua ens fit is 
the nothingness of Dasein (WM, 40/377) would mean that the ens becomes 
-what it is in the reception where, in response to the silent speaking of 
being which 'includes' possibilities of being, the word is conceived in the 
emptiness of Dasein. In order to conceive, Dasein must receive, so there 
Jr. decidedly a 'given', but the givenness of that given lies in the 
inwardness of Dasein, which is also the inwardness of all things. It lies 
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in the unity, in the sense of essential belonging together, of being and 
thinking, a unity that 'occurs' In the being of Dasein. This is the unity 
of being itself, which bestows being (presence) at the same time as it 
opens the space of Dasein. This event, the event of being, is the 
essential happening of truth. One might then even be forgiven the license 
of saying that Dasein is a kind of clearing in the wilderness of the 
Godhead. 
The word of the original thinker, therefore, the individual who thinks 
originatively and thus 'poietically', Is, when conceived in response to the 
word of being, part of the coming to pass of truth. Where the thinker 
thinks for the sake of this conception, he dedicates himself to the 
preservation of the truth of being. This dedication is original thanking. 
It is the nobility of poverty (Adel der Armut) and the freedom of sacrifice 
(Freiheit des Opfers), the possibility of which is preserved by the favour 
(Gunst) of being, which bestows upon man the unique relation that allows 
him to expend his essence for the sake of being (WM, 49-50/389-90). For 
Heidegger, as for Hegel, genuine thinking is devotion, Andacht. As an act, 
it arises from the inward poverty where, for Eckhart, the noble soul 
surrenders its being to the voice that speaks in the innermost depths of 
that being. And for Eckhart, too, this dedication of being to being, 
originating as it does from the ground of the soul, is born of the abyss 
of freedom (WM, 49/389). Insofar as this involves a devotion to the other 
to beings in the midst of what-is, the similarity between Heidegger and 
Eckhart is an essential and not a merely analogical one. The difference, 
on the other hand, is not essential, but particular. It rests in the fact 
that Heidegger is thinking of such devotion in terms of his own task, the 
task of the thinker. That does not mean that only the thinker is capable 
of the acting born of devotion and sacrifice. Heidegger says essential 
thinking is also an act; he does not say it is the only act. 
The interpretation of Heidegger suggested by the above comparisons 
may seem, at times, a bit violent. However, it is highly instructive to set 
some of Heidegger's comments in Was ist Metaphysik? beside those of two 
contemporary philosophers with whom he was involved in, conversation (both 
-literally and metaphorically) during his life, Max Scheler and Edmund 
Husserl. In the first place, many of Heidegger's statements about being 
and nothing in realtion to the question concerning the ground of 
metaphysics seem to have been heavily influenced by Scheler, if not taken 
directly from him. In On the Eternal, in Man (1921), Scheler says, for 
124 
example, that the first self-evident insight of philosophy Is 'that there is 
something (in general) or, to put it more acutely, that there is not 
nothing', where 'nothing' denotes 'absolute nothing' before the distinction 
between essence and existence. He goes on to say that this insight is the 
object of the ultimate philosophical wonder, that it requires humility and 
that it is only granted to those who are prepared to look into the 'abyss 
of absolute nothing'. What is most interesting for the interpretation of 
Heidegger that I am suggesting, however, is that, for Scheler, this first 
insight leads to the second insight that there is an absolute being, seen 
through the 'relative nothingness of contingent and finite beings' (pp. 98- 
102). 
While Scheler's theological concern. at this stage of his thought, is 
with a transcendent absolute being (Seiende), Husserl's phenomenological 
investigation in Ideas I sets out to examine 'pure consciousness' as 
'absolute being' (Sein). This is the 'new region of being' (Seinsregion) 
won through the completed phenomenological 'disconnection' (Ausschaltung) 
or epoche of the 'world of things'. 22 §49 is thus entitled Das absolute. 
Bewußtsein als Residuum der Weltvernichtung ('Absolute Consciousness as a 
Residuum of Nullifying the World'] (p. 114). This absolute and pure 
consciousness is gained (although in another sense it is always there) 
through a radical phenomenological reduction consisting in disregarding or 
turning away from (Absehen von) the whole world (p. 120), and it is 'wholly 
closed within itself and yet without any boundaries (ohne Grenzen) which 
could distinguish it from another region' (p. 121). And like Eckhart's pure 
intellect and the 'all but untrodden region of being' that Heidegger speaks 
of, it is the most fundamental condition for the possibility of what-is. 
Also apposite in this context is Heidegger analysis of Schelling in 
his commentary on Schelling's of the Essence of Human Freedom, where the 
issue of the self-revelation of God in man and creation is associated with 
the question of freedom. For Schelling, God only comes to 'exist' through 
such revelation, and the revelation involves a breaking up of the simple 
identity (the ground) of God which is at the same time a manifestation of 
that identity, a self-manifestation of God (see SA, 918). For Eckhart, the 
ground of God corresponding to the ground of the soul is, as the 
undifferentiated identity of being itself, the condition for the possibility 
of all things, their belonging together in a unity. It is both hidden and 
revealed in its identity through the*free act of creation, the act in which 
God is first God and creatures first come to be. The soul's own freedom 
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to be, a freedom fully achieved only when it binds itself to the action, 
the be-ing, of God, rests in that ground where it is already conjoined with 
the source of what is. 
Keeping all this in mind, it is surely significant that Heidegger 
says, in Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: 
die Besinnung auf den Wesenszusammenhang zwischen 
Wahrheit und Freiheit bringt uns dahin, die Frage nach dem 
Wesen des Menschen in einer Hinsicht zu verfolgen, die uns 
die Erfahrung eines verborgenen Wesensgrundes des 
Menschen (des Daseins) verbürgt, so zwar, daß sie uns 
zuvor in den ursprünglich wesenden Bereich der Wahrheit 
versetzt. 
['consideration of the natural affinity between truth and 
freedom induces us to pursue the question as to the 
nature of man in one of its aspects - an aspect vouched 
for by our experience of a hidden ground in man's nature 
and being, so that we are transported in advance into the 
original -living realm of truth'. ] (WW, 15/332) 
Freedom is the freedom to reveal something open, and it rests in that 
hidden ground in which being is already disclosed to Dasein. In that 
ground, Dasein belongs to being, but the belonging only comes to be, i. e. to 
exist as actual, when it is unconcealed, when truth as Dasein, the open 
space of unconcealment, comes to pass. As Heidegger says in the Schelling 
commentary: 
Wir wissen nur, was wir anschauen. Wir schauen nur an, 
was wir sind; wir sind nur das dem wir zugehören. (Diese 
Zugehörigkeit aber ist nur, indem wir sie bezeugen. Diese 
Bezeugung aber geschieht nur als Da-sein). 
[We know only what we Intuit, We intuit only what we are; 
we are only that to which we belong. (But- this belonging 
is only by our bearing witness to it. This bearing 
witness, however, only occurs as Da-sein, human being. )] 
(SA, 97/56). 
To speak in the language of Sein und Zeit, Dasein can only disclose 
beings because being is disclosed to it in its essence, which means 
because it is disclosed to itself in its own being. Through that 
disclosedness (Erschlossenheit), Dasein understands being as possibility 
and actuality, and in this understanding beings are 'lit up'. But the 
understanding of being as possibility and actuality is also the source of 
Dasein as a free being. And the understanding of being that establishes 
the disclosedness of Dasein, and thus establishes its ability to unconceal 
beings in their being, to let be what-is, is granted to Dasein in the 
-ground of its being, so that Dasein (to speak now away from the language 
of Sein und Zeit) corresponds to being in its ground. This is also a 
correspondence between nothing and nothing. Being, in itself, apart from 
beings, is nothing. Dasein, in itself, apart from beings, is also nothing. 
But this nothing is the emptiness within which beings are unconcealed. As 
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such, it is the ground of all that is. 
A ground is both that which makes something possible, and that on 
the basis of which, or in reference to which, something is comprehensible. 
As such, it is das Woraufhin des primären Entwurfs ('the upon-which of a 
primary projection'] constituting the meaning of something (SZ, 324). 
Nothing is the ground of what-is as a whole because nothing must already 
have been-projected in order for what-is as a whole to come into view. 
The meaning of what-is as a whole is then determined on the basis of 
nothing, because it is in the light of, or, in this case, perhaps it would 
be better to say, 'in the darkness of', nothing that what-is in totality is 
comprehended. It is therefore nothing that permits the process of the 
unconcealment of beings, their revelation as beings. Nothing is the veil 
of being both because this process is what Heidegger sometimes calls 
being, in the sense of presencing, and because nothing hides that which 
permits the presencing of what is present. In the Nachwort to Was ist 
Metaphysik?, this is called being itself. 
It is essential, though, not to consider the 'it' that bestows being 
upon what-is as another being of some sort, whether a substance or a 
subject. In a sense, when that which allows the presencing of what is 
present is considered as, being itself, it is also just presencing 
considered in itself. It is be-ing in itself, without relation to beings. 
This is not to say that being ever 'is' or 'comes to presence' (west) 
without beings. But it can be considered in itself, although it never 
comes to presence as such, and it can then be thought of as that 'within' 
which all that comes to pass is already comprehended. Whether considered 
as nothing or as being itself this ground and end of beings, the ultimate 
'meaning' of beings as that in reference to which they are and are 
comprehensible, is never fully visible in itself. The last end of being 
lies, for Heidegger as for Eckhart, in the darkness of that which makes all 
things possible. 
If one puts the same question to Heidegger as he puts, in 1929, to 
Christian theology, how that which comprehends all being can have a 
relation to nothing, the answer has to be, as it is for Eckhart, that it is 
the opposite of nothing by the mediation of being. By means of the 
(finite) coming to presence of beings, the source of that coming to 
presence, the pure act of presencing, considered in itself, 'appears', 
hiddenly, as the negation of negation, the completion and fullness of 
being. On the other hand, it can also be said that this hidden ground of 
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being is also the opposite of being, in the sense of what-is, by the 
mediation of nothing. 
Clearly, what grounds the totality of what-is, and is, therefore, 
primordial ground, cannot itself 'have' a ground. If the ground of being, 
as the wholly other to what-is, is nothing, then, Nichts ist ohne Grund 
('nothing is without ground (reason)'] (SG, passim. ). As what makes 
something possible in its totality, the upon-which of meaning, however, a 
ground is also what gathers something into a unity while at the same time 
being other to it. It is the principle that gathers together different 
things into the wholeness of an articulated unity. It is then the 
principle of the identity of difference, the principle that reconciles 
difference into synthesis. Nothing does not itself appear as this 
principle, but as that from which the principle emerges in its primordial 
form, as being. Nothing lets being 'be', or rather, it lets beings be, and 
this letting is itself being as presenting. The identity of all things is 
being as ground, but if the ground of being is nothing, then this means 
that being is without ground, since being then has nothing as its ground. 
Because being is primordial grounding, the primal gathering principle, 
being is ground-like (grundartig, grundhaft) (SG, 90), and being and ground 
are in some sense the same, but because being, precisely as primordial 
grounding, cannot itself have a ground, being is at the same time the 
abyss. Sein and Grund: des Selbe. Sein: der Ab-grund (SG, 93). Nothing 
grounds the letting of letting-be. The letting 'merely' lets. In response 
to this letting, it can only be said, Es gibt Sein. 
If the letting is comprehended as ground-less, in that it is seen to 
be comprehensible only in terms of nothing, then it must be understood as 
determined by nothing. But being determined by nothing is the meaning of 
freedom, and what is understood as determined by nothing is called free. 
Being, as groundless letting, is das Freie, the free. While beings need the 
'permission' and com-mission of being to be, being itself, as that which 
gives and is this allowance, is in itself permitted and committed by 
nothing. The being of beings is the free gift of being. 
The way this letting occurs, the way Es gibt Sein, is not, however, 
arbitrary. Die Freiheit des Freies besteht weder in der Ungebundenheit der 
WillkOr, noch in der Bindung durch bloße Gesetze ('The freedom of the free 
consists neither in unconstrained arbitrariness nor in constraint through 
mere laws'] (TK, 25/25). The free, being as letting, cannot be said to be 
determined by laws If these are conceived as other to it, for the other to 
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being is nothing. On the other hand, the way the letting occurs is not 
merely chaotic. It is an-archic in a literal sense, since being does not 
have an archd, a first principle or ground, but is arche as primordial 
grounding. - The sending of being, then, does not have laws, but is itself 
law as dispensation (nomos) (Hb, 114-5/238-9). The giving of being is 
also the giving or dispensing of law (neorein), a giving constrained by 
nothing outside of itself. 2 ' 
As is the case for Eckhart, then, being is groundless ground, 
undetermined by anything other than itself and thus free, and yet this 
very freedom is the source of law. Life is without why, but it is not 
therefore chaotic. The just man, who binds himself to the life that is 
without why, yet binds himself to the source of law. This source cannot 
be 'God', since the truly just man does not take 'God' as an end, but is 
that hidden ground in the depths of the soul which calls it to an absolute 
freedom of being, while at the same time directing it to a necessity of 
being. This free but necessary directing of being is established, for 
Eckhart, in the individual who establishes himself outside the realm of 
purpose and will. It is established in the person who is abegesheiden and 
geldzen, who lives groundlessly from the ground, and thus lives as life 
lives. Such a person is attuned to the groundless ground of being in an 
essential way. 
However, in Heidegger and Aquinas, John Caputo notes that Johannes 
Lotz" sees a strong point of dissimilarity between Heidegger's and 
Eckhart's conceptions of being as groundless ground: - 
In Lotz's view the critical flaw in Heidegger's account of 
Being as ground is his notion of being as a groundless 
ground, as a veritable abyss (Ab-grund). Being is indeed 
an abyss, Lotz holds, only if one means thereby that Being 
is a ground which rejects any ground other than itself, 
that is Being is self-grounding (ens a se), a principium 
sine princip ak as Meister Eckhart says. For Being in 
contradistinction to beings is the absolute fullness of all 
possible ways to be, and so there can be nothing other than itself upon which it is founded. If there were, Being 
would not be Being. But this is clearly not Heidegger's 
view. For Heidegger takes Being as a ground which is 
altogether lacking in any ground, internal or external to 
itself. (p. 214) 
It is not clear, though, what this difference amounts to when, on the one 
hand, being itself is for Eckhart wholly lacking in any purpose other than 
itself, and, on the other hand, being for Heidegger sends itself in a law- 
like way. In both cases, being is both free and necessary, in that it 
'acts' from nothing other than its essential nature, which nature 
necessarily remains a hidden ground and a mystery. In that case, it can 
be said for Heidegger, too, that being is self-grounding, for'what is an 
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'internal' ground if not the necessity of something's nature? But to say 
that something is self-grounded is necessarily to say, with Aristotle, that 
at a deeper level it is ungrounded, not, strictly speaking, a self-caused 
cause, but an uncaused cause. If the answer to Aristotle's question, What 
causes the self that causes itself? is: nothing but itself, then all that 
can be said of it in truth is that it is because it is, and for no other 
reason. 
Furthermore, if one takes Eckhart's formulations seriously, without 
making any a priori decisions. about 'what Eckhart really means' in 
distinction from his 'hyperbolic' way of speaking, : 2r" then the end of being 
is for him genuinely hidden; it is not 'God' in any sense that truly makes 
sense. If all that can be said can be said clearly, then this, the sense 
of the world which lies outside the world, cannot be said. That does not 
require passing over it in silence, for it can still be referred to, but 
only in the manner of hinting and beckoning. " 'God' can then only be a 
word that speaks in this hinting manner, a poetic word, a beckoning 
messenger of divinity, or of being as the holy. But these words, too, are 
only indications, referring to something that remains in itself unknown and 
unknowable, as Eckhart says. 
The above quotation from Heidegger and Aquinas expresses the view of 
Lotz rather than of Caputo, but in The Mystical Element in Heidegger's 
Thought, Caputo does himself adopt a similar position. He says here that 
whereas for Eckhart God is a loving father as well as 'a plenum of Being, 
goodness, and intelligibility', Heidegger's being is not loving or 
benevolent, nor is it a plenum of intelligibility, since 'inasmuch as it is 
a process of a-letheia, being is necessarily a process of emerging out of 
a primary and ineradicable core of concealment (lethe)' (p. 247). I have 
tried to show both that there is a sense in which transcendental terms 
like ens, verum and bonum apply to Heidegger's conception of being, and 
that there is a sense in which they do not apply to Eckhart's conception 
of the Godhead. In both cases, there is a 'primary and ineradicable core 
of concealment', if, that is, one takes seriously Eckhart's claim that the 
ground of God is unknowable, and that every determination of it is 
simultaneously a manifestation and a falsification, simultaneously both 
true and not true. 
It is this belief, which by its very nature also necessitates the lack 
of any firm dogmatic belief, any claim to 'absolute truth', that lends to 
Eckhart's writings, and especially but not exclusively his vernacular 
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writings, their unique tone of a constant struggle with the ambiguity and 
difficulty of language, a tone that Heidegger shares. As Frank Tobin says: 
If one assumes that God is nameless, that our hold on him 
through words is more tenuous than supposed, say, by those 
following Thomas, then in attempting to describe him and 
one's union with him through what is divine in oneself one 
will lay much less claim to being 'dogmatic'. One will not 
suppose that one's formulations of religious truths attain 
a degree of accuracy and completeness which require that 
they-be considered somehow exclusive. 27 
This point about 'religious truths', moreover, is actually a point about 
truth itself. No determination captures the absolute; omnis determinatio 
est negatio. 
It is true that Heidegger's notion of 'the groundless play of Being', 
'far from being a plenum of intelligibility ... is equiprimordially 
unintelligible' (Mystical Element, p. 247), but the same can be said for the 
modeless abyss of the Godhead. In that case, the principium sine principio 
is also, when followed into its depths, a ground that, like Heidegger's 
being, 'does not admit of explanation'. The 'explanation' which is truly 
'final' for Eckhart is not being, nor the good, nor the one, but the hidden 
ground of being, the good, and the one - which is God only knows what. In 
the end, it is only itself, and acts only for the sake of itself. This 
'acting for the sake of itself' is the genuine sense of 'groundless play'. 
That the destiny of being* (Seinsgeschick), the self-sending of being in 
time, is a child that plays does not mean, for Heidegger, that it is 
chaotic and idiotic, - but that the play is for the sake of itself, and has 
no other purpose. Es spielet, well es spielet. Das «Weil» versinkt Im 
Spiel. Das Spiel ist ohne «Warum» ('It plays because it plays. The 
'because' sinks in the play. The play is without 'why'] (SG, 188). The 
self-revelation of being, which Heidegger here thinks of historically, is 
innocent of any motive other than itself, as is the Selbstoffenbý9rung 
Gottes in Schelling's conception, and the ebullitio or Ozfliezen of God in 
Eckhart's. Life is without why because it is its own why, and to live as 
life lives is to live in receptive accord with a be-ing whose ultimate end, 
for Eckhart, too, is 'inscrutable' (Mystical Element, p. 248). It is to 
become innocent of motive, like a little child. 
As to the question of 'benevolence', that God is 'love' and the 'good' 
must . be set against statements like wer dd sprreche, dez got guot were, 
der twte im als unrehte, als ob er the sunnen swarz hieze ('whoever would 
say tht God is good would be treating him as unjustly (also 'unrightly', 
i. e. erroneously) as though he were calling the sun black'] (DW I, 148/257). 
Again, the profoundly analogical nature of every determination must be 
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given its full weight. And yet the determinations are not wholly 
meaningless. God is in some sense, for Eckhart, the source of every 
perfection, of every grace with which life is endowed, and is therefore the 
proper object of devotion and reverence. But then Heidegger's being 
bestows the favour that grants to Dasein the dignity of its essence in 
every respect, the appropriate response to which is thanking and sacrifice, 
and this understanding of being must be set against being as 'inscrutable 
play'. 
This is not to say that Eckhart's and Heidegger's conceptions are 
identical in every way - they are not - but seeing the genuine differences 
requires that one see, first, the extent of the similarity. This endeavour 
is not aided by the nostalgia of any Christian apologetic that would 
prefer to reduce everything radical in Eckhart's thought to the comforting 
platitudes of dogmatic theology. The need of the times (a need only felt, 
admittedly, by those for whom 'God' has become a problem) is also not 
served by such a move. It was in response to that need, the need of a 
god-less age, that Heidegger searched out possibilities for the future, 
within, for instance, the negative theology of Meister Eckhart. Searching 
out, in the past, possibilities for the future is never a matter of simple 
return. It requires transformation, and there can be no doubt that 
Heidegger transforms the elements of Eckhart's thought that he 
appropriates. However, there is, to begin with, an essential and not 
merely superficial correspondence between Heidegger and Eckhart with 
respect to the matter (Sache) of thought, and it is that correspondence 
which makes the appropriation a fruitful one. To miss the correspondence 
by levelling off the more challenging, and at times even disturbing, edges 
of Eckhart's thought is to dismiss what is genunely valuable in the 
dialogue. 
R. S. Gall, whose evaluation of the Christian tradition is very 
different from that of Caputo, also misses this correspondence when he 
says: 
The traditionally pious way of unobstructed vision, of 
cleanliness and purity, implied in otherworldly ideas and 
ideals or the antiseptic procedures of science knows what 
is happening it is a way ruled out for Heidegger b 
Nietzsche and Hölderlin; theirs (and his) is a twilight 
vision ruled over by an enigmatic, chaotic god such as 
Dionysus (Hölderlin, Nietzsche) or a tricky messenger who 
grants favor - or leads astray, one cannot be sure ... There is much danger in such a vision; not surprisingly, 
too much danger for theologians: even a mystic is to be 
preferred to Heidegger. (Beyond Theism and Atheism, p. 33) 
He adds, in a note to this passage, 'John D. Caputo ... much prefers the 
132 
plenum of being, goodness, and intelligibility that is Meister Eckhart's 
lovable God to Heidegger's inscrutable being and Ereignis' (p. 38). There 
is, however, much more affinity between Eckhart's God in relation to the 
unknowable Godhead and Heidegger's being, as presencing, in relation to his 
'inscrutable being' than Caputo allows. Moreover, while the twilight gods 
of Nietzsche and Hölderlin are undoubtedly far removed from the God of any 
Christian theologian, the notion that the 'traditionally pious way' consists 
in 'unobstructed vision' is an absurd oversimplification, not only with 
regard to the thought of Eckhart, but also with respect to a major part of 
the Christian theological tradition in general. 
Gall locates what he sees as the heart of the difference between 
Heidegger and any Christian theology in the concept of faith. 'Faith, ' he 
claims is ... secure (in its affirmation) even where it is unsure of its 
"conception" of God (as in various negative theologies, or those driven by 
the "Protestant Principle")' (p. 27). But affirmation and conception are not 
as easily separated as that. It is not easy to see what is affirmed when 
'God' is said to be so wholly unknowable that not even 'God' is really an 
appropriate term. If affirmation just amounts to saying that there is 
something there which is being spoken of, the same can be said in the case 
of Heidegger's Sein, and all his rewritings of it Was Seyn, des (; eviert, 
das Ereignis etc. ). More importantly, Heidegger thinks of the kind of 
affirmation in which human beings try to make themselves secure and 
certain as being primarily an act of the will, and Eckhart's notion of 
giving up grounds, of being Sne any warumbe including God, involves a way 
of being that establishes itself outside any self-securing position. If 
there is nonetheless a certain calmness and peace in this state of 
geldzenheit, the same can be said for Heidegger's own notion of 
Gelassenheit, as well as for his notion of sacrifice. In both cases, the 
individual is established outside the realm of desiring personal security, 
and in both cases, being established outside this realm entails the 
achievement of a kind of serenity, a peaceful accord with being which is 
not indifference but a 'released' concern for being. As to the slighting 
use of the term 'mystic' in reference to Eckhart, one might quote 
-Heidegger's own response to the possible (pejorative) application of the 
label 'mystic' to Schelling, or to Eckhart or Boehme: aber damit ist 
angesichts geistigen Geschehens and wirklicher denkerischer Schöpfung 
nichts gesagt ['nothing is sled by that with regard to the spiritual 
occurrence and the true creation of thought'] (SA, 204/117). 
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One would not, on the other hand, want to overemphasize the 
similarities either, at the expense of the differences. For one thing, 
while, for Eckhart, it is not easy to discern the other to beings in and 
through beings, so that here, too, being must be wrested from appearance 
through a kind of resolve (the line between resolve and openness being not 
a simple one, in that openness also requires application and overcoming), 
that other does not exactly hide or withdraw itself, as it does for 
Heidegger. It must be both obscured and revealed in beings, but it has no 
love of obscuring, no love of hiding. If the deus is absconditus here, 
that is not a voluntary act. Moreover, where the soul turns away from 
beings and towards their source, there remains for it no uncertainty of 
revelation. God must pour himself out to the prepared soul. This 
returning of the turning is not so certain for Heidegger, as Caputo points 
out (Mystical Element, pp. 248-50). 
But the location of this difference leads in a strange direction. 
Eckhart's notion that God has to turn to the soul that turns towards it is 
one of those supposedly hyperbolic pronouncements that brings Eckhart to 
the borders of heresy, whereas there is something deeply (and perhaps 
depressingly) orthodox in Heidegger's sense that salvation, in this case, 
the salvation of Western Dasein, can in no way be secured or guaranteed. 
Scheler may have been right to spot early on eine neue Form von finsterem 
Calvinism us in Heidegger's understanding of being. 20 More basically, 
though, the idea that the other deliberately conceals itself while 
revealing itself, that its traces in the world are intentionally obscure so 
that only those who have eyes to see, may see is not without 
representatives in the Christian tradition. Pascal, whose shadow is 
unmistakeable in Sein and Zeit, provides an obvious example. And he does 
nothing more unorthodox than take seriously the Old Testament line, Vere 
tu es Deus absconditus. " Furthermore, although it may be true that 
Eckhart's God is, in the end, a safer bet than Heidegger's Ereignis, that is 
not true of every conception of God in the Western tradition. The thought 
that the being of man is staked on the unpredictable turns in the play of 
Ereignis may not produce more of a shudder than the thought of its being 
submitted to the equally inscrutable twists of that arch-God of history, 
Jehovah, or even to the Christian God who breaks into history like an 
unwanted and unexpected intruder into a seemingly secure realm, a thief in 
the night, as it were. 
Caputo does actually allude to Heidegger's interest in the passage at 
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the beginning of I Thess. 5, which speaks of how 'the day of the Lord 
cometh as a thief in the night' (Mystical Element, p. 89). He does not 
note, however, that this passage also speaks of 'danger'; Luther's German 
reads: Denn, wenn sie werden sagen: Es Ist Friede, es hat keine Gefahr; 
so wird sie das Verderben schnell Oberfallen etc. (I Thess 5: 2). Having 
acknowledged Heidegger's interest in these verses, should one not also 
acknowledge the point that Heidegger's experience of being, in terms of the 
cohabitation of the danger and the saving power, and the need to be 
'watchful' (nüchtern) has some strong affinities with orthodox Christian 
thought? The tradition is not homogeneous and Eckhart and his God do not 
represent the whole of it. In fact, on this point. Heidegger is more 
'orthodox' than Eckhart. 
And there is yet another problem here. Either Heidegger's Ereignis is 
wholly impersonal, in which case no analogy drawn from whatever counts as 
Personsein is proper to it, or it bears a stronger resemblance to 'God' 
than even some of the proponents of a similarity between Heidegger's 
thought and Christian theology have wanted to establish. In the former 
case, the ascription of voluntas to it is deeply problematic, and without 
such an ascription the idea that the self-withdrawal of being in the 
history of the West is something voluntary becomes untenable. The latter 
possibility, that there is in fact something person-like about the event of 
being (and time) will be taken up later on. 
Still, I have no wish to gloss over the important fact that Eckhart 
generally thinks of 'God' as the most appropriate term for that which has 
no proper name, and Heidegger does not. For Heidegger, as Caputo notes, 
the Christian God is one historical sending, subordinate to Sein or 
Ereignis. 3'° This is in line with the historical nature of Heidegger's 
thought. Eckhart, on the other hand, is a profoundly ahistorical thinker. 
He seems even to have little relation to Christian salvation history, and 
he stands in an age for which 'God', however conceived, is the right term 
for whatever is ultimate. But insofar as Heidegger's Sein or Ereignis can 
be seen as a historicised version of Eckhart's notion of God as ipsum esse 
or as the hidden source of being, it can also be seen as an enrichment and 
extension, rather than a denial, of that notion. In the end, it depends, of 
course, on what is meant by 'God'. 
To clarify how Heidegger thinks through the notion of esse in terms 
of the historicality of truth, I will proceed now to a more detailed 
analysis of some of Heidegger's conceptions on this issue. 
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In the first place, the free giving that brings beings into 
unconcealment is what Heidegger calls truth. Being, as the groundless 
grounding that unconceals and lets be, is also primordial truth, and the 
revelation of beings in their being is the coming to pass of truth. In 
the giving in which being sends itself, though, it simultaneously holds 
itself back in itself. What is held back is the mystery, and it is 
revealed as such, i. e. as mystery, in the sending itself. Thus, in the free 
giving in which the coming to pass of truth occurs, there is a 
simultaneous concealment of that. which frees, but in this revealing the 
concealment also comes to light as such. It is revealed as veiling; the 
revelation of the free unveils itself as that which frees in unveiling 
itself as the mystery. The veil of the mystery is not thereby penetrated, 
but is revealed precisely as a veil: 
Alles Entbergen gehört in ein Bergen and Verbergen. 
Verborgen aber ist and immer sich verbergend das 
Befreiende, des Geheimnis. Alles Entbergen kommt aus dem 
Freien, geht ins Freie and bringt ins Freie ... Die Freiheit ist das lichtend Verbergende, in dessen Lichtun 
jener Schleier weht der das Wesende aller Wahrheit 
verhüllt and den Schleier als den verhüllenden erscheinen 
1äßt. 
[All revealing belongs within a harboring and a concealing. 
But that which frees - the mystery - is concealed and 
always concealing itself. All revealing comes out of the 
open, goes into the open, and brings into the open ... Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to 
light, in whose clearing there shimmers that veil that 
covers what comes to presence of all truth and lets the 
veil appear as what veils. ] (TX, 25/25) 
The freedom of the occurrence of revealing, and so of truth, is a lighting 
that hides the source of itself, but also, in so doing, lets that source 
appear as a hidden one. 
The one to whom it thus appears is Dasein. Dasein is the 'place', the 
Da, of the letting, the place of the happening of truth. Without Dasein, 
the coming to pass of truth, as the unconcealment of beings in their 
being, could not occur, as there would then be no 'there' within which it 
could manifest itself to itself, and so come to presence in and for itself. 
Dasein is therefore the being to which the free sending of being sends the 
gift of itself. 
The freedom of Dasein, in turn, consists in its ability to receive 
this sending. It consists in the relation to being that allows Dasein to 
correspond to the appeal of being, and to free beings through such 
correspondence. This corresponding freeing can occur only because Dasein 
already corresponds to the free or open in its essence. It is in the 
depths of that essence that the mystery of das Befreiende dwells, for 
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Dasein is itself the setting-free (freilegen) of beings, and it is this on 
the basis of its own primordial projection into nothing. If this is the 
case, then the way the letting occurs, the way Es gibt Sein, where this 
determines the way beings appear to be, is also dependent upon the being 
of Dasein, for it will then be dependent upon the the way Dasein is. The 
ways of being are simultaneously the ways of beings and of Dasein. The 
being of beings is thus dependent upon Dasein in terms of both existence 
and essence. The existence of beings, the fact that they are revealed as 
being at all, is dependent upon the existence of Dasein, upon the fact that 
it is, and the essence of beings, the way or ways that they are revealed 
to be, is dependent upon the essence of Dasein as the ways in which it is. 
Caputo claims that this view of the relation between being and man 
in Heidegger's thought forms an aspect of the disanalogy between Heidegger 
and Eckhart, since in Eckhart's thought God does not need man in order to 
be brought 'into His "own"', but is, as the one, already the fullness of 
being. This disanalogy, Caputo notes, extends also to the relation between 
Eckhart and the German Idealists (Mystical Element, p. 105). However, 
there remains the stubborn fact that this 'fullness of being' which 'is' 
from the beginning does not and cannot be revealed without the division 
between God and soul which, in granting the nothingness of the intellect 
as"a space for understanding, grounds the revelation of God in creatura. 
God is not 'God' without this division and the manifold that it gives rise 
to, and it is for this reason that Heidegger, in Der Feldweg, says: 
Die Weite aller gewachsenen Dinge, die um den Feldweg 
verweilen, spendet Welt. Im Ungesprochenen ihrer Sprache 
ist, wie der alte Lese- and Lebemeister Eckehardt sagt, 
Gott erst Gott. 
(The wide expanse of everything that grows and abides 
along the pathway is what bestows world. In the unspoken 
of IEs speech, there - as Eckhart, old master of letter and 
life, says - God is first God. ]" 
The antithetical moment of Eckhart's dialectic which says that where 
creatures end, there God begins to be, also must be taken into account, but 
creatures only 'end' with the being that can know their end, the being that 
can know the 'something' which is other to all that is, and of which all 
that is is in some way reminiscent. Heidegger's sentence actually captures 
"both moments of this dialectic, for it suggests that God is first God 
where creatures begin and where they end, in what is suggested by them as 
wholly other to them. And that 'happens' only with man. The durchbruch 
may be nobler than the Ozbruch, but both happen only with the coming to 
be of understanding, taken in its broadest sense. This was the 
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fundamental insight of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, who also saw in their 
own way that what comes to be has, in a sense, been from the beginning - 
as, to be sure, Heidegger sees as well. 
With respect to this last point, one cannot avoid the question that 
Heinrich Seuse raises in asking, in the Bilchlein der Wahrheit, whether the 
being (wesen) of creatures is nobler in God or in itself. 32 If, after all, 
it is in every way nobler in God, then it is hard to see what value there 
is in creation, in the original procession of the creature from God. 
Seuse's answer is that the being. of the creature is nobler in itself, as it 
has to be if life as process is to have any meaning, and if the absolute 
is to be anything more than 'the night in which all cows are black'. 3= In 
this case the question about the 'need' of creation, which is 
equiprimordially the question about the 'need' of man, cannot be denied by 
any simple appeal to the self-sufficiency of being in itself as pure 
plenitude. In addition, if, as Eckhart claims, the 'now' of God is an 
eternity that comprehends past, present and future, then this very self- 
sufficiency surpasses all time precisely by including it, so that the 
completeness of ipsum esse does not rest in a having been from the 
beginning where 'beginning' is understood on the basis of a conception of 
time as the nacheinander of now-points. It rests, rather, in the self- 
identity of the ens a se as alpha and omega, the being which, as life, 
stretches itself out in time from potency to act, but which, considered in 
itself as that which realizes itself in time (as Geist, perhaps), is in its 
beginning and end and in-between - the same. This same is the timeless 
plenitude of being that has no 'need' of anything because it 'is' all 
things. 
But the revelation of this same in time, which is simultaneously its 
coming to be, as God, or even as the one or being, does require that it 
part itself from that in and through which it reveals itself. This 
requires a de-parture of itself from itself such that it becomes, in a 
sense, 'dependent' upon the 'itself' from which it takes leave and with 
which it remains. If 'I' were not, then 'God', too, would not be, not as 
being or the one, and not as the divinity that may be read from the book 
. of creation as 
the other to creation, and rests unspoken in the speech of 
what-is. The iht which the world recalls depends for its recalling on the 
iht for which the recalling occurs. 
The freedom of Dasein consists, for Heidegger, in its ability to 
recall this iht (or Nichts) as the other to beings, its ability to pass 
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from beings to being, and to do so in a variety of ways. This 
transcendence, however, has been named as the ground of meta-physics. The 
freedom of Dasein is meta-physical; it is a freedom for the passage from 
which metaphysics arises. The way of this passage is then the way of 
metaphysics. It is the way in which the being of beings and beings in 
their being are found. The particular determination of this way gives the 
manner of Dasein's correspondence to being, and this, in turn, gives the 
way that beings are discovered in their correspondence to being. Where 
being is ground, then, this determination, which is itself free, will 
determine the nature of the ground of beings, and how they are established 
to be by their relation to that ground. If ground is the primary 
projection that gives meaning, and if the question is about the being of 
beings as the ground of what-is as a whole, then the way this ground is 
determined will determine the meaning of what-is as a whole. It will 
determine the meaning of the world, since it is that in reference to which 
that meaning is decided. The meaning of the world is therefore dependent 
upon the way Dasein represents being, not in itself, for being is not 
representable in itself, but as the ground of beings, and this 
representation is dependent upon the nature of its transcendence. 
Metaphysics, then, is. a decision about the sense of the world. If 
'the sense of the world must lie outside of the world', and if 'the feeling 
of the world as. a limited whole is the mystical feeling', 34 then 
metaphysics as transcendence must be dependent, originally, upon a mystical 
feeling, for instance, the feeling (Befindlichkeit, Stimmung) of 
Verwunderung. It is dependent, that is, upon some sense of the iht that, 
in relation to beings, is niht, and yet makes itself manifest in such a way 
that it is also, even as absence, nicht nichts. That metaphysics moves 
everywhere in the realm of the truth of being without being able to 
reflect on that truth itself (WM, 44/382) means that metaphysics cannot 
think, with the mode of thought proper to it, the hidden source tht makes 
transcendence possible, the source that also grants the openness of every 
possible way of being. 
In his earlier works, as already indicated, Heidegger conceives this 
transcendence largely from the side of Dasein, as a self-projecting that 
establishes beings in one way or another. In Vom Wesen des Grundes, for 
instance, he speaks of transcendence in terms of three modes of grounding, 
the first- of which, Stiften ('establishing'], is a function of a will 
(Willen) in which Dasein, existing for the sake of (Umwillen) possibilities 
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of itself, primordially projects a 'for-the-sake-of' (Worumwillen) in terms 
of which beings are discovered (WG, 103). This for-the-sake-of is then 
the upon-which of the primary projection of possibility that constitutes 
the meaning of what-is, and its projection determines Dasein's 
understanding. 
World is defined here not as the totality of beings, but as the 
specific horizon within which that totality manifests itself. World is 
what Dasein transcends to in bringing itself before beings. It is the 
ground that Dasein projects or forms in the freedom of its transcendence 
towards possibilities of itself. World then means ein WJe de Seins des 
Seienden ('a how of the being of what-is'], rather than what-is itself (WG, 
50-1). It is das Seiende Im Ganzen and zwar als das entscheidende Wie, 
gemäß dem sich menschliches Dasein zum Seienden stellt and hält ('what-is 
in its totality as the definitive how in accordance with which human 
Dasein positions and holds itself with respect to what-is'] (WG, 56-7). 
The Wie of Dasein's surpassing to world, the world it throws in the willing 
that projects a 'for the sake of', establishes the form of the 
representation of beings 'in' that world. It establishes the way beings 
are freed. This must not be understood as if the world were just there as 
a totality of things-in-themselves over which Dasein then cast various 
'subjective' nets. World is indeed a projection cast over what-is, but this 
vorgängige Oberwurf ermdglicht erst, daß Seiendes als solches sich 
offenbart ('preceding 'casting over' first makes it possible for what-is as 
such to manifest itself'] (WG, 88-9). 
In projecting, however, Dasein is also already 'in the midst of 
(inmitten von) beings not like itself. In order to surpass them. Dasein 
must already find itself, must already be situated (sich befinden) among 
beings, and this situating also belongs to transcendence, and thus to the 
project of the world in its 'that' and its 'how'. It belongs, therefore, to 
freedom. There are options here; Dasein can be situated in one way or 
another amongst beings, where this situating is one way that the nature of 
beings, the nature or 'woridhood' of the world as the horizon of beings 
opened up by care, is grounded. This being situated within, in which 
-Dasein is already disposed, attuned, and preoccupied with beings, is the 
second mode of grounding, which Heidegger calls Boden nehmen ('gaining a 
footing'] (WG, 106-9). 
The way beings are freed through this situated projecting determines 
both how they are grounded and the form of ground sought for them, the 
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kind of Warum? posed of them. It is, then, in the freedom of transcendence 
that the nature of ground is determined. As in Was Ist Metaphysik? 
transcendence turns out to be the ground of grounds, the reason for 
reasons, but since transcendence is rooted in freedom, it can equally well 
be said that the Freiheit ist der Grund des Grundes ('freedom is the 
reasons for reasons'] (WG, 126-7). Freedom is freedom for grounds, the 
ability to pose the War-um? and seek the Well, the capacity to pose and 
answer questions. The fact of freedom determines the fact of this 
capacity, in that Dasein's asking 'why? ' is rooted in its basic 
comprehension of 'rather than' (WG, 124-5), in its comprehension of 
possibility, and this is a function of freedom. The 'how' of the capacity 
is rooted in the 'how' of its freedom, in Dasein's transcending to one 
possibility or another. 
The understanding of possibility in its 'that' and its 'how' is 
grounded, however, on the prior comprehension of being. Every Warum? 
moves within an already disclosed region of being, a region of truth. The 
understanding of being then establishes every question and contains the 
answer to all questions. Ontological truth, the third mode of grounding, 
is the manifestation of the being of a being. It is the manifestation of 
the being-structure or constitution of a being, That being-structure must 
in some way already be disclosed in any ontic investigation, so that all 
such investigation moves from the beginning in the uncomprehended light of 
this disclosure (WG, 114-17). At this stage of Heidegger's thought, the 
task of ontology is conceived as being the thematization of this already 
disclosed structure so as to bring it into explicit knowledge. The being- 
structure of any entity or region of entities is then both earlier and 
later; it is both the beginning and the end of any seeking to understand. 
Heidegger's basic observation with respect to this mode of grounding 
is that, in order for any question to be raised about the nature of 
anything, that to which the question is addressed must already have made 
itself manifest or evident in some way. This becoming evident, or coming 
forth into unconcealment, is a more primordial form of truth than is the 
usual conception of truth as correspondence, because it forms the basis or 
principle for the articulation of any proposition, as well as for the 
structure of the entity to which the proposition is supposed to 
correspond. This prior unity is the source of both proposition and thing 
which Heidegger refers to in a later work, in a passage where he reflects 
upon the relationship between thing and sentence, and concludes: 
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Im Grunde gibt weder der Satzbau des Maß für den Entwurf 
des Dingbaues, noch wird dieser in jenem einfach 
abgespiegelt. Beide, Satz- and Dingbau, entstammen in 
ihrer Artung and in ihrem möglichen Wechselbezug einer 
gemeinsamen ursprünglicheren Quelle. 
[Actually, the sentence structure does not provide the 
standard for the pattern of thing-structure, nor is the 
latter simply mirrored in the former. Both sentence and 
thing-structure derive in their typical form and their 
possible mutual relationship from a common and more 
original source. ] (Hw, 8/24) 
Primordial truth is actually the manifestness that gives this prior 
visiblity and mutual relation. It gives the unity of being (presence) and 
thinking. It is the openness of being itself, which, as Reiner Schürmann 
points out, is hen as henosis, the primordial binding into one of logos. 36 
Thus, although in Vom Wesen des Grundes Heidegger still takes his 
lead from Dasein in his conception of transcendence, being already 
manifests a certain priority. After all, if transcendence is a movement 
towards possibility, and if any such movement is enabled by the 
understanding of being, then being must be the 'source' or 'ground' of all 
possibility. And if, furthermore, the understanding of the being-structure 
of a being is rooted in an overtness in which Dasein finds itself from the 
beginning, then that overtness, which grants the possibility of both ontic 
and ontological truth, is prior to Dasein, though not in a temporal sense. 
It is only a short step from this to saying that being grants truth in 
granting to Dasein the openness of itself. 
This examination of how Heidegger's 'turn' is prepared for in Vom 
Wesen des Grundes gives a clearer sense of how and why the later 
Heidegger thinks of being, or Ereignis, as the source of every possible way 
of being. This, In turn, deepens and enriches the correspondence between 
his and Eckhart's conceptions of being. For Eckhart, being itself is both 
the unified ground of what-is and the unified ground of the soul. In the 
first place, it is the unity from which every power of the soul flows out, 
and it is these powers, these krefte, that grasp, and so determine, the way 
beings are. In the second place, the flowing out of the soul from its 
unified ground into multiplicity is at the same time the flowing out of 
creatures from their unified ground. Heidegger's conception of the 
Dasein: Sein: Seiende relationship is not dissimilar, and this impinges upon 
his position within the idealist /realist debate. The ways of being of 
Dasein are inextricably bound up with the ways of being of the world, but 
this is not, nor was it ever for Heidegger, a matter of some 'subjectivist' 
projection, whether individual or social. Dasein and Sein belong together 
far too primordially for that. Dasein's Verhaltungen ['comportments'] are, 
142 
after all, ways of being, which determine, at the same time, ways of the 
being of beings. If, then, certain metaphysical conceptions of the ground 
of beings are 'based' in some way on the manifold ways of being of Dasein, 
which they have to be, this is not a matter of 'subjectivization', but 
simply of a finite disclosure of being, a disclosure of the being of Dasein 
'and' the being of beings, where the 'and' should not be understood as 
linking together two genuinely distinct things, but as naming two moments 
of a single disclosure. 
This means that Heidegger must never be understood as rejecting 
metaphysical determinations as 'subjective' in any simple sense. For 
instance, with respect to the mathematical ordering of the being of beings, 
the fact that the being of beings can be mathematical only because the 
being of Dasein can be so does not mean that mathematical conceptions are 
'relative' or 'subjective' in a sense that would entail their being 'not 
really true'. On the contrary, to mathemata, as one disclosure of the 
being of beings is one disclosure of the truth of Dasein and beings. It is 
one disclosure of what being means, and it is not created or fabricated by 
Dasein as a self-assertive subject, but is evoked or called forth, and thus 
given, 'sent', by being itself. Insofar as a certain type of mathematical 
thinking is nonetheless part of the 'error' of Western history, the 
erroneous character of that error does not have to do with its being a 
'merely human' invention or projection - that it is not - but in its 
mistakenness about its own essence, its failure to see itself as a mode of 
being, and not being itself. Mathematics, logic, science, technology: these 
are not false or mistaken, but they are finite ways of corresponding to 
being, where that very finitude gives the determinacy of their truth. 
Their nature is mistaken if one fails to see the necessary finitude of 
that truth, but it is no less mistaken if they are taken as false on 
account of that finitude. Both of these mistakes would rest, for 
Heidegger, on a misconstrual of the essence of truth. 
The ways that being (the being of Dasein 'and' beings) is diclosed in 
these relations of man and what-is, therefore, in, for instance, the 
mathematical relation, yield aspects of what is called truth. In these 
relations, and many others, Dasein corresponds to the giving of being. 
After Heidegger has taken the step of conceiving Dasein as the recipient 
of what being gives to be thought, its freedom comes to mean its being 
capable of authentic response to this giving. That capability is the 
source of 'correspondence', and it is definitive of the being of Dasein as 
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the 'there' of being. W. J. Richardson summarizes this aspect of Heidegger's 
later thought in the following way: 
[Daseinl is the Da des Seins, the there of Being among 
beings through which Being reveals itself. Being has need 
of its There, so that the revelation can take place. 
Dasein's task is simply to let Being reveal itself in the 
finite mittence, to let Being be. Sometimes the revelation 
of Being to Dasein is conceived as a 'call' or 'hail' to 
Dasein. Dasein's task is, then, to 'respond' to that call, 
to 'correspond' with it, to 'tend' Being in beings as the 
'shepherd' of Being, to acquiesce to its own commitment in 
the e-vent of Being's self-revelation. 3'1, 
Given this conception of the dynamics of the Sein: Dasein relation, if world 
is in any sense still to be conceived as a project, it has to be one that 
is given by being. This does not by any means necessitate rejecting the 
analysis in Vom Wesen des Grundes, or in Sein and Zeit where it proceeds 
in similar terms, but it may require reinterpreting that analysis to 
uncover what is unthought in it, in Heidegger's case, what is thought only 
later. In that case, world and truth are in no sense relative to an 
arbitrary choice ' on the part of Dasein. Their relativity to Dasein 
consists only in their dependence upon it as the 'there' of being's sending. 
Since this sending is law and gives law, Dasein's correspondence to it 
will mean correspondence to the law of being, the same law that dispenses 
order to beings and holds them in that order. Authentic correspondence 
does not, however, come about of itself, but by way of a demand or claim 
made on Dasein, to which Dasein, in accordance with its freedom, can choose 
to respond and correspond, or not. The choice -to respond to this claim 
involves a resolution on the part of Dasein to assist in the coming to 
presence of truth, a resolution to let truth be manifest, to participate in 
the allowance that lets beings be. Such resolve is the fundamental 
decision that both differentiates being from beings, and distinguishes 
being from appearance. It yields the discernment that opens the way for 
truth. In so far as the dispensing of truth is the dispensing of order, 
Dasein's resolve for truth is a resolve for the discernment of this order. 
It Is a resolve to hear the order of being, and to make that order 
manifest by corresponding to it in thought and word. If the rules of such 
correspondence are in any way like the rules of a game, the game 
nonetheless arises within the play, and interplay, of being and language. 
That play is not arbitrary. It is ruled by the way Es gibt Sein. 
Authentic correspondence consists in accordance with that rule, in 
following and being ruled by the always finite and always historical, 
always 'aspectival', truth of being. Convention is then originally a 
decisive coming together (con-venire) on aspects of being. 
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It belongs to the nature of the mystery that in the historical 
sending of being, and Dasein's correspondence to it, being draws away in 
itself each time that it manifests itself in beings. In Der Spruch des 
Anaximander (1946), Heidegger says, Das Sein entzieht sich, indem es sich 
in das Seiende entbirgt ['As it reveals itself in beings, being withdraws'] 
(Hw, 332/26). Unconcealing itself in beings, being conceals itself in 
itself, and this revealing concealing is the epoche of being. In each 
epoch of being's destiny, each mode of its sending of itself in beings 
while holding itself back in itself, 'world occurs', that is, a mode of 
world's worlding, a world, which is a way that what-is as a whole is 
disclosed, comes to light. The withdrawal of being in the bringing to 
light of the world of each epoch is the opening up of the realm of Irre: 
Jedesmal, wenn das Sein In seinem Geschick an sich hält, 
ereignet sich jäh and unversehens Welt. Jede Epoche der 
Weltgeschichte ist eine Epoche der Irre. 
[When being keeps to itself in its destining. world 
suddenly and unexpectedly comes to pass. Every epoch of 
world history is an epoch of errancy. ] (Hw, 335/27) 
Errance, in the sense meant here, does not arise as a result of some 
mistake on the part of human beings. It belongs to being's revealing of 
itself in beings, and so belongs to truth. The realm of errance is opened 
up by being itself, in its holding to itself in the truth of its essence 
while lighting itself up in the modes in which beings come to light, in the 
modes of truth, which are modes of being's own essence, but, by the very 
fact of being modes, are not that essence itself. When the essence of 
being, the essence of truth, is left unthought, the modes do not reveal 
themselves as modes but appear simply as truth, and this appearance, the 
presumption of the mode, gives rise to errance. Each world-historical 
epoch in the history of the epoche of being, therefore, is, as a mode of 
truth, simultaneously a mode of errance. 
The root of errance is the darkening of being itself that belongs 
necessarily to the lighting-up of beings, the obscuring of the light of 
being in its granting of light to beings: Die Unverborgenheit des 
Seienden, die ihm gewährte Helle, verdunkelt das Licht des Seins ['The 
unconcealing of beings, the brightness granted them, obscures the light of 
-being'] (Hw, 332/26). With respect to human being, the being whose essence 
is appropriated in this lighting process, the being 'in' whom beings are 
revealed, errance means wandering about in what-is, and wandering from one 
form of what-is as a whole to another, from one world to another, while 
forgetting the truth of world, the truth of being itself. The ecstatic 
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character of Dasein, as the ek-sistence that stands outside of itself in 
the truth of being, and is, therefore, the lighting or clearing in which 
beings can be, sustains the epochs of being (Hw, 334/27), and so sustains 
both the truth and the error which belong to them. 
Because the epochs of being appropriates the ecstatic essence of 
Dasein in its hiding-revealing, to each epoch of being there corresponds an 
epochal determination of the essence of man. In that the ultimate truth 
of the essence of being remains hidden in each of these epochs of errancy, 
and is gathered up only in the ultimacy of that destiny, in the outermost 
point at the end of the history of being, the truth of the essence of man, 
which consists in the appropriateness of that essence to the truth of 
being, also remains hidden until that end. 
It is not hard to see how the structure of epochal unconcealment in 
relation to its hidden source forms a historicized analogue to the 
structure of finite disclosure in relation to its hidden ground in the 
thought of Eckhart. For Eckhart, too, modes of being both reveal and 
conceal Ipsum esse, which, as the pure plenitude of being that comprehends 
all possible ways of being, is both the source of every mode (modus, wise) 
of being, and, in itself, modeless. Moreover, this hidden source is 
simultaneously the ground of every entium and the ground of the soul, and 
the flowing out of the soul from its original unity, into the multiplicity 
of its powers, ideas and images is also the flowing out of creatures from 
their original unity into the multiplicity of their distinct forms. It is 
the Ozfliezen of being to beings, the one to the many. But insofar as 
beings and the many are, and are one, they hiddenly reveal being/the one, 
for they are a function of the be-ing of being/the unifying of the one. 
Heidegger's modes of what-is as whole are also, insofar as they are and 
are one, a function of the happening of the unifying of being, of hen as 
henosis. The more original common source that binds together thing and 
sentence is also the source of the mutual possiblities of being that bind 
together world and Dasein in every respect. Also, while Eckhart thinks 
ahistorically, he does not think atemporally. Being itself includes all 
time, so that every form of being and unity in time must be a formation 
(heard verbally) of being and the one, which, considered in themselves, are 
timeless. Thus, once again, Heidegger's historicizing of such conceptions 
can be seen more as a thinking through and extension than a real 
destruction. 
Given the equiprimordiality of the manifoldness of the soul and the 
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manifoldness of beings, the way the being of beings is revealed 
corresponds to a revelation of an aspect of the nature of the soul for 
Eckhart as well (although he does not, again, think this historically). But 
the ultimate nature of the soul lies in the was which includes all 
possibilities, of the soul 'and' of beings. This is the soul's beginning 
and end. which it finds in the durchbruch of the widerruk. Heidegger's 
version of this is the Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik at the 'end' 
of the destiny of being. Although that end, which is also a return to a 
simple origin, still remains essentially hidden, Heidegger's own thinking 
does seek to give some sense of the understanding of being and Dasein 
that may arise through it. To the extent that Dasein is here conceived as 
a pure emptiness capable of receiving the possible formations of being, 
while being is conceived as that which sends itself in sending these 
formations, the origin is not far from that of Eckhart. The return to it, 
which overcomes errance, consists in paying heed to the deepest mystery at 
the heart of the simultaneous revelation/concealment of being in beings, to 
that which holds itself back in unconcealing. 
In Zeit and Sein, near the close of Heidegger's attempt to return to 
the origin, this mystery is thought in terms of Ereignis Ereignis is the 
event that 'gives' time and being; it is the Es of Es gibt Sein. At this 
point in Heidegger's thought, being is the constancy of presencing, the 
process of arising, enduring and passing away, whose various modes are the 
historical-phases or epochs of being. These are determined aus der Weise, 
wie Es Sein gibt [by 'the way in which It gives being'] (SD, 8/8), where the 
Es is now what holds itself back while sending being (presencing) in its 
various modes. 
Being as presencing is not limited to the present. Rather, the time 
of being is the in der Gegenwart, im Gewesen, in der Zukunft spielende 
Reichen von Anwesen ['giving of presencing that prevails in the present, in 
the past, in the future'] (SD, 14/13), and it consists in the Sich-einander- 
Reichen von Zukunft, Gewesen and Gegenwart ['mutual giving to one another 
of future, past and present'] (SD, 14/14), and so in the unity of these 
three dimensions. The structure of the dimensionality of the time of 
being here is similar to that of the temporality of Dasein as gewesend- 
gegenwartigend Zukunft ('a future which makes present in the process of 
having been'] (SZ, 326) in Sein and Zeit. This formula describes the fact 
that Dasein's present, the being towards of concernful being-in-the-world, 
is originated by the for-itself of its future that comes to pass, the for- 
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the-sake-of itself in the process of having been. Basically, Dasein's 
temporality (Zeitlichkeit), on the basis of which the Temporalitrf 
(Temporalität) of being was to be determined, consists, in Sein and Zeit, 
in the unity of Dasein's meaning as care (Sorge), which is the articulated 
unity of intentional existence. 
Sein and Zeit does not complete the project of working out the 
Temporality of being, but the time of being in Zeit and Sein is obviously 
based on the determination of Dasein's temporality in Sein and Zeit, 
insofar as it consists in a lichtenden Reichen, als welches Ankunft the 
Gewesenheit, diese jene and beider Wechselbezug the Lichtung des Offenen 
erbringt ['a reaching out that opens up, in which futural approaching 
brings about what has been, what has been brings about futural 
approaching, and the reciprocal relation of both brings about the opening 
up of openness'] (SD, 15/14-15). It will be noted that the primary 
temporal mode here, too, is the future. Presenting is primarily futural, 
primarily approaching, so that the time belonging to it is also a coming 
towards in the process of having been, an extension where the coming-to of 
the future and the having-been of the past give rise to each other in such 
a way as to bring about the openness of the present. 
The unity of the time of being, the unity of presenting, and thus of 
time itself, of absolute time, it could be said, cannot be attributed to any 
one of these dimensions, since presence approaches, and so presenting 
'occurs', in all of them: 
Vielmehr beruht die Einheit der drei Zeitdimensionen in 
dem Zuspiel jeder für jede. Dieses Zuspiel erweist sich 
als das eigentliche, im Eigenen der Zeit spielende Reichen, 
also gleichsam als die vierte Dimension - nicht nur 
gleichsam, sondern aus der Sache. 
[Rather, the unity of time's three dimensions consists in 
the interplay of each towards each. This interplay proves 
to be the true extending, playing in the very heart of 
time, the fourth dimension, so to speak - not only so to 
speak, but in the nature of the matter. ] (SD, 15-16/15) 
The unity of the past, present, and future of being is, then, the fourth 
dimension of time. 
The Es that gives being also gives the time which belongs to it, and 
to which it belongs. This 'It' is nothing lying at hand. It is not a 
thing, but an event, the 'event of appropriation' (Ereignis) in which both 
being and time come into their own (SD, 20/19). This event is not an 
occurrence, but that which enables occurrence. It is the unfolding of time 
in which presencing comes to pass. It is the moment of being. 
As such, it must also be the moment of Dasein, for being as 
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presencing is the approaching, the becoming present in the sense of coming 
into presence, of that which concerns, and such an approaching can only 
occur in the event of there being concern. Presencing occurs only 'for' 
that being whose being is essentially care (Sorge): Dasein. Being as 
presencing is thus eventuated only in the event of Dasein. This is 
actually a tautologous statement, for it just says that being is only there 
in being-there. 
The unity of Dasein as care, as the letting-presence that lets be, is 
the unity of its temporality. Dasein is care in that it has a certain kind 
of time, in that it comes towards itself concernfully in the process of 
coming to pass. This temporality, the time of Dasein, echoes the time of 
being because Dasein, as a being that understands being, stands within the 
time of being, within genuine time. In Dasein, i. e. with the event of 
Dasein, time and being are first opened up. The event, the opening up of 
time and being, thus appropriates the essence of human being. It brings 
human being into its own: 
Im Sein als Anwesen bekundet sich der Angang der uns 
Menschen so angeht, daß wir im Vernehmen und 
Obernehmen 
dieses An gangs das Auszeichnende des Menschseins erlangt 
haben. Dieses Ubernehmen des Angangs von Anwesen beruht 
aber im Innestehen im Bereich des Reichens, als welches 
uns die vierdimensionale eigentliche Zeit erreicht hat. 
Sofern es Sein und Zeit nur gibt im Ereignen, gehört zu 
diesem das Eigentümliche, daß es den Menschen als den der 
Sein vernimmt, indem er innesteht in der eigentlichen 
seit, 
in sein Eigenes bringt. So geeignet gehört- der Mensch in 
das Ereignis. 
[In being as presence, there is manifest the concern which 
concerns us humans in such a way that in perceiving and 
receiving it we have attained the distinction of human 
being. Accepting the concern of presence, however, lies in 
standing within the realm of giving. In this way, four- 
dimensional true time has reached us. 
Because being and time are there only in appropriating, 
appropriating has the peculiar property of bringing man 
into his own as the one who perceives being by standing 
within true time. Thus appropriated, man belongs to 
appropriation. ] (SD, 23-4,23) 
The essence of human being belongs to the event, because human being is 
only human in understanding being. 
To stand within the event so as to be the pure recipient of the 
sending of being, with no concern other than following that sending, is to 
stand within the fourth dimension of time. It is rather like standing frl 
. und ledic in 
the nO of eternity. In the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der 
Logik, Heideggr equates Eckhart's no with the nunc stans, which is rooted 
in a conception of eternity as pure presence (MAL, 56/45). However, while 
Eckhart certainly does speak of all things being always, present in the na, 
'present' is an analogous term in this context, as the moment is actually 
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the gathering up of past, present and future. Heidegger is in fact closer 
to Eckhart's conception of eternity when, a few years later, he says in the 
Schelling commentary: 
Die ursprüngliche Gleich-Zeitigkeit besteht darin, daß 
Gewesensein und Künftigsein sich behaupten und 
gleichursprünglich mit dem Gegenwärtigsein als die 
Wesensfülle der Zeit selbst ineinander schlagen. Und diese 
Schlag der eigentlichen Zeitlichkeit, dieser Augenblick 
»ist« das Wesen der Ewigkeit, nicht aber die blog 
stehengebliebene und stehenbleibende Gegenwart, das nunc 
stans. Die Ewigkeit läßt sich wahrhaft, d. h. dichterisch 
nur denken, wenn wir sie als ursprünglichste Zeitlichkeit 
begreifen, niemals aber nach der Weise der gesunden 
Menschenverstandes, der sich sagt: Ewigkeit, das ist der 
Gegenteil zur Zeitlichkeit: also muß, um Ewigkeit zu 
begreifen, alle Zeit weggedacht werden. Was bei diesem 
Verfahren übrig bleibt, ist aber nicht ein Begriff, der 
Ewigkeit, sondern lediglich ein mißverstandenes and 
halbgedachten Begriff einer Scheinzeit. 
I. .. original simul-taneity consists 
in the fact that 
being past and bein present assert themselves and mingle 
with each other 
together 
with being present as the 
essential fullness of time itself. And this mingling of 
true temporality, this moment, 'is' the essence of eternity, 
but not the present which has merely stopped and remains 
that way, the nunc stans. Eternity can only be thought 
truly, that is, poetically, if we understand it as the most 
primordial temporality, but never in the manner of common 
sense which says to itself: Eternity, that is the opposite 
of temporality. Thus, in order to understand eternity, all 
time must be abstracted in thought. What remains in this 
procedure is not, however, a concept of eternity, but 
simply a misunderstood and half-baked concept of an 
illusory time. ] (SA, 197/113) 
The question of the relationship between the Augenblick of Dasein in Sein 
und Zeit and the fourth dimension of time in Zeit und Sein will be raised 
in Chapter Four. For the present, I only want to point out the similarity 
between the temporal self-discoslure of Dasein and that of Sein. Dasein is 
originally pure Seinkönnen, pure potentiality-for-being. Existing for the 
sake of itself, it unfolds that potentiality-for-being through the acts and 
decisions whereby it realises the finite possibilities of its being. It is 
through these acts that it comes to exist as actual, and it is through 
them that it enters time. Pure potentiality-for-being is not 'yet' 
temporal, but is empty of time and being, capable of them. The event is 
also not in itself temporal, for it is the timeless source of time (and 
being). Through the acts of the event finite possibilities of being as 
presenting are realised in time. The event, then, considered in itself, is 
the possibility of being and time. In the event, being extends itself over 
time in finite disclosures for the sake of itself. The event is empty of 
time and being, and yet is their source. In itself, 'before' time and being, 
it, too, is pure potentiality-for-being, a potentiality that realises itself 
in time. Given this structure, it is even possible to speak of the event 
as person-al, in an analogous sense. Or perhaps it is actually the 
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Personsein of Dasein that is the analogon. 
Following the sending of the event with concern for presencing is a 
form of accord with being that lets being be. This is a kind of 
willingness; it is the Gelassenheit zu den Dingen und the Offenheit fUr das 
Geheimnis ['releasement towards things and openness to the mystery'] (G, 
24/55). This willing is neither selfish nor purposeful; it is 3ne 
eigenschaft and 3ne warumbe. In Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Heidegger 
claims that this is what he had meant by Entschlossenheit ['resoluteness'] 
in Sein und Zeit: Die in Sein, und Zeit" gedachte Entschlossenheit ist 
nicht die decidierte aktion eines Subjekte, sondern die Eröffnung des 
Daseins aus der Befangenheit Im Seienden zur Offenheit des Seins ('The 
resoluteness intended in Being and Time is not the deliberate action of a 
subject, but the opening up of human being. out of captivity in that which 
is, to the openness of being'] (Hw, 53/67). It is a Geschehen asse 
('letting-happen'], ein Sichfttgen und so gleichsam ein Nichtwollen ['a 
compliance- and thus, as it were, a nonwilling' (Hw, 67//82) which lets the 
arrival (Ankunft) of truth occur. 
Letting the advent of truth happen is concommitant with acting in and 
for the truth. Wer wahrhaft das Seiende weih Heidegger remarks, weiß, 
was er inmitten des Seienden will ['He who truly knows what is knows what 
he-wills to do in the midst of what is'). This Wissen, das ein Wollen, und 
das wollen, das ein Wissen bleibt, ist das ekstatische Sicheinlassen des 
existierenden Menschen in the Urverborgenheit des Seins ['knowing that 
remains a willing, and willing that remains a knowing, is the existing 
human being's entrance into and compliance with the unconcealedness of 
being'] (Hw, 53/67). It is standing in the moment, living from the ground, 
and becoming a biwort to the wort, and it is available to the one who is 
wagender ... als der Grund ['more venturesome 
than the ground'), the one 
who dares to venture dorthin, wo es an allem Grund gebricht, in den 
Abgrund ('to where all ground breaks off - into the abyss'] (Hw, 292/119). 
Only in this way of being are human beings truly released from care: 
Sicher, securus, sine cura bedeutet; ohne Sorge ... Ohne diese Sorge sind wir nur, wenn wir unser Wesen nicht 
ausschließlich im Bezirk des Herstellens und Bestellens, 
des Nutzbaren und Schutzbaren aufstellen. Sicher sind wir 
erst dort, wo wir weder mit dem Schutzlosen, noch auf 
einem in Wollen errichteten Schutz rechnen. 
[Secure, securus, sine cure means: without care ... We are 
without such care only when we do not establish our 
nature exclusively within the precinct of production and 
procurement, of things that can be utilized and defended. 
We are secure only when we neither reckon with the 
unprotected nor count on a defence erected within willing. ] (Hw, 294/120) 
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Just as, for Eckhart, the soul becomes grounded, acting out of its own 
ground, only when it becomes without ground or dne war umbe, so, for 
Heidegger, human beings become secure only when they give up their quest 
to secure their being. Moreover, the release from care described here is 
much like Heidegger's interpretation, in Nietzsche I (Wille zur Macht als 
Kunst), of the way of being towards described by Kant in saying that the 
beautiful is an object of an interesselosen pleasure. To take an 'interest' 
in something means here: dieses Etwas für sich haben wollen, nämlich zum 
Besitz, zur Verwendung and Verfügung ('wanting to have this something for 
oneself, as a possession at one's use and disposal']. 37 It means being 
towards mit eigenschaft. Release from interest understood in this way 
releases the things of the world as well, releases them from the 
subjection of eigenschaft as own-ing. 
The knowing and willing that complies with the unconcealment of 
being is not an amor fa ti which accepts all that is and wills it as good. 
The convertibility of esse and bonum does not mean this. For Eckhart, all 
that is, insofar as it is, is good, but insofar as it is also not (and it is 
necessarily also not), there is evil, which is a negation to be negated. 
The 'is' here has to be understood essentially, in terms of possibilities of 
being, in terms of 'ideal' being. Unconcealing the truth of what-is is not 
a matter of understanding the 'facts' of its existence, but of seeing what- 
is in its essential relation to what can and should be. Only that seeing 
knows being in beings and beings in being. Being is not what-is, but the 
truth of what-is. Being is meaning. The withdrawal of being is the 
withdrawal of. meaning, just as the hiddenness - or death - of God concerns 
an absence of meaning. Concern for what presences in what-is, then, as 
concern for truth, is concern for meaning. This point is too likely to be 
missed where Heidegger's notion of being is taken as 'existentialist' rather 
than 'essentialist'. In fact, the unconcealment of beings in their being, 
which is at the same time that 'active upsurge' of being from nothing, is 
as much essential as existential. Heidegger does not accept any clear 
fact-value distinction. 
Where being is the holy, it is so in virtue of that sense in which it 
-is convertible with the good, in virtue of the sense in which it is 
meaning. Therefore, Camus' 'quarrel with God', for instance, is well- 
founded as a quarrel with an all-powerful entity that permits utterly 
unholy things to occur, but it is not a quarrel with the God that is Ipsum 
esse and bonum, and not a quarrel with being as the holy. That being is 
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the holy cannot mean that an apparently unholy event, an apparently evil 
event, is nonetheless in some sense, or from some perspective, actually 
holy and good. Such a thought is itself unholy, and well worth quarrelling 
with. Rather, that being is the holy, and that esse is bonum, means that 
the unconcealment of such an event in its truth, in the very extent of its 
unholiness, is the advent of being as the true and the good, as meaning. 
Such unconcealment of negation, the negation which. for example, love 
discovers in the suffering of another and which can itself occur only in 
reference to an implicit agathon,. is necessary for - indeed, if genuine, is 
coterminous with - the action that would seek to negate it. The truth of 
being is not given in the fact of the suffering, but in the appropriately 
corresponding response, for instance, in the revolt against an unholy God 
(the God whose only excuse, as Stendahl said, is that he does not exist). ae 
Compliance with being, therefore, means accordance in thought and 
deed with what the unconcealment of being sends to be thought and done in 
the midst of what-is. This is the essence of renunciation (Verzicht), 
which does not take away, but gives. Er gibt the unerschöpfliche Kraft des 
Einfachen ('It gives the inexhaustible power of the simple']. 39 It gives 
accordance with the being whose eigenschaft ist einicheit ('property is 
unity'] (DW I, 368/TP. 282). Accordance is letting-be. To think of being 
is to allow being to send itself to thought, and, in so doing, to draw 
thought towards it. Thought is drawn by the pull (Zug) of being; it is 
at-tracted by the traits (Züge) of being. To think being is to allow 
thought to be thus pulled. Thought lets be when it fits itself to being 
by holding itself in obedience (sich fügen) to the pull of being, so that 
it may be determined by the structure (Gefüge) of being (which is not 
merely the 'factual' arrangement of what is the case). 
To think the presencing of being in history is to obey its historical 
'construction', the sending (Schickung) of itself which constitutes its 
destining, and is experienced from the side of Dasein as the falling of a 
stroke of fate (Fügung). Thought, the unity of mind and heart, lets be the 
presencing that comes to presence through history insofar as it places 
itself in submission to, and holds itself in readiness for, the call of 
being in time. This holding itself in readiness is thought's being 
obedient (gefügig) to what being decrees (ftlgt), its readiness to fit 
itself to the justice (Fug) of being. This does not mean accepting 
whatever comes as just. It means being ready to be just in the face of 
what comes. 
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Such accordance is, of course, not necessary, since Dasein is free. It 
is free to be dis-cordant, free to not let be, and free to forget the 
mystery. It is free to part itself from the truth of being. For 
Heidegger, modern man, technological man, is specifically parted from the 
truth of being through the way of being that now holds sway over the 
West. This way of being, which Heidegger calls Gestell ('enframing' or 
'setting', as the unity of all forms of positing and arranging) is defined 
by das Unbedingte des bloBen Wollens Im Sinne des vorsätzlichen 
Sichdurchstezens in allem ['the unconditional character of mere willing in 
the sense of purposeful self-assertion in everything'] (Hw, 290/116). Der 
neuzeitliche Mensch stellt sich in solchem Wollen als den heraus, der in 
allen Beziehungen zu allem, was Ist, und damit auch zu ihm selbst, als der 
sich durchsetzende Hersteller aufsteht und diesen Aufstand zur unbedingten 
Herrschaft einrichtet ['By such willing, modern man turns out to be the 
being who, in all such relations to all that is, and thus to himself as 
well, rises up as the producer who puts through, carries out, his own self 
and establishes this uprising as an absolute rule'] (Hw, 285/111). As Ross 
Mandel says, 'to every mode of Dasein's revealing there corresponds a way 
in which a thing is revealed', "" and the mode of revealing definitive of 
Gestell concerns a Wie of Dasein that projects the being of beings in such 
a -way as to uncover what-is as a whole, the 'world', as Bestand or 
'standing-reserve', das Ganze der herstellbaren Gengenstände ['the whole of 
producible objects'] (Hw, 284/111). 
This kind of willing is an extreme form of being mit eigenschaft; it 
is, as Bernhard Welte notes, the world of eigenschaft transformed into a 
world destiny. 41 It may be overturned by a Gelassenheit that lets be, to 
which corresponds a different conception of the essence of being and man, 
and a different conception of truth. That conception is close to the 
original Greek notion of physis, in which being unfolds and reveals itself 
in the coming to presence of beings, and human beings reveal the truth of 
being insofar as they participate in der Entborgenheit und der Entbergen 
des Seienden ['the revealedness and revelation of what-is']. Participation 
is here a freedom which enthüllt sich ... als das Seinlassen von Seiendem 
-['reveals itself as the letting-be of what-is'J, the letting happen of 
aletheia or truth as das Iinverborgene ('the Unconcealed'] (WW, 15/333). It 
is revealing as original poiesis a bringing-forth that reveals truth. 
Techn6s, Heidegger points out, originally belonged to poiesis in this 
sense. For the Greeks, it is eine Weise des aAr19s6cty ['a mode of 
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aletheuein'], of knowing or aufschließendes ['opening up'] that entbirgt 
solches, was sich nicht selber her-vor-bringt und noch nicht vorliegt 
('reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here 
before us'] (TK, 13/13). Modern technology is also a revealing, but, das 
Entbergen, das the moderne Technik durchherrscht, enfaltet sich nun ... 
nicht in ein Her-vorbringen im Sinne der rrofrpts ['the revealing that 
holds sway through modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth 
in the sense of poiesis']. It is, rather, ein Herausfordern ('a challenging'] 
(TK, 14/14). 
Such challenging, which completes, for Heidegger, the oblivion of 
being in the history of the West, is the exact opposite of the 'spirit of 
absorbed submission' (Otto, p. 150) that discovers the holy, and the exact 
opposite of what Richard of St. Victor means by contemplation. Heidegger 
himself, though, claims that the translation of Greek theorein and theoria 
with the Roman terms contemplari and contemplatio bringt das Wesenhafte 
dessen, was die griechischen Worte sagen, mit einem Schlag zum 
Verschwinden ['makes that which is essential in what the Greek words say 
vanish at a stroke'] because contemplari heißt: etwas in einen Abschnitt 
einteilen und darin umzäunen ['contemplari means: to partition something 
off into a separate sector and enclose it therein'], so that, in der zur 
contemplatio gewordenen Bsivpsfa meldet sich das bereits im griechischen 
Denken mit vorbereitete Moment des einschneidenden, aufteilenden Zusehens' 
('in theoria transformed into contemplatio there comes to the fore the 
impulse, already prepared in Greek thinking, of a looking-at that sunders 
and compartmentalizes'] (VA I, 46-7/165-6). 
However, the medieval tradition of contemplatio is, in definition and 
practise, close to Heidegger's description of theoria as das verehrende 
Beachten der Unverborgenheit des Anwesenden ['the reverent paying heed to 
the unconcealment of what presences'] (VA 1,45/164). Far from setting up 
boundaries and divisions, it tries to break them down, and Richard of St. 
Victor's definition of contemplation as libere mentis perspicacia in 
sapientiae spectacula cum admiratione suspensa ['the free, more penetrating 
gaze of a mind, suspended with wonder concerning manifestations of 
-wisdom'] is actually similar to Heidegger's Besinnung ['reflection'] as the 
Gelassenheit zum Fragwürdigen [the 'calm, self-possessed surrender to that 
which is worthy of questioning'] (VA I, 60/180). Moreover, the 
contemplative life, like the bios theoretikos, is das höchste Tun ['the 
highest doing'] (VA I, 44/164), the purest form of work. If it is not seen 
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as such in the modern world, this can perhaps be attributed to what Evelyn 
Underhill, in the language of the early 20th century, described as 'the 
narrow and superficial definition of "work" set up by a muscular and wage 
earning community' (Mysticism, p. 210). Gestell, then, may be overcome by a 
turning that returns to a more primordial form of technd, one that stems 
out of a way of being and knowing which is poietic. 
Many of the specific parallels between the way that, for Heidegger, 
man discovers the holy in the things of the world through such a turning, 
and the way that, for Eckhart, the soul, having become ®ne eigenschaft, 
discovers God in all things have been well-covered by John Caputo and 
Bernhard Welte, 42 and there is no point in repeating their work here. I 
have tried to develop another aspect of the dialogue between Heidegger and 
Eckhart, one that permits a released appropriation and retrieval of 
metaphysics, rather than calling for a destruction of it. I hope to have 
demonstrated that such retrieval can shed new light on the meaning of 
'God' as immanent in what-is. 
As in the case of Bonaventure, though, it is necessary to note that 
this immanence of the other to what-is is still not something that can be 
demonstrated through argument. It rests, ultimately, on a certain 
revelation of being, a certain experience of the truth of being. The holy 
'is' not outside of that truth, and 'God' cannot be in the absence of the 
holy. As Heidegger says in an often-quoted passage; 
Erst aus der Wahrheit des Seins läßt sich das Wesen des 
Heiligen denken. Erst aus dem Wesen des Heiligen ist das 
Wesen von Gottheit zu denken. Erst im Lichte des Wesens 
von Gottheit kann gedacht and gesagt werden, was das Wort 
«Gott» nennen soll. 
[Onl from the truth of being can the essence of the holy 
be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the 
essence of divinity to be thought. Only in the light of 
the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the 
word 'God' is to name. ] (Hb, 102/270) 
This passage is neutral with respect to the possible absence or presence of 
God, and with respect to how God may be conceived in general. It makes no 
decision for or against atheism, for instance, which rests on a certain 
experience of being and has a stance towards the holy, divinity and God which 
corresponds to that experience. It is not possible to argue with that 
experience, or with that stance. Where, hard by the terror of the abyss there 
dwells not awe but nausea, where being is revealed in such a way that nothing 
in the revelation evokes the concept of the holy, where nothing in experience 
builds a need for such language, what this language names for an experience to 
which it is appropriate, and by which it is called forth, cannot be mediated. 
156 
And where there is no mediation, there can be no argument. In that case, it is 
either P or not-P, either IN or nicht, and no Aufhebung is possible. 
As a final note, since the development of the relationship between Eckhart 
and Heidegger in this chapter has impinged at points upon the question of 
ethics, a word or two about Heidegger's relation to the ethical sphere may be 
called for. The formal resemblance between Eckhart's description of the just 
man and Heidegger's description of accordance with the sending of being is 
evident, but it Is no less evident that Heidegger's writings make very little 
reference to notions like justice, or compassion or concern for the welfare of 
others, as many people have observed. It is true that the structure of released 
correspondence to being is entirely compatible with acting in the midst of 
what-is with concern for others. It is, after all, very much like Eckhart's 
description of being perfectly just and right. The fact that this existential 
form can be determined in that way, however, does not entirely mitigate the 
striking absence of references to responsibility for others, and to phenomena 
like suffering, injustice and love in Heidegger's works. These are merely ontic 
phenomena, to be sure. But insofar as every ontology must rest upon a 
determinate ontic foundation, the absence of attention to these things, which 
would seem to reveal an absence of concern with them, necessarily gives 
Heidegger's delimitations of existential structures a particular slant. It would 
lie outside the scope of this thesis to expand upon this point, but the 
observation of this lack in Heidegger's thought does need to be made, and to be 
recognised as important, if only because the need of the times is not served 
any better by a Heideggerian apologetic than by a Christian one. 
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SECTION II 
TBE INDWELLING GOD 
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In the preceding section, it was suggested that, whether conceived as 
creature, the products of a transcendent creator-God, or as beings 
dependent upon the openness or sending of being, the things of nature and 
world can either appear in a way that reveals their source and end, their 
ultimate referent, or in a way that conceals it. Whether the appearing of 
these entities occurs in such a way as to manifest the ground of their 
appearance, or whether it obscures this ground depends, it was suggested, 
upon the correlative mode of knowing of the revealing entity, the way of 
being towards of mess, seele, or Dasein. 
Since this revealing entity is itself a being, although of a special 
sort, it, too, can appear in this twofold manner. Again, the way it 
appears, the way it comes to presence or reveals itself, depends upon the 
way it is revealed, upon the mode of discovering of the being to which it 
is revealed. In this instance, revelation is self-revelation, self- 
discovering or unconcealing, and the writings examined in this section all 
suggest that human existence can disclose itself to itself in a manner 
that allows the ground of the disclosure, the ground of itself, and, in 
fact, of all beings, to come to presence within the disclosure, or it can 
discover itself in a manner where this ground remains entirely hidden. 
In that case, the interpretation of this being, like its interpretation 
of any other being, is ambiguous. It can be based either on the 
appearance in which both entity and ground are disclosed together, or on 
the appearance in which the source of what appears does not come to 
presence in any way. Since the source of the appearance is the ultimate 
referent of the appearing thing, the sign, and since adequate 
interpretation requires an appropriate referring of sign to referent, only 
a mode of disclosure in which the entity becomes transparent to the point 
where the referent may be caught sight of can provide an adequate ground 
for interpretation. The central issue in the next two chapters is the 
degree of human being's transparency to itself, and, consequently, the 
clarity of its interpretation of itself. 
The first chapter in this section begins by examining Bonaventure's 
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descriptions, mainly in Chapter Three of the Itinerarium, of how mens' 
powers of understanding reveal themselves to concentrated reflection. 
Such reflection requires a bracketing out of a profound sort, and 
Bonaventure's thought on this point is a kind of transcendentalism in which 
the mind shuts out particular objects in order to understand its own 
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cognitive powers. The conclusions reached by this reflection, taken 
together, make up the way mens discovers itself in self-contemplation when 
it sees through itself to its source. As in its contemplation of 
creatures, what it finds is a God that is both present and absent, both 
indwelling and transcendent. Bonaventure's account of the nature of human 
understanding, which can only, for him, be fully understood when it is 
thought in reference to this indwelling God revealed in self-contemplation, 
will then be compared with some of Heidegger's descriptions of the 
understanding of Dasein. 
Chapter Four looks first at the sermons of Johannes Tauler, where he 
describes the need and quest of the soul for God, and speaks of the nature 
of human perfection in reference to God. For Tauler, the life of the soul 
is a striving for completion and perfection, a striving for the absolute. 
The soul could not strive for something of which had no knowledge at all, 
and the striving for completion, equivalent, for Tauler, to a reaching for 
God, is guided by God as an indwelling principle, an 'interior witness' in 
the ground of the soul. The essence of the soul's life consists in its 
relation to this witness, and this is determined by its relation to what 
Tauler, writing under the influence of Eckhart, describes as a unified 
ground of the soul where God is present. When the soul enters fully into 
this ground, it achieves the perfection it seeks, in achieving union with 
God. 
These aspects of Tauler's thought will then be compared with aspects 
of Heidegger's analysis of the existence of Dasein in Sein and Zeit. The 
comparison will demonstrate that the care which defines Dasein's existence 
is also a reaching for perfection, and that this reach, like the perfection 
of the soul, is possible only on the basis of a transcendent 'something' 
for which it reaches. That something is then the beginning and end of 
Dasein's existence, as God is the beginning and end of the soul. It is 
Sein, and the essence of Dasein consists in its relation to Sein, as the 
essence of the soul consists in its relation to God. 
The issues of identity and alienation raised in this section are, in 
the first place, issues of awareness. Both chapters in this section are 
concerned, first, with the awareness of human existence, with its becoming 
aware of what is the case for itself. It will be suggested that while 
existence, the whole of the self, is always, in a sense, transcending, in 
that it always proceeds in reference to a transcendent something towards 
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which it transcends, becoming aware of this transcendence requires a self- 
transcendence of a special sort. Such transcendence, in which the self 
catches sight of the ground of itself, brings with it an awareness in 
which it knows itself in relation to what it has seen, and continues to 
see. In 'remembering' the transcendent ground of itself in this way, and 
so remembering itself in relation to that ground, which also means 
remembering the truth of itself, the identity of the self undergoes a 
radical shift. This shift of identity is not, for Bonaventure, Tauler, or 
Heidegger, a matter of a purely 'interior' transformation, from which no 
consequences for action ensue. There is no such distinction between 
thought and praxis here. The transformation is a transformation of being, 
of the way one is in the world. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
I3ONAVENTURE AND HEIDEGGER 
ON THE NATURE OF UNDERSTANDING 
1. Mens as Im b De i. 
The third chapter of the Itinerarium begins by introducing that stage 
in the mind's ascent at which, having been led into God through creatures 
as vestigia, it is next led into itself. It then reenters into the place in 
qua divine relucet imago ('where the divine image shines forth'], the place 
where ad modum candelabri relucet lux veritatis in facie nostrae mentis 
('the light of truth, as from a candelabrum, glows upon the face of our 
mind'] (111.1,314/79). The imagery of light and shining is once more all- 
pervasive, remaining constant through Bonaventure's descriptions of what 
and how the mind sees when it approaches beings other than itself in the 
mode of contemplation, and what and how it sees when it turns to 
contemplate itself. This image of a transcending light that is yet 
immanent to creatures in its shining through and within them again 
suggests the correlative immediacy of presence and vision. Creatures are 
not traces that have been left by God, pointing to something entirely 
external to them, something wholly departed from them, but traces 
indicating an other which is still there. God is different to creatures, 
but this different is present, and its presence (not its essential being) 
is seen, not inferred. 
Seeing in this context is a being-illumined, and there is again a 
combination of activity and passivity essential to the way of knowing that 
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discovers what is to be known in this case. On the one hand, the mind is 
led to God via God's traces in the world, and is illumined by the light of 
divinity shining through those traces, while on the other hand it must, and 
should, strive (conari debem us) to become aware of that light. The mind 
must turn its attention to what is to be known, and concentrate upon it, 
but its vision ultimately depends upon an illuminating light, and this 
light can only be received and reflected. 
Bonaventure sees the movement of withdrawal to interiority in self- 
contemplation as a movement to a higher, because more immediate, 
apprehension of God. In turning from creatures other than itself towards 
itself, the mind draws nearer to God, because it moves from an exterior 
region of the sacred, a region where God is less near, to one where God is 
inwardly present. It moves from the atrium forinsecus ('outer court'] to 
the sanctum ('sanctuary'], thereby moving closer to the true abode of 
divinity in the world (111.1,314/79). 
The distinction between these regions rests upon the nature of mens 
as a preeminent kind of trace. As an imago del, mens is a sign whose 
relationship to God is very different from that of other creatures. In 
terms of the theistic conception of God as the creator and artist of all 
that is, all creatures are in some sense products or effects, although not 
effects utterly divorced from their creative and designing cause, which 
perpetually stays with them and sustains them. But mens is also an image 
of this creative artist, and so a mirror of creator and creation alike. 
Reflecting the mind of the artist, mens reflects as well all that the 
artist conceives and brings into being. Basically, the human mind is a 
mirror of the divine mind, and, by virtue of this likeness, mens is capable 
of revealing, through reflection, what the divine mind has thought and 
created, i. e. what-is. The various faculties of the human mind, the 
categories into which the processes of reflection can be divided, discover 
and preserve the truth of what-is in that they mirror, at a number of 
levels, its structure. And they mirror that structure because they mirror 
the mind which, plene resolvens ('by a full analysis', or in the final 
analysis], is the efficient and structuring cause of all that is. 
The theist notion of God as a creative artist, a notion that, in its 
various forms, is probably a complex blend of poetic metaphor and 
speculative hypothesis, must depend originally upon the intelligibility of 
the world, and arises through reflection upon that intelligibility. Insofar 
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as the world has an intelligible structure, it is like intelligence and 
shows signs of intelligence. It is then person- and subject-like, and the 
notion of God as an intelligent being, as 'spirit', depends upon this 
person-al and subject-ive character of what-is. This character is always 
in some sense 'relative' to the human mind, since it is apparent only to 
that mind, and so the human mind is always, in a way, the 'source' or 
'ground' of intelligibility. Clearly, while the Kantian conception is that 
the human mind is the ultimate source of intelligibility because it is what 
imposes rational structure upon the world, the medieval realist conception 
is that human intelligence and the intelligible world participate in an 
overarching rational structure, articulable into a set of structures, that 
regulate both. Theistic speculation then builds upon this conception in 
the notion that the world manifests intelligible structure because it is 
originally the product of an intelligent being, God, and the ability of 
mens to grasp this structure makes it an image of that being. 
In Bonaventure's Christian theist system, largely adopted from 
Augustine's De Trinitate, the processes of reflection belonging to mens are 
divided into a trinity of powers mirroring the divine Trinity. The divine 
Trinity is not quite a hypothesis or inference where something unknown 
(the nature of God) is projected on the basis of something known (the 
nature of the human mind) but human subjectivity is clearly in some sense 
the starting point for the conclusion: Si igitur Deus perfectus est 
spiritus, habet memoriam, intelligentiam et yoluntatem ['If, then, God is a 
perfect spirit, he has memory, understanding and will'], (It. 111.5.321- 
2/84). This 'starting point', however, while it is the initial immanent 
point of departure for the reflection that moves to the transcendent 
powers of God, is not genuinely initial in the sense of originative. 
Rather, for Bonaventure, reflection upon the powers of mens leads to 
consideration of the powers of God because the former are discovered to 
be derived from and dependent upon the latter. How this discovery takes 
place becomes clear in the course of the reflection itself, a course which 
my analysis will attempt to follow, 
To begin with, the fact that the mind has three powers or 
capabilities (potentia) is not simply taken as the corollary to an article 
of faith. It is instead, for Bonaventure as for Augustine, something that 
makes itself evident to rational observation: 
Intra igitur ad to et vide, quoniam mens tua amat ferventissime semetipsum; nec se posset amare nisi nosset; 
nec se nosset, nisi sui meminisset, quia nihii capimus per 164 
intelligentiam, quod non sit praesens spud nostram 
memoriam; et ex hoc advertis, animam tuam triplicem habere 
potentiam, non oculo carnis, sed oculo rationis. 
[Enter into yourself, then, and see that your soul loves itself most fervently; 
that it could not love itself 
unless it knew itself 
nor know itself 
unless it remembered itself, 
because our intellects grasp only what is present to our memory. 
From this you can observe, 
not with the bodily eye, but with the eye of reason 
that your soul has a threefold power. ] 
(111.1,314/80) 
For an observation without any Christian presuppositions, this tripartite 
division is certainly not the only possible one, but it is not merely 
arbitrary, either. Following Book IX, chs. 2-4 of De Trinitate, Bonaventure 
makes the not terribly contentious claim that mess loves itself. It 
intends and desires itself, and this love of itself is visible to it in 
self-observation. But while love, according to Augustine, draws the soul 
towards what is loved (where lover and loved are the same in this 
instance), so that it acts as a motor for the realization or fulfillment of 
knowledge, it also presupposes some prior grasp of the thing intended. It 
follows, then, that the mind could not love itself if it were not in some 
fashion already disclosed to itself. Only something remembered, however, 
can. be disclosed to knowledge; that is to say, only what is present to 
mens can be known by it. Memoria in this instance is not exclusively a 
faculty of recall, but is that power by which mens presents something to 
itself and retains it in presence. That mens remembers itself then means 
that it is present to itself. It can know itself only because of this 
original self-presence, and it can intend itself only because of that 
knowledge. 
In the operations and relations of these three powers, mens is an 
inferior image, an imperfect copy, of God. As such, it refers to and 
reflects God, but darkly, per speculum in aenigmate (III. 1,314-5/80). The 
relationships of the three powers obscurely mirror God in that their 
identity and difference, the fact that they are genuinely distinct and yet 
do not constitute separate substances, reflects the consubstantiality and 
distinction of the Trinity. God is also revealed through their operationes, 
in that each faculty functions with reference to some aspect of an 
absolute which transcends it, but which it also must apprehend in some 
prior fashion in order to function at all. 
The activities of the first power, for instance, memoria, refer to 
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eternity, simplicity and immutability (111.2,315-6/80-1). The first 
activity of memory which Bonaventure mentions, the retention of all things 
past, present and future, has its source in the Confessions, XI, 20, where 
Augustine speaks of 'three times' existing in the mind. These are 
actually, according to Augustine, three modes of the present: a present of 
past things (memory), a present of present things (direct perception), and 
a present of future things (expectation). For Bonaventure, the memory, in 
its capacity for retaining these three times, bears an image of eternity, 
conceived as an omnipresence extending across all time and times, without 
mode or division. Of such nature is the temporal extension of the being 
of God, then, as opposed to, and yet reflected in, the distensio anima 
constituting the time of human being (see Confessions, XI, 26). 
The second activity attributed to memory is the retention of 
simplicia, sicut principia quantitatum continuarum et discretarum, ut 
punctum, instans et unitatem ['simple things, such as the principles of 
continuous and discrete quantities like the point, the instant and the 
unit']. These simplices formas cannot, according to Bonaventure, be gained 
empirically; they cannot be derived from the phantasmata that enter the 
mind through sense-perception. They are then a priori, which means, for 
Bonaventure, received and maintained a superiori. Aside from the question 
of which principles actually count as basic (a question that Bonaventure 
answers via Aristotle), the more fundamental assumption is that whatever 
is absolutely presupposed presupposes the absolute. In that case, the 
absolutely binding conditions of subject and object, the conditions that 
necessarily bind being and thinking and bind them to one another, are not 
only transcendental but transcendent. They regulate subject and object 
from above and beyond both, and not only from 'within' the subject. 
This applies as well to scientiarum principia et dignitates ['the 
principles and axioms of the sciences'], by which Bonaventure means the 
laws of logic, as is made clear by his Aristotelian examples: «De quolibet 
affirmatio, vet negation and «0mne totum est maius sua partes ['On any 
matter, one must either affirm or deny' and 'Every whole is greater than 
its part']. All axioms that cannot be contradicted ad interius rationem 
['by our inner reason'] belong within the category of invariable truths, and 
these, like simple forms, cannot be derived empirically. They are, rather, 
'remembered' in 'an unchangeable light'. They are recollected by the mind 
as apodictically certain, and the light that grants this certainty, the 
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light within which certain truths are realised, is present to the mind in 
an unchanging way. 
Eternal presence, simple forms, and immutable truths are reflected in 
memory, therefore, present to it primordially and innately. They are 
remembered in principio, and the remembrance of them constitutes the 
enigmatic memory of the absolute, grasped antecedently, although not, in 
the first instance, explicitly. This original memory enables the true 
revelation of the things of time, space and number. The mind discovers 
the truth of particular instantiations through its prior apprehension, its 
innate memory, of their originary principles. 'Innate' in this instance 
does not mean lying within the powers of the subject, nor does it mean 
that a priori principles are actually present in the mind before any 
contact with particular things. It means, rather, that these principles are 
realised upon contact with particular things without yet being derived 
from those things. What grants and maintains the subject's capabilities by 
bestowing these principles is certainly immanent in the sense that its 
power is constantly present to the subject, but it is also transcendent in 
the sense that the subject's own powers depend upon it without having 
power over it, and in the sense that it cannot be seen clearly in itself. 
The memory 'presupposes' the light within which it sees what appears to it 
as certainly true, but the source of that light is not itself visible. 
The situation of the intellective power is similar. Its function 
consists in perceptione intellect us terminorum. prpositionum et illationum 
['understanding the meaning of terms, propositions and inferences'] (11L3, 
316/81). To understand the signification of a term means to comprehend 
that term in a definition. 
Sed definitio habet fieri per superiors, et illa per 
superiors definiri habent, usquequo veniatur ad supreme at 
generalissima, quibus ignoratis, non possunt intelligi 
definitive inferiors. Nisi igitur cognoscatur, quid est ens 
per se, non potest please sciri definitio alicuius specialis 
substantlee. 
[But definitions are constructed by using more universal 
terms; and these are defined by more universal terms until 
we come to the highest and most universal. Consequently, 
unless these latter are known, the less universal cannot 
be grasped in a definition. Unless we know what being per 
se is, we cannot fully , 
know the definition of any 
particular substance. ] (111.3,316-7/81) 
The intellect has an antecedent comprehension of being per se, and only on 
the basis-of this prior understanding can it comprehend the manifold forms 
of being that it encounters. Some understanding of this highest and most 
general term is then presupposed in the delimitation. of any particular 
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substance, although the intellect only realises this presupposition in the 
process of resolving the nature of that substance. Thus, as in the case 
of the presuppositions of memory, what the intellect realises only later is 
what it must have always known in some way in order to function as what 
it is. Since ens per se is, for Bonaventure, God, what it comes to see is 
that it must always have had a dim understanding of God insofar as it has 
understood anything at all. 
The idea of ens per se is also the idea of unlimited and perfect 
being, and it is according to this idea that the intellect grasps limited 
and imperfect forms of being. It cannot, then, be derived from those 
finite forms of being by way of abstraction, because its presence to the 
mind is a prior condition for recognising them. This means that the mind 
understands negations of being, privationes et defectus ['privations and 
defects'], on the basis of purely positive being, quod est ens simpliciter 
et aeternum ['which is unqualified and eternal being']. As for Eckhart, 
being in itself is pure affirmation, containing the perfect principles of 
all things. Negations, 'privations and defects', are understood through 
this wholly pure, actual, complete and absolute being (111.3,317-8/81-2). 
Since all created particular beings are 'defective', not wholly pure or 
actual, and not fully complete or absolute, the knowledge of being without 
any defect is a prerequisite for understanding them. Thus, in every act of 
understanding a being, the intellect implicitly or explicitly refers to 
being per se. The adequate analysis or interpretation of a finite mode of 
being requires a reference to this infinite being; it requires that the 
imperfect mode of being be understood in reference to a perfect one. To 
begin with and generally, the mind is not explicitly aware of this 
reference. It is not aware of its own relation to perfect being, on the 
basis of which its comprehension of beings, which means its relating or 
referring of them to perfect being, is possible. It becomes aware of this 
special relation of itself to perfect and infinite being, constituted by its 
a priori understanding of it, by contemplating the process through which it 
understands. In such contemplation, what is most primordial in its 
comprehension becomes visible. This is ens per se, which, as the source 
of all beings including the mind itself, comprehends all things from the 
beginning in their principles. 
The intellect comprehends propositions, Bonaventure goes on to say, 
cum certitudinaliter scit, 111as veras esse ['when it knows with certitude 
that they are true'] (111.3,318/82). This requires its seeing that the 
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truth the proposition expresses is unchangeable (incommutibilem), and 
Bonaventure argues that since the mind is changeable, it can only see such 
truths per aliquam lucem omnino incommutabiliter radiantem ('by means of 
some light which shines in an absolutely unchangeable way'] (111.3,318/82). 
Consequently, that by means of which the intellect understands the 
invariable truth of a given proposition, like that by means of which 
memory understands logical principles, is not itself something belonging to 
the mind. It cannot be a characteristic of the mind, since the mind is 
changeable. Strictly speaking, then, it does not lie within the power of 
the mind. Rather, like being per se, it is something that both supports 
and surpasses understanding. 
Similarly, intellect um vero illationis tunc veraciter percipit noster 
intellectus, quando videt, quod conclusio necessario sequitur ex praemissis 
('our intellect truly grasps the meaning of an inference when it sees that 
the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises'] (III. 3,318/82). It 
sees this necessity non solum ... in terminis necessarily, verum etiam in 
contingentibus and non solum in rebus entibus, verum etiam in non-entibus 
['not only in necessary but also in contingent terms' and 'not only in 
existing things, but also in nonexisting things'] (111.3,318-9/82). The 
argument then follows a path much like the one from the unchangeable 
truth of propositions, and Bonaventure concludes that the necessity of 
such an inference must come ab exemplaritate in arte aeterna, secundum 
quam res habent aptitudinem et habitudinem ad invicem secundum illius 
aeternae artis repraesentationem ('from its exemplarity in the eternal art, 
according to which things are mutually oriented and related to one another 
because they are represented in the eternal art'] (111.3,319/83). The 
sorts of inferences Bonaventure has in mind are not supposed to depend 
upon the existence of anything, in that they are true regardless of 
whether or not what they are speaking of exists (e. g. 'If a man Is moving, 
the man is running'). They are absolutely necessary, but necessity cannot 
be based upon empirical fact, since whatever is empirical is contingent. 
For Bonaventure, this necessity is a reflection of the way things are in 
their original logic, the way they are in principle. 
At no point does Bonaventure argue for the warrantability of this 
belief, nor would one expect him to from his situation as a medieval 
thinker. He does not try to prove that what appears to be certainly true 
is so, but assumes this, and asks instead about the source of this 
certainty. What is clear and distinct cannot, for Bonaventure, be doubted 
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nor does it need to be proven. The notion that certitude is granted by a 
'light' is not a proof of anything or an argument for anything, but only, 
originally, a poetic description of the fact of clarity and distinctness 
itself. That fact cannot be supported by justification because it is 
itself the support for whatever knowledge counts as justified. It is the 
ground for what is known, and, as such, a beginning behind which one 
cannot go. The light of reason and the principles comprehended within it 
do testify, for Bonaventure, to the presence of God, but it is important to 
see that the process of pointing out this light constitutes a form of 
immediate demonstration rather than an argument. For - Bonaventure, the 
light is itself the immediate demonstration, even though it is actually 
'seen' only indirectly, in its operation. Mens only needs to raise itself 
to an awareness of this light in order to affirm the self-evident presence 
of God. 
However, that Bonaventure is a medieval thinker does not mean, of 
course, that no question of a skeptical nature can possibly arise for him, 
and the examples he gives of certain truths are of the same sort that 
Augusutine gives in arguing against skepticism. ' But there is for him no 
question of any sort of 'evil demon', no question of some occult force or 
principle that could make what is indubitable 'in truth' false. There is no 
question, then, that one might be deceived in some way even in what is 
clearly apprehended as true. The fact that there is certainty, the fact 
anything is held to be certainly true, or just that anyone strives for 
truth, simply demonstrates for Bonaventure the reality of truth itself, as 
the directing principle of the intellect in its quest for understanding: 
Omnis igitur, ut dicit Augustinus de Vera Religione, vere 
ratiocinantis lumen accenditur ab illa veritate et ad ipsam 
nititur pervenire. - Ex quo manifeste apparet, quod 
conjunctus sit intellectus noster ipsi aeternee veritati, 
dum non nisi per illam docentem nihil verum potest 
certitudinaliter capere. 
[As Augustine says in On the True Religion: The light of 
everyone who reasons truly is enkindled by that truth 
which he also strives to reach. From this it is obvious 
that our intellect is joined to eternal truth itself since 
it can grasp no truth with certitude if it is not taught 
by this -truth. ] (111.3,319/83) 
In the chapter of De Vera Religione to which Bonaventure is referring, 
Augustine argues that everything is open to doubt except truth itself, 
since: 
Omnis, qui se dubitantem intellegit, verum intellegit et de 
hac re, quam intellegit, certus eat. De uero igitur certus 
est. Omnis ergo, quý utrum sit ueritas dubitat, in se ipso 
habet uerum, unde non dubitet, nec ullum uerum nisi 
ueritate uerum est. Non itaque oportet eum de ueritate dubitare, qui potuit undecumque dubitare. Vbi uidentur haec, ibi est lumen sine spatio locorum et temporum et 
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sine ullo spatiorum talcum phatasmate. Numquid late ex 
aliqua parte corrumpi possunt, etiamsi omnis ratiocinator interest aut aped carnales infero ueterascat? Non enim 
ratiocinatio talia facit, sed inuenit. Ergo antequam 
inueniuntur, in se manent, et cum inueniuntur, nos 
innouant. 
[Everyone who knows that he doubts knows with certainty 
something that is true, namely, that he doubts. He is 
certain, therefore, about a truth. Therefore everyone who 
doubts whether there be such a thing as the truth has at 
least a truth to set a limit to his doubt; and nothing can 
be true except truth be in it. Accordingly, no one ought 
to have doubts about the existence of the truth, even if 
doubts arise for him from every possible quarter. 
Wherever this is seen, there is a light that transcends 
space and time and all phantasms that spring from spatial 
and temporal things. Could this be in the least destroyed 
even if every reasoner should perish or grow old among 
inferior carnal things? Reasoning does not create truth 
but discovers it. Before it is discovered it abides in 
itself; and when it is discovered it renews us. J2 
The self that doubts cannot itself be doubted, so that the existence of 
that doubting self necessarily entails the concept of truth. It then 
entails the being, in some sense, of truth itself. That truth is 
transcendent, revealed but not manufactured by human reason, and only in 
reference to it is it possible even to question or doubt anything that is 
held to be true. 
Bonaventure is also in accord with Augustine on the point that, to 
find such truth, the mind must return to itself. Indeed, it must go so 
deeply within itself that it transcends itself. To find immutable truth, 
Augustine claims, the mind must go beyond its own changeable nature; to 
find the ultimate - object of reason, it must - transcend reason. For 
Augustine, reasoning is a form of appetition. It is a hunger for truth, 
and truth itself is its beginning and end. Truth fires the appetite of 
reason, and it is what that appetite seeks to consume. But it does not 
follow that 'the' truth, absolute truth or truth in itself, can actually be 
attained by reason. Rather, such truth transcends reason precisely because 
reason is always stretched out towards it. 'Seeing' this truth then means 
catching sight of, becoming aware of, that to which reason necessarily 
refers insofar as it functions as reason. Truth is the transcendent telos 
of reason, and the nature of reason is granted only in reference to this 
t elos 
Just as this transcendental reference on the part of reason makes 
complete skeptical doubt impossible, so, given a similar reference on the 
part of the will, there can also be no question of total skepticism with 
respect to matters of evaluation. The will, the power of choice (virtus 
elective), is seen to operate in consilio, iudicio et desider o 
['deliberation, judgement and desire']. Consilium here consists in 
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inquirendo, quid sit melius, hoc an illud ('in inquiring which is better, 
this or that']. Given, however, that melius non dicitur nisi per accessum 
ad optimum ['better has meaning only in terms of its proximity to best'], 
in the, final analysis, omni ... consiltanti necessario est impressa notio 
summi boni ('the notion of the highest good is necessarily imprinted in 
everyone who deliberates'] (111.4,320/83). The ultimate measure to which 
the will refers when it orders the world axiologically does not belong to 
mens any more than does the one to which the intellect refers when 
ordering the world logically. The ideal by which mens evaluates, like the 
idea by which it understands, is not posited by itself and is not a 
property of itself. It is a priori and transcendent. It follows that this 
ideal cannot itself be evaluated, since there is nothing by means of which, 
or in reference to which, such an evaluation could proceed. The idea of 
the good is the ultimate referent of all that has value, since it is the 
always transcendent standard according to which all that has merit, all 
that is good in any sense, is ordered. It thus provides the ground of 
every act of evaluation, just as the idea of being grounds every act of 
understanding. All that is good approaches this ideal, is near or far to 
it, and refers to it through this propinquity, that Is, by way of 
approximation. And since it grounds all evaluative judgements a priori, 
the notion of the highest good, like that of being in itself, cannot be 
explained as derived from contingent entities by way of gradation. 
Bonaventure argues further that the law according to which wens 
passes judgements concerning value must transcend mens Itself, since mens 
judges about itself, and it cannot judge about the law through which it 
judges (111.4,320-1/83). Thus, wens is no more a law unto itself in the 
sphere of the good than in the sphere of the true. However much specific 
judgements may change, the formal point remains that even in the most 
radical questioning of values, where the values one holds are overturned 
or transvalued, there has to be an examination or evaluation of those 
values, and this evaluation has a logic that cannot itself be interrogated 
as to its value if it is that which makes all such interrogations possible 
in the first place. The logic of evaluation is simply unquestionable, then, 
as the laws that determine judgement are themselves, in a quite literal 
sense, just beyond question. 
Since choice is contingent upon evaluation, and evaluation is itself 
determined in reference to a standard that transcends mens and according 
to laws which, like the laws of logic, are other to and beyond mens, the 
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movement of the will in its desire for happiness is based, ultimately, upon 
a category no less imperative, no less absolute and commanding, than the 
one that originates and provides the end for the movement of the intellect 
in understanding. This is the category of the highest good, the optimal 
and final end of desire. It is said to provide the will with its ultimate 
motivation because this category, transcendental and inaccessible per se, 
is found at the limit of all analyses of that on account of which desire, 
as a function of the will, is stirred, and so of that which stirs it (111.4, 
321/84). Since action is initiated by choice or desire, by the movement of 
the will, this category also establishes the limit of any analysis of that 
for the sake of which action is performed. In the final analysis, the 
highest good is that towards which the will inclines in all of its 
movements, and so that to which, in these movements, it refers. It lies at 
the limit of the will's referring in the same way that the category of 
being provides the referential limit for the understanding. 
This way of talking about these two categories is not entirely 
adequate, however, as the distinction between the highest good and being 
in itself is not a distinction of substance. Being in itself is, after all, 
perfect being, which is dimly recollected when anything is judged to be 
less than perfect. As perfect being, being in itself is then also the 
highest good. It is what the soul seeks in the end, and its complete 
realization would constitute the absolute fulfillment of the soul's desire. 
Inquietum cor est nostrum donec requiescat in te, says Augustine, and the 
to that is wanted is a single being. Ens and bonum, along with verum and 
unum, are convertible names for that being. 
The validity and convertibility of these terms is not dependent on 
the question of whether or not the being named by them is an actually 
existing entity. For Bonaventure, perfect being is God, who exists in some 
way. But in the drive towards fulfillment, the realization of the highest 
good still means the realization of the uttermost possibility of being, of 
perfect being, even if this perfect being does not 'exist', The drive 
towards this being is still the absolute drive upon which all finite 
drives, all limited potentialities for, being, are grounded. What moves to 
act or motivates the drive Is what reduces potentialities to act, i. e. 
brings them into actual being. The drive towards the good is therefore 
the drive towards the actualization of being itself, and the achievement of 
the highest good is then equivalent to the realization of absolute being. 
Since this being comprehends all possibilities, it is also absolute truth, 
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and since it is complete in itself without movement or division, it is 
perfect unity as well. It is, in short, ideal being, and insofar as human 
beings refer to it and are related to it, it 'is' in some way, although 
what way still remains a question. 
To summarize, when the mind turns to contemplate itself, it finds 
that it functions in reference to: eternity, simple forms, and immutable 
truths (memory); being per se, the unchanging light of certitude, and the 
laws of logic (intellect); the highest good, the laws of evaluation, and the 
ultimate end of desire (will). - These are the categories and laws 
delimiting the finite apprehension proper to wens, in that they determine 
and name the limits beyond which mess cannot pass by means of its own 
faculties. They are in some way properties of the ground supporting the 
processes appropriate to mens, but, as that ground is per se utterly 
transcendent to mans, any attempt to produce grounds for these limiting 
laws and categories, any attempt to justify them rationally by referring 
them to a visible ground, must lead ultimately to an abyss insofar as it 
leads beyond reason. To reflect upon the ground out of which reason 
emerges requires that reason be transcended, because reason cannot 
penetrate the ground that supports it. In itself, this ground is 
unfathomable and unthinkable, and yet only with reference to it and by 
means of it can mens fathom the truth of the world in which it finds 
itself, and, indeed, the truth of itself. For Bonaventure, only in and 
through this 'ungroundable' ground, only with its support at every step, is 
it possible for thinking to occur at all. 
This becomes evident to mens upon reflective self-examination. For 
Bonaventure, the fact is that mens does understand, and it can do so only 
with reference to categories and according to laws that are somehow 
present to it, but do not belong to it. These laws are of another order 
than the one in which mens usually discovers itself and upon which it 
generally bases the whole of its interpretation of itself, namely, the 
order of things within the world and concepts derived from them. This 
suggests that mens actually always stands between these two orders, 
between the temporal and the eternal, between beings and being, between 
-creatures and God. An adequate analysis of understanding, then, must point 
out both of these orders. Although mens, in thinking, necessarily refers 
to something that transcends it end to which it has primordial access, it 
must also, in understanding particular things, have contact with them. 
Consequently, its knowledge is to an extent innate or natural and to an 
174 
extent adventitious or acquired. Bonaventure points this out more clearly 
in his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. 
Cum enim ad cognitionem duo currant necessario. videlicet 
praesentia cognoscibilis et lumen, quo mediante de illo 
iudicarnus .. habitus cognitivi sunt quodam modo nobis innati ratione luminis animae inditi, sunt etiam quodam 
modo acquisiti ratione species .. Nemo enim unquam 
cognosceret totum, aut partem, aut patrem, aut matrem, nisi 
sensu aliquo exterior speciem eius acceperet .. Illud 
autem lumen sive naturale iudicatorium dirigit ipsam 
animam in iudicando tam cognoscibilibus quam de 
operabilibus. 
[For since in cognition the two things necessarily 
accompany each other, namely, the presence of the thing to 
be known, and the light, by means of which we judge 
concerning it . the cognitive habits are in a certain 
measure innate in us on account of the light placed into 
the soul, but are also in a certain measure acquired on 
account of the image . For no one could ever know 
whole, or part or father, or mother, unless he had 
somewhere received their images through the external 
senses . But that light or natural judgement directs the soul itself as much in judging of things to be known 
as of things to be done. ]4 
In the event of understanding, mens touches both the particular thing and 
the transcendent light in which that thing is comprehended, so that each 
time understanding occurs, both the 'earthly' and the 'divine' realm are 
manifest. Since this twofold disclosure is of the essence of understanding 
in the intellectual as well as the moral sphere, it follows that mens can 
only produce a proper account of its own functioning, and thereby derive a 
proper definition of itself, on the basis of a self-interpretation that 
recognizes its intermediary position between these two dimensions or 
orders. 
Since the order of particular things, of creatures, is the one that 
mens initially and generally finds itself in, and out of which or in 
relation to which it generally determines itself, the alternative and more 
complete interpretation of itself as intermediary requires, first and 
foremost, that mens realize the transcendent order to which it is also 
related and to which it also belongs. It is this kind of interpretation 
that lies behind the understanding, in this context, of mens as the image 
of God. Where being, truth, and good are names of God, and God as subject 
is the identity in difference of these determinations, being the image of 
God is definitive for that entity which, in reflecting upon beings, reflects 
being, truth and goodness per se. In understanding, mens reflects being 
itself; in evaluation, it mirrors the good, and its discovery of what-is 
through these forms of reflection constitutes the revelation of truth. 
As already implied, the absence here of any complete intellectual or 
moral skepticism is a necessary concomitant of the fact that, for 
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Bonaventure, there is no distinction between the transcendental as an 
epistemological determination and the transcendent as an ontological one, 
and therefore no possible disparity between epistemological imperatives 
and ontological truths. What must be thought is what is the case. It 
could be said that this stance adopts an attitude of faith towards the 
possibility of understanding in general, since the veracity of the ground 
supporting the processes of wens is never called into doubt. But 
Bonaventure's analysis also suggests that the veracity of that ground 
cannot be called into doubt, that mens cannot genuinely ask whether it 
understands at all, but only how, in reference to what, it understands. 
There is, after all, nothing in reference to which it can ask the 
question of whether it understands. Mens cannot, within the limits of the 
modes of understanding proper to it, bring into question the truth of what 
it must presuppose as true, or the being of being in itself, or the 
goodness of the highest good. It cannot ask whether the laws of logic are 
logical, nor can it evaluate the laws of evaluation. Such questions, which 
seek to question the very grounds of rational thought, the basic principles 
upon which it is founded, cannot even be properly posed as rational 
questions. They cannot be posed without self-contradiction, and they 
certainly cannot be answered through the kind of thinking by which reason 
proceeds. Any effort to question them from within the circle of reasoning 
is simply paradoxical, since such an effort inevitably remains 
circumscribed by the very principles and modes of thought it is attempting 
to interrogate in a fundamental way. 
This analysis does not establish any ontic criteria for judgement, and 
it does not offer any definitive 'answer' to conflicts of opinion. But what 
it does establish is the indispensability of basic metaphysical categories 
like being, truth, goodness and unity, wherever answers are sought. 
Thinking, it suggests, cannot help but presuppose these. If truth is 
called error, that statement is nonetheless supposed to be true. If all 
moral systems are judged to be degenerate, that judgement still 
presupposes a principle of value. Truth and value, moreover, are 
intrinsically related to one another and they are both related to being; 
the true is ontos on, the really real, and it is only with reference to it 
that value is decided. And what is judged to be really real, true and good 
will be that according to which and in terms of which what-is is explained 
in its being. It will then be unity. s 
Although the ground of thought is not itself visible, Bonaventure 
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does claim to catch sight of it in some way when he conceives it, in the 
traditional manner, as a transcendent light informing every activity of 
understanding. The concept of divine light, however, like that of all the 
truly fundamental principles of wens, only offers a name for a limit, a 
negativity, as it can never itself be analysed. 'The divine light, ' as 
Gilson says, 'is ... an immediate cause and not an object of our 
knowledge ... we affirm it as we affirm the existence of the hidden 
source whose flowing waters are actually before our eyes'. 116 It is 
immediately present in that it is placed within the soul and truth is 
grasped within it. But it is nonetheless 'seen' indirectly, 'contuited' as 
an objectum fontanum (Gilson, p. 362) in that mode of reflection where the 
functions of mens are revealed as vestigia through which the properties of 
the absolute are manifested. 'The same things may be envisaged either as 
things or as signs, ' Gilson comments, and 'the human soul itself is a 
different object of knowledge according as it is considered a reality 
sufficient to itself or the obscure image of a transcendent God' (p. 345). 
For Bonaventure, it is the obscure image of the God who is one in 
essence or being and three in persons, and the nature and relations of the 
powers of the soul reflect this God: 
Secundum autem herum otentiarum ordinem et habitudinem 
ducit in ipsam beatissimam Trinitatem. - Nam ex memoria 
oritur intelligentia ut ipsius proles, quia tunc 
intelligimus, cum similitudo, quae est in memoria, resultat 
in acie intellectus, quae nihil aliud est quam verbum; ex 
memoria et intelligentia spiratur amor tanquam nexus 
amborum. Haec tria scilicet mens generans verbum et 
amor, sunt in anima quoad memoriam, inteliigentiam et 
voluntatem, quae sunt consubstantiales, coaequales et 
coaevae, se invicem circumincedentes. 
[These powers lead us to the most blessed Trinity itself 
in view of their order, on in and interrelatedness. From 
memory intelligence comes 
forth 
as its offspring, since we 
understand when a likeness which is in the memory leaps 
into the eye of the intellect in the form of a word. From 
memory and intelligence love is breathed forth as their 
mutual bond. These three - the generating mind, the word 
and love - are in the soul as memory, understanding and 
will, which are consubstantial, coequal and coeval, and 
interpenetrate each other. ] (111.5,321/84) 
The first point, that understanding proceeds from memory, is based on the 
notion, previously mentioned, that the mind only understands what is 
present to it in memory. ' When what is present to memory translates 
itself into understanding, it expresses itself in the form of a word. 
Memory and understanding generate love. What is present and known is 
also what is loved, and so love is the 'mutual bond' between the first two 
powers. The generation of these three faculties one from another, a 
generation preceding any action, mirrors the generation of the members of 
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the divine Trinity which is itself non-temporal and prior to the act of 
creation. The fact that the three powers of the mind are nonetheless 
aspects of a single substance or subject reflects the consubstantiality and 
distinction of the three persons which are yet one God. 
Because the mind, for Bonaventure, is itself an image pointing beyond 
itself to God, what is said of God on the basis of it cannot be considered 
as simply a 'subjectivization' of the absolute, and therefore a 'fiction'. 
However, behind all of Bonaventure's descriptions of God and of the 
Trinity, there always stands the consciousness that what is being said 
could never be other than 'according to us' in some way, that any and all 
predicates applied to God are only analogically true. To name God a 
perfect spirit with these and these powers could never be construed here 
as proper definition, as if, through this naming, the 'literal' truth about 
God had been uttered. An utterance of this nature is, with respect to God, 
impossible. As was the case with the relation to God of creatures other 
than man, the immanence of God to the mind is accompanied by a 
simultaneous transcendence. 
The conditions that, -for Bonaventure, form the possibility of 
experience and of the objects of experience do not apply, therefore, to God 
- which does not mean that. God is the thing in itself. The things 
themselves are the particular entities of the phenomenal world. God is 
the noumenal being of which these phenomena are translations, but they are 
real translations, manifold expressions and manifestations of the simple 
being of God. They are therefore copies, images, or representations of 
that being, and reflect it only partially and dimly in their appearance, but 
that appearance is nonetheless a true one, produced by the self- 
translation of the divine, and not the human, subject. Because the human 
subject mirrors the divine one, it understands the translation in reference 
to its source. 
The mode of reflection that reveals mans as an image of God, the 
mode that discovers all entities, including mess, as vestigla dei, is 
contemplation. Near the beginning of Chapter Four of the Itinerarium, 
Bonaventure describes some features of the state in which the human mind 
usually apprehends itself, in which it does not discover God within itself 
and so does not come to understand itself as a sign of God. In describing 
this state, he also suggests, by implication, what differentiates it from 
the mode of self-apprehension proper to contemplation. Solllcitudinlbus 
distracts, distracted by cares and dissolved in them, the human mind is 
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drawn away from itself towards the manifold objects of that care (IV. 1, 
324/87). This constitutes its anxious involvement in the world, where it 
is out of itself and thus, in a sense, estranged from itself. Since the 
objects of care are many, in being drawn towards them, the mind is also 
divided up and pulled apart. To overcome such division, it must recollect 
itself. It must gather up its faculties from their dispersion in the 
manifold objects of its accustomed attention, and concentrate them back 
upon itself. 
It must learn to know itself, to return to itself through 
understanding, and that means to abstract itself from the phantasmata to 
which it adheres through concupiscence. Augustine discusses this point in 
Book 10. viii (11) of De Trinitate; 
Ergo se ipsam quemadmodum quaerat et inueniat, mirabilis 
quaestio est quo tendat ut quaerat aut quo ueniat ut 
inueniat. Quid enim tam in mente quam mens est? Sed 
quia in his est quae cum amore cogitat, sensibilibus autem, 
id est corporalibus, cum amore assuefacta est, non ualet 
sine imaginibus eorum esse in semetipsa. Hinc et oboritur 
erroris dedecus dum rerum sensarum imagines secernere a 
se non potest ut se solam uideat; cohaeserunt enim 
mirabiliter glutino amoris. Et haec est eis immunditia 
quoniam dum se solam nititur cogitare hoc se putat esse 
sine quo se non potest cogitare. Cum Igitur ei preecipitur 
et se ipsam cognoscat, non se tamquam sibi dettracts sit, 
sed id quod sibs addidit detrahat. 
(How the mind may seek and find itself is, therefore, a 
remarkable question: whither does it go in order to seek, 
and whither does it come in order to find? For what is so 
much in the mind as the mind? But because it is in those 
things of which it thinks with' love, and it has grown 
accustomed to -thinking of sensible things, that is, of 
bodies with love, it is incapable of being in itself 
without the images of those things. From this arises its 
shameful error that it can no longer distinguish the 
images of sensible things from itself so as to see itself 
alone. For they have marvelously cohered to it with the 
glue of love, and this is its uncleanness that, while it 
endeavors to think of itself alone, it regards itself as 
being that without which it cannot think of itself. 
When it is, therefore, commanded to know itself, it 
should not seek itself as though it were to be withdrawn 
from itself, but it should rather withdraw what it has 
added to itself. ]' 
To know itself, mens must turn back to itself with desire. It must turn 
its will away from the images which, through its adherence to them, adhere 
to it and then become identified with it. It has drawn these images into 
itself through its attraction to the objects from which they are drawn, 
but wens goes out of itself, out of the purity of its own inwardness, when 
it directs itself towards them: Cum ergo sit mess interior, quodam modo 
exit a semetipsa cum in haec quasi uestigia multarum intentionum exerit 
amoris 'affectum ['As the mind, therefore, Is within, 'it goes in some way 
outside of itself when it directs the affection of its love towards these 
sensible things which leave their footprints, as it were, in our mind 
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because we have thought of them so often']. 9 
Lost in these images, mens confuses its own substance with them, and 
thus comes to understand its own nature in terms of them. To understand 
the truth of its essence, the meaning of itself, mens must first mean 
itself. To think itself per se, it must pull its intention away from all 
that it represents to itself, and intend itself alone. '' It has to unglue 
itself from all that sticks to it through the adhesive power of love or 
intention, and that requires looking away from all particulars towards that 
which comprehends them, towards the self alone. For Bonaventure, this 
looking away and looking towards is a turning inwards of the three 
faculties of the mind, an inversion of memory, intellect and will upon 
themselves. It is concentrated self-reflection, in which the mind detaches 
itself from the objects of reflection in order to focus as profoundly and 
narrowly as possible upon its own reflective processes. What mens finds 
when it concentrates upon itself in this way is not an independent and 
self-sufficient subject, but. rather, its relation to the indwelling God. In 
looking within itself, it looks through itself to the absolute. 
When it is hindered from inspecting itself, on the other hand, it is 
prevented from insight into the source of its comprehension, from insight 
into truth: Videre igitur. per to potes veritatem, quae to docet, si to 
concupiscentlee et phantasmata non impediant et se tanquam pubes inter to 
et veritatis radium non interponant ('You can see, therefore, through 
yourself the truth which teaches you, if your desires and sensory images 
do not hinder you and interpose themselves like clouds between you and the 
rays of truth'] (111.3,319/83). Mens always stands within this truth, and 
the truth of its representations is founded upon it. That truth is 
granted, therefore, not by mens, but by the truth in which it stands. 
Representations, when true. are the creations or the creatures of truth 
itself. They are vestigia del, and in a true representation, what mens 
represents to itself is only what truth represents to it. 
In its usual way of being, mens is deceived and in error (fallitur et 
errat) only because it fails to understand the representation as 
representation, as a translation of truth, though not, it must be 
remembered, as mens' own translation, but as the translation to mens of 
truth itself. Mens wanders in error when, in its everyday mode of 
existing, it accepts image and copy for truth (cum effigiem et simulacrum 
pro veritate acceptat) (111.4,321), because this mode of existing discloses 
beings in such a way that their transcendent ground remains completely 
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hidden, Mens then tends to confuse creature and creator, in that, by 
thinking that it understands beings independently of any transcendent 
ground, it sees the creature as its own ground, not realizing that no 
creature is ever truly comprehensible purely in reference to itself. In 
contemplation, on the other hand, the ground of beings appears, although 
indirectly, and with its appearance it becomes apparent to mens that all 
creatures are in some way related to this ground, and that the truth of 
their being can only be comprehended in terms of that relation. When mens 
then seeks its own truth in self-contemplation, when the mode of revealing 
whose decisive character consists in discovering all things as signs of 
God is turned inwards towards mess, it reveals itself to itself as a 
special kind of sign, an imago dei. 
2. Dasein as Transcendence. 
At the beginning of Sein and Zeit, Heidegger states that the 
intention of this work is the konkrete Ausarbeitung der Frage nach dem 
Sinn von n5eina. No work out the question of the meaning of being and to 
do so concretely'] (SZ, 1). Working out the question of being forms the 
topic of all of Heidegger's works in one way or another. His inquiries are 
always directed by and towards the 'truth' of being, which, in the 
Schelling commentary, he defines as dasjenige, was Seyn in seinem Wesen 
Oberhaupt offen and demzufolge verstehbar macht ('that which makes being 
in its essence open at all and thus comprehensible'] (SA, 110/64). Insofar 
as it is true that jeder Denker denkt nur einen einzigen Gedanken ('every 
thinker thinks one only thought'] (WhD, 20/50), the thought of this truth, 
of the openness, manifestness or comprehensibility of being in its manifold 
determinations, is the one thought around which Heidegger's thinking always 
circles. 
What Heidegger is aware of from the outset, however, is that this 
inquiry already presupposes an understanding of what it seeks, and that 
this prior understanding of being is actually a prerequisite for any act of 
understanding, so that all thinking is, in some sense, the thinking of 
being. Given that each time the 'is, ' or some other modification of being, 
is spoken, there is an unthought reference to being and an implicit 
understanding of it, the understanding of beings always occurs within a 
primordial understanding of being (SZ, 5). 
This primordial understanding of being, moreover, is constitutive for 
the essence of that entity which understands. It belongs to the essential 
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way of being, and therefore to the definition, of Dasein. Dasein Ist in der 
Weise, seiend so etwas wie Sein zu verstehen ('Dasein is in such a way as 
to be something which understands something like being'] (SZ, 17). 
However, Dasein's understanding of being is, proximally and for the most 
part (zunächst und zumeist), pre-ontological and unthematic, a 
'presupposition' in the strongest sense. 
As a presupposition forming the ground of any and all understanding 
of beings, being is, in itself, groundless and transcendent. Dasein does 
not establish its own understanding of being, but always finds itself 
already moving within it, and, since being is always presupposed in every 
act of understanding, Dasein can never step outside being to inspect it as 
an object of understanding. As Helmut Fahrenbach says, 'the understanding 
of being (i. e. the "transcendence") of Dasein ... remains without ground 
(abgr(Indig), ' in that 'temporal-finite Dasein cannot itself be the ground of 
its own being understanding. For the understanding of being ... is only 
possible in an already 'lighted' region, in which beings are cleared in 
their being. Man ... cannot establish this region of 'being open', but 
only relate himself to it; he finds himself always already within it 
beforehand, in so far as he is 'there' and understands beings and himself 
in their being. "' 
On this point, Heidegger explicitly acknowledges his debt to the 
medieval scholastic tradition. In Sein und Zeit, he quotes Aquinas: Illud 
quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cuius intellect us includitur in 
omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit (SZ 3, Summa Theologica, 11, Q. 94, 
art. 2). As pointed out previously, however, for Heidegger, unlike for the 
scholastic tradition that includes Aquinas, being is historical, and appears 
in many lights over the epochs of metaphysics in which it both sends 
itself and holds itself back in itself. But each of these epochs still 
'presupposes' being. Heidegger consistently argues that all metaphysical 
speculation and reasoning already moves within the understanding of being 
in which being is lit up, so that being itself, as what is presupposed in 
every metaphysical interpretation of beings, is the ground of metaphysics 
that remains unthought by metaphysics. Thus, in the 'Introduction' to Was 
ist Metaphysik? he claims: 
Wie auch immer das Seiende ausgelegt werden mag, ob als 
Geist Im Sinne des Spiritualismus, ob als Stoff und Kraft 
im Sinne des Materialismus, ob als Werden und Leben, ob 
als Vorstellung, ob als Wille, ob als Substanz, ob als 
Subjekt, ob als Energeia, ob als ewige Wiederkehr des 
Gleichen, jedesmal erscheint das Seiende als Seiendes im 
Lichte dec Seins. 
Überall 
hat sich, wenn die Metaphysik 
das Seiende vorstellt, Sein gelichtet. 
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[In whatever manner beings are interpreted - whether as 
spirit, after the fashion of spiritualism; or as matter and 
force, after the fashion of materialism; or as becoming and life, or idea, will, substance, subject, or energeia, or as 
the eternal recurrence of the same events - every time, beings as beings appear in the light of being. Wherever 
meta hysics represents beings, being has entered into the 
light. ] (WM, 7-8/207) 
The 'clearing' of being is always there beforehand in every metaphysical 
representation of beings, and because metaphysics, in thinking about 
beings, must always remain inside the circle of this clearing, it cannot 
think the clearing itself. Metaphysics cannot, therefore, question its own 
ground, and any thinking that seeks to experience the ground of 
metaphysics, the revelation of being within which all understanding occurs, 
must in a sense leave metaphysics behind (WM, 9/208). 
When Bonaventure speaks of the mind's transcendental grasp of being, 
and of the eternal light in which the mind grasps whatever it grasps with 
clarity, he has himself, in a way, left metaphysics behind. This grasp and 
this light cannot be turned into an object of which true propositions are 
asserted, since all true saying already has its life, movement and being 
within it. All true saying presupposes it and dwells inside of it. 
Bonaventure claims that this understanding of being obscurely refers to 
God in referring to something beyond the mind. Heidegger would agree that 
it refers to 'something' transcending Dasein, although he would certainly 
not acquiesce in the hypostatization of that 'something' into a 
transcendent personal entity, insofar as that is what Bonaventure means. 
In Sein and Zeit, the way Dasein presupposes being is also the way it 
presupposes truth. For Heidegger, truth is, primordially, uncovering. It 
is unconcealing and disclosing, the wresting of beings from hiddenness (SZ, 
222). As such, it is a way of being of that entity which is in the world 
in such a way as to disclose world and beings. It is a way of being of 
Dasein, and Dasein is then itself primordial disclosure, or truth (SZ, 220). 
Directed towards innerworldly beings, Dasein reveals them in their being, 
and this revelation of being is truth. Therefore, the locus of being, the 
'place' wherein being comes to light, and the locus of truth, defined as 
the uncovering and coming to presence of being, are one and the same - 
namely, Dasein. Insofar as it moves within an understanding of being, 
then, Dasein ist »in der Wahrheit« ['Dasein is "in the truth"'] (SZ, 221). It 
follows that truth only is as long as Dasein is, but that does not mean 
that Dasein either fabricates truth or constructs the being of entities. 
It means only that, since truth is manifestation, it cannot come to be 
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before the appearance of the entity whose essence is constituted as being 
manifesting (SZ, 226). 
Mit der Entdecktheit des Seienden, though, zeigt sich dieses gerade 
als das Seiende, das vordem schon war ('once entities have been uncovered, 
they show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were'], 
since so zu entdecken, ist the Seinsart der »Wahrheit(« ('such uncovering is 
the kind of being which belongs to "truth"'] (SZ, 227). When Augustine 
says that before truth is discovered it abides in itself, he is speaking 
out of this experience of truth, where things are revealed as having been, 
and having been so and so, before their revelation. For Augustine, this 
being, rather than either being manifesting or being manifest, is truth, 
and so, for him, truth, as the truth of the way things are, including the 
way things have been, can be unmanifest or hidden, resting 'in itself' (in 
se) outside discovery. 
What Heidegger observes, however, is that the abiding in itself 
beforehand of truth, the independence of truth, can itself only be 
discovered on the basis of the revelation of truth, and so, again, in 
relation to the entity which reveals truth. While maintaining the 
independence of truth, Heidegger points out, in Gelassenheit, that the 
Unabhängigkeit der Wahrheit vam Menschen ist offenkundig doch eine 
Beziehung zum Menschenwesen ('evidently truth's independence from man is a 
relation to human nature'], in that the Wahrheit kann ... unabhängig vom 
Menschen wesen only because der Mensch ist der in das Wesen der Wahrheit 
Gebrauchte ('truth's nature can come forth independently of man' only 
because 'man is he who is made use of for the nature of truth'] (0,63- 
4/84-5). This also means, though, that, as the one who is made use of by 
truth for the coming to presence of truth, man is never its ultimate 
source. The nature of the most authentic and rigorous kind of thinking, 
the kind that undertakes to discover the nature of truth, consists in the 
Entschlossenheit zur wesenden Wahrheit ('a resolve for the coming forth of 
truth's nature'] (G, 59/81). It never amounts to a primary originating of 
this nature. 
In spite of the fact that they conceive the being of truth in a 
somewhat different way, truth is, for Heidegger as much as for Augustine 
and Bonaventure, a matter of discovering rather than creating. Dasein does 
not spin truth out of itself, although alle Wahrheit Is gemäß deren 
wesenhaften daseinsmäßigen Seinsart relativ auf das Sein des Daseins 
('because the kind of being that is essential to truth is of the character 
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of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein's being']. The way of being of 
truth, as revealing, is always essentially 'according to Dasein' 
(daseinsmäßig), because truth comes into being only with the being of 
Dasein, and its being is therefore dependent upon that of Dasein. But this 
is by no means equal to saying that truth is 'subjective' in the sense of 
Hin das Belieben des Subjekts gestellt« ("'left to the subject's 
discretion"']. On the contrary, this way of being that Dasein essentially 
is (i. e. being-uncovering, which is truth) bringt das entdeckende Dasein vor 
das Seiende selbst ('brings the uncovering Dasein face to face with the 
entities themselves']. In discovering, Dasein sets entities free into their 
own being, and that setting free is, truth, but what these entities are, 
what they are set free into, is not constituted by Dasein. For this 
reason, the »Allgemeingtlltigkeit« der Wahrheit ('the "universal validity" of 
truth'], while lediglich darin verwurzelt, daß Dasein Seiendes an ihm selbst 
entdecken und freigeben kann ('rooted solely in the fact that Dasein can 
uncover entities in themselves and free them'], is not lessened by the fact 
that the event of truth is founded upon the event of Dasein. Wird die 
rechtverstandene Wahrheit dadurch im mindesten angetastet, daß sie ontisch 
nur im »Subjekt« möglich ist und mit dessen Sein steht und fällt? ('If 
truth has been correctly understood, is it in the least impaired by the 
fact that it is ontically possible only in the "subject" and that it stands 
and falls with the being of that "subject"? '] (SZ, 227). 
The essence of truth, then, belongs to the essence of Dasein, since 
both come to presence together with Seinsverständnis: Although this means 
that being is there only as long as Dasein is, since Dasein is the clearing 
or space in which being and beings are lit up, and so the locus of the 
truth of being, it does not mean either that Dasein creates being, or even 
that it in any way commands being to reveal itself. Fahrenbach notes that: 
The understanding of being (in Sein und Zeit) is in no 
case something like a 'power' of Dasein, with which it 
directs itself towards 'being' and 'achieves' the 
understanding of it. Rather, the understanding of being 
in each case already forms the basis of Dasein as a fact 
and makes Dasein itself possible; it is the fundamental 
occurrence, in which Dasein is, but over which it does not 
'dispose'. (p. 106) 
Indeed, according to the later Heidegger, Dasein as clearing is itself 
'sent' by Sein. The Da of Dasein is the space being clears for itself in 
order to reveal itself, in order to be there Heidegger makes this point 
in the Humanism usbrief, while correcting any possible misinterpretation of 
Sein und Zeit in this regard: 
Aber ist nicht in «S. u. Z» (S. 212), wo das «es gibt» zur Sprache kommt, gesagt: «Nur solange Dasein ist, gibt es 
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Sein»? Allerdings. Das bedeutet: nur solange die Lichtung 
des Seins sich ereignet, übereignet sich Sein dem Menschen. Daß aber das Da, die Lichtung als Wahrheit des Seins 
selbst, sich ereignet, ist die Schickung des Seins selbst. Dieses ist das Geschick der Lichtung. Der Satz bedeutet 
aber nicht: das Dasein des Menschen im überlieferten 
Sinne von existentia, und neuzeitlich gedacht als die Wirklichkeit des ego cogito, sei dasjenige Seiende, wodurch 
das Sein erst geschaffen werde. Der Satz sagt nicht, das 
Sein sei ein Produkt des Menschen. In der Einleitung zu 
«S, u. Z. » (S. 38) steht einfach und klar und sogar im 
Sperrdruck: «Sein ist das transzendens schlechthin», 
[But does not Being and Time say on p. 212, where the 
'there is/it gives' comes to language, 'Only so long as 
Dasein is, is there bein '? To be sure. It means that 
only so long as the lighting of being comes to pass does 
being convey itself to man. But the Tact that the Da, the 
lighing as the truth of being itself, comes to pass is the 
dispensation of being itself. This is the destiny of the lighting. But the sentence does not mean that the Dasein 
of man in the traditional sense of existentia, and thought 
in modern philosophy as the actuality of the ego cogito, is 
that being through which being is first fashioned. The 
sentence does not say that being is the product of man. 
The 'Introduction' to Being and Time says simply and 
clearly, even in italics 'being is the transzendens pure 
and simple'. ] (Hb, 83/216) 
Thus, the 'there' of 'being-there' is something sent (Geschick) by the 
sending (Schickung) of being, and what is: sent in the Da, the clearing of 
being, is being itself.. The Da is the lighting up of being, in which being 
lights itself up. In a sense, it is being, in that it is a clearing 
provided by being for itself and within itself, but it is also different 
from being itself in that it is a mode of, being, a kind of being, namely, 
being-there. Dasein is, therefore, a reflection of being in which being 
mirrors itself to' itself, and which comes to be through an act of 
providing on the part of being itself. Far from Dasein's creating being, 
and so projecting it In its own image, Dasein is itself a projection of 
being, a clearing whose 'mission' is to reflect being. 
For Bonaventure, that mess is an image of God and mirror of the the 
world means that it grasps the way things are in their eternal and 
unchanging order, where understanding that order means grasping the fixed 
logic of things. God is revealed in this logic, and is this logic. 
Heidegger questions both the notion of any eternal and unchanging order, 
and the supremacy of logic in determining the truth of what-is. However, 
it is still the case that insofar as the lighting of the Da reflects the 
truth of being in its various manifestations, it in some way reveals the 
order in which and according to which being manifests itself in beings. 
As a clearing in which truth comes to be, Dasein, too, reflects the 
organization or logos of Sein, the 'logic' of being in its appearing. 
Reflection does not mean here the representation of something 'inside' 
which then agrees with something 'outside', and the truth of logic does 
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not, consequently, reside in the agreement between the organization of a 
thinking subject's thought and the structure of an 'external reality'. 
Rather, logos, according to Heidegger, is primarily ein bestimmter Modus 
des Sehenlassens ('a definite mode of letting something be seen'] (SZ, 33). 
As discourse (Rede), it has the structure of apophansis, Offenbarmachens Im 
Sinne des aufweisenden Sehenlassens ('making manifest in the sense of 
letting something be seen by pointing it out'] (SZ. 32), and because of 
this meaning it can also have the structural form of synthesis (SZ, 33). 
The syntheses belonging to logos, and so the logical syntheses expressed 
in the mode of discourse having the form of proposition or assertion, 
reveal by letting what is spoken about be seen in its connection, its being 
together with, something else. To reveal the thing in this connection with 
something means to let it be seen as what it is. 
Such synthesizing projects an order of being, but in doing so, it does 
not manufacture an order into which it then shoves beings, but discovers 
the order, the logos, according to which beings are placed together, and 
through which being is structured. It is systematic in an authentic sense, 
in which the Greek synistemi, 'I put together', from which the word 'system' 
is derived, means: 
Ich füge in eine Ordnung derart, daß nicht nur Vorhandenes 
und Vorkommendes nach einem schon vorhandenen Netz von 
Stellen verteilt und darin untergebracht wird - etwa so, 
wie die Glasscheibe In einen fertigen Fensterrahmen 
eingeschoben wird -, sondern füge in eine Ordnung derart, 
daß dabei die'Ordnung selbst erst entworfen wird. Dieser 
ntwurf ist aber, wenn er ein echter ist, nicht nur ein Überwurf 
über die Dinge, etwas ihnen nur Aufgestülptes, 
sondern der echte -Entwurf wirft das Seiende so 
auseinander, daß es nun gerade in der Einheit seines 
eigensten Gefüges sichtbar wird ... 
(I order things in such a way that not only is what is 
present and occurring distributed and preserved according 
o an already existent network of places - for example, 
the way the windowpane is inserted into a completed 
windowframe - but order in such a way that the order 
itself is thereby first projected. But this projection, if 
it is genuine, is not only thrown over things, not only 
dumped on top of them. A genuine projection throws beings 
apart in such a way that they precisely now become visible 
in the unity of their inmost jointure ... ] (SA, 45/25) 
This passage from the Schelling commentary suggests that a genuine 
projection does not construct being, but uncovers the outlines of being's 
construction or design, its 'architectural blueprint' (Entwurf). It thus 
reveals the structure of being (SeinsgefUge), the way being is put 
together or 'jointed'. 
Heidegger is explicating Schelling here, while his own thought, and 
especially his later thought, attempts to overcome this notion of a 
'system' with a fixed logic. Whereas Bonaventure does. see the truth of 
187 
being as somehow 'systematic', as fixed and ordered within the eternal and 
exemplary art of God, Heidegger thinks of it as changing over time. For 
Bonaventure, then, there is one right sketch, one Entwurf, as it were, 
while, for Heidegger, there are many possible ones, many ways in which the 
being of beings may be ordered, and 'logic' in the narrow sense is itself 
only one kind of ordering. But, in the Beiträge, Heidegger notes that any 
such projection, any Seynsentwurf, is actually ultimately projected by 
being and through Dasein (B, 304). It is the projection of the truth of 
being, and being, not Dasein, is its true source. Such a projection is then 
not arbitrary, but is, Heidegger says, the highest necessity, although not 
in the sense of logical sequence (B, 324). 
If, after all, the Da of Dasein is sent by being to reveal being, and 
such revealing is Dasein's mission and destiny, then the sketches according 
to which Dasein projects the order of being must, when they are 
authentically revealing, also be projects of being. They therefore do not 
create being, but, as modes of revealing, modes of truth, they are modes of 
being's lighting itself up to human being. The Humanism usbrief says of 
this process of lighting up: 
Sein lichtet sich dem Menschen im ekstatischen Entwurf. 
Doch dieser Entwurf schafft nicht das Sein. Überdies aber ist der Entwurf wesenhaft ein geworfener. 
Das Werfende im Entwerfen ist nicht der Mensch, sondern 
das Sein selbst, das den Menschen in die Ek-sistenz des 
Da-seins als sein Wesen schickt. Dieses Geschick ereignet 
sich als die Lichtung des Seins, als welche es ist. Sie 
gewährt die Nähe sum Sein. In dieser. Nähe, In der 
Lichtung des «Da», wohnt der Mensch als der Ek-sistierende, 
ohne daß er es heute schon vermag, dieses Wohnen eigens 
zu erfahren und zu übernehmen. 
(Being illumines itself for man in the ecstatic 
projection. But this projection does not create being. 
Moreover, the projection is essentially a thrown 
projection. What throws in projection is not man but being 
itself which sends man into the ek-sistence of Da-sein 
that Is his essence. This destiny comes to pass as the 
lighting of being, as which it is. The lightingg grants 
nearness to being. In this nearness, in the light Tg of 
the Da, dwells man as the ek-sisting one without yet being 
able properly to experience and take over this dwelling. ] 
(Hb, 84/217) 
Projection is 'ecstatic' in that it projects beyond itself and stands 
outside itself. The projecting 'agent' is being, and it sends human being, 
in projecting, into the standing outside that causes to appear, into ek- 
"sistence as the essence of Dasein. Such a sending occurs, then, as the 
event of the clearing or lighting (Lichtung) of being, as Dasein. In this 
event, human being is placed in a proximity to being in which it always 
lives, without necessarily being explicitly aware of it, without travelling 
through it in thought and overtaking it as its own. 
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If, then, 'logic', in a broad and original sense, is a projection that 
orders beings in a certain way and thus uncovers them as what they are, 
i. e, in their being, that project belongs originally to being itself. It is 
projected by being as understanding, a mode of being-there (Dasein), and 
this project appropriates human being into its revealing. Originally, 
therefore, logic, as letting be seen, is a mode of revealing, a mode of 
truth. Just as, according to the secondary meaning of truth, 'true' also 
refers to what Is revealed, so logos can also refer to das Aufgezeigte als 
solches ('that which is exhibited, as such'] (SZ, 34). What is primarily 
logical is Dasein; secondarily, what Dasein reveals in logical ordering, in 
letting something be seen in its togetherness with something else. 
To say that what is revealed by understanding is logical in a 
secondary sense is then not to say that the understanding or ordering of 
Dasein is its source. The reverse is actually true, in that what evokes 
the understanding of Dasein, what calls forth thinking, including 
representing and ordering, is the thing itself, the 'voice' of being as the 
logos, the 'word' in which and according to which being is gathered 
together and revealed. This voice or word, the principle (which is not 
necessarily 'logical' in the narrow sense) according to which beings are 
structured or 'articulated', and so in and through which being 'speaks' 
itself, evokes the response of Dasein as thought and speech. 
In the case of a representation, for instance, what is primary is not 
a picture in the head that substitutes for something, nor a sound that 
arbitrarily signifies something. The picture and the sound stand in place 
of something, and thus do re-present it, but what is primordial in that 
representation is standing before the thing and being presented to it, and 
its corresponding being presented to and standing before. In Was heißt 
Denken, Heidegger says: 
Wir stehen ... z. B. vor einem blühenden Baum - und der Baum steht vor uns. Er stellt sich uns vor. Der Baum und 
wir stellen uns einander vor, indem der Baum dasteht und 
wir ihm gegenüber stehen. In die Beziehung zueinander - 
voreinander gestellt, sind der Baum und wir. Bei diesem 
Vorstellen handelt es sich also nicht um »Vorstellungen«, 
die in unserem Kopf herumschwirren ... Wir stellen uns 
einem Baum gegenüber, vor ihn, und der Baum stellt sich 
uns vor. Wer stellt hier eigentlich vor? Der Baum oder 
wir? Oder beide? Oder keiner von beiden? Wir stellen 
uns, so wie wir sind, nicht bloß mit dem Kopf oder mit dem 
Bewußtsein, dem blühenden Baum gegenüber, und der Baum 
stellt sich uns vor als der, der er ist. 
C. we stand before a tree in bloom, for example - and the tree stands before us. The tree faces us. The tree 
and we meet one another, as the tree stands there and we 
stand face to face with it. As we are in this relation of 
one to the other and before the other, the tree and we 
are. This face-to-face meeting is not, then, one of these 'ideas' buzzing about in our heads ... We come and stand 
189 
facing a tree, before it, and the tree faces, meets us. 
Which one is meeting here? The tree, or we? Or both? Or 
neither? We come and stand - just as we are, and not 
merely with our head or our consciousness - facing the 
tree in bloom, and the tree faces, meets us as the tree it 
is. ] (WhD, 16-7/42) 
Heidegger is listening, in this passage, to a number of echoes produced by 
the word Vorstellen, its meaning as introduction or meeting, as 
representing and relating, and, most literally, as simply 'placing before' 
(Vor-stellen). This placing before, in which something is set before us 
and we are set before it, is the primordial meeting and the primary 
relation, the primary correspondence at the root of representation. 
Since, moreover, the thing that stands before is a revelation of 
being, in which the phainomenon presents itself to the uncovering of 
Dasein, a 'true' representation, one which is angemessen (a term Heidegger 
uses frequently in Sein and Zeit), is, as a response to being's presenting 
of itself by coming into the open, a re-presenting of being in which being 
corresponds to itself and relates itself to itself. The truth of a 
representation is, therefore, granted and sustained by being, since being 
is itself that which is presented and represented in that representation. 
When representations are organized in a certain way to reveal order, 
either gathered together in the unifying unity of at concept or arranged 
within the articulative structure of a sentence, it is then not a matter of 
something occurring 'in the head' according to a set of laws that determine 
the mental conduct 'of an isolated entity, but of an understanding which, in 
its correspondence to what is as it is, discovers the correspondences that 
hold between the things that are, and allows them to lie forth as what 
they are. The verb corresponding to the noun logos is legein; in Was heißt 
Denken? Heidegger translates, and so interprets, legein as Vorliegenlessen 
['to let lie before us'] (WhD, 123/202). Original speech (legein as Sagen), 
in which unifying and arranging 'first' occurs, is then: gesammelt- 
sammelndes beisammen-vor-lieges-Lassen ['a letting-lie-together-before 
which gathers and is gathered'] (Logos, VA III, 9/64). 
Human speech is not the most original speaking of the logos. It is a 
response to the logos, a response to the silent speaking which is the 
articulation of being, the principle of structure according to which what- 
is is put together as a differentiated unity. The discovery of this 
articulation is the revelation of beings in their being, and that is truth 
and understanding. It is correspondence. Dasein is capable of such 
understanding in so far as it is already in correspondence with being, 
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where correspondence, Entsprechen" heißt ...: be-stimmt sein, etre 
dispose, nämlich vom Sein des Seienden her. Dis-pose bedeutet hier 
wörtlich: auseinander-gesetzt, gelichtet and dadurch in the Bezüge zu dem 
versetzt, was ist ('being de-termined, Ore dispose by that which comes 
from the being of beings. Dis-pose here means literally set-apart, 
cleared, and thereby set, placed in relationship with what is. '] (WP, 76-7). 
The speech of Dasein, in which Dasein articulates being - that is to say, 
articulates the articulation of being as a response to primordial logos - 
is determined not by human being but by being. It is a project of being, 
and only for this reason does it correspond to being. 
'Logic', understood in the above sense, 'maps' the structure of being 
through this essential correspondence. It 'mirrors' the structure of being, 
to which it responds and corresponds, since it is this structure itself 
which evokes logic. Language is primordially the logos, the way being is 
articulated, structured, put together, gathered up and jointed, and 
secondarily human speech, occurring as a response to this speaking of 
being. Dasein reflects the logos insofar as it is the the place where the 
structure of being is unconcealed, where being reflects itself to itself. 
The logos is therefore dependent upon Dasein, but only as a locus. Logic, 
as language, the speaking (articulation) of being, appropriates Dasein, and 
not the other way around. 
Truly 'logical' thinking is then by its very nature in correspondence 
with being, since it corresponds to what calls it forth, namely, to the 
articulation of being, the logos that evokes the word and the sentence. 
Being is, ultimately, what calls for thinking and what calls forth thinking 
(was heißt Denken) in all of its forms. Being is the final 'to be thought' 
(zu-Bedenkende) and the most originally thought-provoking Was 
Bedenklichste). Thinking occurs as a response to being, and is determined 
by being as that which presents itself to be thought, thus forming the 
first and last subject matter of any inquiring after beings. Moreover, 
since being is what is projected in thinking, and thinking is itself a way 
of being, being is also what thinking is called. Thinking is always the 
thinking of being, in a twofold sense, in that being is what gives itself 
to be thought, and being is what gives itself in thought: esse est 
intelligere, where the est is an essential belonging-together. Thinking is 
the free gift of being, and being is, in every sense, the ultimate referent 
of thinking, and yet, although every analysis of thinking, as a way of 
being definitive for Dasein and constituting the essence of Dasein, leads 
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to being, being is itself, in itself, unthinkable. The ultimate referent of 
thinking, which is also the ultimate referent of Dasein, is transcendent. 
Given these points, there are a number of ways that Bonaventure's 
pre-critical position and Heidegger's post-critical one can be seen to 
meet. In the first place, and most basically, Heidegger, like Bonaventure, 
'accepts' the 'truth' of that which is clear. This is not to say that, for 
Heidegger, there are such and such principles or facts that are indubitably 
certain and eternally true, but only that what originally comes to light 
within the clearing of Dasein, viz. a phenomenon, is not an appearance that 
only seems, but is that which shows itself from itself just as it is (see 
SZ, 28-31). The phenomenon then has a certain kind of 'self-evidence'. 
This form of evidence is actually always prior to both doubt and certainty. 
It is an original self-presenting, a coming into the open in which the 
phenomenon makes itself evident by coming to meet the one for whom it is 
evident. Such 'self-evidence' is original manifestation and original 
truth. It forms the basis for truth as correspondence between 
representation and thing. Truth, understood in this way, is a 
presupposition of Dasein; it is presupposed along with the essence of 
Dasein. It could not be genuinely 'doubted' except by annihilating Dasein 
altogether. Thus, there is apodicticty, and therefore truth, insofar as, 
and as long as, there is Dasein. In a sense, then, Augustine is right to 
say that anyone who doubts still has a limit to his doubt because he at 
least knows this one truth, that he doubts. But, in the light of 
Heidegger's analysis, this does not reduce to the correctness of a true 
propostion - 'I doubt' - but to that self-disclosedness of Dasein which 
presupposes truth in such a way as to be prior to any proposition that 
might be understood and called true. 
This original self-disclosedness constitutes the essence of Dasein as 
Lichtung, and in the Beiträge, Heidegger says that if truth consists in 
this kind of Lichtung, it is not possible to ask about the truth of this 
truth (B, 327). However, while Heidegger admits here that there is 
something appropriate in the original interpretation of this primordial 
manifestness as 'light', which he recognizes is only an analogy, he also 
says that this interpretation does not maintain the sense of 'openness' 
contained in the term Lichtung (B, 339-40). But whether this Lichtung is 
conceived as a lighting or as an open clearing, it is still a region in 
which what-is is unconcealed, in which beings are lit up, or step into the 
open. In either case, the point remains that the lighting does not light 
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itself, that the clearing does not clear itself, and that this space is too 
primordial to be questioned. It simply 'occurs' with the understanding of 
being, where this understanding is granted and not created or manufactured 
by a human 'subject'. All truth is then granted by this occurrence, not 
secured by the subject, but given by something the subject can never get 
into its grasp. 
Because what is granted determines the nature of the clearing as a 
whole, the 'laws' that bind thinking and what is thought are, for Heidegger 
as for Bonaventure, one and the same, so that the 'logic' of the space in 
which things appear and the logic of what appears is necessarily the some. 
This logic does not, for Heidegger, consist in the 'rules of logic', as 
ordinarily understood. It is not a matter of there being eternal, 
immutable and universally applicable laws which can be articulated once 
and for all. It is, rather, that what regulates the order of thinking and 
of what-is transcends the process of thought, and cannot itself be 
transcended. Its influence is visible, obscurely and enigmatically, but it 
is not itself visible in such a way that it could be brought under the 
rule of concepts and propositions. 
Of course, as has already been said, Heidegger does not accept a 
fixed exemplarity according to which things are ordered. Things are 
ordered according to an Entwurf, but the Entwurf is not determined as 
precisely this, and from all eternity. Many sketches are possible, and 
these vary across' history and across cultures. But, as Heidegger 
repeatedly makes clear, the projected order according to which beings are 
arranged is not therefore an arbitrary construct on the part of the 
subject. It responds and corresponds, in each instance and in its own 
particular and finite way, to the order of being. The 'productive logic' 
that brings about a new way of understanding the being of beings is still, 
ultimately, produced by being because it comes to be according to the 
'logic' or 'speaking' of being. There are many possible perspectives, but 
the possibility of Dasein's having anything like a perspective is 
nonetheless determined by its standing within the original light of being, 
its being structured by the structure of being. It is this that gives 
Dasein its 'vision': Das Sehen bestimmt sich nicht aus dem Auge, sondern 
aus der Lichtung des Seins. Die Inständigkeit in ihr ist das Gefüge aller 
menschlichen Sinne ['Seeing is determined, not by the eye, but by the 
lighting of being. Presence within the lighting articulates all the human 
senses'] (Hw, 332/26). 
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What is intuitively given in this vision, the 'matter', as it were, is 
not, for Heidegger, any pure data that could be described independently of 
a form added later on, nor is it a substance whose laws of formation can 
be set down once and for all. The 'bare substance' of what is given, in 
fact, is determined by history and tradition. It can be reformed and 
transformed, but the tradition that presents it as such has a kind of 
erring necessity which resists new formations. On the other hand, neither 
the original formations, nor their subsequent reformations and 
transformations, are arbitrary. Human language is an echo of the speaking 
of being and what is mysterious is how human beings can hear this 
speaking in such a way as to correspond to it at all. Put simply, it is 
true that things may be sliced up in many ways, that the definitions of 
things are not fixed, but the decisions about these definitions are 
nonetheless not made ex nihilo. They somehow 'fit' the phenomena, and the 
speaking of being is, for Heidegger, what 'regulates' this fitting. The 
capacity to hear this speaking, then, this original articulation, is what 
lets anyone know whether or not an original word is appropriate, whether 
or not it 'fits' what calls it forth. This capacity 'cannot itself be 
justified, for it forms both the end and the basis of all justification. 
So far, Heidegger's analysis of the transcendental nature of thinking 
has been discussed in terms of logic and truth, in terms of understanding 
as intellection. As a mode of thinking, such understanding is a gift of 
being. In this gift, being grants itself to thought, and through it 
thought points back to being as its original source. In Heidegger's 
conception of memory (Gedächtnis) in Was heißt Denken?, there is a similar 
pointing back to a source that is more original than any human faculty. 
Primordial memory, in which what is to be thought is gathered together and 
recalled, is not primarily a human capacity, a human capability or faculty 
(Vermögen). The search for the essence of memory, that which is memory in 
a most original and originative sense, the source of memory, leads beyond 
human being to a region in which human being as a being possessed of 
memory already dwells. This region is presupposed with human being. In 
it, all that is to be thought and is thinkable lies collected, stored, and 
hidden in a preeminent way (WhD, 97/150). 
In this gathering together and keeping, all that is to be thought is 
kept safe, and it emerges from this safekeeping (Verwahrnis) as a gift 
freely given (WhD, 97/151). Human recall points to and indicates this 
keeping, insofar as it is discovered as already inhabiting it. Here, what 
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evokes thought, what, in every instance, gives itself to and in thought is 
preserved as true (wahr), and the essential ground (Wesensgrund) of memory 
is this keeping in which the true is protected and kept in secret. Memory, 
thought in its essence, is the keeping in safety of the true, and the being 
true of what is kept in safety (die Wahr, das Wahrende) (WhD, 97). It is 
the keeping of what calls for, calls forth, and is called thinking, being. 
Memory is the preserve of being and truth. As human being only inhabits 
being and truth, and does not invent them, so: Der Mensch be-wohnt nur 
die Verwahrnis dessen, was ihm zu denken gibt. Der Mensch erzeugt die 
Verwahrnis nicht ('Man only inhabits the keeping of what gives him food 
for thought - he does not create the keeping'] (WhD, 97/151). 
What-is kept in the keeping as what is most thought-provoking, then, 
is being, and when what is thus kept gives itself to thought, the issue is 
knowledge. Therefore, das Wissen ist das Gedächtnis des Seins ('knowledge 
is remembrance of being'] (Hw, 344/36). Being is not the objectivity of 
objects; it is presencing. The way presencing is bound together with 
Gedanke ('thought'] is suggested by the original meaning of the Old High 
German word gidanc, »»der Gedanc«, which is: das Gemüt, das Herz, den 
Herzensgrund, jenes Innerste des Menschen, des am weitesten nach außen ins 
Äuserste reicht und dies so entschieden, daß es, recht bedacht, die 
Vorstellung eines Innen und Außen nicht aufkommen 1äßt ('man's inmost mind, 
the heart, the heart's core, that innermost essence of man which reaches 
outward most fully and to the outermost limits, and so decisively that, 
rightly considered, the idea of an inner and an outer world does not 
arise'] (WhD, 157/144). In this ground of the heart, all that is of concern 
to human being, all that approaches and touches the essence of human 
being, is gathered together: Der Gedanc, der Herzensgrund ist the 
Versammlung alles dessen, was uns angeht, was uns anlangt, woran uns 
liegt, uns, insofern wir als Menschen sind ('The thane the heart's core, is 
the gathering of all that concerns us, all that we care for, all that 
touches us insofar as we are, as human beings'] (WhD, 157/144). 
Because this original gathering determines and preserves what reaches 
and touches human beings, it is the origin of what comes to presence and 
is held in presence. As such, it is co-essential with the mean-ing of 
love: 
Im anfänglichen Wort »der Gedanc« waltet das ursprüngliche 
Wesen des Gedächtnisses: die Versammlung des unablässigen 
Meinens alles dessen, was das Gemüt anwesen laßt. Meinen 
ist hier in der Bedeutung von minne verstanden: die ihrer 
selbst nicht mächtige und darum auch nicht notwendig erst 
eigens zu vollziehende Zuneigung des innersten Sinnens des 
Gemüts nach dem Wesenden. 
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[The on inary word 'thane' is imbued with the original 
nature of memory: the gatherin of the constant intention 
of everything that the hear holds in present bein 
Intention here is understood in the sense of the OId German word for 'love': the inclination with which the 
inmost meditation of the heart turns towards all that is 
in being - the inclination that is not within its own 
control and therefore also need not necessarily be first 
enacted as such. ] (WhD, 93/141) 
Memory, knowledge and love, then, co-define the essence of human being, as 
they do for Augustine and Bonaventure, and this essence points beyond 
itself to the presencing of what is present, to the being of beings. This 
presencing is not, for Heidegger, the simple presentness of a nunc stans. 
It is not 'eternity' as Bonaventure conceives it, or seems to conceive it. 
It does, however, have a certain kind of simplicity, unity, and steadiness, 
inasmuch as it is the simultaneity of presencing in the three dimensions 
of time. In the Schelling commentary, as was pointed out in the last 
chapter, Heidegger considers such simultaneity to be the genuine essence 
of eternity. 
Heidegger actually always implies, even in his early works, that 
human existence in some way points beyond itself. In Sein and Zeit, 
Dasein, insofar as it is an essentially futural being, is always already 
transcending, has always already crossed over beyond itself. It is 
projected beyond itself towards what it can be, towards its own 
potentiality-for-being, and this projection in which Dasein is already away 
from itself (sich schon vorweg) is a constitutive element of its ek- 
sistence or transcendence (SZ, 199). While each-individual Dasein exists 
towards its own concrete possibilities, Dasein per se has no possibilities 
in particular. '.: It is, rather, pure empty intention, a pure want of being. 
And what it wants, ultimately, is - well, inquietum cor est nostrum ... 
But insofar as the existence of Dasein is essentially care, what 
Dasein ultimately wants, which is also that to which it ultimately refers, 
can never come to pass as something that has been achieved. What stands 
at the limit of Seinkönnen is, rather, Dasein's 'absolute future'. 1: 0 This is 
because, in that Dasein is always being completed and perfected, its 
meaning is always in the process of being fulfilled, where that fulfilment, 
given the kind of being that Dasein has, is accomplished by care. 
Commenting on a sentence of Senecas, unius bonum natura perficit, dei 
scilicet, alterius curd, hominis ['the good of the one, namely God, is 
fulfilled by his nature; but that of the other, man, is fulfilled by care'], 
Heidegger adds: Die perfectio des Menschen, des Werden zu dem, was er in 
seinem Freisein fUr seine eigensten Möglichkeiten (dem Entwurf) sein kann, 
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Ist eine »Leistung« der »Sorgem ('Man's perfectio - his transformation into 
that which he can be in being-free for his ownmost possibilities 
(projection) - is "accomplished" by "care"']. Human being is per-fected, 
brought to completion and made whole, through care. Care, as a being 
towards possibilities, a projection and realization of them, constitutes 
man's self-achieving, and it is the Seinsart ... the seinen zeitlichern 
Wandel in der Welt durchherrscht ['the kind of being which dominates his 
temporal sojourn in the world, and does so through and through'] (SZ, 199). 
This way of being is essential to human being in that it distinguishes it 
from any other kind of being, not only from God, but from animals as well. 
As Roussseau points out, one very specific capability separating 1'homme et 
1'animal is: 'the capacity for self-perfection, a capacity which, with the 
aid of circumstances, develops in succession all the other capacities, and 
resides among us as much in the species as in the individual'. " 
Since care is essential to and definitive for the existence of Dasein, 
and since the primary element in it is a being towards the 'can be', it is 
a process of perfecting where the self is still being achieved, and so 
where it is, to some extent, always not yet achieved and not yet complete. 
If completion is taken to mean a state where there is nothing left to 
achieve, a state in which Dasein has been, and is, all that it can be, then 
it is not compatible with the being of Dasein as care. From the 
perspective of this notion of completion, it is apparent that, as long as 
Dasein, as care, exists, there always remains something outstanding in its 
account. As long as Dasein is possible, and that means as long as Dasein 
is, as ek-sisting, it is noch nicht ('not yet'], so that this noch nicht 
belongs to its fundamental constitution (SZ, 236). As long as Dasein is 
in time, and therefore changing, it is exchanging its possibilities, and so 
throughout its zeitlicher Wandel, its temporal change, its account remains 
open and no final reckoning can be given of it. 
If perfection is seen not as a way of being towards the possible but 
as having no more possibilities of being because they have all already 
been, Dasein is always imperfect, always incomplete, always still on the 
way to being. In this case, there always remains in its account something 
'owed', something that ought to be, but is not yet, for, in any 
determination of a potentiality-for-being, and it is such determinations 
that originate action, Dasein refers to itself not as actual but as 
possible. It refers to the self which it itself, as something accomplished, 
is not. It refers to the other to which it is always underway. The 
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authentic determination of that other then provides the ground for what is 
owed, for what ought to be as what can be, and it is that other, the self 
that Dasein could never wholly accomplish, that calls in the call of 
conscience. It is this transcendent self, therefore, this other than itself 
to which Dasein relates and refers itself, that 'tells' Dasein what is to be 
done and what can be done. The ground of authentic action, the source of 
all 'ethical' conduct, although immanent in Dasein as a beginning and an 
end, a motive, lies in itself beyond Dasein. And it is what Bonaventure 
calls the highest good, in which all want is fulfilled. 
Moreover, if what Dasein wants is that in reference to which its 
meaning is determined, it must also be that In reference to which, plene 
resolvens, the meaning of the world is determined, because it is then the 
final for-the-sake-of-which to which 'Dasein is related in all of its 
references. This is a consequence of Heidegger's analysis of the worldhood 
of the world. In the first place, Dasein discovers entities as ready-to- 
hand (Zuhandenes) in reference to an end, an in-order-to Was Um-zu). 
This end is projected in advance and determines a possibility of Dasein 
itself. Readiness-to-hand, as a kind of being, is discovered in reference 
to a for-the-sake-of, and the for-the-sake-of is always Dasein itself. 
Thus, not only is the kind of being possessed by ready-to-hand entities 
constituted by reference to an end of Dasein, but also its degree, The 
relative 'goodness' of a ready-to-hand entity is determined with respect to 
its suitability for achieving the end in reference to which its being is 
constituted. This means simply that entities uncovered as ready-to-hand 
are evaluated in terms of, and in reference to, their being capable of 
allowing Dasein to realize its end, of allowing it to realize a possibility 
of itself. The significance of the things that are involved in Dasein's 
projects is bound up, therefore, with the significance of Dasein's own 
being. 
This means that the significance of the world has to do with the 
ends of Dasein, and it is in reference to those ends that 'defects' of 
being are uncovered as such. But if the final end of Dasein, the limit of 
Dasein's reference and so the limit of its projection transcends Dasein 
itself, then the standard according to which the goodness of entities is 
measured lies, when thoroughly analysed, beyond Dasein as well. The most 
original Worum willen, that which all wanting is really about (Worum), is 
the true Sache, the true subject matter or end of all willing. It provides 
the directive for all willing, in that all willing is ultimately directed 
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towards it and by it, but it is itself never available for analysis as an 
object of the will, or an object of any sort at all. Standing beyond and 
away from Dasein, there can never come a time when Dasein 'has' 
comprehended it, since Dasein, as existing, is always oriented towards it, 
always on the way to it and thus in the process of comprehending it. The 
sense of the world lies outside of the world because the sense of being 
human lies at the limit of what human being desires, and that desire is 
never wholly fulfilled in the world. 
As an aside, it should also -be noted that, while Heidegger's analysis 
in Sein and Zeit of the significance of intraworldly beings can easily be 
read as 'pragmatism', it must be remembered that the involvement of these 
beings in the being of Dasein also means that their presence is involved 
in care, remembrance, and love. Human being presents and represents them, 
and they in turn present and represent being human. That their 
significance is bound up with the significance of Dasein does not then 
mean that their being can be measured in terms of 'cash value', not even 
when one is speaking of something that unambiguously counts as 
'equipment', for instance, a pair of shoes. And if the significance of 
being human lies strangely both within and beyond the world, then it may 
seem less strange that the, significance of these things often seems to do 
so; too. 
A reflection upon these three modes of Dasein's being - 
understanding, memory, and desire or volition - reveals, then, that Dasein 
refers and is referred beyond itself in each of these processes, and is not 
the ultimate source of them. Since these modes constitute the essence of 
Dasein, and since, in fulfilling them, Dasein surpasses itself, it also 
follows that to the nature of Dasein this transcendence, this reference 
beyond itself, belongs essentially and that, as Dasein does not bring 
itself into being and is not the source of itself, this reference is 
something into which it is thrown. Der Mensch ist ... vom Sein selbst 
in the Wahrheit des Seins ageworfen» ['Man is ... 'thrown' from being 
itself into the truth of being'] (Hb, 75/210). For Heidegger as for 
Bonaventure, human being does not determine the fundamental structure of 
its existence, and it points beyond itself in that existence. 
Furthermore, the difference between the three modes of being 
mentioned above is obviously not a difference of substance or essence. 
Memory, understanding, and volition are not three separate substances. 
They articulate a unity, the unity of human existence and the unity of 
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presencing. Memory, Gedächtnis, is not other than human being, and the 
'keep' in which Gedächtnis has its essential ground is not other than being 
as das Bedenklichste, the limit of das zu-Bedenkende and das Bedenkliche: 
Die Verwahrnis Ist Jedoch nichts neben und außer dem Bedenklichsten. Sie 
ist dieses selber, Ist seine Weise, aus der es und in der es gibt, nämlich 
sich, das selbst je und je zu denken gibt ['But the keeping is not 
something that is apart from and outside of what is most thought- 
provoking. The keeping itself is the most thought-provoking thing, itself 
is its mode of giving - giving itself which ever and always is food for 
thought'] (WhD, 97/151). The drive towards self-actualization is also not 
other than Dasein, and what lies at the limit of this process, at the limit 
of the Worumwillen, is not other than being. As the limit of being- 
possible, the limit of what can be, it can be nothing other than being 
itself. It is being fully achieved, which Dasein, as a process of self- 
achieving, as the kind of being for which its own being is an issue (geht 
es um), is always seeking. This being is the ultimate matter of Dasein's 
concern in every case, and all concernful dealing with entities encountered 
within the world is ultimately founded upon the care for being itself 
which Dasein, whose essence is care, presupposes. Thus, Dasein, like mens, 
is a kind of one in three that points to a one in three beyond iseif. 
Even though Heidegger does not posit an actually existing entity or 
'perfect spirit' as the limit of that to which human being is related, it 
might still be objected against him that all of these attempts to 
articulate that to which existence transcends as to its source involve a 
'subject ivization' or 'anthropomorphisation' of being, in which the structure 
of human being is taken as the measure of being itself. For Heidegger, 
however, such an objection fails to reflect fundamentally enough upon the 
essential nature of being human. Responding to the possibility of this 
objection against Schelling's attribution of Sehnsucht, 'longing', to the 
absolute, he says: 
Geht nicht jede Wesensbestimmung des Menschen - wie schon 
allein die Frage, wer er sei, zeigt - über diesen hinaus, 
so ewiß, wie jede Erkenntnis des Absoluten unter dieses 
herab fällt ... Ist nicht der Mensch solcher art seiend, daß er, je ursprünglicher er er selbst ist, er gerade nicht 
nur und nicht zuerst er selbst ist ... Wenn denn der Mensch - als das Seiende, als welches es nicht nur er 
selbst ist - wenn eben dieses Seiende zum Maßstab wird, 
was heißt dann Vermenschlichung? Heißt es nicht das 
gerade Gegenteil von dem, was der Einwand herausliest? 
[Does not every essential determination of man overreach 
him - as the question alone who he is already shows - as 
certainly as every knowledge of the absolute falls short 
of it Does man not exist in such a way that the more 
primordially he is himself, he is precisely not only and 
not primarily himself ... If man, as the being who is not 
200 
only itself, becomes the criterion, then what does 
humanizing mean? Does it not mean the precise opposite of 
what the objection takes it for? ] (SA, 
283-4/163-4) 
Accordingly, if the nature of Sein is indicated 'in terms of' Dasein, this 
is not a matter of hypothesizing about the attributes of an absolute 
through likenesses drawn from an entity which in fact has nothing to do 
with that absolute. The nature of Sein can be indicated via Dasein 
because the essence of Dasein is itself constituted by its being an 
indication of Sein, by its pointing beyond itself to Sein. Sein is not, 
after all, a product of Dasein. Dasein participates in Sein and points to 
it. When the essential nature of Dasein consists in being a reference to 
Sein, when der Mensch ein Anderes ist als nur so ein Mensch ['man is 
something other than only a man') (SA, 217/124), what does it then mean 
for this entity to be taken as a measure for the dimensions of that 
transcendent other? 
It means that those dimensions are indicated by the dimensions of 
this entity as by signs, and that the attributes of this entity can, as a 
consequence, be authentically predicated of the other in a certain way. 
When applied to the other, they do not then express the 'literal' truth, 
since, precisely because their nature is to be always transcending 
towards that other, they never, quite reach it, but such predications of the 
other are not pure fictions, either. When predicated of the other, the 
truth of these attributes is neither wholly univocal nor wholly equivocal, 
but analogical. The question of pure subject iviza t ion, on the other hand, 
only arises if Dasein is conceived essentially as a purely isolated subject, 
as something severed from and standing against that which is as that 
which stands against it (the object, der Gegen-stand). If Dasein is by 
nature already involved in what-is, in that its nature consists in being an 
involvement that always already has a relation to being, such a question 
loses its meaning. 
Thus, ' just as appropriate interpretation of mens requires looking 
beyond it and beyond the world, so the essence of Dasein in Heidegger's 
conception cannot be determined purely in reference to itself, nor purely 
in terms of entities encountered within the world. It must be thought in 
"terms of the relation to being in which this entity always stands. Die 
Frage nach dem Wesen des Menschen [ist] keine Frage nach dem Menschen 
['the question concerning man's nature is not a question about man'] (G, 
29/58). The essence of man is existence, where Ek-sistenz bedeutet 
inhaltlich Hinaus-stehen in the Wahrheit des Seins ['in terms of content 
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ek-sistence means standing out into the truth of being'] (Hb, 70/206). And 
the essential element in this relation is not human being, but being: So 
kommt es denn bei der Bestimmung der Menschlichkeit des Menschen als der 
Ek-sistenz darauf an, daß nicht der Mensch das Wesentliche ist, sondern das 
Sein als die Dimension des Ekstatischen der Ek-sistenz ('So the point is 
that in the determination of the humanity of man as ek-sistence what is 
essential is not man but being - as the dimension of the ecstasis of ek- 
sistence'] (Hb, 79/213). What makes human being specifically human, what 
differentiates it from other kinds of being, is not reason, but that upon 
which reason itself is founded, the preeminent relation to being in which 
human being always exists, so that das Seyn ist der Aether, in dem der 
Mensch atmet, ohne welchem Aether er zum bloßen Vieh and sein ganzes Tun 
zur bloßen ViehzUchtung herabfällt ('being is the ether in which man 
breathes. Without this ether, he would descend to the mere beast and his 
whole activity to the breeding of beasts'] (SA, 169/98). The preeiminence 
of human existence consists in its safeguarding the truth of being, in the 
fact that man is der Hirt des Seins ['the shepherd of being'] (Hb, 75/210), 
and only on the basis of this essential determination of human existence 
is it possible to understand its 'purpose'. 
To express this in other terms, in order to derive a complete and 
adequate interpretation of Dasein, this entity must be clarified ontico- 
ontologically, understood in reference not only to its understanding of 
beings, but also in reference to the prior relation to being that makes 
such understanding possible, denn im Lichte des Seins steht schon jeder 
Ausgang vom Seienden and jede Rückkehr zu ihm ('for every departure from 
beings and every return to them stands already in the light of being'] (Hb, 
76/211). Dasein is the in-between (inzwischen) of the ontico-ontological 
difference, the place of the jointure between beings and being, and an 
adequate interpretation of it must take into account both of these 
'dimensions', as well as attempting to clarify the nature of Dasein's 
standing between them. 
Proximally and for the most part, however, when Dasein interprets 
itself ontologically, when it produces an account of its essence, of the 
nature of its ownmost being, the special relationship to being in which it 
stands remains covered up, in the same way that wens generally does not 
understand its a priori relation to the absolute. This, for Heidegger, is 
because Dasein tends to interpret its own being on the basis of its 
everyday way of being, which means that it interprets itself in terms of 
202 
the 'the world' (SZ, 15-16). In its daily dealings with the matters that 
most obviously concern it, Dasein comports and directs itself towards 
(verhält sich) the world of its concern in such a way that it is wholly 
divided up and absorbed into (Aufgehen in) it. It then has a tendency to 
interpret itself entirely in terms of its relationship to the world, as the 
whole of its concernful involvement with entities within the world. 
That Dasein hat ... the Geneigtheit, an seine Welt, in der es ist, zu 
verfallen and reluzent aus ihr her sich auszulegen ('Dasein is inclined to 
fall back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself 
in terms of that world by its reflected light'] (SZ, 21) means that Dasein 
has an inclination to forget the source of its understanding. It forgets 
its primordial understanding of, and relation to, being itself. When its 
attention or care is wholly absorbed in the world, Dasein means only the 
world, and it takes this meaning as primary. It then sees itself as an 
image or reflection of the world, and fails to recollect itself sufficiently 
to see that it can only be such a reflection in so far as it is originally 
and essentially a reflection of being. 
In order for Dasein to remember itself in the ultimate truth of its 
essence, it has to re-collect itself from the dispersal and distraction 
(Zerstreuung) that characterizes das »Subjektnr der Seinsart, the wir als 
das besorgende Aufgehen in der nächst begegnenden Welt kennen ('the 
"subject" of that kind of being which we know as concernful absorption in 
the world we encounter as closest to us'] (SZ, 129). Such recollection 
does not demand that Dasein consider itself in total isolation from the 
world. On the contrary, it requires that Dasein concentrate upon its being 
in the world in 'such a way that the fundamental structure of that kind of 
being, its existential and ontological constitution, becomes visible. The 
more profoundly Dasein is fallen and absorbed into the world, the less it 
is capable of the kind of concentrated reflection that uncovers the truth 
of its being-in-the-world, which is also the truth of itself, since being- 
in-the-world is the kind of being definitive for Dasein and unique to it. 
Mens, according to Bonaventure, must gather itself from its common 
distraction into its many cares in order to 'see' itself in its true nature, 
where that means seeing how it always sees. In a similar way, Dasein, to 
uncover the truth of itself, must turn its attention towards its own 
being-in-the-world in a way that gathers and unifies, and that means it 
must step back from the distraction and dispersal characterizing its 
everyday mode of being. It must step back from its own involvement in 
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order to understand the essential nature of that involvement. For 
instance, it must step back from, and yet concentrate more deeply upon, its 
daily preoccupation with beings to see the unified ground of that 
preoccupation, the ground that makes understanding beings possible, the 
prior understanding of being. It must also collect itself out of the 
manifold forms of its concern in order to see the unity of their collective 
totality as the unity of its own structure, in order to see itself, namely, 
as care. 
In Sein and Zeit and Was Ist Metaphysik?, the possibility of this de- 
tached self-recollection is said to be given by Angst, because Angst brings 
Dasein before the world in bringing it beyond what-is as a whole. A mood 
like Angst, therefore, which is a phenomenon within the world, something 
that naturally and spontaneously 'comes over' Dasein, can be said to 
provide an original basis for the epochd of a kind of phenomenological 
reduction. Under its power, the world slips away into nothingness, leaving 
Dasein reduced to itself. The 'new region of being' discovered by this 
detachment from the world then has a kind of 'motive' within the world. 
On the other hand, anxiety or dread does not simply grab Dasein away from 
the world and throw it into this strange region of being in spite of 
itself. Dasein must have the courage- and resolve to face dread in order 
to be thus withdrawn. It is possible to claim that as soon as human 
existence comes to be, dread is there but sleeping, and that the awakening 
of dread is also the awakening of being human, but people can flee that 
awakening, and it is not easy to say why they 'should' not. Consequently, 
the paradox that Husserl faced, that what emerges in the epochd is only 
given through it, and yet a free resolve for the reduction is initially 
required, a resolve for which it is hard to find a motive since the motive 
truly becomes clear only when the reduction is performed, is not wholly 
overcome by Heidegger. '"° Nonetheless, Heidegger does suggest, in dread, 
some natural basis for withdrawal. 
Whatever may provide the original basis for the possibility of self- 
recollection, this possibility is there, and Dasein must, in order to 
recollect its essence, turn to itself, as being- in-the-world, with 
thoughtful remembrance. In terms of the analysis in Was heißt Denkenlil, 
one could say that it must return to itself in memory, where memory 
(Gedächtnis) besagt ursprünglich soviel We An-dacht: das unabldssige, 
gesammelte Bleiben bei ['originally ... means as much as devotion: a 
constant concentrated abiding with something'] (WhD, 92/140). This 
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remembering is a careful and thoughtful understanding, in which human 
being pays close attention to itself, not by isolating itself as subject of 
investigation apart from the world in which it is, but by looking at its 
being-in-the-world with a gaze free and penetrating enough to lay bare 
the fundamental structure of that kind of being, to make it transparent to 
its very ground. 
Under the gaze of such a vision, though, the 'substance' of being 
human is, in a sense, 'separated' from that of the entities encountered 
within the world, like it is for Augustine and Bonaventure. When Dasein's 
understanding of itself arises from a withdrawn vision, as opposed to from 
the concernful circumspection of everydayness, it no longer confuses its 
kind of being with that of the things within the world intended in daily 
concern. Dasein then comes to see that it is not itself an entity like the 
entities which everyday absorption in the world encounters, and that its 
own nature cannot be understood in terms of theirs. It realizes that its 
own substance, unlike theirs, is ek-sistence, a constant standing outside 
and beyond, a constant transcendence. 
Human being's authentic recollection of itself thus means its 
remembering the transcendent to which it always stands in relation, and 
that means remembering itself as a sign whose ultimate referent 
perpetually evades it. The ultimate source of the 'thinking thing', 17 once 
the truth of its substance has been resolved out of-its confusion with the 
substance of things in the world and come to be understood as existence, 
is the true matter of thought, the 'to-be-thought' that pulls away from 
thinking in the same movement within which it pulls that thinking towards 
itself and along with itself. Das zu-Denkende wendet sich vom Menschen 
ab. Es entzieht sich ihm ['What must be thought about, turns away from 
man. It withdraws from him']. However, was sich uns entzieht, zieht uns 
dabei gerade mit, ob wir es sogleich and überhaupt merken oder nicht 
['what withdraws from us, draws us along by its very withdrawal, whether 
or not we become aware of it immediately, or at all'] (WhD, 5/9). What 
thinking ultimately refers to is not clear, and so the ultimate meaning of 
thinking, and thus of human being as essentially thinking, always remains 
to some degree obscure to thinking itself. But since thinking is always 
drawn by and towards that to which it ultimately refers, it must be 
understood in terms of this referring. 
The meaning of human existence, therefore, as thinking, resides not in 
any closed determination, as if it could at some time be fully and finally 
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accomplished, but in the openness of meaning itself, in the pointing to the 
withdrawal of what withdraws: 
Wenn wir in den Zug des Entziehens gelangen, sind wir . auf dem Zug zu dem, was uns anzieht, indem es sich 
entzieht. Sind wir als die so Angezogenen auf dem Zuge zu 
dem uns Ziehenden, denn ist unser Wesen schon durch dieses 
»auf dem Zu e zu ... « schon geprägt. Auf dem Zuge zu dem Sichenfziehenden weisen wir selber auf dieses 
Sichentziehende. Wir sind wir, indem wir dahin weisen; 
nicht nachträglich und nicht nebenbei, sondern: dieses 
»auf dem Zuge zu .. « ist in sich ein wesenhaftes und darum ständiges Weisen auf das Sichentziehende. »Auf dem 
Zuge zu ... « sagt schon: zeigend auf das Sic-hentziehende. 
[Once we are drawn into the withdrawal, we are drawing 
towards what draws, attracts us by its withdrawal. And 
once we, being so attracted, are drawing towards what 
draws us, our essential nature already bears the stamp of 
'drawing towards'. As we are drawing towards what 
withdraws, we ourselves are pointers pointing towards it. 
We are who we are by pointing in that direction - not like 
an incidental adjunct but as follows: this 'drawin 
towards' is in itself an essential and therefore constaný 
pointing towards what withdraws. To say 'drawing towards' 
Is to say 'pointing towards what withdraws. '] (WhD, 5-6/9) 
So what human being refers to is not clear because it always pulls away 
from thought and always transcends it, but human being is related to it 
precisely in its pulling away and transcending. The essence of being 
human consists in being this pointing relation. 
In that case, the essence of man consists in being a sign whose 
interpretation can never be completed, since that to which it points 
constantly recedes from it: 
Insofern der Mensch auf diesem Zug Ist, zeigt er als der Al der dahin so Ziehende in das, was sich n zieht. s 
Zeigende ist der Mensch der Zeigende .. Sein Wesen beruht darin, ein solcher Zeigender zu sein. Was in sich, 
seinen Wesen nach, ein Zeigendes ist, nennen wir ein 
Zeichen. Auf dem Zug in das Sichentziehende ist der 
Mensch ein Zeichen. Weil dieses Zeichen jedoch in das 
Sichentziehende zeigt, deutet es nicht so sehr auf das, was 
sich da ent-zieht, als vielmehr in das Sichentziehen. Das 
Zeichen bleibt ohne Deutung. 
[To the extent that man is drawing that way, he points 
toward what withdraws. As he is pointing that way, man Is 
the pointer .. His essential nature lies in being such a 
pointer. Something which in itself, by its essential 
nature, is pointing, we call a sign. As he draws towards 
what withdraws, man is a sign. But since this sign points 
toward what draws away, it points, not so much at what 
draws away as into the withdrawal. The sign stays without 
interpretation. ] (WhD, 6/10-11) 
The ground of human being, originating and directing thinking, yet always 
remains dark. It always shows itself in itself as an abyss into which 
thinking cannot penetrate. just because thinking is in essence a relation 
to this ground, and always stretched out and reaching towards it. 
The withdrawal of that towards which human being reaches does not, 
however, signify mere absence. It is a positive event (Ereignis) in which 
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what withdraws, in so far as it refuses to arrive in a final way, refuses 
to present itself as something that can be definitively named, but is not 
on this account nothing at all, is nicht nichts. What withdraws refuses 
arrival (Ankunft) only because it always is arriving, so that, in this 
event, what withdraws from thought is not only always immanent in thought 
as evoking and directing it, but also always imminent to thought as 
constantly arriving to be thought. Das Denken ist auf das Sein als das 
Ankommende U'avenant) bezogen. Das Denken ist als Denken in the Ankunft 
des Seins, in das Sein als the Ankunft gebunden ('Thinking is related to 
being as what arrives (1'avenant). Thinking as such is bound to the advent 
of being, to being as advent'] (Hb, 117/241). 
And, for Heidegger, what draws the reach of thought while drawing 
away from it, far from being utterly remote from thought and so 'unreal', 
is what lies closest to human being as a thinking being, what is most 
intimately present to it. The presence of what arrives in withdrawing 
could thus be the most real presence of all, and the mysterious event in 
which what evades thought presents itself to thought simultaneously with 
its hiding of itself could concern the essence of human being more 
actually than anything that touches it in the daily concerns of its 
average present (WhD, 5/9).. 
The task of authentic reflection upon the nature of human being is 
the task of becoming aware of this event. It is accomplished by entering 
into the kind of thinking that resolves and holds itself open for the 
manifestation of truth, into besinnliches Denken ... das dem Sinn 
nachdenkt, der in allem waltet, was ist ('meditative thinking ... which 
contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is'] (G, 13/46). 
When understanding turns this thinking towards itself, its meditation upon 
itself remains in an openness towards what sich zeigt and zugleich sich 
entzieht ('shows itself and at the same time withdraws'] (G, 24/55), what 
reveals itself to being-in-the-world and at the same time transcends it. 
It is in this collected openness, the opposite of the distracted dispersal 
of everydayness, that the truth of the essence of human being, its 
mysterious character as a special kind of sign, is revealed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CALL AND CONSCIENCE 
IN TAULER AND HEIDEGGER 
1. The Call of God in the Ground of the Soul. 
In his sermon, Fratres, obsecro vos ego vinctus in domino, Johannes 
Tauler explicates a Pauline passage (Eph. 4,1-4), which he translates as 
follows: 
Brüdere, ich gebunden mensche in Gotte, ich bitten üch das 
it wirdeklichen wandelent in der ladunge als it geladen 
sint, mit aller demUtikeit und senftmütilceit, und mit 
gedult vertragent ein andern in der minne. Sint sorgveltig 
ze behaltende die einikeit des geistes in dem bande des 
friden, ein licham und ein geist, als it gerUffet eint ... 
(Brothers, I, a man bound in God, I beseech you that you 
walk worthily in the vocation to which you are called, with 
all humility and gentleness, with patience bearing one 
another in love. Take care to keep the unity of the spirit 
in the bond of peace, one body and one spirit, as you are 
called ... ] (V, 240)' 
The sermon analyses the nature of this calling by resolving it into four 
components: 1. wer der ist der uns hie raffet und ladet ('who it is that 
calls and summons us here'], 2. war z0 er uns rtfft, war es uns haben welle 
['what he calls us to, what he wishes of us']. 3. weles sin rOf si, wel wise 
er her zo habe ('what the call is, what form it has'], and 4. wie man 
wirdeklichen volgen stille disem rdffe in diser ladunge ('how one should 
actually follow the call in this summons'] (V, 240). 
The first item in the structure of the call, the one who calls in the 
-calling, is said to be 'the heavenly father' (V, 240). The 'who' of the call 
is thus the being whose nature is defined as perfection, and the call is 
the summons both of, and to, perfection. For Tauler, the perfection of 
human beings consists in the achievement of likeness to this perfect being, 
the achievement of deiformity. Although delformity is a potentiality of 
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human beings, then, their highest potential form, its accomplishment is 
enabled by a transcendent and infinite power which cannot be reduced to 
the soul's own finite capabilities. 
This infinite transcendent power, God, is nevertheless present to 
human beings as an indwelling principle, drawing them to their, and its, 
own perfection. The perfection of the absolute beckons with all of its 
attributes. With its being, its properties, and its power, it invites and 
attracts towards itself and into itself. It calls upon the soul, the finite 
spirit, to realize itself, the absolute spirit, and it has want of (not 
nach) the soul for this achievement. Because the absolute is the source 
of the soul, its creator, in calling the soul to itself, it summons it back 
to its beginning (beginne), but this beginning is not the same beginning 
with which the life of the soul started out. It is, rather, the end of 
that life, its completion, perfection and closure, a return to the absolute 
not as a beginning in time but as an origin (ursprung) (V, 240). 
The absolute is the origin of the soul's life in that it names what 
the soul strives for in its struggle to perfect itself. It is thus what 
gives rise to the struggle, and so to what the soul, as life, is. The soul 
completes itself when it reaches this origin, when it attains what 
initiates, sustains, and guides its striving as an existing human life. 
This is its final destination or ultimate destiny, that towards which it is 
sent. Therefore, Tauler says elsewhere that that menschen louf ('human 
course'] is aloe edelste and aller volkomenste ('most noble and perfect of 
all'] which aller elgenlichest wider in sinen ursprung get ('which most 
truly goes back into its origin'] (V, 9). In the return to its origin, the 
soul completes the circuit of its life.. 
The second component of the call, that to which it calls, is Christ. 
The call calls upon human beings to conform themselves to the image of 
the perfect, the divine, human being. Christ is the image of God in the 
world, in human form, and also of deiform humanity, of perfect humanity. 
In possessing from birth the capability of becoming like this image, all 
human beings are potential co-heirs with it; every human being is 
potentially an heir apparent, as it were, to the properties of the absolute. 
By realizing this capability, by becoming all that it is possible for a 
human being in the world to be, a person appropriates this potential 
inheritance, thereby coming to possess by the free gift of the absolute all 
that the perfect image is by nature (V, 240-1). 
The call to this perfection, which is the call of God to the soul, 
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speaks both outwardly and inwardly, and this is the third constituent of 
the calling, wet wise er zt1 habe ['what manner it has'], or, as Tauler also 
puts it, weles der rdf si and wenne er rüft ['what the call is and when it 
calls']. Because the potential for perfection is bestowed upon human 
beings by God, and is rooted in the fact of God's real presence to the 
soul as an indwelling principle, it calls inwardly in the ground of the 
soul (inwendig in dem grunde), the 'place' where, for Tauler, the essential 
presence of God has its true abode. From this ground, it speaks to the 
soul in a multiplicity of ways. Since, however, it is not only this inward 
capability. which is bestowed by God, but also an individual's concrete 
situation, and since all that is destined by God contributes to that 
individual's perfection - or, at least, is capable of doing so, if he or she 
is rightly related to it - die starken stimme do Got dem menschen mit rüft 
['the strong voice with which God calls people') also comes outwardly, 
through the events (ufvellen) which come upon and befall a person (V, 300). 
The general decree of the call, the command to perfection, can, for 
Tauler, be broken down into a series of commandments, etliche ding the 
sint uns gebot ten and etliche the sint uns verbotten ['certain things which 
are commanded of us and certain which are forbidden to us'] (V, 241). 
These then form ethical principles, the highest and most comprehensive of 
which is the command, das wir Got vor allen dingen sdllen minnen ['that we 
. should 
love God before all things') W. 241). These principles for ethical 
conduct, interior as well as exterior conduct, articulate the last 
component in the structure of the calling, We man wirdeklichen volgen 
stille disem rdffe in diser ladunge ['how one should actually follow this 
call in this summons'] (V, 240), that is, was wir tOn sullen zu disem rtlffe 
['what we should do in response to this call'] (V, 241). 
In the context of this fourth and final element of the calling, Tauler 
also speaks of wem Got rilffet ['whom God calls'], and divides those who are 
called into three kinds of people. These three kinds of people correspond 
to three degrees or stages of Christian life, and Tauler arranges these in 
ascending order of perfection. Each person is suited to one of these 
ways of life, and each person can see the proper way for him or herself by 
paying heed to the call inwardly: Ein ieklichs sehe ... mit offenen 
innerlichen d8-en weles sin weg si, and denne in welen in Got welle 
. 
von 
disen drin wegen ['Each person should see, with open, inner eyes, which is 
his way, and then in which of these three ways ... God wishes him to go'] 
(V, 243). 
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Tauler does not lay down one universal prescription for what all 
human beings should do in the world. On the contrary, he recognizes and 
values the variety of lives to which individuals are called, and chastises 
the individuals in his own audience only for lack of attention and 
constancy to their call: 
Nu enkoment it in üch selber nüt noch enwissent üwers 
rdffes nüt, and hütte beginnent it eins and morn eins 
anderen, als it hörent oder sehent von ussen and üch durch 
die sinne in kumet, and des enist f1wer ding nüt. Und 
dannan von enblibent it da bi nüt and enwirt nüt drus, 
alles blindelingen. Wiesest das eins menschen leben das 
ist des anderen tot. 
Kerent zip üch selber and sehent wo mit it umbe gont, 
and enversument üch selber nüt. Wissent das manig 
mensche enmitten in der welt ist, and hat man and kint, 
and sitzet etlich mensche and macht sin schahe, and ist 
sin meinunge zü Gotte sich and sine kint generen. Und 
etlich arm mensche us einem dorffe gat misten and sin 
brötlin mit grosser surer arbeit gewinnet. Und disen allen 
mag geschehen, si sullen hundert werbe bas yarn and 
voIgent einvelteklichen irem reffe, and das is doch ein 
kleglich ding. 
(Now you do not come into yourselves and do not 
recognize your call, and today you begin one thing, and 
tomorrow another, according to what you see or hear from 
outside and what comes in through the senses to you. And 
that thing is not for you, and so you do not stay with it 
and nothing comes of it, as everything is happening 
blindly. Know that what is life for one man is death for 
another. 
Turn to yourselves and see what your concern is, and do 
not deceive yourselves. Know that there is many a woman 
in the world who has. husband and child, and many a man 
who sits and makes his shoes and their consideration for 
God consists in maintaining themselves and their children. 
And many a poor man spreas manure outside a village, and 
wins his bread with great and bitter labour. This may all 
happen so that, if they are simply following their call, 
they will fare a hundred times better than you, and that 
is a lamentable thing. ] (V, 241) 
Where the call articulates that to which an individual is ordered by God, 
not hearing the call means not hearing God, and inconstancy to the call is 
an inconstancy to God, an unsteadiness of the self before God. 
The call still calls for an imitation of Christ, but it has to be 
followed according to a person's own limited and particular capabilites, 
nach unser müügelichelt, so that when the simple 'where to' of the call is 
translated into time, it becomes individualized. The simplicity of the 
universal and eternal content of this call, the realizing of perfection, 
becomes, in its working out in number and time - i. e. within the 
particularity of an individual life unfolding in a concrete situation - 
various and complex. The universal destiny of human beings is then broken 
up into the particular destinies of particular individuals, so that, while 
it is still always a shared destiny, the common destiny of the community 
of human beings, it becomes one in which each individual has his or her 
own unique share or part. The call of individual destiny calls a person to 
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his or her own unique calling within a community. It calls upon an 
individual soul to fulfill its own finite capabilities, to bring to fruition 
the gifts which make it suited to a certain kind of work, and so to 
realize the particular possibilities of itself bestowed upon it by grace. 
In Sermon 42, Divislones ministracionum sent, idem autem spirit us, Tauler 
says: 
... wir gemeinen cristene menschen wir süllen"vil eben war nemen was unser ambacht sülle sin der zil uns der 
herre gerUffet and geladen hat, wele die gnade si z' der 
uns der herre gefüge hat. 
[. .. we common Christian people should perceive precisely what our duty should be, the position to which the lord 
has called and summoned us, what the grace is to which the 
lord has ordered us. ] (V, 177) 
Everyone is summoned, but each person is not summoned to the same thing. 
It is therefore not possible to say precisely, in terms of vocation, what 
the call calls a person to, for this differs from individual to individual. 
In this respect, the universal content of the call can be articulated no 
further than to say that it calls upon an individual soul to realize itself 
before God, to perfect itself in the finite and particular task to which 
it has been ordered by God. 
The spirit that works in these tasks, these different destinies, is 
one and the same, but its. labour is divided: Nu nemen wir das wort S. 
Paulus: 'es sint teilunge der werke and der dienst and wdrket alles ein 
and der selbe geist. ' ['We should note the words of St. Paul: "there are 
divisions of work and service, and yet one and the same spirit works all"'] 
(V, 177). The spirit at work here is a binding and unifying one, the 
spirit of love for God and neighbour, not a particular love, but a love 
that does not distinguish, ein ganze minne, ein ganze ungeteilet gunst ['a 
whole love, a whole and undivided favour'] (V, 340). Such love is caritas, 
the absolute love of the absolute spirit, the Holy Spirit. 
Being with other human beings in the spirit of this kind of love is a 
form of being in the world while referring to God. When the human spirit 
is one with the spirit of God in interaction with others, the nature of its 
concern and thought for others is constituted in reference. to the common 
destiny of human beings in relation to God. It refers to the perfection of 
all human beings before God, and wills only that perfection. This means 
willing the good of others along with one's own, while recognizing that 
good as a progress towards perfection, as a relation of the individual self 
to God. 
Given that conversing is a primary mode of interaction with others, 
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it is not surprising that Tauler, in various other sermons, especially 
stresses care for words in the context of being with others. In Sermon 
38, for instance, Estote misericordes sicut et pater vester misericors est, 
he admonishes his listeners for their idle chattering (klaffendes), and 
tells them that they should, before opening their mouths, consider three 
times whether their words sullen sin zO den eren Gotz and üwers nechsten 
besserunge and Elch selber bringen friden inwendig and uswendig 
['contribute to the glory of God and to the betterment of your neighbour, 
as well as bringing you peace yourself, inwardly and outwardly'] (V, 149). 
Tauler's ideal of human perfection is not one of withdrawal from the 
world, but is the combination of action and contemplation which is 
represented in its ideal form in Christ. The perfect imitation of Christ 
consists here in the achievement of a certain form of unity with God, a 
unity where the mind and heart are perpetually fixed on God in such a way 
that only God is meant in all that is said and done. In this form of 
union, an individual remains within in the presence of God, while going 
forth into the world, and this results in a perfection or divinization of 
works (V, 157). 
If the presence of God in the soul is realized through contemplation, 
then so, ultimately, is the. generation of the image of God as actual and 
active in the world, since deiform activity is rooted in the way a person 
is in the world when God is inwardly present to that person, when God 
alone is loved and meant. While the final goal is not isolation from the 
world, realizing this presence does, for Tauler, require periods of 
withdrawal. In this withdrawal, the soul is to be drawn away from its 
actions, as well as from its thoughts, as this sentence of Anselm, quoted 
by Tauler, urges: entzüfch dich von der manigvaltikeit uswender werke and 
entelaf von dem gestürme inwendiger gedenke, and sitze and rdwe and hebe 
dich selber Ober dich selber ('draw yourself away from the manifoldness of 
outward works and sleep from the turmoil of inward thoughts, and think and 
rest and raise yourself above yourself'] (V, 244). 
It is through such withdrawal that the soul is enabled to hear the 
call to perfection so as to be capable of following it. To hear God, the 
"soul must withdraw 
from its preoccupation with the world, and make itself 
silent and still. Sol Got sprechen, du most swigen; sot Got ingon, alle 
ding mOssent usgon ['if God is to speak, you must be silent; if God is to 
go in, all things must go out'] (V, 12). The dd that must become silent in 
this process is the self which is made up of things, and thus completely 
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verdinget, in that its constitution is wholly bound and determined by the 
things of the world in which the soul is usually submerged. When this 
self predominates, the soul's 'hearing' is full of the 'noise' of these 
things, so that it cannot hear the word and voice of God. It then cannot 
hear within itself the voice that calls it to perfection by calling it into 
the higher forms of itself. 
Transcending this self requires that the soul sink into a 
vergessenheit sin selbes ['forgetting of itself'] (V, 423), so that it may 
remember God. It must forget the self that is constantly occupied with 
frömden usserlichen dingen ['foreign outer things'] (V, 249), the objects of 
a person's everyday concerns. To this occupied self, these things, these 
creatures, generally appear as neither frimden nor usserlichen, since this 
self dwells perpetually among them and upon them, and is, consequently, at 
home with them. When the self lingers exclusively over these things, they 
are all that is present to it. It only has them in mind and only 
remembers them. Being filled with the presence of creatures in this way, 
the memory of the absolute can find no room in it in which to dwell, so 
that what is foreign or strange to it is the presence of God. 
Contemplation, on the other hand, is a forgetting, an estrangement or 
alienation, of these things,. and a remembering of and reconciliation with 
God. It is ein anhangen in Got mit elme vergessende aller zitlicher dinge 
['a hanging onto God with a forgetting of all temporal things'] (V, 426). 
When the gem Ute, as the gesamtheit der gedenken and empfindungen 
('totality of thoughts and experiences']a is burdened with the images of 
creatures and with thoughts pertaining to them, it dwells in nearness to 
these creatures, and is far from the presence of God. Contemplation frees 
the gem Ute from its entanglement in creatures, and binds it instead to 
God. 
To devote attention to God in this way, an individual must first be 
recollected from all manigvaltige zerströwunge ['manifold dispersals'] (V 
54,249), from all that zerzdhet and zerströwet das gemüte ['pulls apart 
and scatters the mind'] (V, 128). For prayer, for instance, a person should 
vor alien dingen ... sin gemUte heim holen and rUffen dem von alien den 
"uslöiffen and zerstrtfwunge do es gewesen Ist von allen dingen ['before all 
things fetch his mind home and call it from all the going out and 
dispersal in which it has been'] (V, 280). These outward wanderings are 
the accustomed abode of a person who sine gesiht het uzgekert and irre 
get ['has turned his sight outwards and goes astray'] (V, 125). They are 
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the common errors, the tegliche gebresten ['daily failings'] which make God 
unheimelichen and frdmde ('unfamiliar and foreign'] (V, 126) to the soul. 
In the confused wandering of this state, the soul has forgotten its end. 
Such wandering and confusion is only visible as an erring in view of 
that end. Those who have never glimpsed this end, those whose vision has 
never penetrated deeply enough into themselves to see the image of 
perfection that guides all their striving remain estranged from this, their 
own end, and so estranged from the truth of their existence. These people 
are at home in their wanderings; . they have never left home. In light of 
their end, with respect to understanding disen hohen götlichen , 
dingen 
['these high things of God'], they are rough and immature, rehte al cinder 
oder kelber ['just like cattle or calves'] (V, 10). They have never 
travelled beyond the state in which they first found themselves, and with 
which they are now familiar and comfortable. Having never 'gone abroad', 
they have never seen this state from another, perhaps a. more distant, 
perspective, from which it might appear not as a place of rest but as a 
place of wandering, not as home-like but as frömd. Having never become 
strangers to the world, the world has never become strange to them. 
Spiritual advancement, by contrast, 'consists in becoming aware of the 
image of perfection and completion which lies within the soul, and in 
coming, consequently, to understand the self in its relation to that image. 
Being perfection itself, this image 'tells' the self of its present 
condition of imperfection, its actual condition of, being not yet complete. 
It bears witness to the self of both its actual condition, that of an 
immature being, and of its possible one, that of itself as perfect. This 
witness in the depths of the soul thus tells the actual self, the self as 
it has been achieved so far, that it is the child of the possible self, the 
child of perfection. In so doing, it testifies to the self of both its 
nearness to God, its perpetual relation to the perfect source and end of 
itself, and of its distance from God, the unavoidable imperfection of all 
that it is and has been so far: 
In dem himmel sint drige gezügnisse, das ist in dem 
indewendigen himmel, das ist rider vatter, das wort and der 
geist- dise bezüggent dir and gebent dir ein wor gezügnisse 
das du Gottes kint sist, and lüchtent dir in disen grunt, 
and der grunt züget dir selber; and daz selbe ggezuget ouch 
wider dich and alle dine unordenunge and lüchtet dir in 
dine redelicheit, du wellest oder enwellest, es git dir 
gezügnisse von allem dime lebende, obe du es wilt nemen. 
[In heaven, there are three witnesses, that is, in the 
inward heaven, which are the father, the word and the 
spirit. These testify to you and give you true evidence 
that you re God's child. They enlighten you in the 
ground, anda the ground shows itself to you, and it -in turn gives witness to you of all your disorders. It enlightens 
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you in your reason, whether or not you wish it, and gives 
you evidence of all your life, whether or not you wish to 
accept it. ] (V, 302) 
Here Tauler is speaking of the presence of God to the soul in terms of the 
indwelling. Trinity, which the soul is said to mirror in its three powers 
(memory, understanding, will), and in terms of the unified ground of God 
reflected in the ground of the soul. It is this image of God reflected in 
the soul that speaks to the self of its guilt, because only in relation to 
this indwelling but transcendent principle of perfection does the self know 
the multiplicity of its shortcomings. 
The right way to be in response to this guilt is to will its 
redemption. Since this is precisely what God wills, to will redemption is 
to come into accord with the will of God, where that will is manifested in 
the-call of God that comes both inwardly in the ground of the soul, and 
outwardly in the events that befall a person. Coming into accord with 
God's will means ' coming into accord with what God destines in the moment 
(öugenblicke) of eternity. In the all-comprehending vision of this moment, 
the becoming of each individual being, the path every being is to run in 
the course of its existence in time, is comprehended from beginning to end. 
Given that this moment is also the moment of creation, in which what is 
conceived by the absolute understanding is simultaneously willed to be by 
the absolute will, it follows that all the occurrences which devolve upon a 
particular being are destined here. 
For Tauler, as for Eckhart, the soul is itself both temporal and 
eternal. It is temporal through its involvement with creatures, an 
involvement in which it is situated, first and foremost, by the manifold 
acts of attention and intention on the part of the will. It is also, 
however, eternal in the freedom of its innermost ground, the dwelling place 
of the presence of God. Because it is capable of entering into this 
ground, it is capable of entering into eternity, into the moment in which 
past, present and future are comprehended, and when it does so it sees 
what God sees, and wills what God wills. It then wills its own perfection, 
and in translating that will back into time, it sees in what comes to it an 
occasion, a means, of achieving that perfection to which it is destined. 
Peaceful acceptance of what is seen and willed in the moment is thus not 
an indifference to all events, much less an indifference to one's own 
activity. It is, rather, an active accord with destiny, a person's willing 
that God's ewig wolgevelleclicher Wille alleine gewerde in in and in allen 
creaturen ('eternally pleasing will alone come to pass in him and in all 
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creatures'] (V, 30). To bring the will into accord with its destiny in this 
way means to will what God has willed, and does will, in eternity, and this 
means willing the eternal decree of the absolute, which is to reconcile all 
things with itself by bringing them to their perfection. 
Willing this eternal decree, the self freely binds the whole of itself 
to the law of God. It orders the freedom of all of its faculties into 
service to the eternal will of God (V, 32). Free bondage to this eternal 
will is also bondage to what is eternal in the soul. Through this 
commitment to the perfection " of . itself, a perfection known in its 
particularity through the commanding voice of God in the innermost point 
of the spirit, the soul exchanges the unsteadiness (unstetikeit) of its 
temporal and changeable life for the stability and constancy (stetikeit) of 
its eternal one (V, 249). 
The krangheit, the fallenness and thus the imperfection, of the will 
consists in its lack of steadiness, its constant changeableness, which in 
turn has to do with the soul's perpetual uzgelouffen in the zit and in the 
zitlichen ding ('going out into time and into temporal things'] (V, 9). 
Being directed towards, and so divided up into, the multiplicity of objects 
within the world which it 'loves', the will is distracted from the true 
object of its love, from its true goal. Those who have merged their will 
with God, on the other hand, hant it herze and iren gunst gekert zO gotte 
in alsolicher wise des si in für alle minnent and meinest, and begerent 
von ganzem grunde das si in alleine minnen and meinen müssen für alle 
ding ('have turned their hearts and their favour to God in such a way 
that they mean and love him before all, and want from the whole of, their 
ground to have to love and mean him alone before all things'] (V, 138), In 
loving and meaning God alone, the will wills only its own perfection. It 
wills only the redemption of its guilt, and so the the cure of all that 
characterizes its 'sick' condition. 
The 'finite' will here allows the 'infinite' will to work within it. In 
letting be the achieving of perfection, it allows the absolute to draw it 
towards itself, and, possessed of this single aim, the will becomes steady 
and sure. It becomes unbeweglich like the absolute will which it seeks, 
but which, in seeking, it already possesses, given that what is sought in 
this case is only redemption, the perfection that the absolute will calls 
towards in calling upon the human will to realize itself. Since, in uniting 
with the divine will, the human will is subsumed into a higher one, the 
transfiguration it here undergoes involves a kind of death. This death, 
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however, is actually a transformation, in which the finite will gives way 
and surrenders to the absolute will. The creature here gives up its 
creaturely will; it gives up all eigenwille. Becoming an absolute willing 
is, therefore, from the point of view of the limited being, the creature, a 
renunciation of will. 
The commitment of such bondage to the will of God, and so to what 
the self has been destined to by God, is a property that love in which a 
person ist aller dinge ... ze friden, We alle ding koment, and enhat ntit 
vil wOrkelicheit, Jenne stet in einer stillen rdwe and Ist bereit war in 
der herre fdren oder mit im wdrken welle, als ein knecht der vor sines 
herren tofellen stot unde nOt anders entdt denne sicht den herren an, was 
er von im welle, das er bereit si das ze tdnde ('is ... at peace in all 
things Just as they come, and has not too much activity, but stands in a 
still rest and is ready for wherever the lord wishes to lead him or for 
whatever he wishes to work with him, like a servant who stands before his 
master's table and does nothing but look at his master to see what he 
wishes from him, so that he may be ready to do that'] (V, 252). In this 
love, the self's willing is a willingness, a preparedness to do and to be 
what it is called to do and 'to be. This is ultimately a readiness to 
undertake that to which it is ordered by the order of. that which has 
ordered its being, by the God who has 'determined its being in. both its 
'what' and its 'where'. 
The necessity of this imposition 'does, not contravene the soul's, 
freedom. The' law of God for, it is the law of itself for. itself. It ' is the 
law of itself as spirit, ' as an infinitely perfectible being which is 
conscious of its own perfectibility, because, it has a relation to 
perfection itself. In binding itself to the law of God, then, the goul 
binds itself tdr the highest law of its own nature, but it is under no 
obligation to do so. It is obligated to have the nature or law which it 
has, but it can refuse to fulfill this law. It is always related to God, 
and yet it can refuse . to relate 
itself to God. In other words, 'it can 
relate itself to that relation in one of two ways, either by accepting the 
task of perfection which the relation imposes upon it (and thus accepting 
its actual imperfection), or by shunning it, either by being willing to hear 
and to obey the voice that calls it to that perfection, and so to itself, 
or by fleeing it. 
In calling it to perfection, this voice speaks to the soul of 
perfection, speaks to it of that to which it is called. Listening to the 
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call, and following it, the soul is taken away beyond itself. It is thereby 
taken away not to itself, but to its other. As itself, the soul never is 
this perfection, but is related to it, and it comes back to itself from its 
flight to the other with a heightened knowledge of this relation, a 
heightened awareness of itself in this relation. In being willing to hear 
the voice, therefore, the soul is willing to see itself as it is and has 
been in relation to that to which it is called, in relation to what it can 
be. It is willing to see its own imperfection in relation to that before 
which it will always, as long as . it is itself, be imperfect. Binding itself 
to the law of its own perfection, it is also willing to take upon itself 
the task of redeeming this imperfection. That task is an infinite one, and 
cannot be-fulfilled by a finite spirit. The role of a finite spirit within 
this infinite , 
task consists not in bringing about its completion, but in 
being-willing to undertake it, in the particiºlar form allotted to it and to 
the best of its ability. 
The unwillingness to recognize the relation, the unwillingness to be 
the self of the relation, which requires the acceptance of being guilty, is 
the worst guilt. This lack. of recognition is obviously not an unavoidable 
ignorance - which could not be guilt, as something for which the self is 
responsible - but an unwillingness to know, a not willing and not wanting 
to know. Since the self, as itself, is always guilty in relation to that to 
which it is called by the perfect caller of this call, the root of such 
guilt lies not in unwillingness to be this or that before the caller, but 
in unwillingness to be before it. Sin is before God, and the worst sin is 
not wanting to be before God, not wanting to be guilty. 3 Thus, Tauler 
says wanne tusent gebresten the du in der worheit bekennest and dich 
dovon schuldig gebest, enwerent dir nit also sörglich noch also schedelich 
else ein einiger des du ndt enwoltest bekennen noch dich nit woltest 
lassen wise and nit jomer noch bankideit darum enhettest, den dich wolte 
alles dunken du bet test rent ('for a thousand failings that you know in 
truth and accept guilt for are not of so much concern and so harmful as 
one single one that you do not want to recognize and do not want to allow 
to be made known to you, so that may not have anxiety and pain thereby, 
since you want to believe that you are right in all things] (V,. 73). 
The soul's understanding itself in relation to God, and accepting to 
be what it is in this relation, is simultaneously an understanding and 
acceptance of its own nothingness, of both its natürlich nicht ('natural 
nothing'] and its gebrestlich nicht ['faulty nothing'] (V, 365), the 
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nothingness of its own being and the nothingness of its own goodness. The 
soul's being is nothing in relation to God, because God is the infinite 
being from which its finite being (its essence as well as its existence) is 
wholly derived and upon which it is utterly dependent. The soul's 
perfection is also nothing before God, because the degree of perfection it 
has and achieves is bestowed by God and enabled by God, and because, in 
relation to the infinite perfection of God, it is always imperfect. As 
long as the soul does not recognize these two forms of nothingness, it is 
in error with regard to itself. It may then will to be what it cannot be, 
and thereby will itself to eternal pain.. It can gain peace for itself only 
by accepting what it is while binding itself to what it can be, which 
means binding itself to the universal decree that commands its perfection. 
When the soul is wholly reconciled with the will of God, the will 
that speaks itself in this decree, the gap between 'should' and 'want' is 
closed for it. What it should be and do, which is what the will of God, 
the will towards perfection, wills for it and asks of it is now precisely 
what it wills to do with the whole of itself, what it wants for itself. It 
is thus perfectly reconciled with itself, and, in this reconciliation, the 
guilt of the divided will is redeemed. 
The 'when' of this. reconciliation is an ideal time, since such 
perfection is the final 'towards-which' of human destiny, and consists in 
the complete conformity to Christ mentioned earlier. The guilt belonging 
to being yet imperfect is therefore unavoidable. It belongs to the essence 
of human existence, although not to the essence of human perfection; that 
is, not to the nature of the perfect human being, who, in being perfect, is 
also other than human, is also 'divine'. Because human beings bear the 
stamp of this perfect image within themselves from the beginning, and yet 
are not it, they perpetually experience themselves as being in a state of 
distance from perfection, a fallen state. 
Since the guilt which characterizes human fallenness and imperfection 
is always before God, always in relation to the principle of absolute 
perfection present to the soul, its total redemption can only consist in 
being God in an individual human form, i. e. in being Christ. It is 
certainly not possible, according to Tauler, for human beings to become 
God, but it is possible for them to be taken away beyond themselves to 
God, in a moment of 'ecstacy where the soul is wholly united with the 
essential being of God present to it in its innermost ground. It then 
enters into das edele gotvar fünkelin, das uns vii innewendiger and noher 
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Ist denne wir uns selber ['the noble God-coloured spark, which is much 
more inward and nearer to us than we are to ourselves'] (V, 322), In so 
doing, it finds Got mit allem sinem richtCm -und in sin selbes eigenem 
wesen and naturen ['God with all his riches and in his very own being and 
nature'], since this divine spark of the soul is found in dem innersten 
grunde, do Got der seien naher and inwendiger ist verrer wan si it selber 
ist ['in the innermost ground, where God is nearer and more inward to the 
soul by far than it is to itself'] (V, 144). 
This ground is, as has been noted, the 'place' in which the image of 
God is most truly found within the soul, the image that God in some sense 
is, daz selbe bilde das Got selber ist in sinem eigenen luteren gtltlichen 
wesen ['the same image which God himself Is in his own pure divine being'] 
(V, 146). Tauler, like Eckhart, actually uses a cluster of terms to 
describe this 'region' of the soul, including geist, grunt, gemilte, funke, 
and bill. With respect to the terms grunt and gemUte, Claire Champollion 
suggests that, while these are often interchangeable, gemüte tends to be 
more a dynamic faculty and grunt more a kind of place, so one could say 
that 'gem Gte is the spiritual energy of the most intimate part of the soul, 
the grunt'. 4 This, however, as she admits herself, is a schematisation, In 
fact, none of these terms literally name a place, as opposed to a dynamic 
faculty or inclination, and Paul Wyser is doubtless right to say, the 
human spirit, the ground of the soul, the image of God and the disposition 
(Gemüt) which strives for God are one and the same, the one indivisible 
fundamental condition, understood in a highly dynamic way, of our spiritual 
life'. & 
Where this dynamic inclination of the soul is fulfilled, when it 
unites with the image in its ground, the soul becomes wholly deiform (V, 
146). At this point, and only at this point, there no longer remains any 
distance between what it is in fact and what it can and will be, no gap 
between actual imperfection and possible perfection. Tauler therefore does 
say that, in the widertragen ['taking back'] and widerfliessen ['flowing 
back'] of daz edele indewendige fiinkelin ['the noble inward spark'] of the 
soul in sinen ursprung do es usgeflossen ist ['into its origin whence it 
flowed out'], all guilt is completely repaid. This is pure deiformity, then, 
and it is attained in a mystical union, but the ethical is not lost in this 
union. Rather, it is perfected, for there wort der mensche ein gättelich 
mensche, and dis sint die sdlen der weite and der heiligen kirchen ['a man 
becomes a Godlike man, and these are the pillars of the world and of the 
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holy church'] (V, 80). There, a person becomes wholly Christlike, both 
inwardly and outwardly, and the contemplative perfection attained in this 
ideal time, this moment of eternity, is translated into the active 
perfection of historical, worldly existence. 
The realization of such deiformity is the completion of the identity 
of human being, the realization its 'ideal essence' as the limit of its 
striving. However. it is true that, within Tauler's mysticism, the gaining 
of such an identity within contemplation involves, for the individual and 
also for the human in general, a complete extinction of identity. When 
the spirit is drawn into the perfect unity of the ground, which is the 
limit of what it seeks for itself, what it seeks finally to be, it becomes 
so wholly God that it is utterly lost as itself. Moreover, the fundamental 
nature of the absolute, the nature with which the soul seeks to unite 
itself in its being, is and always remains a mystery to the soul itself. 
The God is always, in essence, an unknown God, namelose formelose wiselose 
('nameless, formless, mannerless'] (V, 109), and the ultimate identity of the 
created spirit corresponding to this unknown God, the ground of the soul, 
is equally hidden, known only as a nothing and a secret, 'an abditum mentis 
(V, 357). It thus turns out that, in seeking its own essence and ground, 
the perfection of itself as the end and completion of its identity, the 
soul is led, in the end, to a loss of ground. The innermost ground of 
itself which mirrors the undifferentiated unity of the ground of God is an 
abyss in which the spirit meets, and loses itself in, the abyss of God. 
Following to its source the call that recalls it to itself, the soul 
discovers both the identity of that source and of its own ground, of 
caller and called, as an unfathomable, unknowable and ineffable darkness. 
What calls is an abyss, and that to which it calls is an abyss (V, 330). 
Thus, whoever resolves to remain by the self, and remain with the quest 
for the self by remaining attentive to the voice that calls the self 
forwards to its end and back to its beginning, is led, ultimately, in being 
drawn into the all-encompassing circle of the ground's perfect unity, into 
a wilderness in which the self is lost, in which all identity is dissolved. 
Anyone who is willing to remain by the self right to its end is led to the 
end of the self, its utter dissolution. 
The loss of ground to which the soul is led in finding this abyss is 
connected with the fact that, in being utterly perfected, it is taken in 
every way 'beyond' itself, beyond all that defines it as a human soul. The 
absolute perfection of the understanding is a loss of human understanding, 
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for what this absolute understanding knows in perfect clarity appears to 
the finite powers of the soul as a total darkness. The absolute 
perfection of the will is a loss of self-will, the extinction of any will 
that can be seen as belonging to a human being. The perfection of 
memory is likewise a perfect self-forgetting, a perfect forgetting, in fact, 
of all things. Thus, the final realization of the 'essence' of the soul, 
understood dynamically as a striving and' a relation, leads to a 
transcendence of that essence. Only in such transcendence does the soul 
achieve perfect stillness. 
As a consequence, the finite spirit never actually reaches the 
infinite one, for it cannot be truly said to undergo the experience of 
being the absolute if, in its attainment to that absolute, its own 
experience is lost. The experience of the infinite spirit is then never 
that of the finite one, since, in the unity of perfection, there is only the 
infinite spirit's experience of itself. This is the perfect contemplation 
of God, but it is not any human being's contemplation of God; it is God's 
contemplation of God, the contemplation of God in and for itself. In the 
perfection of this vision, the human being is necessarily extinguished - no 
man can see God and live. 
The point here is that. the human soul, qua human, never achieves rest 
or " completion. As itself, it is always on the way. The absolute arrival 
which signals the end of the way is not found in the human, but in the 
other than human, and it consequently requires the 'unbecoming' of the 
human, since nieman mag ein anders werden, er enmilsse denne entwerden daz 
er do Ist ('no one can become another without relinquishing that which he 
Is'] (V, 68). If it belongs to the essence of human being to seek this 
other, it belongs to that essence to seek the transcendence of itself. The 
soul, therefore, can never be said to become God, since what becomes at 
this end is by definition - in essence and substance - other to the soul. 
For Tauler, the unto mystica consists in this flight to the other, which 
involves a form of mystical death. However, his ideal of human existence 
is not described as a perpetual resting in this flight, but includes a 
moment of return, in which the self, perfected through abstraction from 
. itself, translates itself 
back into itself and, in so doing, translates this 
perfection into the world. 
As long as a human soul has. not reached absolute perfection, it is 
still striving and becoming and its completion is still imminent, still 
futures, a thing about to be. Since becoming belongs to time, this 
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means that being fully accomplished can never, for a human being, wholly 
come to pass, and be past, in time. The moment of perfection, the moment 
in which the individual realizes the eternal, is not, for Tauler, a moment 
that can be permanently accomplished in the time of this life, the time 
proper to life, which is simply time itself as opposed to eternity. In 
time, being is always still being accomplished, so that having been 
accomplished is always something that will be. As that which has been, 
therefore, perfect being is being that will be until the end of time. 
2. Dasein and the Call of Conscience. 
As is well known, Heidegger, in his analysis of selfhood in Sein and 
Zeit, distinguishes between an authentic (eigentlich) and an inauthentic 
(uneigentlich) self, where these describe two ways in which it is possible 
for Dasein to be, or to exist (SZ, 115). The way of being that makes up 
the character of Dasein's everyday and inauthentic self, des Man-selbst 
('the they-self'], exhibits the trait of Verfallen ('falling'], of absorption 
in the public world of everyday concern (SZ, 175). To be its authentic 
self, to be in the world in an authentic way, Dasein must fetch itself back 
(sich zurückholen) out of this inauthentic self; it must retrieve the 
authentic Selbstseinkdnnen ('potentiality-for-being-itself'] to which its 
own being attests (SZ, 267), but which has been lost in the way of being 
of des Man. For this to take place, however, the authentic self, the self 
it is possible for Dasein to be - and so which, in the realm of 
possibility, it already is - must first be shown (gezeigt) to it (SZ, 268). 
The attestation (Bezeugung) of this authentic self can be found, Heidegger 
claims, in a phenomenon familiar to Dasein's everyday self-interpretation 
as the voice of conscience (Stimme des Gewissens) (SZ, 269). 
Conscience, Heidegger observes, gibt »etwas« zu verstehen, es 
gran 1ieBt ('gives us "something" to understand; it discloses']. A more 
penetrating analysis reveals it als Bl1L( ('as a call'], which hat den 
Charakter des Anrufs des Daseins auf sein eigenstes Selbstseink $nnen ('has 
the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost 
potentiality-for-being-itself'] (SZ, 269). The call of conscience discloses 
"Dasein's authentic self, 
its authentic potentiality-for-being, and thereby 
calls Dasein out of its inauthentic self, des Man. It breaks through the 
noise of das Man's everyday chatter, and recalls Dasein to the self this 
noise has drowned out, the self whose voice Dasein has failed to hear 
because of its Hinhären ('listening away'] to das Man (SZ, 271). 
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Like Tauler's notion of call, then, this voice provides an 'interior', 
and thus individual, attestation of a higher possibility for the self, and 
in recalling it to this possibility, it calls the self back in from its 
everyday lostness and falling, its average absorption in the world. 
Furthermore, while the actual performance of the call does not, for either 
Tauler or Heidegger, lie within the self's own power of choice, the failure 
to hear the call does, at some level, involve a decision for which the self 
is responsible. In Heidegger's description, the voice of conscience is 
experienced as a disruptive force effecting a break in the continuity of 
Dasein's everyday life, but the falling which characterizes that life is 
already a fleeing, already a not wishing to be met and called back. The 
voice of conscience does not call from the nearness and familiarity of 
anything which the everyday self recognizes as itself, so that, in terms of 
the everyday self, the call comes, unasked, from somewhere else. It calls 
out of the distance and into the distance. However, it only reaches the 
self that wishes to be reached. In der Erschließungstendenz des Rufes 
liegt des Moment des Stoßes, des abgestezten Aufrtlttelns. Gerufen wird 
aus der Ferne in the Ferne. Vom Ruf getroffen wird, wer zurückgeholt sein 
will. ('In the tendency to disclosure which belongs to the call, lies the 
momentum of a push - of an abrupt arousal. The call is from afar unto 
afar. It reaches him who wants to be brought back. '] (SZ, 270. ) 
What is talked about (das Beredete) in the call, what is called and 
appealed to (Angerufene) in the call, is das Man. The call strikes the way 
of being of Dasein's inauthentic self, and is of concern for the form of 
disclosure belonging to it; it reveals that form of disclosure as 
inauthentic. The Geredete of the call, its content, is: Streng genommen - 
nichts ['Taken strictly - nothing'] (SZ, 273). The call does not convey 
information; it summons Thus, that to' which (woraufhin) the call calls 
this self is das eigene Selbst ('one's own self] (SZ, 273). This call to 
the self cannot be formulated in words, but remains always dunkel and 
unbestimmt ['obscure and indefinite'] (SZ, 273). Das Gewissen redet einzig 
und ständig im Modus des Schweigens ('Conscience discourses solely and 
constantly in the mode of keeping silent. '] (SZ, 273. ) The call of 
. conscience 
does not thereby lose any of its clarity or audibility; rather, 
the force of this silent speaking presses the Dasein that is appealed to 
and summoned into the hiddenness and seclusion, the silence 
(Verschwiegenheit), of its own self. 
Tauler's call also does not convey information to the self, but 
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summons the self forwards. And for him, too, this summoning forwards 
draws the self into the hidden ground of itself, while, at the same. time, 
calling upon it to be in a certain way in the world. Both of these 
moments are included in Tauler's version of the 'to what' of the call, 
which he describes not as the self but as Christ. In this context, 
however, Christ, as a war zd, is also a possibility for the self, and the 
self, in being summoned to Christ, is being summoned to a form of self- 
realization. Tauler's call does also, to be sure, articulate some general 
ethical principles, some universal and positive guides for the We of any 
particular self-realization. It is significant, though, that these universal 
principles, if they are themselves a component of the call, must be known 
in a particular way, for they are then known through a mediation which is 
itself individual. In any case, apart from the universality of these 
ethical principles, which are themselves comprehended in the one directive 
to love God before all things, the universal nature of the call consists 
only, for Tauler as for Heidegger, in its basic structure, in its character 
of summoning in, back, and towards, and not in some 'objective' content. 
Heidegger notes that, in this summoning call, both caller and called 
remain indistinct. As already indicated, the self that is called is nothing 
that Dasein knows itself as in its everyday way of being, and the caller is 
nothing that can be named, or with which 'worldly' Dasein can ever be 
familiar (SZ, 274-5). Furthermore, the call is neither planned, nor 
prepared for, nor voluntarily performed von uns selbst. »Es« ruft, wider 
Erwarten and gar wider Willen. Andererseits kommt der Ruf zweifellos 
nicht von einem Anderen, der mit mir in der Welt ist. Der Ruf kommt aus 
mir and doch Uber mich. (l"It" calls, against our expectations and even 
against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come 
from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes from me 
and yet from beyond me. '] (SZ, 275. ) 
For Tauler, the call comes both from the hidden. depths of the self, 
and from the other to the self, from God. Heidegger does not equate the 
voice of conscience with the voice of God, and he explicitly and 
emphatically rejects the possibility of any such explanation within his own 
phenomenological project (SZ, 275). According to Heidegger, both the 
theological explanation which interprets the voice of conscience as a 
dominating power, and then either supplies the voice with a possessor or 
takes it as person who thereby manifests himself, and the explanation 
which rejects this interpretation and attempts instead to explain the 
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phenomenon away in biological terms pass over the phenomenal findings too 
quickly. While these two explanations may appear to be diametrically 
opposed to one another, they are actually both guided by the same 
dogmatic thesis, that was is1 das heißt so tatsächlich wie der Ruf, mug 
vorhanden sein; was sich nicht als vorhanden objektiv nachweisen läßt, ýLst 
überhaupt nicht ['what is (in other words, anything so factual as the call) 
must be present-at-hand, and that what does not let itself be objectively 
demonstrated as present-at-hand, just is not at all'] (SZ, 275). These two 
interpretations rest, that is, upon the same conception of being and truth, 
where being equals Vorhandenheit ['presence-at-hand'], and truth means the 
objective proving of a present-at-hand entity. In this case, the 
theological interpretation is a 'scientific' explanation no less than is the 
biological one, and it, too, attempts -to explain the phenomenon away, to 
render it comprehensible in the sort of terms with which everyday Dasein 
can make itself familiar and at home. 
Any attempt to minimize the obvious difference between Tauler's 
theological account and Heidegger's phenomenological one on this point 
would only do both a disservice. On the other hand, it would also be a 
disservice to the depth of Tauler's thought not to point out that his 
'explanation', insofar as it can appropriately be called that, does not fit 
neatly into Heidegger's critique. The caller of the call is, for Tauler, 
God, but not a God that can ever be made definite or familiar, not a God 
that can be known in such a way that the caller of the call ceases to be 
strange. Ultimately, this caller is as strange and hidden as the ground of 
the soul, as strange and hidden as that to which, and into which, it calls. 
Thus, it, too, like Heidegger's caller, and perhaps even more so, hält sich 
in einer auffallenden Unbestimmtheit ['maintains itself in conspicuous 
indefiniteness'] (SZ, 274), and for Tauler, too, it can be said that der 
Rufer ist in seinem Wer »weltlicha durch nichts bestimmbar ['in its "who", 
the caller is definable in a "worldly" way by nothing at all'] (SZ, 276). 
Yet' just as, in the soul's inclination towards God, what draws the 
soul away and inwards can also be described as the fundamental 
constitution of the soul itself as geist, bald, gemUte, grunt and so forth, 
-so, for Heidegger, what calls is actually Dasein's ownmost being: Er ist 
das Dasein in seiner Vnheimlichkeit, das ursprüngliche geworfene In-der- 
Welt-sein als Un-zuhause, das nackte »Daßa im Nichts der Welt ['The caller 
is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown being-in-the-world as the 
not-at-home - that bare "that-it-is" in the nothing of the world'] (SZ, 
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276), Because being not at home is just that state of being-in-the-world 
which inauthentic Dasein flees from and covers up, the caller that calls 
from out of this state is wholly unfamiliar to Dasein's everyday self, and 
its voice is, to that self, a foreign (fremde) one (SZ, 277). This bare 
self, which is not at home in the world, calls Dasein back out of its 
immersion in des Man, and calls into the hiddenness and silence of the 
potentiality for being which Dasein, as an existing and transcending being, 
has as its own (zurückruft in the Verschwiegenheit des existenden 
Seinkännens) (SZ, 277). The call of this self, calling out of the silence 
of nothing, and bringing Dasein before the nothing of its world, recalls 
Dasein to the knowledge of itself as not at home, and this understanding 
first enables Dasein to throw itself into the project of its being, to 
project to itself the possibility that it can be and to project itself upon 
the potentiality-for-being which it is (SZ, 277). 
The memory of itself as not at home haunts Dasein in the fleeing and 
falling of its everyday way of being. By threatening to recall Dasein to 
the fact of its lostness, this memory threatens with extinction the 
illusion of being at home in its wandering which das Man attempts to 
maintain, and must maintain to retain its inauthentic being. The call 
that recalls Dasein to its true self then simultaneously imperils the 
negative being of das Man, the false self whose identity consists in 
Dasein's constantly not being itself and escaping from itself, and whose 
memory is a perpetual self-forgetting. This'false self must be forgotten 
and estranged in order for Dasein to reverse the self-alienation which is 
the true condition of das Man. Falling into the world. Dasein is, in truth, 
estranged from itself and has forgotten itself, for the truth of this 
condition, which the voice of conscience discloses, is strange to the world 
of das Man, and das Man's world is strange to it. 
Prima facie, it seems obvious that here there is a fundamental 
difference between Heidegger and Tauler, in that, although for Heidegger 
the call is said to come 'from me and yet from beyond me', it ultimately 
reduces to the immanence of Dasein's own being, while, for Tauler, it 
involves a transcendent dimension of existence. This initial impression is, 
however, misleading, because, as I will demonstrate shortly, the condition 
for the possibility of the phenomenon that Heidegger lays bare at this 
point is a relation into which Dasein is thrown, and which does involve an 
element of transcendence. For the moment, though, I only want to draw 
attention to the similarity between Tauler and Heidegger with respect to 
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the dynamics of self-realization as expressed in the language of home and 
estrangement. Tauler speaks of this in terms of God and world, Heidegger 
in terms of being and Dasein, but they both, in their own ways, describe 
the immediate condition of the self, the condition in which it finds itself 
in the first instance and for the most part, as a being at home in a 
wandering which is not recognized as wandering, an erring that errs 
precisely in not knowing itself to be in error. It could be said that, for 
both, this is conceived as a condition of alienation in which the self does 
not know that it is alienated, and that the overcoming of this alienation 
requires that it first come into view as such. The self must first know 
itself to be not at home. To the self that does not know this, the self 
immersed in the world and constituted by the world, the voice that recalls 
it to the alienation which is the truth of its condition is first heard as 
alien itself. In recalling the self to the truth of itself, however, this 
voice alienates what is truly alien; it recalls to the self that the self 
which has based itself upon being at home in the world is untrue. This 
self must be alienated, estranged and made strange, if the self is to 
return to itself. The voice therefore calls upon the self to make this 
untrue self and its world other to itself by recognizing their otherness. 
In so doing, it calls the self back home. 
Through Heidegger's analysis, das Gewissen offenbart sich als Ruf der 
Sorge ('conscience manifests itself as the call of care'] (SZ, 277), where 
care signifies the unity and totality of. Dasein, the determination of the 
whole of its being. That being means: Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in- (der 
Welt-) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begenendem Seienden) ('ahead-of-itself- 
being-already-in-(the world-) as being-alongside (entities encountered 
within-the-world)'] (SZ, 192). This formulation also expresses the unity of 
Dasein's time: Dasein's future is its being-ahead-of-itself towards 
possibilities of itself, and so towards itself; its past Is its being- 
already-in the world, and so already having been itself; its present is the 
self of its being-alongside, as concernfully involved with, the beings it 
encounters within the world. 
In this structure, the structure of a becoming being which can 
-explicitly take over the becoming of its being, the structure of Dasein's 
everyday and inauthentic way of being is also disclosed: Im Sich-vorweg- 
schon-sein-in-einer-Welt liegt wesenhaft mitbeschlossen das verfallende 
Se beim besorgten innerweltlichen Zuhandenen ('Ahead-of-itself-being 
already-in--a-world essentially includes one's falling and one's being 
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alongside those things ready-to-hand within-the-world with which one 
concerns oneself'] (SZ, 192). - Conscience addresses itself to the way this 
kind of being spends its time. It calls from out of the truth of Dasein's 
'past', from the facticity of its thrownness into existence, and this is a 
determination of its being over which Dasein has no power: Als geworfenes 
ist es In lie Existenz geworfen. Es existiert als Seiendes, des, We es 
ist and sein kann, zu sein hat ('As something thrown, Dasein has been 
thrown into existence. It exists as an entity which has to be as it is 
and as it can bell (SZ, 276). 
That Dasein has to be as it is and can be means, for one thing, that, 
in the existing becoming in which a certain Dasein achieves itself - or, 
rather, in which it is in the process of achieving itself - it can only 
become what lies within it to be, in accord with the characteristics, 
limitations, and demands of its own unique historical location. The way 
the call of conscience 'speaks' the 'has' in 'has to be' (zu sein hat), 
moreover, gives that 'has' the nature of an imperative, a must, in a 
twofold sense; Dasein has to be what it is and can be in the sense that 
it can only be this, but also in the sense that it is summoned to be this, 
that it must take it upon itself to be what it is and can be, must accept 
and undertake (Ubernehmen> to be what it has been thrown, determined, to 
be. It must be determined to be what it has been determined to be, even 
though it has not, and cannot ever. determine what it has been determined 
to be in principio, even though it cannot ever get behind its thrownness 
to determine its being from the ground up. It is this determination, this 
decision, which brings Dasein into its destiny. 
Being thrown into existence, and having to be as it is and can be, 
also means that Dasein must, as this or that particular Dasein, be the kind 
of being that it is in its essence. The essence of Dasein is existence, 
and existence is transcendence. Transcendence is that projecting of 
possibilities which is grounded in the prior understanding of being and 
which makes possible (in the sense of 'is a condition for the possibility 
of') the being of Dasein, where that being is defined as care. Care, it 
will be remembered, reveals itself as the structure of a being that is 
concerned with, and responsible for, its own becoming. Insofar as there 
is anything like a determinate essence of Dasein, it lies in the inexorable 
past of this »das es ist and als das Seiende, das es ist, seinkinnend zu 
sein hat« ("'that it is, and that it has to be something with a 
potentiality-for-being as the entity which it is"'] (SZ, 276), where the zu 
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sein hat has, again, the double meaning of an imperative. 
Thus, when the call of conscience gives Dasein to understand the kind 
of being which it, as Dasein, is and has to be, it also discloses to Dasein 
the unity and destiny of Dasein in general. The 'purpose' of Dasein is to 
be that being which explicitly reaches for being and exists for the sake 
of being. Recalling Dasein to its thrown self, as a self which reaches for 
being, conscience recalls the self that Dasein is thrown into the world to 
be. Dasein then remembers itself as a futural being. The remembrance of 
its primordial essence is then, for Dasein, also the remembrance of its 
primordial future, of the self that exists ahead of itself, and is the 
'towards-which' of its existence. 
Heidegger, therefore, like Tauler, sees transcendence, in the simple 
sense of 'going beyond', as definitive of the fundamental constitution of 
human being. The very being of this being, existence, is characterised as 
a passage beyond the actual towards the possible, where this passage is 
made possible by Dasein's a priori understanding of being. That is to say, 
the transcendence constitutive of existence is enabled by an understanding 
which is itself transcendental and which grounds the understanding of 
possibility. Tauler sees the movement of the soul towards perfection as a 
movement towards God, enabled by the presence of God to the soul. But 
this presence, as the limit of what the self desires, is the limit of its 
essence, the limit and ground of its possibility. It is, in fact, the limit 
of all essences, the essence of essences, infinite being, and as such it 
grounds every possibility of being. It is because Tauler sees God as the 
limit and ground of essence as pure possibility of being that God is also, 
for him as for Eckhart, an abyss of being which is 'deeper' than being, an 
Ab-grund of possible perfection out of which finite being arises and into 
which it returns. 
To say that Tauler conceives of God as the ground and limit of all 
possibility, all essence, is not to say that he does not see God as an 
actual being. Rather, Tauler, again like Eckhart, conceives of the possible 
essence, including the essence of the soul and the essence of essences, 
the essence of God, as the highest actuality. Heidegger does not think of 
-essence as a higher actuality, but he does conceive of possibility as 
higher than actuality (SZ, 38), and for him as for Tauler (and, for that 
matter, Eckhart) the understanding which grants Dasein's possibility, and is 
therefore the ground of Dasein as a free being, a being which can assume 
responsibility for the task of its own perfection, is itself groundless. In 
231 
Sein and Zeit this is simply because it is transcendental, something into 
which Dasein is thrown and behind which it cannot go. But in Vom Wesen 
des Grundes, Heidegger adds that die Freiheit stellt in ihrem Wesen als 
Transzendenz das Dasein als Seinkönnen in Möglichkeiten, die vor seiner 
endlichen Wahl, d. h. In seinem Schicksal aufklaffen ('freedom, in its essence 
as transcendence, places Dasein as potentiality-for-being in possibilities, 
which gape open before its finite choice, i. e. in its destiny' (WG, 126/128). 
In freedom, Dasein is essentially related to an abyss of possibility; it is 
in this sense that freedom is der"Ab-grund des Daseins (WG, 128). 
The absymal freedom of Dasein does not deliver it into arbitrariness. 
The call of conscience, in recalling Dasein to its thrown and finite self, 
calls upon it to take responsibility for that self in the fulfillment of 
the particular possibilities that make up its unique destiny. The call of 
God for Tauler summons the individual in much the same way. In both 
cases, the self is called upon to assume responsibility for its being even 
though it has not determined that being, and the decision to do so is the 
decision to accept and undertake a destiny. Because it involves decision, 
this destiny is itself not necessary, but possible. 
With -respect to the assumption of responsibility, Heidegger claims 
that the call which recalls. Dasein to itself in calling it forwards to its 
ownmost potentiality-for-being does so by way of summoning it to its 
ownmost being-guilty (SZ, 269). The guilt of which conscience speaks is 
associated with a 'not', a negativity or nullity (Nichtigkeit), but that 
negativity does not indicate a lack (Mangel) in Dasein. It has to do, 
rather, with Dasein's being responsible for a negativity, its Grundsein 
einer Nichtigkeit ('being-the-basis of a nullity') (SZ, 283). As the basis 
of a nullity, Dasein is the ground or cause of the 'not' of being. It is 
this because it is responsible for the perfectio of its own being, even 
though, as thrown, it did not and cannot determine that being. Dasein is 
essentially being-guilty precisely because the law of Dasein's own being, 
as existence or transcendence, issues to it the imperative to take over 
being-the-ground (Grundsein) of itself, although it has not lain that 
ground itself. Its not having determined itself in its ground, along with 
its having to take over being-the-ground of itself, gives the nothingness, 
the negativity, of Dasein. 
Existence, transcendence, means: understanding being, being 
understanding. That Dasein exists means that it understands possibilities 
of being, and, in this understanding, transcends to being. As already 
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suggested, in order to understand possibilities of being, Dasein must first 
understand being-possible itself, and it is enabled to do so because it is 
that entity whose relation to being is such that it always moves within an 
a priori and transcendental understanding of being. The understanding of 
possibility (understanding being-possible), is what makes it possible for 
Dasein to be responsible, because it makes it possible for Dasein to 
choose. Thus, in the final analysis, it is the understanding of being that 
makes it possible for Dasein to choose possibilities of its own being so 
as to be responsible. Since this understanding is granted to Dasein, it 
can be said that Dasein exists, transcends, becomes as a response to a call 
made possible by something, or by some event, that lies beyond the reach 
of its power, but at the same time sustains its power in every respect. 
Its choosing of possibilities of being in projection, which 
constitutes Dasein's being-free, adds another form of nothing to the 
nothingness of its having been thrown, because its choice must always be a 
single and therefore exclusive one (SZ, 285). When it is the ground of 
the 'not' of being, then, Dasein cannot help but know itself as such, in 
knowing the possibilities of being its own choice has excluded. 
Furthermore, as was pointed out in the last chapter, as long as Dasein is 
possible, and it is its nature to be possible, there is also a futural 
'not' in it, a noch nicht, and this is in addition to the 'not' of its past. 
As long as Dasein exists, therefore, as long as it projects possibilities 
into a future and is responsible for itself as the thrown being which it 
is and is to be, its being is permeated by nothingness, pervaded by being- 
guilty. Guilt is never wholly redeemable in the time that belongs to 
Dasein. 
Thus, Dasein is always guilty in relation to being in much the same 
way as the human soul is always guilty before God in Tauler's conception. 
Of course, human beings are guilty before God in any Christian conception, 
but in this case the similarity is more than merely analogical, and also 
involves more than a similar understanding of the way human beings 
experience themselves in the world. It extends to a similarity in nature 
between Heidegger's understanding of being and Tauler's understanding of 
God. The soul, for Tauler, is guilty before God because God is that 
infinite essence in whom every finite essence Is gathered up and fulfilled. 
The presence of that infinite essence to the soul is therefore the ground 
of its being possible, the ground of its possibility as a transcending 
being. It is before this ground of possibility that the soul qua human is 
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always guilty. 
Since, for Heidegger, Dasein is being-possible, and so being-guilty, in 
its very essence, its being its authentic self cannot mean its reaching a 
state in which perfection has been accomplished and in which guilt is no 
more. Authenticity consists in choosing to be the authentic self, in 
Dasein's choosing to be what it can be and what it has been determined to 
be. To make this choice, Dasein must hear the call of itself correctly; its 
hearing must correspond to it. In this corresponding hearing, Dasein has 
to be situated towards itself in a way that enables it to understand the 
call, a way that makes it possible for it to hear the testimony of that 
potentiality which calls to it from afar, and from out of the depths of its 
own being. 
That hearing is a willing; it is a willingness to be appealed to by 
the call and to be called forth to that of which it attests. In such a 
willing, Dasein becomes attentive and submissive (härig) to seiner 
eigensten Existenzmäglichkeit ('its ownmost possibility of existence'] (SZ, 
287). Heidegger describes this choice as Gewissen-haben-wollen ('wanting 
to have a conscience'], which means only Bereitschaft für das 
Angerufenwerden ('that one is ready to be appealed to'] (SZ, 288). Because 
this readiness means its being prepared to be its own ground, however. 
Dasein's binding itself to itself in this way also means its accepting 
being-guilty, for, in being prepared to be the ground of its being, Dasein 
accepts being-the-ground of a nullity. It accepts being responsible for 
the 'not', the imperfectio, of being, and is thus ready to take upon itself 
the guilt which is its very own. The willing readiness of this choosing 
understands the call of the authentic self in that it allows that self to 
act in Dasein of its own accord; it allows it to speak. Only when the self 
is allowed to speak in this way can Dasein's actions answer to the appeal 
it makes, and only then is Dasein truly responsible (verantwortlich) for 
itself and to itself (SZ, 288). 
Heidegger delimits the totality of Dasein's authentic way of being as 
das verschwiegene, angstbereite Sichentwerfen auf das eigenste 
Schuldigsein ('reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost being-guilty, in 
which one is ready for anxiety'] (SZ, 296-7). This sentence articulates 
the authentic potentiality-for-being that consistutes Dasein's genuine 
being-its-self in being-in-the-world, which Heidegger names 
Entschlossenheit ('resoluteness']. The idea that Dasein wins its true self 
in resoluteness rests on the notion that only in light of the truth of 
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There is also a parallel between Heidegger's account of 
Seinsverlassenheit and Ruusbroec's notion of ghelatenheit. The two 
moments of ghelatenheit, forsakenness and surrender or relinquishment, find 
an echo in Heidegger's notion of the forsakenness by being which may be 
overcome by a relinquishment of the centrality of the subject. For both 
Heidegger and Ruusbroec, this relinquishment is a willingness to endure 
absence, and an abandonment of the search for security. But while the 
Untergang which this reliquishment involves for Heidegger can be compared 
with Ruusbroec's conception of humility, there is, as usual, nothing in 
Heidegger's thought corresponding to the Christian notion of compassion. 
There is, however, in Heidegger's account of Ereignung, something 
corresponding to Ruusbroec's notion of love. The parallel between the 
giving of Ereignis and the outflowing of God as love has already been 
noted, but there is also a similarity between the ways Heidegger and 
Ruusbroec describe the response to this giving. For both, the inclination 
is a reciprocal one. For Ruusbroec, the response to the touch of love is 
love, while for Heidegger Ereignung involves a mutual giving over of being 
and Dasein. The similarity of some of the language in which they describe 
the event of this encounter is apparent, and what is important about this 
language is that it, once again in contrast with Eckhart, places the 
emphasis on moments of transformation, moments where something that 
transforms is suffered, something that can in no way be compelled or 
calculated. 
This emphasis on an overpowering power does not, for either 
Ruusbroec or Heidegger, take away self-responsibility. Just as grace and 
effort go hand in hand for Ruusbroec, so the turning, for Heidegger, 
requires a preparation. The giving of Ereignis is beyond human control, 
but while it, and only it, can enable an appropriate response, it does not 
inevitably compel that response. Correspondance to its sending requires an 
openness and dedication. It requires something much like the Denken, 
which, in Was heißt Denken?, Is said to be Meinen in the sense of mine. 
In comparing these features of Ruusbroec's and Heidegger's thought, 
it is important to steer a careful course between the Scylla of 'identity' 
on the one side and the Charybdis of 'analogy' on the other. Heidegger is 
not talking about a personal experience of God, and his thought is 
historical through and through. But the similarity between what he says 
and what Ruusbroec says is not a matter of some purely formal analogy, 
either, nor does it just involve that form of repetition which often 
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the self is made steady and whole; it is healed of its divisions. The 
reconciliation and free bondage of the self which Heidegger describes In 
terms of willingness to be guilty and wanting to have a conscience, means, 
for Tauler, reconciliation with the will of God. 
In being resolute, Dasein constantly relates itself (and that means 
the whole of its world) to itself as an authentic potentiality-for-being. 
It then refers all that makes up being-in-the-world to itself as 
potentiality, and is thereby constant to the self to which its existence 
truly refers, the potential self which it most genuinely is. As the end to 
which being-in-the-world is related and referred, this possible self is, 
in Entschlossenheit, the 'for-the-sake-of-which' for the sake of which 
Dasein exists. The meaning of being-in-the-world is then determined in 
reference to this possibility, and the way in which all that is within the 
world is disclosed is thereby radically transformed. 
For Heidegger as for Tauler, therefore, the transcending self, when 
faithful to itself, refers itself constantly to the future of transcendent 
imminence, and, in so doing, takes 'world' along with it. When world is 
referred to such a destiny, it is necessarily transformed. The world that 
Dasein meets when it refers to what can be with faithfulness is not the 
busy world of everydayness,. and the world the soul encounters in referring 
all- things to God is not the world of vanity and distraction. It is the 
world which Is itself imminent, the world of 'transcendent' meaning. 
Being resolute does not isolate Dasein from the world, but brings it 
into the world in a more authentic way. The choice Dasein makes in 
resolving upon itself is nothing 'selfish' or 'solipsistic'. Far from 
pulling Dasein away from being-with others, this resolve gives Dasein the 
vision to see what those others can be, and enables it to help them be 
this (SZ, 298). And in Vom Wesen des Grundes, Heidegger says, nur das 
Hörenkönnen in the Ferne zeitigt dem Dasein als Selbst des Erwachen der 
Antwort des Mitdaseins, im Mitsein mit dem es the Ichheit darangeben kann, 
um sich als eigentliches Selbst zu gewinnen ('only the ability to hear into 
the distance awakens Dasein as self to the answer of its Dasein-with, so 
that in being-with others it can surrender its individuality in order to 
win itself as an authentic self'] (WG, 130/131). For Tauler, perfect being 
with others consists in intending perfection above all things, and the 
perfection of others as one's own, in loving God before all things and 
one's neighbour as oneself. 
The vision that belongs to resoluteness is indeed one in which Dasein 
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is 'withdrawn' from the world of its daily concern, drawn back and out of 
its lostness in das Man, but the distant withdrawal of this vision does 
not shut being-in-the-world away from Dasein. Rather, it makes that form 
of being transparent. Resolute understanding does not escape from the 
conditions determining Dasein's factical existence in the world, but 'sees 
through' them to their truth. To this truth belongs the discovery not only 
that Dasein can never itself be wholly free from the irresoluteness and 
falling which make up the world of das Man, but also that the unfolding of 
its potentiality-for-being can occur only within the factical possibilities 
offered by this world into which it has been thrown. It is this 
understanding that discloses to Dasein the full truth of its condition, and 
so brings it Into its 'situation' (SZ. 2919). 
The situation of Dasein is its Da, the 'there' of 'being-there', within 
which, and only within which, the Sein of Dasein is accomplished. It is 
disclosed as such, however, only when Dasein has resolved upon itself as 
Dasein, as that entity which accomplishes . itself as the 'there' of 'being'. 
Entschlossen to being there, open and willing to be there, Dasein refers 
the concrete circumstances of its world to the potentiality for being- 
there which the call of its conscience reveals to it. Only 'in the light 
of' this reference does it uncover the reason and explanation (Bewandtnis) 
for its circumstances (Umstände). Only in view of the relationship to 
itself which Entschlossenheit discloses and for which it makes a'decision 
do chances and accidents (Zufälle) devolve upon and fall to (zufallen) 
Dasein, rather than merely occurring in a haphazard and meaningless way 
(SZ, 299-300). 
The call to the self, in Tauler's thought, comes not only inwardly but 
also outwardly, in the particular events that befall a person. Moreover, 
each person is 'ordered' to a particular position within the common 
framework of a community. An individual's 'calling', therefore - which is a 
call to realize its duty to God, to realize itself before God, thereby 
translating the presence of God to it into the world - consists, as for 
Heidegger, in the summons to a unique destiny, which is known through a 
hearing and seeing that is both 'inward' and 'outward'. That destiny is 
neither arbitrary nor necessary, neither a matter of blind chance nor of 
blind fate. It is not arbitrary because it is ordered, and it is not 
necessary because it must be chosen; it can be either accepted or refused. 
Thus, this destiny is, once again, a possibility for the self, a possibility 
to which it can bind itself, or not. And only when the self discloses and 
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chooses itself as this possibility, which means only when it is open to the 
call that calls it to the destined place which is its own unique and 
proper destination in the world, does it uncover the 'sense' of its world. 
Only when it means this destiny in its reference to the world, that is, 
does its world have meaning. 
Tauler, of course, unlike Heidegger, conceives of a supreme being, 
God, whose ordering activity is the condition for the ordering of being 
into something like a destiny, where that ordering activity is a 
'foreseeing', a pro-vidential, one. It is in following the providential 
ordering of this being, the 'will of God', that an individual accomplishes 
the destiny provided for it. It might be thought that Tauler's 
understanding of destiny here, even leaving aside the issue of a highest 
being, differs from Heidegger's in positing something that is settled in 
advance, and from all eternity, by transcendent decree. By contrast, for 
Heidegger, it could be said, the individual self destines itself through its 
own foreseeing. It provides itself with its own destiny, and any 
'providence' in that destiny is its own doing. After all, is not Dasein's 
being destined a determination, a decision, a resolve, an immanent destino 
rather than a transcendent destinatum? But it needs to be noted, in 
mitigation (not abolition) of this difference, both that Tauler's notion of 
accepting the destiny provided by God also involves decision, and that 
Heidegger's notion of projecting a destiny in resolve also involves a 
transcendent having-been-ordered-in-advance. Dasein is, after all; thrown 
into its being-Da, and can only resolve upon itself as having-been-thrown- 
to-be. It, too, is already ordered in its being, and does not order that 
being itself. 
Thus, Heidegger's later talk of the Seinsgeschick and Ereignis, while 
it certainly manifests a shift in tone and focus, does not represent a 
genuine break with the central insights of Sein and Zeit, much less a 
repudiation. , 
It is truly a continuation, as Heidegger himself always 
maintained. ' It only thinks what is unthought, but implicit, in Sein and 
Zeit, that Dasein is sent into its being and its time, appropriated to its 
destiny by an event beyond its power. 
Like Tauler, Heidegger understands the appropriative ordering of this 
event in the sense of both structure and decree. Dasein, too, is gefüget 
to a destiny, 'ordered', in a dual sense, to a particular position in virtue 
of the gifts/limitations that it has and the requirements/constraints of 
its circumstances, i. e. in virtue of its thrown potentiality-for-being 
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within the factical possibilities of its finite and localized Da. Again, 
this is implicit in Sein and Zeit. Heidegger does not speak of Fug, and 
the cluster of terms surrounding it, until later. But it is interesting 
that when he does, in, for instance, the passages from Einführung in the 
Metaphysik discussed in Chapter One, where he uses it to translate the 
Greek dike, usually translated as 'justice', it means both fügende Gefüge 
('governing structure'] and Fügung ('decree']. It will be recalled that 
Heidegger claims in this text that, for the early Greek thinkers, dike as 
Fug is the order imposed by the overpowering power of physis, an early 
Greek term for being (EM, 168-9/160-1). The world of (Heidegger's) early 
Greek thinkers, the world of Tauler, and the world of Heidegger himself 
may well belong to different dispensations of being, involving different 
ways of understanding being, but there is something of the same here, too. 
There is also something of the same in the 'advance' of the having- 
been-ordered-in-advance common to Tauler's and Heidegger's conceptions of 
being-in-the-world, and it has to do with the relation between being and 
God. It is brought more clearly into view in the previously quoted line 
from Was Ist Metaphysik? Im Sein hat sich anfänglich jedes Geschick des 
Seienden schon vollendet (WM, 52/392). Being, after all, comprehends all 
possibilities. As the essence of essences, so does Tauler's God. 
To return to Sein and Zeit, in that conscience calls Dasein forward 
into its situation, - it is not merely negative,. but is a kind of being 
enclosed in the ground of Dasein (im Grunde des Daseins beschlossene 
Seinsart) which attests to what Dasein is capable of being, and thereby 
first enables it to be what it can be in its factical existence (SZ, 300). 
The factical existence of Dasein is finite. Two aspects of this finitude 
have already been indicated: that Dasein is limited by the thrownness 
which determines its being as a potentiality-for-being, and that it is 
limited to the possibilities available in its situation. The radical 
finitude of existence, however, is only fully grasped in the knowledge that 
this existence is bounded not only in its past and present, but, first and 
foremost, in its future. Dasein comes' to an end, it dies, and this is 
diclosed to Dasein in the running ahead of anticipation (Vorlaufen) which 
gives rise to. its authentic future. Thus, resoluteness, in disclosing the 
truth of Dasein's existing potentiality-for-being, a disclosure which must 
encompass the finitude that belongs essentially to such existing, gives an 
authentic relation to potentiality only in being anticipatory, for dos 
»kann« des Schuldigseinkönnens versteht die Entschlossenheit erst, wenn sie 
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sich als Sein zum Tode »qualifiziertc ('only when it "qualifies" itself as 
being-towards-death does resoluteness understand the "can" of its 
potentiality-for-being-guilty'] (SZ, 306). 
Taken together, the forms of negativity that are said to be the 
limiting conditions of Dasein express the same kinds of finitude as the 
two forms of nothingness mentioned by Tauler. Dasein is also bounded by a 
'natural nothing', in that it does not determine the 'that' or the 'what' of 
its being, neither its arising and passing away, nor its nature and 
location, and it is bounded by a 'faulty nothing', in that, as a 
potentiality-for-being, it always lags behind its possibilities. Tauler, 
like Heidegger, views the understanding and acceptance of these forms of 
negativity as essential to understanding the truth of existence, and thus 
essential in the self's becoming transparent to itself, but being towards 
death is not nearly so important for him as it is for Heidegger. Nor 
would one expect-it to be, since the form of death revealed in anticipation 
is not, for Tauler, the ultimate truth, the true end of the soul. That end 
lies, rather, in another kind of death, one which is also a fulfillment and 
an eternal life. 
The 'self' of Dasein's average way of being, Heidegger notes, 
constantly evades its authentic potentiality-for-being, and interprets 
itself not in terms of this potentiality but in terms of the world of daily 
concern. It is still related to this potentiality in its ground, as the 
being which it is, but its relation to that relation is one of evasion. The 
present of this self, the present of Dasein's everydayness is 'the being- 
alongside which falls' (des verfallende Sein-bei) (SZ, 328). In 
resoluteness, Dasein is pulled back out of this falling. It is not thereby 
taken somewhere else; it does not cease to have a present, but the nature 
of that present changes. The present of resoluteness is the 'moment' 
(Augenblick) (SZ, 328), in which Dasein is fetched back from the distraction 
of its average way of being. This moment is not an isolated instant, not 
a 'now' that has been severed from future and past, but a unity in which 
the present is held in the future and the past. It is held in authentic 
temporality, that temporality in which the future, the coming-towards, is 
in the process of having been, of coming to pass (SZ, 328). 
The moment is a rapture, a form of ecstasis. Its form is different 
from that of the ecstasis of everydayness, in which Dasein is carried away 
in bearing away from itself towards the objects of its concern, and thus 
existing away from itself in the mode of being immersed in the world of 
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that concern. The ecstasy of resoluteness, on the other hand, is an active 
being carried beyond the world of daily concern, which is at the same time 
an authentic way of being towards the matters of concern encountered 
within a situation. 
The vision that belongs to the moment involves the conjunction of 
both the understanding of that which is in time, and of that which is not. 
All beings, including Dasein, are in time, but being itself is not (SZ, 17- 
19,376). It follows that, if Dasein has an understanding of being, it has, 
in some sense, an understanding of the temporality of what is not in time. 
The moment of Dasein is, in fact, the conjunction of a kind of 'time' and 
and a kind of 'eternity'. This traditional formulation can, I feel, still be 
used in reference to Heidegger, with the caution that time and temporality 
are to be conceived as he has described them. This requires that all 
notions of time as the succession of now-points, and all notions of 
eternity derived-from these, which then conceive of it as the infinite 
succession of such points, as infinite duration or an infinitely perduring 
'now', be kept at a distance. The temporality of what is in time is the 
unity of the time of that which is in time, the unified totality of its 
past, present, and future. If based on this notion of temporality, the 
temporality of that which' is not in time - i. e. 'eternity' - must be 
conceived of as the unity of its past, present and future, the unity of the 
temporal modes of- the 'supra-temporal', the 'moment' of being, as was 
pointed out in Chapter Two. 
In Sein and Zeit, the moment of Dasein is actually the meeting-point 
of necessity and possibility, of Da and Sein. Sein is not in time, and it 
is on the- basis of the understanding of Sein that Dasein is enabled to 
project' possibilities of being. The understanding of what is not in time, 
then, is the 'infinitizing factor' in Dasein's constitution; it is because 
Dasein understands being that it has imagination. ® Resolute 
understanding, however, also crashes against limits, and authentic 
understanding allows its infinitizing projection to be qualified by these 
limits, by death, thrownness, guilt, and facticity, by all that makes up the 
Da of Dasein. When resolute and authentic, Dasein knows both of these 
'components' of itself. It knows itself to be not merely Da, and not 
unlimited Sein, but Da-sein. It understands being, and strives to be on 
the basis of this understanding, but it understands as well the limiting 
conditions of being Da. The moment grants the event that comprehends the 
temporality of Dasein as the temporality of a conjuncture, of that jointure 
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of Sein and Da which Dasein is. 
Given what has already been said about the nature of destiny in 
relation to possibility, necessity and decision, the similarity between the 
transparencies gained in Heidegger's and Tauler's 'moments' does not 
require much further comment. All I would like to add is a point of 
emphasis, that Heidegger's moment, while it involves decision, is still a 
moment of revelation, a visionary moment, as is Tauler's. Whatever 
affinities there may be between Heidegger's description of the resolute 
individual and Nietzsche's notion of the Übermensch, and there certainly 
are some, lil the revelatory and transcendently imperative character of the 
moment (which, in truth, also finds an echo in Nietzsche's thought)' ° must 
not be overlooked, as it sometimes is in expositions that concentrate 
exclusively on the 'I resolve' aspect of the 'I am resolved'. " This 
suggests that Heidegger's celebrated Kehre, manifest, for instance, in the 
turn from Entschlossenheit to Gelassenheit is not, once again, a radical 
break, but a continuation. The moment in which being is revealed to Dasein 
was always, implicitly, understood as an arrival (An-kunft), a disclosure 
(Erschlossenheit) of being granted to Dasein in virtue of the Bereitschaft 
far das Angerufen werden that makes up Entschlosssenheit. 
On the other hand, Fergus Kerr, in 1969, writes, 'the Heidegger who 
quaintly reinterprets Entschlossenheit as Ent-schlossenheit is the one who, 
with a hyphen, rejects the arbitrariness, of dominating will in favour of an 
accepting correspondence with deep needs and desires. The stance of 
subject towards object, man towards being, man towards Nature, one man 
towards another, which Heidegger once identified as will to dominate, now 
becomes transformed into letting-be, Seinlassen'. '2 Kerr is surely right 
to point out that some shift takes place here, and that it results from 
Heidegger's rethinking of his position after his experience with Nazism. 
John Caputo has made the same point about Entschlossenheit, in 'Heidegger's 
God and the Lord of History'. "' But the sense that 'the basic structure of 
being human is existenzial, rather ekstatish: open, receptive, responsive, 
in a certain sense passive and submissive' (p. 365), which Kerr thinks 
Heidegger comes to later on, actually has firm roots in Sein and Zeit, 
although it is only one side of an existential account which is admittedly 
ambiguous. I think it is not so much a matter of Heidegger's having 
'changed his mind' (p. 365), as of his having listened more carefully to 
what he himself had said in Sein and Zeit, and of his having decided upon 
one of the meanings in that work's ambiguous description. In that case, 
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Heidegger's later reinterpretaton of Entsclossenheit as Ent-schlossenheit 
is not quite as 'quaint' as it may at first appear. 
It is interesting in this context to compare Sein and Zeit's 
Augenblick with the rapture of the seer described in Der Spruch des 
Anaximander, where Heidegger comments upon Homer's portrayal of Kalchas in 
The mad. The seer is rapt away from the closest concerns which press 
upon him in the present, and transported into a, distance (Weite) which is 
unified (einige), a distance in which past, present, and future dwell 
together in the unity of a simple presencing. In this rapture, the seer is 
also carried away to the presencing of what is currently present, of what 
is arriving and departing in what Sein and Zeit calls the situation (Hw, 
343/36). This is a vision of what is being sent. It is a vision of the 
destining of being, and so of the destiny in which the present is involved. 
What befalls Dasein in the present, the concatenation of current events and 
circumstances, is- comprehensible and meaningful only in the light of this 
destiny. 
When the seer enters into the expanse of this presence, he enters 
into the truth of the present, for he enters into the preserve of truth 
itself. In this preserve, what Is, was, and will be is gathered together 
and kept safe in a simple unity in which what comes about always already 
'was'. Here, the truth of the whole of presencing, the truth of being, is 
kept: 
Dem Seher ist alles An- und Abwesende in ein Anwesen 
versammelt und darin gewahrt. Unser altes Wort »war« 
bedeutet die Hut. Wir kennen es noch im »wahrnehmen«, d. h. 
in die Wahr nehmen im »ggewahren« und »verwahren«. Das 
Wahren ist als das lichtend-versammelnde Bergen zu denken. 
Das Anwesen wahrt das Anwesende, das gegenwärtige und das 
ungegenwärtige, in die Unverborgenheit. Aus der Wahr des 
Anwesenden sagt der Seher. Er ist der Wahr-Sager. 
[All things present and absent are gathered and preserved 
in one presencing for the seer. The old German word war 
[was] means protection. We still recognize this in 
wahrnehmen [to perceive], i. e. to take into preservation; in 
gewahren and verwahren [to be aware of, to keep or 
preserve]. We must think of wahren as a securing which 
clears and gathers. Presencing preserves [wehrt] in 
unconcealment what is present both at the present time and 
not at the present time. The seer speaks from the 
preserve [Wahr] of what is present. He is the sooth-sayer 
[Wahr-Sager. ] (Hw, 344/36) 
. The seer speaks 
the truth because he speaks from out of the truth of 
being, insofar as he has seen the totality of presencing, and has knowledge 
of it: Der Seher Ist derjenige, der das All des Anweseden im Anwesen 
schon gesehen hat; lateinisch gesprochen: vidit; deutsch: er steht im 
Wissen. Gesehenhaben ist das Wesen des Wissens ('The seer is one who has 
already seen the totality of what is present in its presencing. Said in 
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Latin, vidit; in German, er steht im Wissen (he stands in knowledge). To 
have seen is the essence of knowledge. '] (Hw, 344/36. ) What is present is 
not merely what is, factually, at the time, It is, rather, what is coming 
to pass, what is happening. True knowledge of the present is therefore 
the vision of what is coming to pass, insight into the truth of what is 
happening in the present. Such insight does require 'projection'; it 
requires an Entwurf in terms of which what is happening is understood. 
But the Entwurf, if genuine, corresponds to what-is, and lights up the 
truth of what-is. It illumines. And the illumining Entwurf is sent in 
the rapture of vision, not 'thought up', or calculated, by Dasein. 
To the authentic present, the moment comprehending the whole of 
Dasein's temporality, and the authentic future, the anticipation that 
understands potentiality and its limit, there corresponds an authentic 
past, an authentic way of having-been. For Heidegger, this way of having- 
been, to which Dasein is brought back and brought before through the 
resolute running ahead in which it comes towards itself while coming back 
to itself, -is Wiederholung, 'repetition' or 'bringing back' (SZ, 339). As a 
way of having-been, repetition brings the past before Dasein, not as an 
actuality, not as something that once happened and is now no longer of any 
concern except as a matter, of 'disinterested' historiological inquiry, but 
as a possibility for itself. 14 In repetition, Dasein fetches back 
possibilities of itself from the past, and translates them into its 
situation. In so doing, it inherits its tradition. It discloses 
possibilities of itself to itself in terms of the heritage (Erbe) which it, 
as thrown, assumes (SZ, 384). 
Possibilities do not recur of their own; they must be chosen. 
Without such choice, history is not repetition, but necessity. The 
historicity of inauthentic Dasein is one in which the possibilities of the 
past are constantly forgotten, in which the past as possible is forgotten 
altogether. Everyday being-in-the-world has the inauthentic present, the 
making-present which disperses itself in the closest concerns of today, as 
its primary temporal mode. It knows the past only in terms of this 
present, as the 'actual' (»Wirkliche«) which is left over in the present, 
and which has had an effect upon the present as something actual and 
active, as a cause. By contrast, the eigentliche Geschichtlichkeit Versteht 
the Geschichte als the »Wiederkehrr« des Möglichen and weiß darum, daß the 
Möglichkeit nur wiederkehrt, wenn the Existenz schicksalhaft-augenblicklich 
für sie in der entschlossenen Wiederholung offen Ist ('when historicality 
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is authentic, it understands history as the "recurrence" of the possible, 
and knows that a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it 
fatefully, in a moment of vision, in resolute repetition'] (SZ, 391-2). 
Repeating is handing down an inherited possibility explicitly. 
Fetching a possibility out of the past and repeating it, imitating a hero, 
for instance, is not a matter of some simple copying in which what 
happened once is actualized again, nor is it a matter of just being 
determined by the past so as to participate in the working out of its 
effects. Repetition translates past possibilities into the present, and, in 
so doing, it responds to them. This response, made from within the moment 
of vision, is at the same time a revocation (Widerruf) of the past's effect 
on the present, of the way in which the past is working upon, and working 
itself out in, the present. Repetition, the authentic response to a past 
possibility, cries out against the way in which the past is being worked 
out in the present, while at the same time calling the present back to 
that past, recalling to it the possibility that has been (SZ, 384-5). 
Through authentic repetition, Dasein is brought immediately before what 
has already been before it. Moreover, repetition brings Dasein into the 
real presence of what has been; it brings the past to presence, and into 
the present, for Dasein. Presenting the past to itself in this way, Dasein 
hands its inheritance over to itself and accepts the thrownness of its own 
Da. It accepts itself as Dasein. 
For the Christian Dasein of Tauler, the inherited repeatable 
possibility is Jesus Christ. The history of the divine man constitutes 
the past which is made really present through such repetition. 
Resoluteness, in the sense of openness and readiness for the the call to 
the self, discloses this past as possibility, and repetition, as imitatio 
Christi, translates that possibility into the infinite variety of possible 
individual lives. Only through such disclosure and repetition is this past 
event really present to Christian Dasein, only, that is, when it is thought 
out of the future so as to be an imminent possibility. 
This possibility is inexhaustible. Christ is the hero who can always 
be imitated precisely because he can never be imitated. The event is 
therefore unique, infinitely repeatable because unrepeatable, and so always 
possible. Since Christ is perfection itself in human form, which no human 
being is or can be, the repetition is a never-ending attempt, an imminence 
for all time. 
Nowhere in any of Heidegger's works is there a description of a state 
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quite like that of the completion of the soul in mystical union. In Sein 
and Zeit, Dasein, as existing being-in-the-world, is always incomplete, 
always lacking and striving. If it were to gain the completion in which 
mystical union consists, it would no longer be Dasein, would no longer be 
there (see SZ, 236). In fact, in mystical union, 'human being' is no longer 
there, and so such union is often described as a form of death, although 
this death is supposed to equal absolute fulfillment, not the end, in the 
sense of 'cutting off', of possibility. If such death dies into any kind of 
life, it then cannot be the life of this. world, since absolute fulfillment 
cannot belong to being-in-the-world. 
In Sein and Zeit, Heidegger's analysis of death is limited to this 
world, to the 'this-worldly' side of it, where it is always a possibility 
towards which Dasein exists. Heidegger decides nothing one way or another 
about what might be after death, but points out that the question of the 
'otherworldly' side of death cannot be meaningfully raised until the this- 
worldly ontological interpretation of death has been secured (SZ, 247-8). 
This raises the possibility of using the terms of Heidegger's analysis of 
Dasein and death to interpret the mystical union in which the soul is 
described as undergoing a kind of death. ' Heidegger does not himself 
ever move to speculation about the other side of death, though, and Sein 
and Zeit views death not as fulfillment but as the cutting off of 
possibility. 
Looking only at Sein and Zeit, there is another point of disanalogy 
in that Heidegger speaks only, in this work, of Dasein's being withdrawn by 
the voice of conscience, and does not speak of the kind of voluntary 
withdrawal which contemplation involves. Wanting to have a conscience 
does require resolve, and in this resolve there is a willingness to be 
withdrawn by the voice that calls away from das Man. But Heidegger does 
not, in Sein and Zeit, describe the sort of deliberate drawing in and away 
of attention from the world of everyday concern and focussing of it 
elsewhere that characterizes Tauler's notion of contemplative devotion. 
It is, however, precisely such a movement of the GemUt, das Wesende des 
ganzen Menschenwesens ('the essential being of all human nature'] (WhD, 
95/148) that Heidegger describes in Was heißt Denken?. This movement is 
recollection. It involves memory, the collection (Sammlung) of the whole 
of the mind, das ganze Gemüt im Sinne der steten innigen Versammlung bei 
dem, was sich allem Sinnen wesenhaft zuspricht ('the whole disposition in 
the sense of a steadfast intimate concentration upon the things that 
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essentially speak to us in every thoughtful meditation'] (WhD, 92/140). 
Memory in this sense, the concentrated affection of the innermost 
meditation of mind and spirit, is devotion (WhD, 158/145). 
Thinking (Denken) is memory (Gedächtnis), remembering and 
commemorating (Andenken), thanking (Danken) and devotion (Andacht). It is 
the unceasing and concentrated commemorative remembrance of what is most 
worthy of thought (das Bedenklichste), of what gives itself, in every 
instance, to thought to think, and is itself gathered up and present in the 
innermost unity of the Gemüt. Such concentrated remembrance is Meinen, 
understood in the sense of minne. It is devotion to being, a devotion 
which, in and by itself, gives thanks for the gift of our being (Wesen) to 
that which bestows, and to which we are therefore indebted, for that being. 
In terms of the later Heidegger's task, such devotion is that besinnliches 
Denken ... das dem Sinn nachdenkt, der in allem waltet, was ist 
('meditative thinking ... which contemplates the meaning which reigns in 
everything that is'] (G, 13/46). It is remembrance of being, giving thought 
to being. This does not, with respect to existence (scholarship is another 
matter altogether), mean speculating about the nature of being. It means 
keeping being in mind so as to deliver thought over to it. It means 
dedication to being. 
Such thinking is established outside the realm of willing and arises 
from Gelassenheit. -In the work Gelassenheit, it is said that this term is 
certainly not being used in the sense of giving up sinful selfishness, of 
renouncing self-will in favour of the divine will (G, 33-4/62). Heidegger 
does not imagine a divine agent having such and such intentions, with 
which human intentions should be made to coincide. Tauler does, although 
in a peculiar way, and one far removed from any kind of calculation. One 
would not want to deny that there is a vast difference between the 
formulations of the age of theistic faith to which Tauler belongs and 
those of the god-less age of Heidegger. What I have tried to demonstrate 
is only that, within this difference, something of the same is present, too. 
Finally, in light of the analysis in this section, it may be advisable 
to add a brief note to what was said about Heidegger and the question of 
ethics at the end of Section I. Attention to ontic phenomena like 
suffering and sympathy is no more evident in the works considered in this 
section than in those considered in the last section. But once again 
Heidegger does suggest a way of being whose form can include an 
appropriate being with others, an appropriate being towards the other. The 
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watchful (nüchtern) anxiety of the resolute individual has its roots in the 
Christian notion of living as if one might be judged at any moment for the 
way one is, of living with constant vigilance and self-responsibility. That 
conception decidedly involves responsibility towards others, and this is 
echoed in Heidegger's analysis in Sein and Zeit. Resoluteness 
individualizes (vereinzelt), but this kind of individualization first makes 
possible an appropriate and genuinely helpful Fürsorge. The ethical 
moment is therefore formally included in this way of being, as it is in 
Gelassenheit. And in both cases, this moment involves allowing the other 
to be, not in the sense of an indifferent letting alone, but in the sense 
of a considerate and conscientious paying heed, and one which does not 
exclude the possibility of opposition. Thus, while, at the end of Section 
I, it was suggested that the apparent lack of concern for being with 
others in Heidegger's thought should not be ignored, I wish to end this 
section with the qualification that it should also not be exaggerated. 
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SECTION III 
THE TRANSCENDENT GOD 
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The first chapter in this section compares the last three chapters of 
the Itinerarlum, in which Bonaventure considers God under the names esse 
(Chapter Five) and bonum (Chapter Six), and beyond all names in the divine 
darkness (Chapter Seven), with Heidegger's reflections on being and the 
good. The involvement of God in the question of being qua being is 
present, as Heidegger points out, in the original explicit formulation of 
this question by Aristotle. For Aristotle, philosophla is a striving for 
the possibility of essential understanding. As such, it seeks to 
understand what is prior to everything else, prior to individual beings, 
namely, being. Philosophy as the knowledge of being qua being is therefore 
ontology. But philosophy, according to Aristotle, is also theology. The 
knowledge of being qua being, the logos of on he on, is also, in some way, 
the knowledge of the divine, the logos of theion (See MAL, 17-18/13-14). 
Given Bonaventure's notion of ipsum esse, with which Chapter Five of 
this section will begin, it is clear how his thought stands in relation to 
this conception. For Bonaventure, being itself is divine being. The 
understanding of being itself is, consequently, the understanding of divine 
being. It follows that, insofar as philosophy seeks the knowledge of being 
itself, it is scientia dei, (natural) theology. Any genuine comparison of 
Bonaventure with Heidegger on this question must then ask, what is the 
relation between Bonaventure's notion of being itself as divine being and 
Heidegger's own notion of being, where that means asking at the same time, 
to what extent and in what way is Heidegger's questioning of being also a 
questioning of the divine, i. e. to what extent and in what way is 
Heidegger's philosophy also a theology? In keeping with ' the general aims 
of the present inquiry, this is not meant to be a merely historical 
question about the relation between Heidegger and some past thinker or 
thinkers, but an attempt to investigate and further the dialogue between 
Heidegger and medieval mystical theology in order to shed light on the 
question of God, and with special reference to the relation between God 
and being. 
Bonaventure says, being itself is God. Heidegger explicitly says that 
being is not God (Hb, 76/210). The question posed here is, what, in both 
cases, is meant by being and how does this meaning relate to what is 
called God? The discussion of Bonaventure on this point will give an 
account of what being itself means according to him, and why, given this 
meaning, it must be construed as divine being. It will then look at how 
the dynamic nature of this some divine being is grasped. under the name of 
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the good. Proceeding, next, to look at Heidegger on this question, I will 
mainly examine sections from two works, the Grundbegriffe (Freiburg 
lecture course, 1941), and the Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Logik im 
Ausgang von Leibniz (Marburg lecture course, 1928). The examination of 
the first of these will revolve around the meaning of being, while the 
second addresses the question of the good. However, the analysis will also 
assume, and refer to, what has been said in previous discussions of 
Heidegger's notion of being and its relation to the good. 
Bonaventure's claim that being itself is divine being rests on the 
notion that it is perfect and wholly actual being. Any conclusions about 
where Heidegger is situated with respect to this notion requires looking 
at his conceptions of both being and the good. Consequently, these 
conclusions will be postponed until the consideration of both these 
conceptions, mainly through the two works mentioned above, has been 
completed. 
In final chapter, I will compare a number of key elements in Jan van 
Ruusbroec's mystical writings with similar themes in Heidegger's thought. 
The summary of Ruusbroec's thought with which this last chapter begins 
draws on three of Ruusbroec's works: Boecksken der verclaringhe [Little 
Book of Enlightenment], Vanden'seven sloten [The Seven Enclosures], and Die 
geestelike brulocht [The Spiritual Espousals]. This summary will' highlight 
those features of Ruusbroec's mysticism which differentiate it from that 
of Eckhart, particularly his emphasis on love, conversion, and grace. The 
discussion of Heidegger that follows will then focus on aspects of his 
thought that contain similar features. To this end, it will look first 
mainly at the Beiträge zur Philosophie, and will then examine a few later 
works in which some of the major themes of the Beiträge are taken up and 
expanded. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BONAVENTURE AND HEIDEGGER ON BEING AND GOODNESS 
in 
1. Bonaventure on God as esse and bonum. 
Chapter Five of the Itinerarium is entitled De speculatione- divinae 
unitatis per eius nomen primarium, quod est esse ['On contemplating the 
divine unity through its primary name which is being']. It describes the 
first mode or stage of contemplating God supra per lumen, quod est 
signatum supra mentem nostram, quod est lumen Veritatis aeternae ['above 
through the light -which shines upon our minds, which is the light of 
eternal Truth']. The second mode of this contemplation considers God under 
the name of the good, and forms the subject of Chapter Six. While the 
contemplation of God under the name of being is concerned with the 
attributes of the unity of God, the contemplation of God as the good is 
concerned with the attributes of the. Trinity. These two modes of 
contemplation, taken together, form the third phase of the mind's ascent to 
God, where, having considered God outside through the vestigia, and inside 
through the imago it looks above and beyond itself, thereby entering into 
the sancta sanctorum ['holy of holies'] (It. V. 1,330-1/94). 
According to Bonaventure, contemplating the God whose nature is revealed 
the saying, Ego sum qui sum, contemplating God as ipsum esse. leads mess to 
the thought of that which is wholly certain because it excludes all not-being, 
so that it cannot be thought not to be (non potest cogitari non esse). 
When 
mens concentrates its vision (defigat aspectum) on 
this pure being, it look to 
that which jr. empty of all not-being, to that which has nothing of nothing: 
quia ipsum esse purissimum non occurrit nisi in plena fuga 
non-esse, sicut et nihii in plena fuga esse. Sicut igitur 
omnis nihil nihil habet de esse nec de eius conditionbus; 
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sic econtra ipsum esse nihil habet de non-esse, nec actu 
nec potentia, nec secundum veritatem rei nec secundum 
aestimationem nostram. 
[For pure being occurs only in full flight from not-being 
just as nothing is in full flight from being. Therefore, 
just as absolute nothing has nothing of being or its 
attributes, so contrariwise being itself has nothing of 
nonbeing either in act or potency, either in objective 
truth or in our estimation. ] (V. 3,332/96) 
If ipsum esse purissimum 'occurs' only in full flight from not-being, then 
it will occur for mans only when it is in full flight from not-being, when 
it turns its attention away from all forms of nothing and fixes itself 
upon what is itself turned away or opposed to all not-being, viz. being 
itself. The movement that thus turns away from not-being to what is 
itself turned away from not-being is not a 'mere' thinking, but a turning 
of intension. Only through this kind of turning does the mind genuinely 
grasp the full content of ipsum esse.. Only then does this content, as the 
exclusion of all forms of not-being, truly emerge. 
As in Chapter Three of the Itinerarium, though, what emerges is only 
the explicit understanding of what is in truth logically prior in every act 
of understanding. Everything understood (intelligitur) is understood 
either as not being (non ens) or as being in potency (ens in potentia) or 
as being in act (ens in , act u). 
But every 'not' of being, whether it 
concerns simply not being (non ens), or not being yet complete (ens in 
potentia), is grounded on the prior understanding of being as pure act. 
Therefore, esse ... est quod primo cadit in intellectu et illud esse est 
quod est purus actus ['being is what first comes into the intellect and 
this being is pure act'J. This is a similar point to the one made in 
Chapter Three about 'defects' of being. All forms of not-being involve a 
deprivation, a lack or negation, of being, and are understood on the basis 
of that pure being which they negate. They are therefore understood 
through being: Cum eutem non-esse privatio sit essendi, non cadit in 
intellectum nisi per esse ['Since not-being is the privation of being, it 
does not come into our understanding except through being'] (V. 3,332- 
3/96). 
The being understood prior to all forms of negation and forming the 
-condition for the possibility of understanding any not-being must, 
Bonaventure claims, be esse divinum, divine being (V. 3,334/96). That is 
because it must be purely positive being, pure act with no admixture of 
potentiality or defect. Since the intelligibility of anything whatever 
rests upon this being, since, that is, the intellect in all of its acts 
relates in an a priori way to pure being itself, mens has a latent innate 
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knowledge of the divine being. It has a remarkable tendency, however, not 
to realize this knowledge, a tendency not to see that by which it sees: 
Mira igitur est caecitas intellectus, qui non considerat 
illud quod prius videt et sine quo nihil potest coggnoscere. 
Sed sicut oculus intentus in varies colorum differentias 
lucem, per quam videt cetera, non videt, et si videt, non 
advertit; sic oculus mentis nostrae, intentus in entia 
pparticularia et universalia, ippsum esse extra omne genus, 
licet primo occurrat menti, et per ipsum alia, tarnen non 
advert t. 
[Strange, then, is the blindness of the intellect, which 
does not consider that which it sees first and without 
which it can know nothing. The eye, concentrating on 
various differences of color, does not see the very light 
by which it sees other things; and if it does see this 
light, it does not advert to it. In the same way, the 
mind's eye, concentrating on particular and universal being, 
does not advert to being itself, which is beyond every 
genus, even though it comes to our minds first and through 
It we know other things. ] (V. 4,334/96) 
On the one hand, the intellect 'sees' being itself first of all, since the 
visibility of everything else is founded on that prior vision. On the 
other hand, intent upon what being itself makes visible, the mind does not 
turn to that which grants the visibility. It does not bring being itself 
to light for itself or recover in thought what makes thought possible. 
This is not any particular being, since particular being is always finite, 
always mixed with the not-being of potentiality, nor is it any universal 
being, any general category or genus under which a specific region of 
finite being may be subsumed. It is also not analogous being, since that 
has the least actuality, and therefore the least being, of all (V. 3,333- 
4/96). It is rather ipsum esse as a transcendental beyond all limitation 
and determination, and as the all-inclusive unity of the divine essence. 
Thus, the mind does 'not see what lies closest to it. It does not 
customarily bring into view what is most evident, and because of this, 
when it does turn away from the shadowy beings to which its sight is 
accustomed, towards the light that grants the being of those shadowy 
beings, it is at first blinded and seems to see nothing: 
Unde verissime apparet, quod «sicut oculus vespertilionis 
se habet ad lucem, ita se habet oculus mentis nostrae ad 
manifestissima naturae)); quia assuefactus ad tenebras 
entium et phantasmata sensibilium, cum ipsam lucem summi 
esse intuetur, videtur sibi nihil videre; non intelligens, 
quod apse caligo summa est mentis nostrae illuminatio 
sicut, quando videt oculus purem lucem, videtur sibi nihii 
videre. 
[Hence it is most truly apparent that 'as the eye of the 
bat is in regard to light so is the eye of our mind in 
regard to the most evident things of nature. ' Thus our 
mind, accustomed to the darkness of beings and the images 
of the things of sense, when it limpses the light of the 
supreme being, seems to itself 
glimpses 
see nothing It does 
not realize that this very darkness is the supreme 
illumination of our mind, just as when the eye sees pure 
light, it seems to itself to see nothing. ] (V. 4,334/96) 
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That what the mind is accustomed to see lies in truth in shadow and 
darkness does not mean that it is not factually existent. It means only 
that what the mind ordinarily sees depends upon something which it does 
not ordinarily see, something that seems to be nothing in relation to 
beings, but actually grants the being of beings in that beings could not 
be without the illumination of this apparent nothing. The exit from the 
cave, then, is not exactly a journey to somewhere else wholly remote from 
beings. It is not a journey to some foreign region with which the mind is 
in no sense already familiar. It' is, rather, a journey to what is 
presupposed along with beings and yet seldom brought to mind. The 
process of bringing it to mind is a passage to a greater clarity about 
beings, a greater degree of truth or transparency concerning them, since it 
involves seeing through to their ground as the condition for their 
possibility. 
To the extent that a person can come to 'see' ipsum purissimum esse. 
certain attributes of it, which are attributes of the divine unity, present 
themselves. If you can truly think of being itself, Bonaventure says, it 
will become apparent to you (occurrit tibi) that it must be thought of 
(necessario cogitatur) as absolutely first, being through itself (per se) 
and by itself (a se); as lacking all non-esse, and therefore as eternal, 
never beginning or ending; as having nothing in itself but being itself, 
and therefore as simple; as having. no possibility, and therefore as wholly 
actual; as having no defect, and therefore as entirely perfect; and as 
having no diversity, and therefore as supremely one. These attributes 
belong to the logic of ipsum esse in such a way that: a) their contrary 
cannot be thought by anyone who understands being itself, and b) one 
implies (infert) the other (V. 5,334-5/97). However, while to 'understand' 
being itself so as to 'see' these attributes as necessarily belonging to it 
is, in a way, to raise what is grasped implicitly to the clarity of a 
concept, the awareness thereby attained involves more than what is usually 
meant by the notions of conceptual clarity or rational grasp. This in turn 
suggests that the process of achieving this awareness also involves more 
than what is usually meant by coming to understand the logic of a concept. 
Becoming clear about what being itself means consists, for Bonaventure, in 
accomplishing a vision, * achieved with difficulty, whereby the mind is 
simplified and illuminated: Si hoc vides in Pura mentis simplicitete, 
aliqualiter perfunderis eeternae lucis illustratione ('If you see this in 
the pure simplicity of your mind, you will somehow be bathed in the 
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brilliance of eternal light'] (V. 6,336/97). The full meaning of being 
itself is illustrated only when the intellect reaches this form of vision; 
only then has it truly risen to the, thought of ipsum esse. In other 
words, grasping the content of this term means, for Bonaventure, attaining 
an understanding that is not only rational but intuitive, and what is being 
put forward here is not only a doctrine but a way. 
The contemplation of being presents a number of further 
determinations, and Bonaventure goes on to list and develop these in a 
language once again intertwined with references to wonder and light. 
First of all, being itself is primum et novissimum, first and last. It is 
first because omnia operatur propter se ipsum, because it performs all of 
its works - and its works Include all that is and becomes - for itself, 
for its own sake. It is then itself, as ipsum esse, both the origin and 
the goal of all that is, finis ultimus, initium et consummatio, alpha et 
omega ('the ultimate end, the beginning and the consummation, alpha and 
omega'] (V. 7,336-7/98). It is the last end of what-is as a whole, what 
everything seeks insofar as it seeks to be. What everything seeks, after 
all, is the consummation of its being. It seeks to become what it is. But 
in order to be sought, what-it-is (essentia, quidditas), as that for which 
something reaches, must be 'presupposed in the reaching. It must be prior 
and this priority makes it a beginning as well as an end. The highest and 
most universal beginning and term of all, omnium origo e1 Lints consummans 
('the origin and consummating end of all things'], is being itself, esse 
purissimum et absolutum, quad est simpliciter esse ('the most pure and 
absolute being, which is being without qualification'] (V. 8,337/100). This 
is a being that, like Plato's agathon, surpasses the (finite) being of all 
actual and possible beings. 
Being itself is also aeternum et praesentissimum, eternal and most 
present. Since it is eternal, it brooks no passage, no transition from one 
state to another, and so no motion. It does not flow from something else 
(non fluit ab also), nor does it ebb away of itself (nec deficit a se ipso), 
nor does it run from one thing to another (nec decurrit ab uno in aliud). 
It does not flow at all. What does not flow, Bonaventure claims, has no 
past or future, no having been or about to be, but only esse praesens, 
present being (V. 7,336/99). This present being includes and enters into 
the presence of what is present for any length of time. It encompasses 
and enters all durations (omnes durationes ambit et intrat) as if it were 
simultaneously their centre and circumference (V. 8,337/100). Its pure 
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presence embraces all finite, temporal being. Furthermore, all being 
present for a while, all duration, participates in present being, so that 
present beings (the beings that are present for a while) image, in their 
being present (presence), purely present being. They form a moving image 
of eternity, where eternity, which encompasses all time, is understood as 
pure presence, as purely being present. 
Next, being itself is simplicissimum et maximum, wholly simple and 
greatest. It is greatest in power (virtus) because it is utterly simple in 
essence, since the more unified power is, the more infinite it is (V. 7, 
336/99). Being itself, since it is utterly simple, possesses whole and 
undivided power, infinite power. It is the power containing all power 
within the simple unity of its essence. As the simple ground of all 
possibilities, being itself is infinitely powerful and grants every finite 
power the power it has. Because it is utterly simple and greatest, it is 
totum intra omnia et totum extra, ac per hoc nest sphaera intelligibilis, 
culus centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam. # ('totally within all 
things and totally outside them and thus "is an intelligible sphere whose 
center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere"'] (V. 8,337/100). 
Its simple power both wholly informs and wholly surpasses all things. 
Fourth, being itself is actualissimum et immutabilissim um, most actual 
and most unchangeable. What is most actual is pure act. And pure act, 
having no unrealized potentiality, can neither. acquire, anything new nor 
lose anything it has. It therefore cannot be altered (V. 7,336-7/99). 
While remaining stable itself, it gives motion to all things («stabile 
manens moveri dat universaA') (V. 8,337/100). While never altering its 
nature as pure act, it communicates act to all beings. It is the purely 
actual source of all actualisation. It is then the pure act of being 
through which all beings become, the act through which they arise, remain, 
and pass away. 
Fifth, being itself is perfectissimum et immensum. most perfect and 
most immense. As pure act and the last end of all things, it is 
necessarily most perfect, and as most perfect it is that than which 
nothing greater, nothing more perfect, can be thought: nihil potest 
cogitari ultra ipsum melius, nobilius nec dignius, ac per hoc nihil maius; 
et omne tale est immensum ('nothing can be thought beyond it better, 
nobler or more worthy, hence nothing greater; and such a being is immense'] 
(V. 7,337/99). Because it is most perfect and immense, being itself is 
intra omnia, non inclusum, extra omnia, non exclusum, supra omnia, non 
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elatum, infra omnia, non prostratum ('within all things, but not enclosed; 
outside all things, but not excluded; above all things, but not aloof; below 
all things but not debased'] (V. 8,338/100-1). It is within all things as 
their origin, support and end, and all that is, insofar as it is, 
participates in it, but it is not circumscribed or limited by anything, nor 
is it contained by anything. Rather, as perfect and immense, being itself 
surpasses all bounds. It is in itself outside and beyond all finite and 
imperfect beings, outside and beyond all that is, and yet it is not shut 
out or remote from what-is, since all that is is from it, through it, and 
in it. It is below all things as their ground and source, their 
unconditioned condition, but this being below is at the same time being 
highest of all. 
Finally, being itself is summe unum et tarnen omnimodum, supremely 
one and yet all-inclusive, containing within itself all modes. It is 
'omnimodal' precisely because it is one. What is one is the principle of 
many; what is supremely one est omnis multitudinis universale principiurn 
('the universal principle of all multiplicity'] (V. 7,336/99). It is the 
greatest universal, the highest and most simple principle of what-is, 
containing all within itself in a preeminent way. As the supremely simple 
and all-inclusive principle of being, it is universalis omnium causa 
efficiens, exemplans et terminans, sicut «cause essendi, ratio intelligendi 
et ordo vivendi» ('the universal efficient, exemplary and final cause of all 
things as "the cause of being, the basis of understanding and the order of 
living"'] (V. 8,337/99). As the efficient cause of all things, it is the 
universal cause of being, the cause that originates being from out of not- 
being, the act that creates ex nihilo. As the exemplary cause of all 
things, it is that through which anything is intelligible, since things are 
understood through that which falls first into the intellect. And they are 
understood in accordance with the rules for their possibility, where these 
rules, the rules of being, are granted by the unseen source that regulates 
both understanding and what is understood because it is the cause of both. 
As the final cause of all things, being itself orders all living. It is 
that to which all living is oriented, and thus that from which all seeking 
to be derives its structure. Therefore, being itself -is omnimodum, not 
because it is the essence of all things, but because it is the cause, the 
ground and origin, of all essences (V. 7,3371100). It is omnis in omnibus, 
the one which, never being anything other than one, yet includes within 
itself the many in that it, as pure being itself, comprehends every 
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possible perfection of being. As this all-inclusive but simple one, being 
itself is singular, for while the all-embracing superabundant gives to all, 
it is, in its unqualified superabundance, wholly unique (V. 6,335-6/97-98). 
These, according to Bonaventure, are the essential attributes of being 
itself, which is absolute being. His analysis concludes: 
ac per hoc, ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia et 
hoc, quia omnipotens, omnisciens et omnimode bonum, quod 
perfecte videre est esse beatum, sicut dictum est Moysi: 
Ergo ostendam tibi omne bonum. 
Consequently, 
from him, through him and in him 
are all things; 
for he is 
all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good, 
and to see him perfectly Is to be blessed, 
as was said to Moses: 
I will show you all good. 
(V. 8,338/101) 
For Bonaventure, being itself, rightly considered, is divine being, and its 
attributes are the attributes of God, the attributes of perfect being. And 
that is also the highest good. 
Chapter Six of the Itinerarium considers God under the name of the 
good. At this point, Bonaventure says, the eye of the intellect is to be 
raised to a 'contuition' of the Trinity (elevandus est oculus intelligentiae 
ad contuitionem beatissimae Trinitatis), since the good itself (ipsum 
bonum) is the principal foundation for contemplating the emanations (VI. 1, 
338/102). He begins his consideration by evoking the ontological argument. 
The highest good (optimum), which is simpliciter, is that than which 
nothing greater than be thought, and it therefore cannot be thought not to 
be, since to be is in every way better than not to be (VI. 2,338-9/103). 
While Bonaventure simply adopts Anselm'e original formulation of the 
argument here, it should still be seen in the context of his own analysis 
of being and goodness. In Chapter Five, he had claimed that being itself 
cannot be thought not to be, where being itself is absolute and purely 
perfect being, that than which nothing greater can be thought and 
therefore also the good. The being of God is thus not like the being of 
any finite entity, since it, rightly conceived, excludes all negativity, all 
potentiality and imperfection. It is this being which, for Bonaventure, 
cannot be considered not to be in any way, since it excludes all forms of 
not-being. Whatever may be the flaws of the ontological argument, it is 
at least important to keep in mind, as Hegel says, largely against Kant, 
that the arguments for the existence of God are not just inferences, but 
involve an elevation (Erhebung) of thought to the infinite, and that the 
relation of concept and reality in reference to the infinite is different 
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than it is in reference to any finite being. ' 
Most of Chapter Six of the Itinerarium is devoted to explicating the 
claim that the highest good non potest recte cogitari, quin cogitetur 
trinum et unum, that the highest good cannot be thought of rightly, 'unless 
it is thought of as three and one. This is because the good, according to 
the teaching of Dionysius, is said to be self-diffusive (diffusivum sui), so 
that the highest good must be most self-diffusive. The consideration of 
the highest good as most self-diffusive leads, according to Bonaventure, to 
the notion of the Trinity (VI. 2,338/103). The contemplation of being 
itself led to the notion of absolute and perfect being, which is the good. 
Understood now as the good, absolute and perfect being is not only static 
but also dynamic. Otherwise it would not be perfect being, and then it 
would not be the good as that which gives itself of itself, and, in the 
end, gives rise to beings by giving itself to them. 
The good, then, gives itself. It pours itself out, diffuses itself, 
and the highest good diffuses itself to the highest degree, and thus 
totally. In so doing, it generates the perfect image of itself, the image 
in which its being is perfectly and fully expressed, the Word. This Word, 
the Son. is the knowledge of the infinite power of God the Father. It is 
the complete expression of being itself, of the essence or nature of God 
as the infinite ocean of substance. As such, it contains all that may be, 
the infinity of possible beings. In this Word, the divine being knows 
itself in its ratio, its reason-principle. It expresses and grasps itself 
in generating the idea of itself. At this point, it grasps itself as an 
end, and in that grasp it breathes forth the Holy Spirit, the divine will in 
which all good is contained, and through which it is chosen and realised. 
The love of the good, therefore, the act in which it expands itself into 
its emanations eat diffusio per modum Verbi, in quo omnie dicunter, et per 
modum Doni, in quo cetera done donantur ['is a diffusion by way of the 
Word, in which all things are said, and by way of the Gift, in which other 
gifts are given'] (VI. 2,340/104). 2 In this way, the three persons 
articulate the unity of the divine essence as 'the cause of being, the 
basis of understanding and the order of living'. The Father is the power 
by which the good is effected, the Son is the knowledge by which it is 
grasped, and the Holy Spirit is the will by which it is chosen. 
Thus, Bonaventure, in keeping with the Neoplatonic tradition, combines 
the conception of the good as diffusive, an efficient cause, with the 
conception of the good as an end, a final cause.: ' He then postulates the 
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will as the cause of what is realized, in that it is the ground for 
choosing between what is to be realized and what is not. This point can 
be clarified through a passage from the Commentarium in Sentential 
Ratio autem, quare voluntati attribuitur causalitas, haec 
est, quia ratio causandi est bonitas et in ratione 
effectivi et in ratione finis. Nam «bonum dicitur 
diffusivum», «et bonum est propter quod omnia». 
Effectivum autem non fit efficiens in effectu nisi propter 
finem. Illud ergo, quod dicit coniunctionem principii 
effectivi cum fine, est ratio causandi in effectu; sed 
voluntas est actus, secundum quem bonum reflectitur supra 
bonum sive bonitatem: ergo voluntas unit effectivum cum 
fine. 
[The reason causality is attributed to the will is that the 
round of causing, both efficient and final, is goodness. 
or the good is said to be diffusive, and the good is that 
for the sake of which all things [are and act]. But an 
efficient cause does not actually produce an effect except 
for the sake of an end. Therefore, that which expresses 
the conjoining of an efficient source with an end provides 
the explanation for causing an effect. But volition is the 
act in accordance with which a good is turned towards a 
good, or goodness. Therefore, it is volition that, unites 
an efficient cause with an end J4 
As Gilson says, the dual conception of the good as diffusive (efficient 
cause) and as that for the sake of which '(final cause) fixes the two 
'poles' of goodness between which the current of will is placed (p. 163). 
These three aspects of the good, power, knowledge and will, are not, 
of course, substantially distinct. There are not three substantially 
separate goods, but one good communicating its substance entirely in the 
plurality of hypostases. The substance of the good is not altered in this 
communication. The power of the good generates knowledge of itself, not 
of something different. The knowledge of the good is self-knowledge, and 
the end for the sake of which it acts is itself. The will that is 
breathed forth, 'spirated', from the power and knowledge of the good is a 
will towards the good. It is the will by which the good chooses itself, 
and the highest good is an end in itself. It is an end that produces 
knowledge of itself, and chooses itself in choosing what is given in that 
knowledge. 
The self-diffusion of the highest good (the greatest self-diffusion) 
must, Bonaventure claims, be actualis et intrinseca. substantialis et 
, 
hvnos tatica naturalis et voluntaria. liberalis et neressaria. indeficiens et 
per ecta ['actual and intrinsic, substantial and hypostatic, natural and 
voluntary, free and necessary, lacking nothing and perfect'] (VI. 2,339/103). 
It must be actual in that the highest good, diffusing itself to the highest 
degree, must actually communicate the whole of itself, so that there is 
no more potentiality in what is produced by the emanation than there is in 
what emanates. The self-diffusion of the highest good must be intrinsic 
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in that it must occur 'within' itself, since what is communicated is the 
whole substance and nature of the good, so that the distinction arising is 
a distinction within a single substance and nature. The diffusion must be 
substantial since, if the good did not communicate the whole of its 
substance, it could not be said to diffuse itself to the highest degree, 
and therefore it must be hypostatic, a communication of underlying 
substance and not merely of attributes, and the resulting plurality of 
hypostases are then consubstantial. It must occur by the nature of the 
good, and not by anything outside that nature, and yet it must be chosen. 
It must, consequently, be both necessary and free. The good must diffuse 
itself of itself, and so necessarily, and yet it must freely choose itself. 
Finally, its self-diffusion must be complete and perfect. It must be 
entire, so that what is communicated Is the nature of the good as perfect 
being lacking nothing. 
Bonaventure says that these attributes characterize the emanation of 
the Trinity, in contradistinction to the diffusio ex tempore i creature 
('the diffusion in time in creation'], which non est nisi centralis vet 
punctalls respectu immensitatis bonitatis aeternae ('is no more than a 
center or point in relation to the immensity of the divine goodness'] (VI. 2, 
339/103). The outpouring of the divine nature in creation is but a point 
in relation to the total communication of that nature in the emanations, 
the total self-diffusion of the good. It follows that while the power, 
knowledge and will of the highest good are reflected in the finite beings 
that actually come to be, that reflection is an imperfect one. All actual 
beings are products of the divine efficiency, understanding, and choice; 
they follow from the self-emanation of the good. They are the manifold 
temporal expression, the works in time, of the simple eternal act in which 
the power of the good generates knowledge of itself and gives rise to the 
will towards itself. They therefore reflect what being itself, as perfect 
being or the good, the fontalis plenitude (Sent. I, d. 27, p. 1, a. un., q. 2; 
p. 470) is capable of in terms of its efficiency, understanding, and choice. 
However, in relation to the immensity of the highest good, the vastness of 
the divine power, knowledge and will, that reflection is a mere shadow. 
The last few paragraphs of Chapter Six, the penultimate chapter of 
the Itinerarium, are devoted to considering the person of Christ, in whom 
the divine and human natures are conjoined, in whom God and man are 
reconciled: Nam admirari debemus non solum conditiones Del essentiales et 
personales in se. verum etiam comparationem ad supermirabilem unlonem 
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Del et hominis in unitate personae Christi ('For we should wonder not only 
at the essential and personal properties of God in themselves but also in 
comparison with the superwonderful union of God and man in the unity of 
the person of Christ'] (IV. 4,342/106). Having wondered at the dialectical 
nature of being itself and of the highest good, one should wonder, next, 
that these are joined with human nature in the paradox of the God-man. 
If one is amazed at the essential attributes of the divine being, one 
should look at the divine man and wonder that in him the eternal is joined 
with the temporal, the most simple with the most composite, the most 
actual with the one who suffered most greatly and died (cum summe passo 
et mortuo), the most perfect and immense with the limited and ordinary 
(modico), the supremely one and all-inclusive with a composite individual 
distinct from others (VI. 5,342/107). In this ideal paradoxical figure, 
born in the fulness of time, God is formed into man, and man into God. 
The figure thus expresses the ideal conformity of the divine and human 
natures. It expresses the 'reconciliation of the incommensurable, the 
reconciliation of eternity and time, simplicity and diversity, activity and 
passivity, perfection and limitation, infinity and finitude. And if human 
nature is completed only in the attainment of the divine, the figure 
expresses the necessary, and necessarily paradoxical, condition of its 
fulfillment. 
According to Bonaventure, in the contemplation of Christ, the perfect 
image of the invisible God, the mind reaches the perfection of its 
illumination, videndo simul in unum prim um et ultimum, summum et imum, 
circumferentiam et centrum, alpha et omega, causatum et causam, Creatorem 
et creaturam, lib rum scilicet ri u intus et extra ('when at the same 
time it sees united the first and the last, the highest and the lowest, the 
circumference and the center, alpha and omega, the caused and the cause, 
the Creator and the creature, that is, the book written within and 
without'] (VI. 7,343/108). Christ, the mediator between God and man, is the 
highest image though which the mind may rise to God, the image that 
presents God in the form of the divine human being, thereby representing 
God in the highest image of man, and man as the highest image of God. 
This is the highest form in which the mind is capable of grasping God, the 
form in which it experiences the most profound, but still mediated, vision 
of God. Beyond this highest form, the intellect cannot pass, since there 
is no form beyond this form, and the intellect cannot grasp what has no 
form. 
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The final chapter of the Itinerarium does speak of a passage though 
this form, but this passage is a matter for faith and love, and not for 
the intellect, which must be left behind. Consequently, the chapter is 
entitled De excessu men tall et mystico, in quo requies datur intellectui, 
affectu totaliter in Deum per excessum transeunte ('On spiritual and 
mystical ecstasy in which rest is given to our intellect when through 
ecstasy our affection passes over entirely into God'] (VII, 344/110). The 
stage of contemplation considered here begins where Chapter Six ends, with 
the figure of Christ. The intellect can come to this figure, but it cannot 
penetrate it. The figure is, after all, a paradox. Its mysteries therefore 
surpass all penetration by the human intellect (omnem perspicacitatem 
humani intellect us excedunt), and, once the mind has reached this figure, it 
only remains for it to transcend and pass over not only the sense world 
but also itself by contemplating the paradoxical things that Christ 
represents (restat, ut haec speculando transcendat et transeat non solum 
mundum istum sensibilem, verum etiam semetipsam) (VI. 2,344/111). 
In representing the highest image of man as the highest image of 
God, the figure of Christ presents the divine ratio in which the one and 
the many, the ideal and the actual, God and creation, are united and 
reconciled. Through this paradoxical figure, the mind may pass over to the 
God who contains, all things and is yet wholly remote from them. This 
wholly remote God can only be reached by the way of remotion, by the 
suspension of all images and all intellectual activity, and, for 
Bonaventure, by the transference and transformation of the height of the 
affection into God (et apex affectus totus transferstur et transformetur 
in Deum) (VI. 4,346/113). At this stage, parum dandum est verbo et 
scripto, -et totum Dei dono ('little importance should be given to words and 
to writing, but all to the gift of God'] and parum dandum est creaturae, et 
totum creatrici essentiae ('little or no importance should be given to 
creation, but all to the creative essence'] (VI. 5,346/113-4). The ec- 
stasis beyond the mind, necessary for reaching what wholly transcends the 
powers of the mind, is achieved by the will and not by the intellect, by 
desire rather than understanding. It is achieved by the forgetting of 
world and self, and by the fire of affection that inflames and carries over 
to God. In truth, this fire is itself God, and it can only be enkindled by 
that for which it inflames desire, by God (VI. 6,348/115). 
Because what is sought at this point lies beyond all that may be in 
any way seen or thought, beyond all that may be lit up for the mind, the 
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ascent to it is an ascent into darkness. It is an ascent into Dionysius' 
darkness of unknowing, the superluminous darkness beyond the senses and 
the intellect, beyond sensible and invisible things, beyond all not-being 
and being, all essence and knowledge (VI. 5,346-7/114-5). Such passing 
beyond is a dying to all that is; Quam mortem qui diligit videre potest 
Deum, quia indubitanter verum est: &a videbit me homo j vivet ['Whoever 
loves this death can see God because it is true beyond doubt that man will 
not see me and live'] (VI. 6,348/116). In the absolute transcendence of 
this death, and only in it, the soul finds what seeks. Here, the conatus 
of the soul find its completion and cessation, its fulfillment and its rest. 
With this death, then, the soul's journey into God comes to an end. 
2. Heidegger's Consideration of Being and Beyond Being. 
The main section of Heidegger's Grundbegriffe which I wish to 
consider is' entitled Leitworte far the Besinnung auf das Sein, 'Guidewords 
for Reflection on Being'. Near the end of this section, Heidegger guards 
against any possible misunderstanding of his thought by saying that these 
guidewords, these sayings, are not meant to announce a particular doctrine 
or system, or to develop a theory about being. They are not propositions 
to be passed around as statements about a certain philosophical standpoint 
or position, but are Anweisungen zur Besinning, directions towards a 
reflection, and one which, moreover, can, be performed at any time and from 
any situation, and can take different forms without necessarily having to 
follow the exact course of Heidegger's own words (Gb, 76-7). These words, 
then, words about being, are suggestions for thought rather than 
assertions proposing a determinate view of the meaning of being. They are 
sayings that point out ,a 
direction for thinking. 
The first of these sayings is: Das Sein ist des Leerste and zugleich 
der Überfluß ('Being is the emptiest 'and at the some time the 
overflowing']. Consideration of the 'is' presents, on the one hand, an 
emptiness in which thought (Nachdenken) can find no hold, and, on the other 
hand, a richness in which the being of beings is pronounced (sich 
ausspricht). Measured against the determinacy of beings, being appears as 
the most vacuous of all terms, a term eluding definition because empty of 
any meaning. But that indefiniteness may also appear as a surplus of 
meaning, a wealth of possibility whose content is unexhausted and 
inexhaustible by the naming of any number of beings, and an overflowing 
abundance that dispenses itself to all possible beings, but against whose 
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measure every being falls infinitely short. Thus: Des Sean Ist das 
Leerst e und zugleich gar_ cue Überfluß. aus dem alles Seiende, des bekannte 
and erfahrene, aber auch das unbekannte and erst zu erfahrende, beschenkt 
wird mit der jeweiligen Wesensart seines Seins ('Being is the emptiest and 
at the same time the overflowing, from which every being - the known and 
the experienced, but also the unknown and yet to be experienced - is 
presented with the specific character of its being'] (Gb, 49). On the one 
hand, it appears as an empty abstraction, a mere appendage and shadow of 
beings (Gb, 69), but it also appears as das, was in jedem Seienden zuerst 
and Lfberallhin des Wesende bleibt ('that which remains first and 
everywhere the essential in every being'] (Gb, 70). 
Given this reflection, it would be appropriate to say, with 
Bonaventure, that being is simplicissimum et maximum and summe unum et 
omnimodum, ' the fontalis plenitudo whose nature both includes and 
surpasses all possible beings, and from which every possible being receives 
the determinate, and therefore finite, being which it has. For Bonaventure 
as for Heidegger, this receiving is a kind of being presented or given. 
The being of beings arises through a self-giving of being which, as the 
good, diffuses and communicates itself in flowing over into beings. The 
all-inclusiveness of being is, for Bonaventure as well, a kind of emptiness, 
the emptiness of being in no way determinate that constitutes the absolute 
simplicity of being itself. In relation to beings, being itself does appear 
as a void, 'and to eyes accustomed to the sight of. beings, it looks at first 
like nothing. Indeed, in a sense, it 'is' nothing, and at the same time it 
'is' all, the simple one that includes the many. Eckhart's notion of the 
puritas essendi is helpful here. Being itself is a purity or emptiness of 
being, but it is from the overflowing (Qzfliessen) of that very purity that 
the being of every possible being is granted. The notion of being as das 
Leerste, however, needs also to be set against Bonaventure's saying that 
ipsum esse is not analogous being, which is lesser in actuality and being 
than the actual being of any finite being. For Bonaventure, the emptiness 
of being which Heidegger suggests may appear as the emptiness of what 
Bonaventure calls analogous being, is not the genuine sense of the 
emptiness of ipsum esse, once ipsum esse is rightly understood. 
The second saying that Heidegger considers runs: Das Sein ist des 
Gemeinste and zugleich das Einzige, 'being is the most common and at the 
same time the singular or unique'. In every being, being is found 
gleichmäßig and unterschiedslos ('in equal measure and without 
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distinction']. While beings are distinguished, displaying many orders and 
ranks, being is common through all. It is the most common, for what all 
beings have in common is that they are. What all beings have in common is 
being. But precisely because beings are distinct one from another, each 
has a like to itself insofar as each is a being. However much beings may 
differ, they are like to each other insofar as they are all beings. What, 
though, of being? Das Sein bat nirgendwo lºlLd nigendwie seinesgleichen. 
Seth ist genre über allem Seienden e. ['Being nowhere and in no way 
has its like. In contrast with all beings, being is singular']. Being is 
wholly unique. It is not a like (das Gleiche), for in order to be a like, 
there must be multiplicity. Something can only be like if there are others 
to which it is like. Being, however, is Überall das e be, nämlich, es 
selbst ['everywhere the same, namely, itself']. It is different in this and 
this case, but the different (das Unterschiedene) is not, in this case, the 
distinct (Verschiedenes), in the sense that it becomes more than one and 
therefore has its like (Gb, 50-52). Being is differentiated in itself, but 
it does not thereby become multiple. In other words, the differentiation 
of being in sich is not a multiplication of being an sich. Thus, being is 
singular precisely because it is common; that which is one in all cannot 
have another to itself to which it is like, and this not having a like is 
what makes being unique. * Being, one could say, is distinguished by 
indistinction (Eckhart). It is, as Bonaventure says, summe unum and yet 
omnia in omnibus, the one which is never other than one, and is yet the 
simple principle of the many. Present everywhere and within all things, 
its essence is wholly simple and singular, and it therefore has no equal. 
At this point, Heidegger's reflection takes a decidedly Eckhartian 
turn. He asks, Aber gibt es, nicht noch ein Drittes, das wir außer dem Sein 
und dem Seienden unterscheiden müssen - , 
dm Nichts? ['But is there not a 
third, that we must differentiate from being and beings. - nothing? ] (Gb, 
52). The question may be dismissed by saying daß es das Nichts eben nicht 
gibt, that nothing is not, so that there is no sense in speaking of a 
third. However, while nothing is clearly no thing, kein Seiendes, since it 
is the negation of all things, 
die Frage bleibt noch, ob das Nichts selbst in der 
Verneinung des Seienden besteht, oder ob Verneinung des 
Seienden schlechthin nur eine Vorstellung vom Nichts Ist, 
die das Nichts selbst von uns verlangt, wenn wir es, das 
Nichts, zu denken uns anschicken. Dann ist also das Nichts 
zwar nie ein Seiendes, aber gleichwohl »gibt es« das 
Nichts. 
[the question still remains, whether nothing consists in 
the negation of beings, or whether the complete negation 
of beings Is only a representation of nothing, which 
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nothing requires of us when we prepare to think of it, of 
nothing. So then nothing is in truth never a being, but 
nonetheless 'there is' nothing. ] (Gb, 52-3) 
Nothing, that is, west. It comes to presence and thereby suggests that it 
is not merely the absence (Abwesenheit) and lack (Fehlen) of beings. It is 
not an indifferent nullity (ein gleichgitltlges Nichtiges), for if it were, 
how could one understand terror and alarm in the face of nothing? (Gb, 55) 
Nothing cannot be said to be in the way that beings are, but: 
das Nichts ist uns nichts Nichtiges: Der Schrecken vor der 
Ver-nichtung und das Entsetzen vor der Ver-wüstung 
weichen ja zurück vor solchem, was doch wohl nicht gut als 
bloße Einbildung und als nur Bestandloses angesprochen 
werden kann. 
[nothing is not a nullity for us: horror in the face of 
an-nihilation and terror in the face of de-vastation shrink 
back before something which surely cannot be properly 
addressed as a mere product of imagination and as having 
no standing at all. ] (Gb, 73) 
This horror is in the face of what is no thing and wholly other to all 
things, what is utterly empty, and unique in this emptiness. These 
characteristics, however - not being a being, being other to beings, and 
being empty and unique - are all proper to being. Nothing then shows 
itself as essentially related (wesensverwandt) to being, and perhaps even 
essentially identical (wesenseinig): Ta, vielleicht ist sogar das Nichts 
das Selbe We des Sein ['Indeed, perhaps nothing is even the same as 
being'] (Gb, 54). 
As was demonstrated Chapter Two, nothing, for Eckhart, is the 'other 
face' of being. It is being, as what stands against all beings, for, in 
relation to beings, being is nothing. Being and nothing both 'are' the 
opposite of beings, and both 'occur' as different from beings. God, for 
Eckhart, is being, but this God is born in the nothing. To find this God, 
the soul must venture into the wüste. It must be bold enough to endure 
the nameless nothing beyond all beings in order to find what is other to 
beings, and this requires that it allow all beings to be vernichtet, to be 
made as nothing, in order to become, itself, as it was when it was not. 
This is a kind of endurance of total an-nihilation. 
Bonaventure speaks of an an-nihilation similar to this not in the 
context of his reflection on being itself, where he speaks only briefly of 
seeming to see nothing, but in the last chapter of the Itinerarium. Here, 
the soul, seeking the God who Is beyond all names, beyond both being and 
not-being, chooses the death that brings it into the darkness of unknowing, 
the darkness of absolute nothing. Although this absolute nothing is 
described as beyond being, the being of which Eckhart and Heidegger speak 
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is in itself an absolute nothing much like this, and the wilderness into 
which, according to Eckhart, the soul enters when it passes beyond all 
names into the simple essence of God appears, in many respects, similar to 
this Dionysian darkness. 'Is' this darkness not in some sense also being? 
What the soul finds there is, after all, not simply not. It finds what 
exceeds it and all beings. The darkness is also an exceeding light, and so 
could also be described as das Leerste and das ÜberfluB. This absolute 
other surpasses all conception, Bonaventure says, but then Eckhart, and at 
times Heidegger, say the same of being. 
After all, what mans finds at every stage of its ascent is always the 
same. It does not find one God when it contemplates creatures, another 
when it contemplates itself, another when it contemplates being, and yet 
another when it passes beyond all names into the divine darkness. There 
is only the one God, and the stages of discovery are degrees and 
varieties of mediation. Thus, the God beyond being 'is' also ipsum esse, in 
which case the journey beyond esse might also be seen as a journey into 
the heart of esse, a journey into the darkness at the heart, the innermost 
essence, of the divine. being. In this journey, all that can be named of 
this being, including esse and bonum, must be left behind, but perhaps the 
full truth of esse and bonum is actually known in this departure, known, 
that is, in taking leave of the terms. That would suggest that what is to 
be known in this case is best known by unknowing -a strange thought, but 
no stranger, and perhaps not so different, from the thought that being and 
nothing may be the same. 
There might also be an ambiguity in Heidegger's reflections on 
nothing in the Grundbgriffe similar to the one previously pointed out in 
Was Ist Metaphysik?. Nothing, he says, does not need beings, but it does 
need being. In Was ist Metaphysik?, nothing 'grants' the experience of 
being,, the experience that beings are, and are not nothing. In the 
Nachwort, this experience prepares for insight into the vastness of what 
allows all beings to be, being itself. The reflections on nothing in the 
Grundbegriffe may also suggest that nothing, the confrontation with 
annihilation and devastation and the ability to endure these, which is the 
ability to endure the nihilation of nothing in what Scheler calls the 
abyss of absolute nothing', 'clears' Dasein for being. It clears Dasein for 
awe or astonishment in the face of the fact that there are beings, and not 
rather nothing. Dasein would then be prepared to experience the immensity 
of. that which brings beings from out of nothing. In this case, nothing and 
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being would be essentially related but not essentially identical. They 
would, in fact, be opposites, and it could then be said that nothing occurs 
in full flight from being, and being in full flight from nothing. 
The problem is, this would suggest that nothing does need beings, 
since one must then, to have the experience of being, experience that 
beings are, and the experience that beings are obviously requires that 
there be beings. This reading would then appear to contradict the text, 
which suggests that the coming to presence of the absolute other in the 
form of nothing 'is' simultaneously the coming to presence of being as the 
emptiest and singular, and that these both 'are' apart from beings. Once 
again, a distinction must be drawn, though, between being qua presencing 
and being qua what makes presencing possible. Being qua presencing is 
suspended in nothing and arises from nothing. Nothing is then the source 
of all presencing, and so in spite of, or because of, its emptiness, it is 
an overflowing abundance. But this is being itself, not presencing but the 
hidden source of presencing, that which lets all beings be, the nothingness 
of which consists not in nonbeing but in being the impenetrably dark 
origin of beings. 
There is a difficulty in saying, though, as I have, that nothing and 
being 'are' apart from beings. They are found, presented, in taking leave 
or de-parting from beings, and this leave-taking and departing does 
uncover what is prior to all beings, although not' in a temporal sense. 
However, the departing de-parts from what-is, and being as the other to 
what-is and yet its source (being is in a sense inescapably the being of 
beings) cannot be what it is, the being of beings, without beings. r- If 
this thought is taken into account, it then makes sense to say, as 
Dionysius, Bonaventure, and Eckhart do say, that to find the 'itself' which 
has no relation to beings, one must go beyond being, into nothing. What 
'is' here cannot properly be called source, because it is un-related, and 
yet it still has to be acknowledged somehow that it is 'from' this un- 
related Etwas that what-is flows, where only in this flowing does the 
Etwas become related; only then does it become the being of beings. The 
linguistic problems are insurmountable. Even apartness and unrelatedness 
suggest relation - apart from, unrelated to - while the Etwas in itself 
has in truth nothing different from it to which it may be related. It is a 
one without any many, and therefore not even a one. While, then, it may be 
beckoned to through partially inappropriate expressions, its proper 
expression can only be silence. 
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Before going on to discuss the next saying in Heidegger's list, it 
should be noted that, in pointing out the commonality of being, Heidegger 
says: Der Stein ist, and der Baum ist, des Tier ist, and der Mensch Ist, 
the »Welt« ist, and der Gott »Ist« ['a stone is, and a tree is, an animal is, 
man is, the "world" is, and God "is"'] (50). For Heidegger, being is common 
to all beings, including God. The scare quotes around 'is' in the case of 
God indicate an acknowledgment that God is in a different way than other 
beings are, but the line still makes it clear that God, according to 
Heidegger, is in some sense a -being and not being. Bonaventure, by 
contrast, says being itself is a name of God. As stated in the 
introduction to this section, the question of the precise relation between 
Heidegger's notion of being and Bonaventure's notion of God will be 
suspended until the present analysis has been completed, but it may be 
useful to pause at this point to elaborate a little on Heidegger's own 
views about the medieval conception of God in relation to the question of 
being. In-his 1931 lecture course on Aristotle (Aristoteles, Metaphysik e 
1-3: Von Wesen and Wirklichkeit der Kraft), Heidegger notes, in a section 
discussing Aristotle on the analogy of, being, 'that the God of medieval 
Christian faith is the highest being, the summum ens, and that the doctrine 
of analogic entis occurs in-medieval thought in the context of the attempt 
to* differentiate the being of this highest being from the being of all 
creatures, from ens. finitum. The analogic entis is, however, he claims, not 
a solution to the problem, but only a formula. He then adds: 
Der einzi e, der die Lösung suchte, Meister Eckhart, sagt: 
Gott »ist« Oberhaupt nicht, weil »Sein« ein endliches 
Prädikat ist and von Gott gar nicht gesaggtý werden kann. 
(Dies war freilich nur ein Anlauf, in Eckharts' späterer 
Entwicklung ist er verschwunden$ wenn er auch in einer 
anderen Hinsicht in seinem Denken lebendig geblieben ist. ) 
[The only one who sought a solution, Meister Eckhart, says: 
God 'is' not at all, because 'being' is a finite predicate 
and cannot be attributed to God. . (This was admittedl 
only a preliminary attempt; in Eckhart's later development 
it disappeared, although, in another respect, it also 
remained present in his thought). ]'i 
Eckhart, as was pointed out in Chapter Two, claims in the Parisian 
Questions that esse does not apply to God, since God is a puritas essendi. 
However, he also says there that it is possible to' call this puritas 
essendi 'esse'. Esse is then being used in a different sense to the one 
proper to all finite beings. At other times, Eckhart calls God ipsum esse, 
and says that esse belongs properly only to God. But the point here, 
surely, is still that God, as ipsum esse, 'is' in a different way than all 
ens finitum. And the same could be said' of Bonaventure's. ipsum esse. 
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Heidegger asserts that in the Middle Ages God is the highest being, 
which must assume the claim that God is a being. But if, in addition to 
the notion that God is the highest being, it is said that God is being 
itself, and that the difference between the being of God and the being of 
creatures is tantamount to the difference between being itself and all 
finite beings, the situation becomes more complex than Heidegger's account 
seems to allow. For being itself is then taken as infinite being, which is 
not a being, except in the extraordinary sense in which being itself can be 
considered a being, i. e. the sense-in which being itself can be said to be. 
In a sense, it can, since it is not nothing, and in a sense it cannot, since 
it is not a being. Which is precisely what Heidegger says about being, 
that it, in a sense 'is' not, and yet, in another sense, only being 'is' (see 
TK, 43/46). ' Therefore, the dismissal of the possibility that God could be 
considered as being itself, implicit in the notion that God, as the highest 
being, is in some sense still a being, is not entirely warranted. 
The third saying in the course of Heideggers reflection runs: Des 
Sein ist das Verständlichste and zugleich the Verbergung ('Being is the 
most understandable and at the same time the concealing'] (Gb, 55). 
Whatever we may or may not understand about this or that being or region 
of beings, and there is always something that we do not understand, we 
nonetheless always understand the 'is'. Die Verständlichkeit des »ist« im 
Satze bleibt uns im voraus so vertraut and sicher, daß wir auf sie gar 
nicht erst besonders achten ('The understandability of the "is" in a 
sentence is so familiar and certain to us beforehand that we do not at 
first pay any attention to at all'] (Gb, 55). If we did not understand this 
'is', if we did not have any understanding of being, beings could not be 
uncovered so as to be either intelligible or unintelligible. Any failure to 
understand what a being is, is still grounded in the prior understanding 
that it is, in one way or another. Being here does not equal actually 
existing. A being may or may not exist, but it still, in some sense, is. 
Otherwise it could not even be incomprehensible. However much 
expectations about beings may be frustrated or surprised, what comes to 
meet them will still retain the continuity of being. At the very least, 
what comes to meet an expectation about beings can be expected to be. As 
Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes, then, since all understanding of beings is 
grounded upon the understanding of being, then, the understanding of being 
is the condition for the possibility of any understanding of beings at all. 
Denn das Sein hat uns sich zugeworfen als das »Licht«, in dem jeweils 
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Seiendes als ein Seiendes erscheint ['For being has cast itself to us as 
the "light", in which every being becomes visible as a being'] (Gb, 88). 
Being is therefore first in the order of understanding, for it is 
understood prior to any understanding, any 'lighting up', of beings. This 
understanding is not acquired at some time. We do not recall having 
learned what being 'is' and means (Gb, 58). Rather, the Verständlichkeit 
des Seins ist uns, wir wissen nicht, wie und wann, einfach zugefallen ('the 
understandability of being has simply fallen upon us, we do not know how 
or when'] (Gb, 59). Being is what falls first into the intellect, although 
the intellect usually does not pay heed to this first. 
On the other hand, 
Wenn wir nun aber eigens sagen sollen, was wir unter dem 
also »verständlichsten« Sein denn verstehen, das heißt, was 
wir uns bei dem wort »Sein« denken, und das heißt als was 
wir das Sein »begreifen«, dann sind wir plötzlich ratlos. 
Plötzlich zeigt sich uns: Wir haben für dieses 
Verständlichste, das Sein, nicht nur keinen Begriff. wir 
sehen auch nicht, wie wir hier hinsichtlich des Seins noch 
»etwas« begreifen sollen. 
[But when we are now supposed to say specifically what we 
then understand by this most understandable' being - that 
is, what we think of with the word 'being', and that means 
what we 'conceive' being as - then we are suddenly at a 
complete loss. Suddenly we see: We not only have no 
concept for this most understandable being, but we also do 
not see how, with respect to being, we are still supposed 
to conceive 'something. ] . (Gb, 59) 
When, that is, the intellect first 'looks' to being, this most familiar of 
all terms, it seems. to see nothing. Being, Heidegger goes on to say, draws 
away (entzieht sich) from all conceiving, and in so doing, it removes itself 
from all determinability (Bestimmbarkeit), from any possibility of being 
revealed (Offenbarkeit). Therefore, to being belongs Sichverbergen, self- 
concealing, and Q4_s fgjn selbst »« Verbergunrr ['being itself "is" 
concealing? (Gb, 60). Consequently, being, the most understandable and yet 
the concealing, is näher ... denn jedes Nächste und ferner denn alles 
Fernste ['nearer than the nearest and further than the furthest'] (Gb, 93). 
As a transcendental, being, in Bonaventure's reflection as well, draws 
away from any determination, and its movement of drawing away is visible 
in the paradoxical sayings that arise in pursuit of it. It is within and 
yet outside and beyond, both the centre and the circumference, everywhere 
and yet nowhere. It gives itself to the understanding as the closest and 
most familiar, and yet pulls away from it as the most distant and remote. 
The next saying Heidegger takes up is: Das Sein ist das 
Abgegriffenste und zugleich der Ursprung ['Being is the most worn and at 
the same time the origin'] (Gb, 60). In every comportment towards beings, 
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we make use (Gebrauch) of being, so that through all this usage being is 
in a way spent, consumed (verbraucht). But it is not thereby used up 
(ausgebraucht). Its constant usage does not exhaust it, but it always 
remains in stock (vorrätig), always still available for use. Thus, the 
perpetual employment of being leaves it wholly untouched (unangetastet) 
Its usage is a matter of indifference (GleichgUltigkeit) for it. While it 
is never conceived (begriffen), it is always grasped for use, always worn 
(abgegriffen). As the most customary habit of thought, it is in fact the 
most worn. But this habit wears incredibly well, indeed so well that it 
never becomes either worn-out or wearisome. The self-evident (das 
Selbstverständliche) standing always and at every moment in our 
understanding, being is the coin that grants us every purchase on beings. 
It is the most worn coin with which we pay for all of our transactions 
with beings. But we never throw this coin away; we never become tired of 
it. Even at the extreme point, Heidegger says, in the wish for 
annihilation, being makes an appearance. It even has the last word, for 
the wish is not to be. Even here, and especially here, being steps into 
the light wie ein Erstmaliges and Unberührtes, aus dem alles Seiende and 
sogar dessen mögliche Vernichtung noch herstammt ['as a first and unmoved, 
from which every being and even its possible annihilation still originates'] 
(Gb, 61). Being is the spring from which all beings spring forth as what 
they are. It is the primal spring, der Uýrung,. the origin (Gb, 62). 
It is, again, ' an inexhaustible source, and- even a kind of unmoved 
mover. Grasped first in every act of understanding, though never 
comprehended, it, esse or being, lets every being be what it is, while 
remaining in itself unchanged and unmoved. The oldest of the old, it is 
yet the very latest, and the constant origin of everything new. It 
communicates itself always and everywhere, but never expends itself or 
becomes tarnished in any way. And it is prior to all, prior even to 
negation. 
Heidegger then suggests: Das Sein ist das Verläßlichste and zugleich 
der Ab-grund ['Being is the most reliable and at the same time the abyss'] 
(Gb, 62). His reflection begins with the thought, wann immer such and in 
welcher Weise and in welchem Umfang Seiendes uns fragwürdig wird and 
unsicher, das Sein selbst bezweifeln wir nicht. ['however and in whatever 
way and to whatever extent beings become questionable and uncertain, we 
never doubt being itself'] (Gb, 62). As Bonaventure says, being itself is 
the most certain and most indubitable. Through all the changing 
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uncertainty of beings, Heidegger points out, being is always reliable. For 
how could we doubt what is in any respect, if what 'being' means (heißt) 
did not remain reliable? (Gb, 62) So being is the always dependable 
support for every comportment towards beings, even the comportment of 
doubting. In spite of this firm reliability, however, being is not 
something that could ever serve as a foundation or ground upon which we 
could immediately base any of our daily intentions or acts. It refuses 
every expectation of being able to serve as a reason or ground (Grund), 
and it is therefore der Ab-grund. the abyss (Gb, 63). 
For Bonaventure, on the other hand, being is the ground of all 
grounds, the ultimate reason and end of all things, and the final answer 
to the seeking of beings. As this ultimate end, though, it is a surpassing 
ground, a reason beyond or behind which thought cannot go. That is to 
say, it cannot itself be grounded. Being is for the sake of itself, 
because nothing is for the sake of anything other than being. Being is 
therefore the all-encompassing and basic end to which all finite ends are 
ordered, but precisely because it is so common and basic, it could never 
serve as a proximate reason for any finite task or answer to any definite 
question. As an answer to a definite question, in fact, it is utterly 
abysmal, because wholly empty and indeterminate. But once again, that 
indeterminacy can also be seen as infinite possibility. 
Das Sein is also, says Heidegger, das Gesagteste and zugleich the 
Verschweigung ('the most said and at the same time the withholding'] (Gb, 
63). Because we rely on it in all our dealings with beings, being comes 
everywhere and constantly to word. Not only is it there whenever we 
explicitly use some tense of it - e. g. 'is' and 'are' and 'was' and 'will be' 
and 'has been' - but we name it implicitly in every Zeitwort, every verb, 
and It is co-expressed every time we refer to any entity at all. It is 
the pre-given (Vorgabe) there in every naming of beings, and there even in 
silent judging about beings and relating , 
to them. Therefore: p 4ein j 
das Gesagteste a allem Sagen. KaU Sagbare s nur IM 5Up zj sagen j 
('Being is the most said in all saying, because the sayable can only be 
said within being') (Gb, 63), This does not mean that the essence of being 
lies unveiled before us. On the contrary, the most said in all saying is 
nonetheless silent about its essence. It is the Versch weigung seines 
Wesens ('the withholding of Its essence']. But it is from the essential 
silence (wesende Schweigen) of being that every word originates and must 
originate, insofar as it breaks this silence. Therefore, being, as the 
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withholding, is also the origin of speech (Gb, 64). 
Given that speech is not just a matter of uttering sounds, but of 
articulating the intelligible, what is the basis of speech must also be the 
basis of intelligibility. For Bonaventure, that is being itself. As what 
falls first into the intellect, through which all things are understood, 
being is the presupposition for all speaking insofar as it is the 
presupposition for all understanding. It must then be articulated in any 
utterance, but this does not mean that it is understood in itself. Rather, 
as the unity of the divine essence, it must always remain hidden, for that 
essence, the simple yet infinite ocean of substance, exceeds all 
understanding. It must then also exceed every form of (human) expression, 
for such expression is always manifold and finite, while the divine essence 
is one and infinite. Consequently, while every true statement expresses 
that essence, expresses being and presupposes it, being itself remains 
unspoken. The word arises from what cannot be uttered. 
The penultimate saying presented by Heidegger is, Das Sein I 
1-st das 
Vergessenste and zugleich the Erinnerung ('Being is the most forgotten and 
at the same time the recalling'] (Gb, 65). The comparison with Bonaventure 
on the first of these characteristics is obvious, and has already been 
suggested. Intent on particular and universal being, Bonaventure says, the 
mind's eye does not turn to being itself, even though it comes to our 
minds first and through it we know other things. Heidegger's point is 
much the same: 
Immer deutlicher wird uns, wie das Sein überall das 
Nächste in allen Bezügen zum Seienden bleibt, and daß das 
Sein doch zugleich ganz übergangen wird zugunsten des 
Seienden, an dem alles Wollen un Wissen seine Erfüllung 
sucht. Kein Wunder, daß wir das Sein Ober dem Seiendem 
and seinem Andrang vergessen nämlich als solches, was 
noch irgendeiner Besinnung würdig wäre. 
[It becomes ever clearer, how being remains the nearest in 
all relations to beings, and is yet at the same time 
completely passed over in favour of beings, from which all 
willing and wishing seek their fulfillment. No wonder, 
that, against beings and their crush we forget being as 
anything worthy of reflection. ] (Gb, 65) 
Being is the most forgotten. And yet, if it were not also in some way 
constantly remembered, it would not be possible to come across any being, 
including ourselves. Being is what allows beings to enter into us, and 
enables us to be among beings. It allows us to call beings to mind and to 
be called into their midst; s er-innert uns in cn Seien , gl an 
ads eiende ['being recalls us to and into beings'] (Gb, 66). All that is 
encountered, whether experienced as present, past or future, is and remains 
manifest through the Er-Innerung gigs Seins ('the recalling of being']. 
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Heidegger distinguishes this thought from Plato's doctrine of anamnesis by 
saying that, for Plato, anamnesis means that we recollect something. 
Being, on the other hand, is not an object (Gegenstand') that we can recall, 
but is itself des eigentlich Erinnernde ('the authentically recalling'] (Gb, 
66). Being, the nearest and yet the furthest, is what allows all beings to 
come close. 
According to Bonaventure, the intellect tends not to 'see' being 
itself because it is generally lost among beings. But if being is the 
condition for the possibility of any understanding of beings, it could not 
be thus lost if being were not always, in some way, present to it, since it 
is through the presence of being to the intellect that beings may be 
presented to it. It might be thought that the parallel between 
Bonaventure and Heidegger at this, point is offset by an apparent 
intellectualism on the part of Bonaventure. Heidegger's talk of the 
awareness, the becoming inward (innewerden), of beings through the 
recalling or 'innering' (Er-innerung) of being is linked to the observation 
that das Sein geht uns an (Gb, 65), that being is an issue for us, that it, 
and therefore beings, matter. The coming close of beings, their being 
presented and stepping into the open, is a function of this 'mattering'. 
But the lostness of mans among beings is, for Bonaventure too, nothing 
merely intellectual. It is also a concernful dispersal. Insofar as being 
is at the same time the good, it is that which matters most, and all finite 
beings, all finite goods, are dependent upon it. " Being, after all, the end 
and consummation of beings, is that for which all beings long. 
The remembrance of being, for-Heidegger, the becoming aware of it as 
opposed to constantly overlooking and forgetting it, means letting it come 
close in the way that beings are usually, close. It does not mean a mere 
lifting into consciousness as an object of representation, but a being 
taken into the midst of, a being transported into: 
Das Seins innewerden, besagt ... etwas anderes als der Versuch, das Sein ins Besu tsein zu heben. Vollends ist 
dies Innewerden kein verlorenes Vorstellen dessen, was man 
sich bei dem »Be riff« von »Sein« im ungefähren denkt and 
nicht denkt. Das Sein beggreifen, , heißt den »Grund« 
be reifen. Be-greifen heißt hier »inbegriffen werden« im 
Sein vom Sein. 
[To become aware of, to become inward to being, means ... 
something other than the attempt to raise being to 
consciousness. This becoming aware of is altogether 
different from any vain representing of what one usually 
thinks, and does not think with the rough 'concept' of 
'bein '. To conceive, to take in being, means to conceive 
or take in the 'ground'. Taking in means here 'being taken 
in', 'being included' in being by being. ] (Gb, 93) 
The ascent of mens to being itself is also a being taken into being, a 
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being taken up into that which is the ground, the foundation, reason and 
end, of all. It does not mean representing an object, since being cannot 
be an object, nor does it mean forming a concept in the usual sense, since 
being cannot be appropriately captured by a concept. It is, instead, a 
being raised to the vision of that which is present everywhere, and in 
which mens must in a way already be included. 
However, for Heidegger, the remembrance of being involves a 
historical reminiscence. Within his thought, the Anfang to be recalled is 
best recalled in its historical beginning, so that the return to being as 
ground involves a return to a historical source. For Bonaventure, on the 
other hand, while being is the source of time and therefore has to be in 
some way the source of history, it is not itself historical in the way that 
it is for Heidegger. The remembrance of being, for Bonaventure, is truly a 
remembrance of what is everywhere and at all times the same, and may be 
recalled as the same at any point. While Heidegger does say that being is 
das Selbe, and that reflection upon it can occur anytime and anywhere, and 
while his reflection on the historical beginning is nonetheless a 
reflection on what is in truth always, and at all times original, his 
attempt to search out the genuine sense of being by returning to its 
earliest conception (the second part of Grundbegriffe is 'a reflection on 
Anaximander) involves a historical understanding and approach quite foreign 
to a medieval thinker, as I have often already emphasized. 
The final saying in Heidegger's reflection, Das Sein ist das 
Verzwingendste and zugleich the Befreiung ('Being is the, most compelling 
and at the same time the freeing'], also raises points that have been taken 
up previously, since both of these characteristics of being can be found, 
in one form or another, in many of Heidegger's other works. For instance, 
the compelling yet freeing character of being is implicit in the notion of 
being as the overpowering power which clears a place for its own revealing 
in 'sending' the 'Da' of Dasein. Here in the Grundbegriffe, Heidegger says 
that, since it is being that lets every being be a being, every being, 
however it may concern and affect us, remains infinitely behind and under 
the compulsion of being. All beings are bound to the surpassing necessity 
of being, so being is the most compelling. On the other hand, we do not 
'feel' the compulsion of being; we feel only the press and urgency of 
beings. Being is as if it were not there, as nothing. We are played about 
(umspielt) ' and played through (durchspielt) by it as by something 
inexperiencable. Aber dieses Spiel hat in allem stets doch the einzige 
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Eindeutigkeit des Einzigen ['But this play has yet constantly and in all 
things the single unambiguity of the singular']. For it is being that 
transposes us into the openness of the Da in which being may be 
differentiated from beings, and beings one from another. Being is itself 
the opening (Öffnende) that first grants the openness (Offene) of the 
'there' in which being and beings come to presence (Gb, 67-8). 
With Bonaventure's comments in mind, it could be said that being 
itself is the simple and single surrounding of beings. It is the all- 
powerful power that permits, sustains end rules over the being of all that 
is. Heidegger also says that the Versetzung in das Sein ist the Befreiung 
in the Freiheit ['the transposition into being is the freeing into freedom'], 
where diese Befreiung allein ist das Wesen der Freiheit ['this freeing 
alone is the essence of freedom'] (Gb, 68). It will be recalled that being 
itself, for Bonaventure (following Augustine), is not only the cause of 
being and the basis of understanding, but also 'the order of living'. As 
final cause, and' therefore the good, being itself is what orients and 
structures the progress of all beings. Clearly, the way it does so must 
be different for beings that cannot see the good themselves, and for the 
being that can. If being and the good are same, the being that can 
recognise the good and take over its own progress towards it must be the 
one that knows being. 
In that case, the falling of being into the 
intellect must also be the source for the possibility of the free choice of 
the good, for freedom in general. This point has already been addressed 
in a certain form in the comparison of Tauler and Heidegger. 
That concludes Heidegger's Leitworte fUr the Besinnung auf das Sein. 
This section of the Grundbegriffe is intended as a preparation for the 
reflection on Anaximander that follows, it. - ' It is worth going on to 
examine that reflection briefly for the light it sheds on how the 
overpowering, constant and selfsame character of being may be conceived, 
given that these characteristics are essential to Bonaventure's notion of 
ipsum esse as a name of God. Before doing so, however, it may be 
advisable to ask, for the sake of clarity regarding the aims of this 
examination, what the 'may be' in the question of how being 'may be 
conceived' is supposed to mean. May be conceived by whom, and when, for 
instance? Heidegger's discussion is a reflection on Anaximander, and it 
offers suggestions as to how being was conceived in early Greek thought, 
It thereby also offers a suggestion as to how being may be conceived in 
general. In so doing, it presents a possibility of being that could hold 
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promise for the future. This possibility is presented partly in opposition 
to the way being has been conceived in the metaphysical tradition, where 
it has been involved with the notion of God, and where, according to 
Heidegger, it has tended to be thought of as permanent presence. Before 
'comparing' - in the sense of setting up a dialogue between - the possible 
sense of being which Heidegger presents and Bonaventure's notion of being 
as ipsum esse, the question needs to be posed: In what relation does the 
former stand to the latter, or rather, in what way are these to be related, 
in light of the task that the present study has set for itself? 
As stated in the Introduction, that task is: to search for 
possibilities of 'God' through a dialogue between Heidegger and a number 
of figures in a certain strand of medieval thought, and it is this task 
that determines the way in which the sense of being presented by 
Heidegger in his reflection on Anaximander is to be related to the sense 
of Bonaventure's ipsum esse. The question of what is the same and what is 
different in Bonaventure's conception and that of [Heidegger's] Anaximander, 
therefore, is ordered to this end. In view of the characteristics of being 
mentioned above, overpowering, constant and selfsame, the question then is: 
How may these be thought in a way that is phenomenologically angemessen, 
a way that fits the phenomena and does not distort them, if they are taken 
as being essential to the . ipsum esse which may be (has been in the past 
and in some [transformed] form might be in future) called God? The 
dialogue being set* up between Bonaventure and Heidegger at this point is 
meant to offer some suggestions in response to this question. 
This is not simply a matter of reckoning up what Bonaventure says 
and setting it against what Heidegger says about Anaximander in some 
purely historicist 'compare and contrast' fashion, but of thinking through 
what needs to be thought, the Sache selbst, if you like, in the light of 
what these thinkers say. This requires asking not only what Bonaventure 
says but also what his statements about ipsum esse demand and entail, 
even when he does not explicitly bring those demands and entailments into 
view, in which case the question of whether or not he actually 'sees' them 
remains an open one. For instance, if being is the same which may be 
conceived differently, then how is the sameness of this same to be 
adequately conceived, given radical historical change and process, including 
even changes in the conception of being? How is it 'rightly' conceived, in 
a way that rights itself by the phenomena and is therefore right to them, 
in accordance with them? How must being 'be', as the overpowering, the 
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constant and the selfsame? Is permanent presence the best way of 
conceiving its constancy? Moreover, if it is said that Bonaventure 
conceives being itself, and therefore God, as permanent presence, how may 
he think such permanent presence? This means: 1) how may he have actually 
thought it, where this is not immediately and unambiguously apparent from 
what he says, and 2) how might he think it, given what a dialogue between 
his thought and Heidegger's reflection on Anaximander brings to light 
concerning the matter at issue? These are the questions guiding the 
following examination. 
Because of what may be presupposed from previous discussions, there 
is no need here to follow through the whole course of Heidegger's 
analysis. Instead, I will go straight to a passage near the end of the 
Grundbegriffe. 
Denn des Selbe, von woheraus das Hervorgehen auf and 
wohin zurück das Entgehen eingeht, dieses Selbe ist die 
nötigende Not .. Dieses Selbe and in seiner 
Notwendigkeit Eine and in seiner Einheit Einzige and in 
seiner Einzigkeit Anfängliche ist der Anfang. Der Anfang 
ist als die Verfügung über die Anwesung des jeweilig 
Anwesenden des Wesen der Anwesung: das Sein selbst. 
[For the same, from which coming-forth arrives and into 
which passing-away goes back, this same is the need which 
compels . This same and in its necessity one and in its 
oneness singular and in its singularity initial is the 
beginning. The beginning, as the ordering over the 
presenting of what is. resent at any time, is the essence 
of presencing: being itself. ] (Gb, 117) 
Being is presenting, Anwesung, which is lingering awhile, Verweilung (Gb, 
121). But this lingering awhile, as the Übergang, the transition or 
crossing-over between coming-forth and passing-away, 'includes' both of 
these dimensions as well: Der Übergang ist 'je the Anwesung, in der das 
Hervorgehen and das Entgehen zumal wesen, ['The transition is in each case 
presencing, in which coming-forth and passing-away especially come to 
presence'] (Gb, 120). This idea will already be familiar from the 
discussions of Heidegger on early Greek thought, and on the relation 
between being and time. What Heidegger specifically says here is, in fact, 
quite similar to what he says in the 1946 Der Spruch des Anaximander. 
Being, as presencing, is not merely the being presently present of 
the while, is not mere persistence in the while, but is the process of 
coming to be and passing away, presenc-ing. The necessity, unity, 
uniqueness, and initiality of being itself lie in the way these 
characteristics may be thought in application to presencing, as the 
arising, enduring and departing of beings. There is, then, as one would 
expect from Heidegger, an essential relation between being and time, where 
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the temporality of being has to be thought in terms of the temporal 
character of presencing in relation to that of present beings. While 
present beings come to be, linger and pass away, presencing has a certain 
steadiness. It does not itself come to be or endure or pass away, and is, 
in this sense, always and at all times the same. This steadiness and 
sameness constitute its unity and uniqueness. Furthermore, presencing is 
disposed over by a need which compels, where that need is not something 
external to it, but is the manner of its happening, the way in which the 
Anwesung west, the way it sends every being that comes to presence and 
departs into the apportioned portion of its while. This disposing over and 
ordering (Verftlgung) is being as arch A the first which originates not in 
the manner of bringing about and then departing, but as a constant holding 
sway. The necessity and initiality of being are to be thought from this 
sense of arch 
Being as arctic is also apeiron. This term is usually translated as 
'the limitless', but Heidegger translates it as the Verwehrung der »Grenzea, 
the refusal of limit, where 'limit' means the closing off of presencing in 
some final and conclusive presence (Anwesenheit), in the subsistence 
(Beständigkeit) of a mere presence (Gb, 114). Being as apeiron is in- 
finite in the sense that presenting prevents beings from stiffening into 
subsistence. This prevention belongs to the ordering of being, which 
occurs as a surmounting of the disorder of beings, their tendency to 
stiffen so as to resist dissolution. But this ordering of presenting, as 
what sends to beings the presence of their while, is also a Wehrung, a 
preserving and protecting, of limit. The ordering of being both sends and 
refuses limit. It is in this sense that the 'infinite' essence of being is 
to be thought, as well as its character of determining the essence, the 
coming to presence, of all limited, all bounded or finite, beings. 
It is illuminating to link what Heidegger says here in commenting 
upon Anaximander with some elements in his analysis of the being of Dasein 
in Sein and Zeit, and especially with respect to the character of being as 
superior power, which, Heidegger claims, determines the sense of being as 
the holy and is therefore connected with divinity and God (see MAL, 211, 
n. 3/l65, n. 6). Since the analysis of the being of Dasein was meant to be 
preparatory to the task of working out the sense of being, one can ask how 
the sense of being as an overpowering ordering suggested in this 
commentary on Anaximander might be 'rooted' in the being of Dasein, in 
Dasein's understanding of its own being as worked out in Sein and Zeit. 
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There is a clear connection here with Dasein's thrownness and facticity. 
Dasein is thrown into its De; nobody asks it whether it wants to come 
forth or depart, or whether it wishes to linger in the while of its own 
specific while. Nobody asks it if it wants to be Dasein, if it wants to be 
this being that has 'to be', this being that has to take over being the 
ground of itself, and thus take over the being (the coming to presence and 
becoming. the coming to exist which is always finite and determinate) of 
the ground. Given what such being involves, a Wesen, if asked, might well 
prefer not to ek-sist, might prefer nicht zu wesen, as it were, but to 
remain invisible and dim in the darkness of the ground. " And if thrown 
Dasein happens to inquire about its thrownness, if, given to be there, it 
asks, what gives? the answer, for Heidegger, can only be being itself, or 
the the Es of Es gibt Sein which throws a present being into the place 
allotted to it, and which, in so doing, holds sway over the totality of its 
being (becoming) in its past, present and future, and so over the fulness 
of its time. 
Moreover, the self-constancy of Dasein in Sein and Zeit consists in 
the steadiness of becoming, rather than in achieving any final stage. It 
is this steadiness, the steadiness of constantly originating new forms, 
that constitutes Dasein's being. And Dasein determines the actualization, 
the concrete coming to presence, of these forms by choosing to realize a 
finite set of possibilities. These are chosen from the greater, but still 
finite, set that it'might actually choose. Although it stands in a dim 
relation to infinity, Dasein, being factical and therefore determinate, can 
only choose from the limited set of possibles available in its concrete 
situation. These are not all compossible; otherwise there would be no need 
for, and no value in, making a choice. If "Dasein's understanding of the 
being of beings is rooted in its understanding of its own being, then one 
can see how the analysis of Dasein's being on these points links to the 
analysis of being in the commentary on Anaximander. The steadiness of 
being consists in the steadiness of Anwesung, of the process of coming to 
presence. This process is Itself not bounded. Its unbounded, in-finite, 
nature consists, rather, precisely in refusing any final fixity. But 
determinate realisation, and all realisation is necessarily determinate, 
requires limitation. The actual form that comes to presence, the Wesen 
that west, involves the 'choosing' or the picking out of a finite set of 
possibilities from the infinite set that belongs to being as ground, to 
what has sometimes been described as the infinite sea of substance. 
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Finally, as suggested in Chapter Four, Dasein's authenticity consists 
in willingness for the way, in being willing to become what it may be, and 
that means in being constantly willing to take leave of what it is and has 
been, to surmount the actual towards the possible. Dasein's dim relation 
to infinity rests in the 'towards' of this being towards possibility. 
Furthermore, it is through this willingness, which includes willingness to 
be there in the way that is given to it, 'settled in advance' (destinatum) 
for it, that Dasein achieves authentic being with others. It is, then, in 
the surmounting of fixity, the resistance of finality, that Dasein achieves 
the genuine order of its being. Being as Anwesung orders by surmounting 
the disorder of beings that lies in their tendency towards fixity, their 
tendency towards bloßes Beharren. Thus, the authentic Seinkännen to which 
Dasein's own being attests points to the truth of the being of beings, its 
true nature as Anwesung. 
Bonaventure conceives of being itself as a pure presence that enters 
into all limited 'being present, all finite duration, and this notion of 
being is connected with its sense as a pure and self-identical act. He 
also claims that being itself is all-powerful and the infinite cause of 
every finite essence. Keeping in mind what was said about the queations 
guiding the present examination, it can now be asked, how may these 
characteristics of being be conceived in light of what Heidegger says 
about Anaximander? The answer has, for the most part, already been 
indicated. Pure presence would be understood as the peculiar steadiness 
of presencing, a steadiness which Heidegger especially seems to 
acknowledge in his later works, in, for instance, his characterisation of 
the event of appropriation in Zeit and Seine' The pure and self-identical 
act of being would then be construed as, this act of presencing, as coming 
to presence itself, which, in itself, is everywhere and always das Selbe. 
Its all-powerful character would consist in its being the overpowering 
power that allots the locations of beings. And it would be the infinite 
cause of all finite essences in the sense that it would be the 
inexhaustible source of beings, the original boundlessness which reveals 
its essence as origin by sending the boundaries to beings and holding sway 
over them, and which reveals its essence as the boundless by refusing any 
final Grenzung, where the sense of both of these revelations must be 
thought temporally. Being itself, as the unlimited, the in-finite, would 
then reveal its essence precisely by withdrawing it, by holding itself back 
from any conclusive delimitation. Different conceptions of being might 
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then themselves belong to the finite presencing of its own inexhaustible 
essence. 
But does Bonaventure 'mean' this? Or, for that matter, does 
Anaximander even 'mean' this? These are not easy questions to answer. In 
the end, I remain not wholly convinced by Heidegger's assessment of the 
forgetting of being in the metaphysical tradition, and also unconvinced 
about the accuracy of his retrievals, the accuracy, that is, of his attempt 
to recover an 'original' (meaning more than just historically early) sense 
of being by going back to early Greek thought. Nonetheless, his own 
commentary in the Grundbegriffe, whether it is 'right' about Anaximander or 
not, is decidedly illuminating about the sense of being, about how certain 
characteristics of being may be thought in a way that is angemessen to 
the phenomena, which also means a way that is just to the things of time 
and number. Insofar as Bonaventure's sayings about ipsum esse include 
such characteristics, Heidegger's analysis helps to point out what is 
demanded by them, demanded, that is, in view of the present situation, and 
that means in view of what it will now be authentically possible to think, 
given an honest appropriation of what past thought has brought to light. 
Justice to the things of time and number, to the value - indeed, the 
holiness - of life and becoming must be central to this demand. But, as 
should be clear from the discussion of Bonaventure on delight in Chapter 
One, it is by no means obvious that Bonaventure's thought is wholly unjust 
on this point, and 'it certainly is not so in anything like the manner or 
measure which is arguably characteristic of a good deal of Western 
philosophy and theology. 
It is important that Heidegger does say that we are only granted 
access to, Anaximander's saying because, however distant it may be 
historically, it does not concern something wholly foreign, but something 
that is always close and therefore, in a way, already familiar: 
Wäre es nur Inhalt einer längst entschwundenen Lehre, dann 
müßten wir jede Hoffnung auf ein Wissen fahren lassen. 
Aber in dem Spruch ist ja das Sein selbst das Gesagte, and 
dieses, des Sein, bleibt uns das Übernahe, das alle Nähe 
des Seienden übertrifft. Also muß im Befremdlichsten noch 
ein Wink in Vertrautes aufbewahrt bleiben. 
[If it were only the content of a long vanished doctrine, 
then we would have to give up all hope of understanding. But in the saying, what is spoken of is being itself, and this, being, remains the most near, surpassing all the 
nearness of beings. Thus, in the strangest there must 
still remain preserved a hint leading into what is 
familiar. ] (Gb, 111) 
What is being spoken of is something that we already 'know', something in 
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which we stand insofar as we are what we are. The Sache is not distant. 
Instead, it is so near that even talk of nearness is misleading: 
Das Sein ist das Übernahe. Jede Rede davon, es sei nahe 
and am nächsten, hat es schon entfernt, da auch die 
nächste Nähe schon wesentlich den Abstand einschließt. Das 
Sein steht nie von uns ab, weil es das ist, worin wir 
verstezt sind. 
[Being is the surpassingly near. All talk of it which says 
that it is near and right next to us has already distanced 
it, since even the nearest nearness still essentially 
involves a standing apart. Being never stands apart from 
us, because it is that into which we are transposed. ] 
(Gb, 102) 
The return to the beginning is still a return to what is nearest, what 
cannot be far from anyone because anyone who is stands within it. Of 
course, it may be misunderstood and even wholly forgotten, as Heidegger 
often claims it has been in the Western metaphysical tradition. On the 
other hand, if it is the nearest of the near, the possibility of being 
awake to it in an appropriate way, the possibility of being authentically 
aware of that within which all thinking, saying and doing occur, cannot be 
wholly closed off to anyone at any time, to anyone, that is, who is willing 
to heed the call: Sei inständig im Sein! Innestehen in Sein! ('Be 
insistent in being. Stand within being. '] (Gb, 102). 
Still, in the Beiträge, written a few years earlier than the 
Grundbegriffe, Heidegger does claim quite unambiguously that the sense in 
which metaphysics, during the long course of its history from Anaximander 
to Nietzsche, understands the being of beings constitutes a forgetting of 
being (B, 424). In this history, according to the 'Beiträge, being means 
beingness (Seiendheit), and, as such, it is a nachträgliche Gattung (B, 258), 
a later category added on to what-is. What Heidegger means by being as 
beingness at this point, however, is what in the Middle Ages was 
understood as analogical being, and it is from this being that Bonaventure 
explicitly differentiates the ipsum esse which, for him, is God. While 
much of what Heidegger says in this earlier work is explicitly opposed to 
many of the metaphysical determinations of being in Bonaventure's account, 
as well as to some of the suggestions for what being may mean in the 
Grundbegriffe, the opposition is not a simple one, and can just as easily 
be seen as a retrieval of a sense of being where it is not a shadowy 
general category, but the simple and unique source of all that is. Where 
this sense is understood, the metaphysical determinations themselves may 
be meant in a different way than they are when being is an empty 
abstraction from beings, what Bonaventure understands as analogous being. 
In the Beiträge, Heidegger claims that the forgetting of being 
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consists in the reduction of it to the most general and empty, to the 
beingness of beings (B, 112), and he rejects a number of metaphysical 
characteristics that have been attributed to it on the basis of this 
interpretation. Thus, while in the Grundbegriffe he suggests, for 
reflection, that being is both the emptiest and most common, and the 
richest and highest, he says in the Beiträge that it is the richest and 
highest rather than the emptiest and most common (B, 118). However, in 
saying that being is not the most common attribute and emptiest 
determination of what-is (B, 258), he means that the simplicity of being is 
not emptiness but the ground 
of fullness (B, 471). The simple Was 
Einfache) is not the merely empty - it is not empty in the manner of 
analogous being - but is the inexhaustible which is never exhausted, das 
un-erschöpfliche Unerschdpfte (B, 137). Heidegger also says that being is 
not the greatest being which causes (verursachte) and in one way or 
another encompasses (umfaßte) all other beings (B, 258). But this includes 
rather than excludes the notion that, in overcoming the misinterpretation 
of the simple as the empty, das Einfache, in dem sich alle Wesung 
gesammelt hat, muß wiedergefunden werden in Jeglichem Seienden, nein, 
dieses in Jenem ('the simple, in which all coming to presence has gathered 
itself, must be found again in every being. --no, ever being in it'] (B, 278). 
Likewise, that being is not ä cause (Ursache) or ratio means that, being 
unrepresentable, it cannot be represented in such terms, but it is 
nonetheless to be'experienced and thought as simultaneous with beings as 
their ground (Grund) (B, 288-9). Being should never be made common, says 
Heidegger, and doch west es, wo and wann es west, näher, and inniger denn 
Jegliches Seiende ('and yet it comes to presence, where and when it comes 
to presence, more nearly and more inwardly than any being'] (B, 260). That 
being is not the most common and familiar then does not exclude this 
nearness. It only means that being is not the universal category which 
thought extends to all things, but is the unique and strange which comes 
to presence in all things (B, 177). 
Bonaventure, it is clear, uses many of the terms that Heidegger 
rejects here, but it is much less clear that he means them in the sense 
that Heidegger rejects, since what Bonaventure says about being does not 
seem to be unequivocally oriented to beingness. Heidegger thinks, at 
least in this work, that metaphysical conceptions necessarily falsify the 
nature of being. But is it so obvious that to say, for instance, that 
being is not an all-encompassing cause but a simple and most inward 
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ground is utterly different from saying, as Bonaventure well might, that it 
is an all-encompassing cause, but that this is a hard saying whose terms 
must not be understood as they are when used in reference to finite 
entities? It is not so obvious to me. Because of such questions, 
Heidegger's interpretation of the history of philosophy as the history of 
the forgetting of being, where no element in anyone's thought is excluded 
from this forgetting, or even thought to be difficult and uncertain with 
respect to it, is not obvious, either. This study is concerned primarily 
with medieval mystical theology, but this point could be extended to the 
thought of many figures within the tradition. As I have said before, that 
does not mean Heidegger is simply wrong in his account of the history of 
metaphysics. I only want to suggest that the story may be more complex 
than he implies. 
In all that has been said so far, the one attribute of ipsum esse to 
which nothing has been seen to correspond precisely and explicitly in the 
course of Heidegger's reflection on das, Sein selbst is perfection, although 
one might say that Dasein's relation to the infinite through its relation 
to being is implicitly. a relation to perfection. This was suggested in the 
last chapter. Still, given that no explicit notion of being as perfect has 
as yet emerged in this chapter, and given that perfection is utterly 
essential to Bonaventure's attribution of divinity to ipsum esse, and 
therefore essential to any conception of God that purports to be similar 
to his, it must be 'concluded that no such conception has been presented so 
far. What has been presented may be similiar in many ways to what 
Bonaventure calls ipsum esse, but if the attribute of perfection were 
excluded from ipsum esse, Bonaventure would be unlikely to identify this 
esse with God. This is the issue to which I will now turn in discussing 
Heidegger's notion of the good. 
To begin with, although in past chapters some suggestions have been 
offered about the place in Heidegger's thought of what may be called the 
good, it must be acknowledged that Heidegger does not have a notion of the 
good in the same sense as he has a notion of, being. That is, he does not 
usually talk explicitly about the good An the way that he does about 
being. However, the Metaphysische Anfangsgrande der Logik ends: 
Zum Wesen des Seins gehört wesenhaft Grund. Mit der 
konkreten Einsicht in diesen metaphysischen Zusammenhang 
habe ich Sie lediglich dahin zurückgeführt, wo Plato stand 
als er die Sätze im »Staat« schrieb (Pol. VI, 509b 6-10), 
mit denen ich schließe ... 'Und so mußt du sagen: fur des 
erkannte Seiende and mit ihm ist nicht nur zugleich 
anwesend das Erkennen, anwesend nämlich auf rund des 
Guten (das Gute verschafft dem Seienden niche nur die 
Erkanntheit and daher den Welteingang), sondern auch das 
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Sein and das Wassein Ist dem Seienden zugewiesen durch 
jenes (nämlich das Gute). Das umwillen aber (die 
Transzendenz) Ist nicht das Sein selbst, sondern was es 
Überschreitet, and zwar indem es das Seiende an Würde and 
Macht überschwingt. ' 
[Ground belongs essentially to the essence of being. With 
concrete insight into this metaphysical connection I have 
only led you -back to where Plato stood when he wrote the 
sentences in the Republic ... with which I close . 'And 
so you must say that knowing is not only present for and 
with known beings, present namely on the basis of the good 
(the good establishes for beings not only knownness and 
thereby world-entry) but also -being and being-a-what is 
assigned to beings from that (namely the good The for- 
the-sake-of, however, (transcendence) is not being itself, 
but surpasses being, and does so inasmuch as it outstrips 
being in dignity and power. ' (MAL, 284/219) 
In some way, then, this work, composed one year after the first publication 
of Sein and Zeit, involves a retrieval and repetition of Plato's idea of the 
good, agathon, which is beyond being, epekeina tes ousias. In that case, an 
examination of what is said in it should yield further' insight into the 
position of the good in Heidegger's own thought. This examination will 
then, in conjunction with what has already been said in previous chapters, 
help to lay a foundation for relating Heidegger and Bonaventure on this 
issue. 
I will confine myself to 5511-14 of this work, which form a section 
entitled Das Problem des Grundes. 511 discusses Transzendenz, and helps 
to. clarify what was said about this concept in Sein and Zeit. On pp. 211- 
13 (English 165-7), Heidegger makes the following four points about 
transcendence: 
1. Transcendence is the primordial constitution of the subjectivity of a 
subject. It belongs to the essence of Dasein, and is that on the basis of 
which Dasein can relate itself to beings. 
2. Transcendence does not mean crossing the barrier of an inner realm in 
which the subject is confined. It means, crossing over, surpassing 
(Überschreiten) the being itself which can become manifest to the subject. 
It is through this surpassing in advance that beings come to stand against 
Dasein so that they can be apprehended. In this surpassing of beings, 
transcending Dasein is beyond nature. As transcending, and that means as 
free, Dasein is something alien (Fremdes) to nature. 
3. That 'towards which' (»Wohin(() the subject transcends is not an object 
or being, since these are surpassed in transcendence, but is the world. 
4, Because transcendence is the basic constitution of Dasein's being, and 
therefore primordial, and because this being crosses over to a world, 
Dasein's transcendence is designated as being-in-the-world. 
What these points suggest about the nature of transcendence and world is 
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familiar from Sein and Zeit, and repeated in Vom Wesen des Grundes. 
Entities within the world are disclosed to Dasein, on the basis of Dasein's 
surpassing of them, where what Dasein surpasses towards are possibilities 
of its own being. Dasein is 'beyond nature' because it, transcending, is 
beyond the actual in existing towards the possible. 
In order to be towards the possible, Dasein has to be free. It is 
through freedom, therefore, that Dasein surpasses, and what it surpasses is 
not just beings other than itself, but also, in a sense, itself. It 
surpasses itself as actual, as what has been achieved so far, and it is 
precisely through this surpassing of itself as actual and towards itself 
as possible that Dasein is truly itself, a free being. In its surpassing 
of itself, the abyss (Abgrund) that Dasein is for itself, the abyss of 
possibilities which it may choose in its coming to be, is opened up (MAL, 
234/182). 
World, as that towards which Dasein transcends, is connected with 
these possibilities. It is therefore not the totality of the actual, but is 
'beyond' all actual beings, and because it determines the way beings are 
uncovered in their being, because it determines the way beings are, the 
being of beings is manifest in the light 'of this 'beyond'. The nature of 
transcendence indicated here is, according to Heidegger, visible in Plato's 
idea of the good, which is even beyond beings and -the realm of ideas. 
This idea, Heidegger claims, is the ou ivexa, that for the sake of which 
and because of which something is or is not, and is so or otherwise. The 
idea of the good, as das Umwillen, transcends the totality of ideas and at 
the same time organises them in their wholeness, and Welt als das, 
woraufhin Dasein transzendiert, ist primär bestimmt durch das Umwillen 
('world, as that to which Dasein transcends, is primarily defined by the 
for-the-sake-of-which']. Since the surpassing projection of a for-the- 
sake-of-which is only possible for a being that can transcend the actual 
towards the possible, a being, that is, which can project its own being as 
possible and on this basis can project possibilities of its own being and 
choose between them, world is only there for a being that is free. 
Dasein's freedom and its transcendence are identical (MAL, 257-8/184-5), 
and they form the condition for the possibility of projecting something 
like world. 
Indeed, das Dasein als freies ist Weltentwurf ('as free, Dasein is 
world-projection'], where world is das Ganze der wesenhaften inneren 
Ndglichkeiten des Daseins ale des transzendierenden ('the totality of the 
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essential intrinsic possibilities of Dasein as transcending'] (MAL, 248/192). 
Because, the being of beings within the world is constituted in reference 
to the world understood in this way, and because the world understood in 
this way surpasses all actual beings, 
Dieses enthüllt sich, wann und wie immer es angetroffen 
wird - und gerade wenn in seinem Ansich -, immer nur als 
eine Einschränkung, als eine mögliche Verwirklichung des 
Möglichen, als das Ungenügende aus einem Uberschuß an 
Möglichkeiten, darin sich das Dasein als freier Entwurf 
schon immer hält. 
[Whenever and however they are encountered, actual beings 
always reveal themselves - precisely when they are 
disclosed as they are in themselves - only as a 
restriction, as one possible realization of the possible as 
the insufficient out of an excess of possibilities, within 
which Dasein always maintains itself as free projection. ] 
(MAL, 248/192) 
The actual is always limited because Dasein is always transcending, always 
surpassing towards the possible. Because das Dasein Ist in sich 
tlberschtlssig, d. h. durch eine primäre UngenUgsamkeit an allem Seienden 
bestimmt ('Dasein is in itself excessive, i. e. defined by a primary 
insatiability for beings'], the actual is always, in relation to the possible 
(and Dasein necessarily constitutes the being of beings through such a 
relation), finite and insufficient (MAL, 248/192). The world, as the 
totality of Dasein's possibilities, and that means of all that may be, is 
epekeina, the beyond surpassing all beings while at the same time 
determining the being of those beings. 
As such, the world is, in a sense, nothing. It is not something 
present-at-hand, and it is not any of the beings Dasein transcends, where 
that includes Dasein Itself. And yet it is not a nihil negativum, but is 
still something. Die Welt: ein Nichts, kein Seiendes - und doch etwas; 
nichts Seiendes - aber Sein ['The world: a nothing, no being - and yet 
something; nothing of beings - but being']. In asking what kind of nihil 
the world is, Heidegger poses the question about the intrinisic possibility 
of transcendence, which, he maintains as in Sein und Zeit, is time as 
primordial temporality (Zeitlichkeit) (MAL, 252/195). 
912, Transzendenz und Zeitlichkeit (nihil originarium), addresses 
itself to this question of the form of nothingness characterizing the 
world in relation to temporality as the possibility of transcendence. It 
begins by noting that, als freies entwirft sich das Dasein auf das Umwillen 
seiner als das Ganze der wesenhaften Möglichkeiten seines Seinkännens ('as 
free, Dasein projects itself on the for-the-sake-of-itself, as the whole of 
the essential possibilities in its capacity-to-be] (MAL, 252-3/196). The 
whole of the essential possibilities of Dasein's potentiality-for-being is 
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the world towards which Dasein exists. Surpassing all actual beings, this 
world is, in a sense, nothing. However, in attempting to determine the 
nature of this nothing, Heidegger says at this point, perhaps against 
Scheler, that Dasein in being beyond does not come up against das absolute 
Nichts (MAL, 254/196). Rather, as in Sein and Zeit, Dasein's being beyond 
actual beings brings it into being-in-the-world, and thus brings it face to 
face with beings encountered within the world. The world, this nothing 
which is yet somehow being, is not nothing in the sense of absolute 
nothingness. 
The possibility of transcendence, and so of world, is temporality, and 
temporality is primordial time. What Husserl calls time-consciousness, 
Heidegger says, is precisely this primordial time, temporality (MAL, 
264/204). Primordial time, that is, is the self-unifying unity of the three 
ekstases of time: 1) the future in which Dasein comes towards itself 
(Zukunft), characterized by expectance (Gewärtigen), 2) the past in which 
Dasein is as having-been (Gewesensein, Gewesenheit), characterized by 
retention (Behalten), and 3) the present as a waiting towards (Gegenwart), 
characterized by making present or presenting (Gegenwärtigen). The 
'opening' which occurs in the unified spreading out of these dimensions of 
time is the space, the clearing, within which beings are manifest as what 
they are. This primordial temporality is therefore the unitary but tri- 
dimensional horizon of intelligibility. In itself, it is not some thing, not 
a being, since the horizon within which the being of beings is constituted, 
the horizon within which beings are intellible as what they are, is not 
itself a being. It is rather the condition for the possibility of the 
being of beings. Temporality 'is' not, but temporalizes itself. It occurs 
or happens, one could say, and world arises in and through this happening. 
Die Welt ist das Nichts, das sich ursprünglich zeitigt, das 
In and mit der Zeitigungg Entspringende schlechthin - wir 
nennen sie daher das nihil originar um. 
[World is the nothing which temporalizes itself 
primordially, that which simply arises in and with 
emporalization. We therefore call it the nihil 
originarium. ] (MAL, 272/210) 
World is the original and originative nothing, holding within itself the 
possibility for the being of all beings. 
In that case, world, as primordial temporality, is the origo of 
transcendence (MAL, 272/210), and it temporalizes itself primordially out 
of the for-the-sake of (913,273/211), and therefore out of Dasein's 
Zukunft, its coming towards itself in its projection of possibility. The 
ecstasis of the future does not in itself produce this or that possibility. 
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Rather, it provides des Künftige als solches, KUnftigkeit überhaupt, d. l. 
Möglichkeit schlechthin ('just something futural as such, futurity as such, 
i. e., possibility pure and simple'] (MAL, 269/208). The future is the 
dimension of possibility in general, 'containing' all that may be, all that 
'is' possible in any way. 
There are some strong parallels between what Heidegger says here, 
and elsewhere, about temporality and Plotinus' remarks on time in the Third 
Ennead. For Plotinus, time arises through the 'unquiet faculty' of the soul 
which desires to translate potentiality into actuality (Enneads, p. 227). 
Unending time is then originated by 'the ceaseless forward movement of 
Life'. Time is an image of eternity in that this ceaseless forward 
movement 'tends, yes, to infinity but by tending to a perpetual futurity' 
(p. 228). The succession brought about by this tending to futurity, which 
is in turn a function of the soul's seeking an increase of being, is 
opposed to the stillness of eternity, the divine sphere of perfect, 
unchanging and self-identical life. This life, for Plotinus, is the realm 
of authentic being. 
For Heidegger, authentic being is not the 'dense fullness' (p. 227) of 
unchanging presence, but the steadiness of constant realization. 
Nevertheless, the structure. of Dasein in this regard is rather like the 
structure of what Plotinus calls the soul. For Plotinus, that soul is a 
'world-soul', and its. desire for succession originates cosmic time, so that 
while time is not outside the soul, it is not 'subjective' in a Kantian 
sense. Given the relation between Dasein and world, a similar point could 
be made about time in Heidegger's conception. It only comes to be by the 
ceaseless forward movement of Dasein, but that movement is inseparably 
tied to the worldhood of the world, and the being of beings, The 
worldhood of the world is 'relative' to Dasein, but it is not 'subjective', 
since Dasein is not conceived as an isolated subject translating the world 
in accordance with its own structures, thereby subjectivising it, but as 
the Lichtung of being-in-the-world. 
In the Anfangsgründe, Heidegger says that he will not go into the 
question of the extent to which the interpretation of Dasein as 
temporality may be conceived in a universal-ontological way, since that 
question is completely unclear to him (MAL, 271/210). But in his later 
works, and especially in the very late Zeit and Sein, the temporality of 
Dasein (by this point, 'man') reflects the temporality of being, and thus of 
das Seiende Im Ganzen. Moreover, in this work the temporal structure of 
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both man and being exhibits something like an 'eternal' and a 'successive' 
aspect. The 'fourth dimension of time' is, after all, Heidegger's revision 
of eternity. 
§13 of the AnfengsgrUnde connects what has been said about 
transcendence, world and temporality with the question of ground or reason 
(Grund) in a way similar to the later work Vom Wesen des Grundes, The 
for-the-sake-of projected in primordially futural temporalizing 
transcendence is das Urphänomen von Grund Uberhaupt ('the primal 
phenomenon of ground as such'). And wenn das Umwillen als solches das 
Urphänomen des Grundes Ist, dann transzendiert er alles Seiende, nach allen 
seinen verschiedenen mods essentiae and existentiae ('if the for-the-sake- 
of is, as such, the primal phenomenon of ground, then ground transcends all 
beings according to all their various modi essentiae and existentiae'] 
(MAL, 276/213). Since the for-the-sake-of is possible only with freedom, 
moreover, freedom is ultimately, as in Vom Wesen des Grundes, the ground 
of grounds (MAL, 277/214). 
Dasein uncovers beings in 'returning from' the possibilities it 
projects in surpassing beings. Only a free being, and so a being projected 
upon temporality, can do this. Only with it is possibility higher than 
actuality. If this possibility, the towards-which of Dasein's existence, is 
seen as seiender, 'more being', than actuality, then Aristotle is right to 
say that actuality. is prior to possibility (MAL, 279/216). The for-the- 
sake-of, that is, as the 'may be' is higher and prior, thus seiender, than 
the actual being it surpasses. 
The being of beings, then, is always understood in light of a freely 
projected for-the-sake-of, where the projection of this for-the-sake-of 
involves a choice and therefore a potius quam, a this rather than that, a 
preference (MAL, 284/219). The for-the-sake-of that is chosen is the 
primordial ground determining the way beings are uncovered. It determines, 
consequently, the kind of questions posed of beings and the grounds sought 
for them in any definite region of inquiry. The definite region of inquiry 
is broken open, happens, through the projection of a for-the-sake-of as a 
particular possibility of Dasein, a particular 'world', as it were. The 
definite possibility of Dasein's being projected in a definite for-the-sake- 
of determines the definite being of any possible region of beings. But 
because the world as such is the totality of Dasein's intrinsic 
possibilities, and because Dasein is never 'finished' - i. e. because 
insatiability for being belongs to Dasein's existential constitution as a 
294 
1 
becoming being, a being in whose being the sich vorweg cannot be crossed 
out - the world is in itself inexhaustible. That is to say, Dasein's 
freedom places it in relation to a Grund which, because it is infinite in 
the sense of never closed, is an Abgrund. It is this constantly surpassing 
Abgrund which must now, in light of what has been said so far, be related 
to Bonaventure's notion of bonum. 
The Abgrund to which Dasein is related is the true idea tou agathou, 
the pure form of the good. It is the abysmal towards-which of existence, 
the totality of the possibilities of Dasein's being in the light of which 
the being of beings is constituted. One way of relating this conception to 
Bonaventure's notion of the highest good might be to see the latter as a 
kind of infinite subject. Dasein, in understanding itself, and that means 
in understanding its own being, projects the for-the-sake-of as an end for 
which it exists. That end is what it may be, and what it may be is 
determined through its original self-understanding. If the end is 
constantly surpassing, and if it 'includes' all of the intrinsic 
possibilities of Dasein, then it is, in a sense, in-finite - in the same 
sense, that is, that Anaximander's apeiron is infinite. If the being of 
beings, moreover, is ordered to this end, if the end itself orders the 
being of beings, then that being is itself infinite in the same sense. 
However, in another sense it is always finite, since what any given Dasein 
may choose to actualize in choosing to be (become) itself is always a 
finite range of the intrinsic possibilities of Dasein. What Dasein comes 
to be, and so what beings come to be (these are equiprimordial), is at any 
given time and within any given region, definite and therefore bounded. 
Given this analysis of the structure of the subject, there is even an 
analogy between Dasein's self-understanding projection and choice, and the 
generation of the Trinity in Bonaventure's account. What is generated in 
the word is what may he, what may be realised, and this generation flows 
from the self-knowledge of the infinite subject. Dasein, related to 
infinity but always finite, generates a finite set of possibilities. An 
infinite subject, on the other hand, taken as the pure form of the good 
and so constantly transcending any finite subject, must generate an 
'infinite set of possibilities. That infinite set, for Bonaventure, is the 
offspring of the self-knowledge of God, the Word. These two members of 
the Trinity are the alpha and omega of the good as dynamic and self- 
diffusive. What 'connects' them is the Holy Spirit, the will by which what 
is actually realised is chosen. What is chosen by an infinite subject must 
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be, in a way, infinite. The infinite subject chooses itself as the totality 
of all that is good, of all that may be realised. But what is brought into 
being at any time and place is necessarily finite. Conceiving time as a 
moving image of eternity, one might even say that the being of God as 
efficient cause, the pure potential or power to produce itself corresponds 
to the temporal dimension of the 'past' which gives rise to itself as 
'future' in the projection of all that may be, and which chooses itself in 
the 'present' of creation. This, though, is an atemporal, infinite and 
perfect generation, in relation to which the temporal, finite and imperfect 
outflowing into creatures is but a point. 
It might be objected, and with warrant, that while all this talk of an 
'infinite subject' may be of interest for certain forms of speculative 
metaphysics, Dasein does not have knowledge of any such subject. and to 
posit such a subject as some kind of Weltgrund is something that Heidegger 
would wholly reject. Prima facie, this is quite true. But the comparison 
of Bonaventure and Heidegger in Chapter Three suggested that Dasein is a 
kind of indicator. What it indicates is the being of beings; insofar as it 
points forwards towards the good, what it indicates is also the epekeina 
of agathon. Furthermore, previous discussions have already suggested how 
being itself, or the event, are person-al in an analogous way. Dasein 
certainly does not 'come across' an infinite subject in the way it does a 
finite one (itself), but it could be said that it, as a creature of distance 
(MAL, 285/221; WG, 130-1), does point, obscurely, to something like this. 
Existing beyond itself in the realm of possibility and never satisfied with 
what-is, it functions as a kind of forward indicator of the in-finite that 
may be. This does not constitute anything like a 'proof' for the existence 
of God qua infinite subject. Indeed, the existential status of what Dasein 
points towards remains obscure. What Heidegger's analysis points out, 
rather, is how the notion of something like an infinite, overpowering and 
perfect subject is rooted in the being of Dasein, and how it might be 
considered a valid analogy (not hypothesis) in describing the being of 
beings. 
To make this more concrete, it needs to be demonstrated how 
transcendence, world, freedom and the for-the-sake-of are related to the 
being of beings as such, and how the being of beings manifests itself as 
an overpowering power, and Is in turn related to the good. This has 
already been suggested in past chapters, and only needs to be repeated 
and clarified a little further in the light of what Heidegger says in the 
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AnfangsgrUnde. As in Sein and Zeit, the interpretation of the being of 
Dasein in this work points towards an interpretation of the being of 
beings. The good is that in accordance with which the being of beings is 
ordered, since it is in light of a freely projected for-the-sake-of that 
the modus essentiae and existentiae of things is determined. This 
projected for-the-sake-of is then what determines them, as in Vom Wesen 
des Grundes. But in Heidegger's later thought, the projection comes more 
and more to be seen as a reception, a response to what being sends as 
what is to be willed and thought, and one can see the reasons for this 
move in the emergence of being as superior power, _which 
is already there, 
at least implicitly, in Sein and Zeit. In that case, the relation between 
being, the good, Dasein and beings could be represented like this: 
a' ý 
'Past' 
Being 
Dasein 
Good 
(alpha) 
Seiendheit 
des Seienden 
'Future' 
Being itself, it will be recalled, is inherently eschatological. It (being 
itself, alpha) stretches itself out towards itself as eschaton, as end (the 
good, omega). In each epoch a finite possibility of being is realised, but 
the essence of being withdraws. In each epoch, a definite world worlds. 
In the happening of worlds, successive possibilities of being (the being of 
Dasein: the being of beings) are realized, while the essence of being holds 
itself back as in-finite. That essence is, like the essence of Dasein, 
inexhaustible. Being itself is presencing, the sending that both gives 
and refuses boundary. It grants order in that the being (Seiendheit) of 
beings is intelligible in the light of a particular end, a particular for- 
the-sake-of of being. Essences are ordered in and through this freely 
projected end, but that end is not, really projected 'by' Dasein; it is 
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projected through Dasein by what hurls Dasein into its Da (being as 
overpowering power). Factically, the end is always one finite possibility 
or another. However, the end considered in itself as ultimate, the end of 
all ends and the world of all worlds, one could say, is the agathon as the 
last end of being. It is 'perfect', for it is the completion of all. And it 
is hidden; it withdraws. That it is beyond the ideas because the ideas 
(essences) are ordered according to it, because it orders them, means: a) 
in every world and region of beings, the factical and finite for-the-sake- 
of determines 'from above' or a" priori the order of beings within that 
world or region, and b) the good, as the final for-the-sake-of which, if 
achieved, would bring Dasein and thus what-is as a whole to rest once and 
for all, is always futural, is always coming close and yet drawing away 
into the distance. Its in-finitude rests in the constant about-to-be- 
realised (futurus) of this approaching withdrawal. "' 
In a sense, although not quite in Bonaventure's sense, it can be said 
that the self-diffusion of being as conceived here is also both actual and 
intrinsic, substantial and hypostatic, natural and voluntary, free and 
necessary, lacking nothing and perfect. Considered from the point of view 
of the completion of being, a view to which Dasein is related but which it 
cannot ever quite be said to possess, being contains within itself all that 
it may ever send to Dasein as what is to be realized. It contains within 
itself as intrinsic to it the totality of its ends, all that, in an infinite 
time, it may send to be fulfilled. In the realm of the infinite that may 
be, these infinite ends, summed up in the summum bonum, constitute that 
actuality which is prior to all possibility. Moreover, while being can be 
viewed in terms of its power, the power that compels Dasein into its Da 
and sends possibilities to it; in terms of its end, the for-the-sake-of 
itself that it may send as what is to be; and in terms of its choice, the 
voluntary sending and holding itself back that constitutes the epoche of 
being, these are not truly separate, just as the capability-to-be 
(Seinkönnen), the projection of a for-the-sake-of to be realized and the 
choice to realize it, are not truly separate elements of Dasein, although 
they can be distinguished as structural items. These three, corresponding 
-to past, future and present, and to memory, knowledge and will are 
substantially identical and yet distinct, a unity with three faces. 
In addition, the sending of being happens according to nature and 
necessity. - Or rather, it is nature and necessity, the compelling power 
that binds and orders. But the epoche of being is also a free and 
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voluntary play, in which being chooses to reveal and conceal itself in one 
way or another. The very nature of being, qua presencing, is both natural 
and voluntary, free and necessary. The way this conception is rooted in 
Dasein's self-understanding was suggested in Chapter Three. Dasein's 
freedom is at the same time necessity, a binding of itself to its own 
being, to what it may be as what lies within it to be. While Dasein is 
always limited in its 'may be' because of the finitude of its particular 
capacities and its location, being itself, as superior power, is not. 
Finally, considered, again, from the point of view of its completeness - 
sub specie aeternitatis - being Itself is perfect and lacking nothing. It 
is, after all, that in which all that is sent to be in the world has been 
perfected from everlasting (WM, 52/392). 
The unity of being is the totality, the wholeness, of all possible 
regions and epochs of being. It is the gathering together of all regions. 
It must be rooted in the unity of the being of Dasein, since the happening 
of being itself is reflected in the happening of Dasein's being, because 
Dasein is the being that understands being, the being with which and for 
which being is there. But the unity of the being of Dasein, its final 
wholeness, constantly recedes. Every region and every epoch of being is 
finite because definite and determinate. It involves a 'choice' among 
possibilities of being, a this rather than that, a potius quam. The end 
that is chosen, the, possibility of being which guides an epoch or region, 
also grants to it its unity. It is that through which a region or epoch is 
unified, and thus ordered, gathered into the harmonious unity necessary for 
intelligibility. This unifying is therefore also truth, for it is that 
through which anything becomes visible, intelligible as true. Once again, 
the relation between ens, verum, bonum and unum comes to the fore. The 
in-finite good, for Bonaventure, is the formal unity of all possibilities of 
being, of all that may be. This is the perfection of the good in relation 
to which what is actualised in the world, in creation, is always but a 
point. 
The perfection of the good, then, is pure actuality in Aristotle's 
sense. It is the actuality that is prior to possibility precisely because 
possibility- is higher than actuality, precisely because the projected 
possibility is the a priori that guides actual beings into their proper 
destinations. The final good, the unmoved mover as the end of all ends, 
is the ultimate cause of being, the basis of understanding and the order 
of living, but it is by its very nature always transcendent, always both 
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revealed and concealed in any finite manifestation. 
When this is repeated, and thus transformed, in the light of 
Heidegger's thought, 'following' the ordering of the good cannot ever mean 
shoving entities into categories that are supposed to hold once and for 
all. The nature of the good is such that no final definition of Dasein, 
and thus of beings, is possible, precisely because definition is always 
possible, always subject to revision in the light of new ends, new 
possibilities of being. Following the ordering of the good, which is also 
the ordering of being, is then a responsive openness to possibility, a 
listening that attempts to accord with what Dasein, and that means all the 
various groups and regions of Dasein, says it is in saying what it may be. 
Gelassenheit and Seinlassen are the stances appropriate to this listening 
accordance. They do not suggest indifference, but letting-speak, and that 
means letting entities show themselves from themselves, letting them 
define themselves. in their identity and difference, and in terms of the not 
yet of their possible and unknown future. Phenomenology then follows the 
ordering of being insofar as it holds back while attending carefully and 
concernfully to that to which it addresses itself. This holding back that 
attends is genuine letting-be, genuine allowing of what-is to show itself 
precisely as it is, or in the truth of its being. Because the good is 
always transcendent, because Dasein is always becoming, its 'correctness' 
has to be understood as the achieving of a correct stance in the midst of 
becoming, a right way of being on the way. 
The essence of Dasein rests in the truth of being because Dasein is 
the one that is capable of allowing beings to be. It is capable of this 
because it is the inzwischen of the ontico-ontological difference, the 
'between' that holds being and beings apart and yet together. The highest 
figure for the relation of being and beings is actually the understanding 
of Dasein, since it is in and for that understanding that being and beings 
are manifest in their relation to one another. In Aus einem Gespräch von 
der Sprache, it is said that the essence of man stands in a 
hermeneutischen Bezug ... zur Zwiefalt von Anwesen and Anwesendem 
('hermeneutic relation to the two-fold of presence and present beings'] (US, 
125-6/32-3). The clearing of this twofold is prior, and essential, to all 
speaking and knowing. It is prior and essential to all that makes man 
what he is. The truth of being emerges in the clearing of this twofold, 
and man is the messenger of this truth, the mediator of being and beings. 
This idea can be viewed from a number of aspects. For one thing, it 
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is within the understanding of Dasein that the steadiness of being and the 
passage of becoming are related to one another, and it Is only through 
this relation, a relation that obviously involves time in the conjunction of 
the enduring and the changing, that anything becomes intelligible as what 
it is. Moreover, it is in the understanding of Dasein that the in-finite 
(possibility) is conjoined to the finite (actuality), and it is through that 
conjunction that beings are constituted in their being. It is in the 
understanding of Dasein that unity is conjoined to particularity, for it is 
in and through Dasein that the for-the-sake-of which binds and orders into 
an articulated and ordered whole is projected. It is, furthermore, the 
unity of the being of Dasein that holds together the regions and epochs of 
being. It is in and through the figure of the logos, therefore, the 
gathering gatheredness which might be described as a mediatrix of the one 
and the many, the infinite and the finite, that the mystery of the wholly 
other to beings is revealed - insofar, that is, as it can be revealed. 
This Is, for Heidegger, initially the mystery of the emptiness (Leere) 
which is dasselbe wie das Nichts, jenes Wesende nämlich, das wir als das 
Andere zu allem An- and Abwesenden zu denken versuchen ['the same as 
nothingness, that essential being which we attempt to add in our thinking, 
as the other, to all that is present and absent'] (US, 108-19). This 
'other' is what Heidegger, for much of his career, calls being. It is the 
openness in which all that is present and absent comes to pass, and which 
remains through all passing. But this mysterious other is, in a sense, 
beyond the twofold of presence and present beings, beyond being and 
beings. As the source of appearance, it is the source of the two, for in 
der Herkunft des Erscheinens kommt auf den Menschen jenes zu, worin sich 
die Zwiefelt von Anwesen and Anwesenden birgt ['in the source of 
appearance, something comes towards man that holds the two-fold of 
presence and present beings'] (US, 135/40). What holds a twofold must be, 
in some manner, a transcending one. It is, in fact, the boundless region 
of regions, which cannot be named, either as being, or as presence, or as 
nothing. 
The question of the essential origin of appearance, the question of 
the clearing in which man stands, leads into the distance of what is the 
same in all thinking and speaking. It leads into the boundlessness 
(Grenzenlose), the emptiness, of what the dialogue on language has sought, 
not to reveal, exactly, for this boundlessness, as the source of revealing, 
cannot itself be disclosed in the manner in which it discloses, but to 
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gesture towards, to hint at and beckon to. This gesturing towards the 
opennness which does not disclose itself in its opening is the speaking of 
language that beckons towards the mystery, without ever being able to 
name it as anything other than a mystery. If man is the one used for 
such speaking: 
F So wäre denn der Mensch als der Botengänger der 
Botschaft der Entbergung der Zwiefalt zugleich der 
Grenzgänger des Grenzenlosen. 
J Auf diesem Gang sucht er das Geheimnis der Grenze ... 
F das in nichts anderem 'sich bergen kann als in der 
Stimme, die sein Wesen be-stimmt. 
(I: Then man, as the message-bearer of the message of the 
two-fold's unconcealment, would also be he who walks the 
boundary of the boundless, 
J: And on this path he seeks the boundary's mystery ... 
I: which cannot be hidden in anything other than the 
voice that determines and tunes his nature 
j 
(US, 137/40) 
In addition,, although it was noted in Chapter Four that Heidegger 
does not ever move to speculation about the 'other side' of death, and that 
in Sein und Zelt, he views it simply as the cutting off of possibility, 
this passage at the end of Moira suggests another interpretation: 
Wer jedoch vom Denken nur eine Versicherung erwartet und 
den Tag errechnet, an dem es ungebraucht übergangen 
werden kann, der fordert dem Denken die Selbstvernichtung 
ab. Die Forderung erscheint in einem seltsamen Licht, wenn 
wir uns darauf besinnen, daß das Wesen der Sterblichen in 
die Achtsamkeit auf das Geheiß gerufen ist, das sie in den 
Tod kommen heißt. Er ist als äußerste Möglichkeit des 
sterblichen Daseins nicht Ende des Möglichen, sondern das 
höchste Ge-birg (das versammelnde Bergen) des Geheimnisses 
der rufenden Entbergung. 
[But anyone who only expects thinking to give assurances, 
and awaits the day when we can go beyond it as 
unnecessary, is demanding that thought annihilate itself. 
That demand appears in a strange light if we consider that 
the essence of mortals calls upon them to heed a call 
which beckons them towards death. As the outermost 
possibility of mortal Dasein, death is not the end of the 
possible but the highest keeping (the gathering sheltering) 
of the mystery of calling disclosure. ] 
(VA III, 52/101) 
Heidegger says this after a remark on the unending nature of dialogue, 
which has to do with boundlessness. In The Science of Knowledge, Fichte 
had claimed that the desire to become absolute is self-contradictory, for 
the subject cannot desire to become absolute 'unless it is to disown 
reason and demand its own annihilation'. " This annihilation, the absolute 
fulfillment in which the subject is completed but at the cost of being 
taken beyond itself, is precisely the mystical death of which Bonaventure, 
and Eckhart and Tauler, speak. It is that to which Dasein is beckoned in 
so far as it is related to the infinite through its insatiable want of 
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being, The emptiness of what is wholly other to beings and the negativity 
of what is the end of all being are actually one nothing, veiling one 
being. 
It would, it seems to me, be misguided to suggest that all human 
beings, or any human being who does not feel inwardly called to do so, 
should choose to seek this end beyond nothing, should choose to die before 
their death. But the testimony of the few who do feel thus called, and 
who follow the call right to its end, is still valuable for those who do 
not make that choice - not for everyone, perhaps, but at least for those 
who, having chosen to bind themselves to the world, are yet not unfamiliar 
with the 'unutterable sigh, lying in the depths of the heart', ' 2 the sigh 
for that which promises and bestows itself everywhere in the world, but 
whose final promise might, in the end, only be fulfilled by a flight of the 
alone to the alone. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
HIDDENNESS AND MMIIFESTATION: 
RUUSBROEC AND HEIDEGGER ON THE SELF-REVEALING ABYSS 
1. Ruusbroec's Mysticism of Love and Rapture. 
Oliver Davies points out in God Within that 'the idea of a movement 
between activity and rest, unicity and multiplicity' is fundamental to all 
of Ruusbroec's thinking (p. 131). Like Bonaventure, Ruusbroec conceives of 
the triune unity of the Godhead as containing these two moments, a moment 
of static unity and one of dynamic multiplicity. God is active and 
fruitful in the Trinity of the persons, inactive and silent in the unity of 
the divine essence. The active nature of the Godhead as a Trinity of 
persons does not, however, indicate a temporal process. The 'movement' of 
the persons, in which they flow into one another while being held in the 
embrace of unity, is sonder tijt, dat es, sonder yore ende na, in . 1. ewech 
nu ('without time, that is to say, without before or after in an eternal 
present'] (BV, 138-9). Thus, while the atemporal character of the Godhead 
is expressed as an eternal now, as it is for Eckhart, this expression does 
not denote a purely static being. Rather, the atemporal activity of the 
Godhead includes the modalities of actuality, achievement, and potentiality: 
Want in den behelsene in enecheit sijn alle dinghe 
volbracht; ende in den utevloene der minnen soe werden 
alle dinghe ghewracht; ende in der levender vrochtbaere 
naturen sijn alle dinghe mogheleke to gheschiene. 
C. .. for in the embrace in unity all things have been 
consummated. And in the outflowing of love all things are 
being achieved. And in the living fruitful nature all 
things have the potentiality to occur ... ] (BV, 138-41) 
In the all-embracing unity of the Godhead, all creatures are there as in 
their eternal origin, one essence and one life with God. They are there 
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'without themselves' (sonder hen selven). Again like Eckhart, Ruusbroec 
says that all creatures are there in their essences, there where all 
essences abide in a unity, and where all things have always been, and 
always remain, complete. But that unity is a fruitful one; it is the 
source and fount of all life and genesis (BV, 140-41). It is perfect 
actuality, but it is also all becoming and all possibility. 
For Ruusbroec, the name that best captures the nature of this unity 
is love (minne). God es eene vloeyende ebbende 'zee ['God is a flowing, 
ebbing sea'] (GB, 418-9), and the love of God is utevio. iende met alien 
goeden, ende intreckende in enecheit, ende overweseleke ende. wiseloes in 
ewegher rasten ['flowing out with all good and drawing in into unity and 
(as) superessential without mode in an eternal repose'] (BV 140-1). The 
dual action of love as outflowing and indrawing parallels Bonaventure's 
notion of God as the simultaneously diffusive and attractive good. The 
unifying nature of love, moreover, not only flows out and draws in; it also 
binds and holds together. It embraces in unity. With respect to 
creatures, this embrace is not an equalization of all, but a holding 
together of what is ordered and distinct (SS, 174-5). 
The highest embrace of unity, though, is the superessential essence 
(overweseleke wesen) of the-Godhead, the superessence of all essence (alre 
wesene overwesen) (BV, 146). The formulations that Ruusbroec employs to 
express the character of this highest and innermost nature of God recall 
themes from Eckhart's descriptions of God as absolute unity and ipsum 
esse Like Eckhart's wilderness of the Godhead, this essence is modeless 
and dark, a nameless abyss. It is an afgrondighe unwise ['unfathomable 
modelessness'] comprehending all modes, properties and names in an 
essential unity that surpasses all understanding. In this weselijcke 
bloetheit ['essential bareness'], 
alle godlijcke namen ende alle wisen ende alle levende 
redenen die inden spieghel godlijcker waerheit ghebeeldet 
sijn: die vallen alle, in die eenvuldighe onghenaemtheit, 
in onwisen ende sonder redene. 
[all divine names and all modes and all life-giving ideas 
which are depicted in the mirror of divine truth fall 
without exception into this simple namelessness, without 
modes and without reason. (GB, 598-9) 
Here, all distinctions and determinations are dissolved and engulfed in the 
simple bareness of the essence beyond essence, the grondelosen wiele 
['groundless whirlpool'] of the superessence (overwesen) that encompasses 
all things, and yet is itself beyond and without all name, mode and reason. 
The absolute bareness of this essence corresponds to, and is known 
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only by, the essential unity in the innermost depths and at the highest 
point of the spirit. Above all images and multiplicity, 
besit de mensche weselijcke ende overnaturlijcke eenicheit 
sijns gheeste else sine eyghene woninghe, ende sijns self's 
eewighe persoenlijcke erachticheit. Altoes hevet hi 
natuerlijcke ende overnatuerlijcke neyghen in die selve 
eenicheit. 
[<a person> possesses the essential and supernatural unit 
of the spirit as his own dwelling and as the eternal (and) 
personal inheritance of himself. He always has a natural 
and a supernatural inclination towards the same unity. ] 
(GB, 402-3) 
The inclination towards this unity, which, as for Eckhart and Tauler, is the 
dwelling place of God within the soul, is associated with the inclination 
towards God at all levels of life and activity. Human beings have een 
natuerlijc grout neyghen to Bode overmids de vonke der zielen ende the 
overste redene, die altoes begheert dat goede ende haet dat quade ['a 
natural fundamental inclination towards God because of the spark of the 
soul and because of the higher reason which always desires the good and 
hates evil'] <GB, 164). While Ruusbroec uses this image of the 'spark of 
the soul', so common in Eckhart's writings, only infrequently, and then in a 
rather different sense than Eckhart, ' the notion of a fundamental interior 
inclination towards God, and of God as constantly present and active within 
the soul, are common themes in his works. God is ons inwindigher dan wij 
ons selven sijn, ende sijn inwindich driven ochte werken in ons, 
natuerlijcke ochte overnatuerlijcke, es ons naerre ende innigher dan ons 
eyghens werkens ['more inwards to us than we are to ourselves, and his 
inward impulse, or working, within us, naturally or supernaturally, is 
nearer and more inner to us than our own work'] (GB, 296-7). This inward 
presence of God dwells in that essential unity which is always calling or 
drawing in lintreckende ochte immanende) (BV, 140-1), and which abides in 
God, flows from God, hangs in God and returns to God as into its eternal 
cause. Were the creature ever to part from God, Ruusbroec says, it would 
fall into a puur niet, a pure nothingness, and the existential dependence 
of human beings upon God rests in this unity which is their bare nature 
(GB, 474-5). 
Ruusbroec actually speaks of three kinds of unity possessed by human 
'beings, of which this essential unity is the highest. The lowest is the 
unity of the heart. It is the origin of the bodily life and corresponds to 
the sensitive and animal life. The second and intermediate unity is the 
unity of the higher faculties, and corresponds to the rational and 
spiritual life. The third and highest unity is essential and beyond 
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intellectual grasp. This is the unity referred to above, in which 
creatures hang met wesene, met levene ende met onthoude ['with (their) 
being, life, and subsistence'] (GB, 286-9). It is in being raised to the 
realization of this highest unity that a human being enters into the 
overweselijcken, godscouwenden levene ['superessential life of contemplating 
God'] (GB, 156-7), into the divine life, which is perfect (SS, 170-2). 
The perfection of this highest life is onse overweseleke salecheit 
['our superessential beatitude']. It is the duustere stille the altoes 
ledech steet ['the dark silence that is always inactive'] which is Bode 
weseleec, ende allen creaturen overweseleec ['essential to God and 
superessential to all creatures'] (BV, 136-7). A person's vision must 
always conform itself to that which is to be seen, and, since what is to 
be seen at the level of the highest life is modeless and simple, the 
seeing must be correspondingly modeless and simple. It must be a wholly 
empty and pure insight: 
Ende boven alle godleke wise <sal hi verstaen, met den 
selven insiene sonder wise), dat wiseloese wesen gods, dat 
ene onwise es. Want men maechs niet toenen met waerden 
noch met werken, <met wesen> noch met geliken. Maer het 
openbaert hem selven den eenvuldegen insiene der 
ongebeelder gedachten. 
[Beyond all the divine modes, with the same in-sight 
without modes, he shall understand the modeless essence of 
God which is a modelessness, for it can be demonstrated 
neither by words nor by actions, by modes nor by signs nor 
by likenesses. It reveals itself, however, to the simple 
in-sight of the imageless mind. ] (SS, 186-9) 
The simultaneously all-engulfing and empty nature of what is seen in this 
insight is comparable to Eckhart's ipsum esse as a puritas essendi. 
Because it comprehends all essences within itself, the essence of God may 
be thought of as absolute and modeless being, but because in this 
modelessness all determinate being is surpassed, it may also be thought of 
as beyond being. In the end (as usual) it depends on what one calls being. 
Corresponding to this being beyond being so as to understand it 
means becoming like it. It reveals itself only to that which, like itself, 
is beyond word, action, mode, sign and likeness. It reveals itself only to 
the insight of the mind that is wholly ongebeelder, wholly free of all 
images and concepts. While men mach oec setten inden wege tekenen ende 
geliken, the den mansche bereyden dat rike gods to scene ['we may also set 
out signs and likenesses along the way, to prepare man to see the kingdom 
of God'] (SS, 188-9), these are only preparations, and the highest truth of 
this kingdom, the superessential unity of the divine nature, is boven 
begrijp ende verstaen a1 onser crachte, in dot bloet wesen ons gheests 
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('above the comprehension and understanding of all our faculties, in the 
bare essence of our spirit']. In the sublime stillnes (hogher stillen) of 
this bare essence, God transcends and surpasses (onthoghet) all creatures 
(GB, 446-7). Here, there shines an ombegripelijcke claerheit 
('incomprehensible brightness'] which blinds all created sight in the 
encounter with it, om dat si afgrondich ist ('because it is abysmal'] (GB, 
456-7). 
According to Ruusbroec, reason (redene) and intelligence 
(verstannesse) cannot comprehend this, and fail in the face of it. It is 
love that goes further, and at this point, Ruusbroec says, beghint een 
eewich hongher, the nummermeer vervult en wert ['begins an eternal hunger 
that will never be filled'] (GB, 458-61). This is an insatiable inward 
avidity and craving on the part of the faculty of loving (der minnender 
cracht), and it is through this craving of love that the passage to the 
innermost unity of the divine essence is achieved. While Ruusbroec claims 
that the hunger for God can never be satisfied, all striving does cease in 
the highest unity with God, the unity without difference (sonder 
differencie). However, the creature is not then satisfied as itself. 
Rather, it surpasses itself and its craving for God altogether, for it then 
goes beyond even the weseleec vorwert neighen ['essential forward 
inclination'] which Ruusbroec claims is the hoechste onderscheet dat men 
ghevoelen mach ['the highest distinction that can be felt'], and which a 
person experiences in the stage just below the highest one of perfect 
unity (SS, 145-6). The creature's desire is, in a sense, never fulfilled, 
because it can never be said to 'possess' God. Nor, on the other hand, 
does it become God; it passes beyond itself to God, and this repeats a 
theme one comes across again and again in the mystics, that the striving 
of the created spirit is satisfied only when that spirit dies to itself in 
passing over to an other from itself. 
The love that effects this passing over must, like the emptiness of 
spirit that grasps it, be like that to which it passes over. Therefore, in 
her ascent to God, love is wiseloes ende sonder maniere ('modeless and 
without manner']. Only such a love could make the soul wander boven 
t^ede<ne> in onwisen ende in onwetene sonder gront ['above reason in 
modelessness and in the bottomless depths of unknowing'] (SS, 160-1). Only 
a modeless and mannerless love could correspond to that unity which, in 
the return inwards (weder inkeerne), behaves rechte alse een duysternisse 
ende een onwise, ende else eene ombegripelijcheit ('just like a darkness 
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and a modelessness, and like an incomprehensibility'] (GB, 518-9). 
In the perfect satisfaction of absolute unity, the creature does not 
comprehend God as an object of its own powers, not even of the power of 
love, for this is something it can never do. It is raised beyond all the 
powers it has as a finite spirit, and raised into the divine nature that no 
finite understanding can capture. Here, it comprehends God with God (GB, 
242-3). The essence of God is unbegripelijcke because it surpasses all 
creatures and therefore surpasses every gescopen begrijp, which only 
comprehends creatures. Its vastness then cannot be comprehended by means 
of the images and concepts proper to finite comprehension and appropriate 
to the finite objects of that comprehension. This God that is above, but 
also without and within, all creatures can only be begripen by itself and 
within itself. It can be comprehended only through the understanding's 
being drawn beyond itself and into it. While at the higher stages below 
this final one, enlightened (verclaerde) people are met vrien mode verhaven 
boven redene in een bloet onghebeelt ghesichte ('lifted up with free mind 
above reason to a bare vision devoid of images'] (BV, 142-3), the 
comprehension achieved without difference cannot, when perfect, even be 
properly called vision in this sense of ghesichte, since there is then no 
distinction between the seeing and the seen. 
Ruusbroec describes this surpassing comprehension in terms that are 
necessarily paradoxical. It is een weselec insteren boven redene ende 
sonder redene, ende i. ghebrukelec neighen, dore lidende alle wisen ende 
alle wesene ('an essential inward gazing above reason and without reason, 
and an enjoyable inclination surpassing all modes and all essence'], and yet 
it is alsoe eenvoldech ende alsoe wiseloes, dat deer inne vergheet al 
weseleec staren, neighen ende onderscheet der creaturen ['so simple and 
without mode that therein all essential gazing, inclination and distinction 
of creatures pass away']. It is a darkness and a bottomless unknowing 
(onwetene sonder gront) (BV, 146-7), but it is also an incomprehensible 
light (GB, 582-3). The contemplative does not stand before this light as an 
object apart from the subject, nor is the light only a means of seeing 
something else. Rather, in the bareness encompassing all things, the 
contemplative sees and feels nothing but this light, and finds and feels 
himself to be that very light by which he sees, and nothing else (GB, 582- 
3). In the one-fold seeing and divine brightness in which contemplative 
persons contemplate God and all things, they are transformed and at one 
with that same light by which they see and which they see (GB, 590-1). 
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Some of the themes and imagery that give Ruusbroec's writings their 
unique tone and differentiate them from Eckhart's works, with which they 
nonetheless share a number of fundamental ideas, will be apparent by now. 
In the first place, the importance of love, minne, in Ruusbroec's mysticism, 
which cannot be overestimated, contrasts sharply with the emphasis on the 
intellective faculty in Eckhart's thought. This has to be qualified by 
noting that the breakthrough to the Godhead described by Eckhart as a 
function of the highest point of the intellect does not involve a rational, 
in the sense of conceptual and discursive, comprehension, but is as much 
beyond reason, concept and image as is the passing over into the 
transcendent stillness of the divine essence described by Ruusbroec. 
Moreover, Eckhart does speak of hunger and thirst in relation to the soul's 
striving for God, and the image of the breakthrough itself suggests 
intention. Nonetheless, the rather cool process of remotion, of stripping 
away and detachment, characteristic of Eckhart's mysticism is far removed 
from the way of passionate love characteristic of Ruusbroec's. Ruusbroec 
does also speak of achieving bareness and freedom, where these are 
associated with being without beelde, being on verbeeldet, but his 
descriptions of this process are unlike Eckhart's insofar as they are often 
mingled with the language of rapture and transport, of an ecstatic being 
lifted up and taken away. 2 This ecstacy, essential to the experience of 
union, is brought about by God, and that points to another aspect of 
Ruusbroec's mysticism which gives it a different flavour from Eckhart's, 
the emphasis on the action of God, and so on the requirement for grace, at 
every stage of a person's ascent. This emphasis is nowhere more evident 
than in Ruusbroec's pervasive and varied use of the image of light, a light 
that reveals, transforms and illuminates, and is bestowed by God. The rest 
of this analysis will focus in particular upon these points, and on themes 
related to them. 
The passage into the Godhead, it has already been suggested, requires 
that the soul go beyond all of its capabilities, and this is effected by 
the action of God. Deer des minschen wise gebrect ende niet hoeger en 
mach, deer begint the wise gods ['where the human mode is deficient ... 
and may go no higher, it is there that God's mode commences'] (SS, 184-5), 
and it is ultimately 'God's mode' that takes the soul into that highest 
enjoyment which is welt ende wuste else een verdolen ('wild and waste as 
wandering']. and in which there is neither wise noch wech, noch pat noch 
zate noch mate, noch inde noch begin, ochte yet dat men gewaerden mach 
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ochte getoenen ['no mode, no trail, no path, no abode, no measure, no end, 
no beginning, or anything one might be able to put into words or 
demonstrate']. Because this ineffable divine essence is, in relation to 
human beings, a 'superessence' (onse overwesen), to experience it a person 
must be ontgeest, transported beyond his or her own spirit, into that 
essence. Ruusbroec says of the divine essence that it is the ewege punct 
deer alle onse linien in beginnen ende inden ['the eternal point, wherein 
all our lines begin and end'] and where they lose all their names and all 
distinction, ende sijn een met den' puncte, ende dat selve een dat dat punct 
selve es ['and are one with the point and the selfsame one that the point 
itself is']. In this point, a point of absolute unity and the beginning and 
end of all, selen wi, sijn ons selven onthoecht, ontsonken, onbreidt ende 
ontlinct in ewege verlorenhelt sonder wederkeer ['we shall be brought 
higher, deeper, broader, and farther than ourselves in an eternal lostness 
without return']. Ruusbroec is careful to add, though, that the 'lines' 
beginning and ending in this point always remain in themselves converging 
(toegaende) lines. That is, in passing over (overladen) into their 
superessence, people nonetheless remain what they are in their created 
essence (SS, 188-9). 
Although the experience of this overwesen, an experience accomplished 
only in unity, is rare, the essence is itself common to all (SS, 190-3). It 
is the hidden source of all, and the union with it is the realization of 
what is always there as that upon which all created being, with all of its 
gifts, depends. But while God is common to all, it does not follow that 
all realize God to the same degree. Just as only a few attain perfect 
unity, although this unity overflows equally into all, so, while the 
spirit's inclination towards God is common to all good people, it remains 
hidden (verborghen) from some all their lives (GB, 480-1). At the lowest 
stage are the ghene the udewert gaen, ende van vremden dinghen troest 
ontfeen ['those who turn outwards and receive consolation from things 
foreign'], for wat hen ontbiiven si en ghemessens niet ['they will not even 
miss what is lacking to them'] (BV, 152-3). 
Ruusbroec describes the hidden source in its action of originating, of 
'being the constant cause (oersake) of all gifts and virtues, as a 
measureless and incomprehensible light. It is the onghemetene inlichten 
gods met ombeghripelijcker claerhelt ['the incommensurable Inshining of 
God, with incomprehensible brightness']. This same light overformet ende 
doregheet ('transforms and permeates'] the inclination of the spirit met 
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onwisen, dat es, met ombegripelijcken lichte ['with modelessness, that is, 
with incomprehensible light'], and through the transformation by this light 
and within it, the spirit understands what can never be contained or known 
through mode and measure. The overflowing of incomprehensible brightness 
in which the spirit flows away from itself into the wild darkness of the 
Godhead is the inward call ((in) roepen) where the abyss of God calls in 
the abyss (die afgront gods roept in den afgront). Thus, the 
transformation through which the spirit 'knows' in a peculiar sense what it 
cannot know in any ordinary sense is effected by the incomprehensible 
brightness of God, and involves a being taken up into that same 
brightness. This is at the same time a darkness before which all the 
powers belonging to the soul are blind. Since these powers are themselves 
granted by this hidden brightness beyond and within the soul, this means 
that the natural powers of the soul are powerless to grasp their own 
source. The source is therefore 'supernatural', and can be grasped only by 
a supernatural understanding, and that means by the measureless rest 
beyond all activity which is the source itself. Only this rest is 
sufficient to know itself, and only it is wholly sufficient to appease the 
unrest of the spirit (GB, 524-7). 
The dialectic of darkness and light forms a constant motif in 
Ruusbroec's attempts to express the transformation whereby a person is 
taken into the bare. unity of God grasped in the bare unity of the spirit. 
The contemplative is shown darkness, bareness and nothingness by the 
inshining of the simple (eenvuldich) light shining out of the unity of God, 
He is lost and enveloped in the modelessness and bareness of this 
darkness, in which he is transformed and permeated'by a simple brightness 
(GB, 526-7). In the abyss of the darkness where the loving spirit has died 
to itself, there begins the revelation (oppenbaringhe) of God, for in this 
darkness there shines and is born an incomprehensible light, which is the 
Son of God. The bare spirit is modeless and dark, but it is in the this 
simple being of the spirit that the divine light is granted, for it is the 
place in which the hidden brightness (verborghene claerheit) of God is 
present (GB, 580-1). 
The relations between the light in which the contemplative is 
transformed, the brightness of the simple and unitary ground of God, and 
the shining out of revelation in the form of the Son are explored in a 
passage worth quoting in full for the light it sheds on Ruusbroec's 
conception of divine modes and modelessness: 
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Ende hier omme, al dat leeft inden vader o<n>vertoent in 
eenicheit, dat levet in den sane ute ghevloten inder 
openbaerheit; ende altoes vlijft die eenvulaighe gront ons 
eewichs beelds in demsterheiden ende zonder wise. Maer 
die onghemetenne claerheit die hier ute schijnt, die 
oppenbaert ende brinct voert die verborghenheit gods in 
wiser. Ende alle die menschen die boven hare 
ghescapenheit verhaven sun in eenen scouwende levene, die 
sijn een met deser godlijcker claerheit ende si sijn die 
claerheit selve. Ende si sien ende ghevoelen ende venden 
hem selven, overmids dit godlijke licht, dat si sijn die 
selve eenvoldigghe ront, na wise haerre onghescapenheit, 
deer die claer<heitý sonder mate ute scijnt in godlijcker 
wisen ende na der simpelheit des wesens eenvoldich binnen 
blivet eewelijcke sonder wise. 
(And therefore, everything that lives in the Father (as) 
unmanifested in unity lives in the Son (as) having 
streamed out in revelation. And the simple ground of our 
eternal image always remains in obscurity and without 
mode. But the incommensurable brightness which shines out 
from this reveals and brings forth the hiddennness of God 
in modes. And all those who are elevated above their 
creaturehood into a contemplative life are one with this 
divine brightness, and they are the brightness itself. And 
the see and feel and find, by means of the divine light, 
that according to the mode of their uncreatedness they are 
themselves the same one-fold ground out of which this 
brightness shines forth without measure, in a divine mode 
and in which (ground), according to the simplicity of 
being, this brightness remains simply within, eternally 
without modes. (GB, 590-1) 
The distinction between the Father and the Son in this passage recalls the 
Godhead/God distinction in Eckhart. The Father is the incomprehensible 
ground of absolute unity, the modeless simplicity comprehending all 
essences. Just as Eckhart says that 'I' am in that ground as identical 
with it, and therefore not as myself but as God, so Ruusbroec says 
contemplatives are elevated into the simple brightness of this ground with 
which they are one in their uncreatedness. This ground is unmanifest, 
'eternally without modes', but it shines out, reveals itself, in modes. Its 
shining out is the streaming forth of the Son, the revelation of the 
Father. It is the revelation in modes of the hidden unity of the ground, 
which is modeless. The revelation of the Son, however, is a perfect and 
complete manifestation of the Father, whereas the revelation in creatures 
is imperfect and partial. The shining -out of revelation in the Son is 
measureless, just as the Father is measureless. This measureless shining 
out of the simple brightness of the ground , 
is thus a revelation in a 
'divine mode'. And just as Eckhart says that all creatures flowed out in 
, 
'my' birth, the birth, that is, in which all things are manifested in the 
simple generation of the Word, so Ruusbroec says that contemplatives see 
that according to the mode of their uncreatedness they are both the hidden 
brightness and the light shining out of the brightness, although they 
never lose what they are in their createdness. 3 
The hidden truth which is the brightness of the Father is revealed in 
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the hiddenness (verborghenheit) of the spirit, Here, Ruusbroec says, the 
heavenly Father speaks eternally, without intermediary and without cease, a 
single fathomless (grondeloes) word. That word is 'Siet' ['see'] (GB, 578- 
9). It is the word of revelation, the going forth and the birth of the 
Son. The revelation of this word, moreover, is the coming of the 
Bridegroom in the spirit, a rapid and ceaseless coming consisting in an 
eternal now, without time. In receiving this coming, the eyes of the 
spirit, are so widely dilated that they will never again be closed, its 
comprehension so enlarged that the spirit itself becomes the wideness 
(wijtheit) it apprehends (begrijpt). *. In this receptive and enlarged 
comprehension rests the verborghene oppenbaringhe gods ['the hidden 
revelation of God'] (GB, 584-5). 
As has been suggested, the light in, which the revelation of God-takes 
place is something a person suffers or' undergoes. It first requires the 
achievement of . an onghebeelden 
bloeten : verstane,. ['imageless naked 
understanding'] in which people go beyond all things to the summit of 
their spirit (BV, 142-3). But there, their naked understanding is doregaen 
met ewegher claerheit, gheliker wijs dat de locht doregaen wert met lichte 
der sonnen ['penetrated with eternal clarity as the air is, penetrated by 
the light of the sun'] (BV, 144-5). The., pure and, simple understanding is 
receptive to this light, and suffers itself.: to be illumined and transformed 
by it. 
The light is connected with truth, and 'both the'''light and the truth 
are identical with God. This truth is, again, something to which a person 
must submit, something suffered. ' To, ",, experience , any form of union, a 
person must verhaven werden ende sterven, in''gode, . sijns' selves ende alle 
siere werke, also dat hi wike met, alley sinen. crachten ende ghedoghe the 
overforminghe der onbegripeleker waerheit' the god selve es ['become 
exalted through love and die in God to himself and -to all his works, so 
that he yields himself with all his ' faculties and suffers the 
transformation wrought by the incomprehensible truth that is God himself'] 
(BV, 122-3). Such a submitted person becomes perfect in all things, want 
hi es to gode gevoeghet ['for he is joined to God'] (BV, 122-3). 
This process of releasement from oneself: and joining oneself to God 
is necessary at all stages of advancement. The experience of God without 
intermediary (sonder middel), the stage below the experience without 
difference, is possible only for someone who met gheheelhelden sijns selves 
ende met allen sines crachten, op recht ende to Bode voeghet met levender 
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werkeleker minnen ['raises himself with the totality of his self and with 
all his powers and turns to God with lively active love'] (BV, 128-9). 
Ultimately, as already noted, all the powers of the soul must give way, 
ende moeten laden ende ghedoghen the doregaende waerheit ende goetheit 
the god selve es ['and must suffer and endure the piercing truth and 
goodness which is God himself'] (BV, 128-9). Thus, the self must surrender 
itself, join (voeget) itself to God, and suffer the transforming power of 
God, which is truth, where the surrendering and joining are necessary 
conditions for the advent of this transforming truth. They are the 
processes through which the self makes itself appropriate to the truth of 
God. 
This truth is something that one realises; the process involves 
coming to know what is always there, and in the in-turning where the self 
turns towards its essence, it discovers what is essential to it. it 
discovers the God that is always within it aldus es de loecht in den 
lichte der sonnen ende dat licht der sonnen in die locht ['in the same way 
the air is in the light of the sun and the light of the sun is in the 
air']. Union, then, is a being united with the source that is always 
present within the soul, and to which the soul always inclines in its 
striving for the true and the good. When united with it, the soul 
possesses this source with itself, and therefore knows all truth with the 
simple knowledge of. God, and experiences all good with the simple savor of 
God BV, 130-131). 
The notion of turning takes a variety of forms in Ruusbroec's 
thought. ' The inkeeren where the soul turns towards its essence is also a 
bekeeren, a conversion, and an af- and toe-keren, a turning away and 
turning towards. This turning heals and enlightens, and it is a function 
of the will, of love rather than reason and understanding. It Is a 
function of intention or meynunghe. At one level, the turning of love and 
intention is simply a turning away from sin and turning towards God (GB, 
266-8). However, this free conversion which turns away and towards is 
also a turning in to unity, for, in desen selven oghenblicke dat hem de 
mensche van zonden keert, soe wert hi van Bode ontfeen in the weselljcke 
eenicheit sijns self, in dat overste sijns gheests, op dat hi in gode raste 
nu ende emmermeer ['in the same instant in which a person turns away from 
sin, he is received by God in the essential unity of his very self, in the 
highest (part) of his spirit, so that he may rest in God now and evermore] 
(GB, 480-1). 
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The moment (oghen blicke) of turning is often associated with the 
'inner flash' (inbllc) of grace, and there is a constant interplay between 
these. As I indicated earlier, grace is, for Ruusbroec, necessary at every 
step of a person's spiritual progress. He claims in one place that the 
inner flash of grace is the first point that stirs a person and grants 
vision, where this vision is prior to the gathering of the powers into 
unity, and both of these are prior to the freedom in which, through an 
imageless and unhindered (onverbeelt ende onghehindert) inkeeren, a person 
may find God at will (GB, 298-9). , Grace, for Ruusbroec, is a created light 
through which the soul is elevated and enlightened ' (verhoecht ende 
verclaert) to contemplate the uncreated light which is God (SS, 172-3). It 
is also a light that grants discernment; the 'second stream of grace' is a 
spiritual clarity that shines in the understanding met ondersceede in 
menigher wisen ['providing distinction, in many a mode']. The illumination 
of this light is not constant, and it does not lie within the soul's own 
power, although the light itself is always present in the soul. Ruusbroec 
says, want al hebben wij dit licht altoes in onset zielen, god doet swighen 
ende spreken, ende hi maghet vertonen ende berghen, gheven ende neme in 
tide ende in stade; want dat licht es sine ['for though we always have this 
light in our soul, God makes it keep silent or speak, and he can manifest 
or conceal it, give it or take it away, in (his) time and place, for the 
light is his'] (GB, 402-3). The light of grace that grants illumination is 
a free gift on the part of God, and it may be given or concealed at 
different times and places. 
The enlightenment bestowed by the action of God's grace allows a 
person to lift up sine verclaerde oghen ... in verstandigher waerheit 
met verlichter redenen, ende merken ende aensien, creatuerlijcker wijs, the 
hoghe natuere gods ende the grondelose eyghenscape the in gode sijn ('his 
enlightened eyes towards intelligible truth, with enlightenend reason, and 
examine and behold, in creaturely fashion, the exalted nature of god and 
the fathomless attributes which are In God'] (GB, 404-5). It is grace, 
therefore, which grants the vision of God, and of what belongs to God. It 
allows the turning towards the eternal light in the ground of the spirit 
where the verborghene waerheit sonder middel oppenbaert ['the hidden truth 
reveals itself without intermediary'] (GB, 578-9). 
In that case, the action of God is responsible for rapt us, which 
Ruusbroec defines as gherovet ochte overghenomen ['snatched away or taken 
over']. Within such rapture, a person is drawn above himself and above the 
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spirit, but not altogether outside himself, and he is drawn in een 
ombegripelijc goet dies hi nummermeer ghewaerden noch getonen en can na 
the wise dat hijt hoorde ende sach; want Koren ende sien es een in dien 
eenvuldighen werke ende in dien eenvuldigen ghesichte ['into an 
incomprehensible good that he can never verbalize or express according to 
the mode in which he heard and saw it; for in this simple act and in this 
simple sight, hearing and seeing are one'] (GB, 348-9). In rapture, then, a 
person is taken over by God and granted a wholly simple understanding. 
What is experienced in this rapture is necessarily ineffable in itself, and 
any expression of it is inadequate and inappropriate. It cannot be 
expressed, in a mode truly proper to it, since no mode is proper to an 
understanding that is wholly simple and modeless. 
God also grants flashes of transforming and enlightening vision, 
which occur in a moment, like lightning: 
Bi wilen ghevet god selcken mensche torte blicke inden 
gheeste rechte als die blixeme die<s> hemels. Soe comt 
een tort blic eenre zonderlingher claerheit ende die 
schijnt ure eere eenvoldigher bloetheit, ende soe wert die 
gheest verhaven boven hem selven in eenen oghen blicke, 
ende to hens es dat licht leden ende de mensche comt to 
hem selven. Dit werket god selve, ende het is seers edel, 
want dit werden dicwile verlichte menschen. 
[At times God gives some people brief glimpses into their 
spirit, just like lightning in the heavens. Then there 
comes a brief flash of particular brightness and it shines 
forth from a simple bareness, and thus the spirit is 
elevated above itself in the wink of an eye and suddenly 
the light is gone and the person comes back to himself. 
God himself produces this, and it is very noble, for these 
often become enlightened persons. ] (GB, 348-51) 
The blic in which, through the inblic of God shining forth from a simple 
bareness, the spirit is taken beyond itself into an utterly simple vision, 
is an oghen blicke of enlightenement. It is at the same time an in- 
turning, for in elcken inblicke gods keert hem de geest in ['every time God 
glances within, his spirit turns inwards'] (GB, 534-5). This in-turning 
into unity is also a renewal. Through it, the spirit visits that essential 
unity which is the woninghe ende the raste ['the dwelling and the resting- 
place'] (GB, 484-5) that God has prepared within the soul, and which God 
visits without cease. A person who himself visits this unity without 
cease realizes the God who in elcken nuwen nu ['in each new now'] is ons 
-gheboren ['born in us'] (GB, 486-7). Such a person is prepared to meet, at 
every moment, the advent of the Bridegroom. 
Of course, the necessity for grace does not disburden people of the 
share of work that they must do. Ruusbroec says, rather, that if a person 
does what he can, God perfects his work. Then there comes the higher 
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light of God's grace, rechte e1 een blic der zonnen ['just like a flash of 
sunlight']. From this springs the free conversion (vri toekeer) of the will 
in the wink of an eye (in eenen oghen blicke), and charity, the bond 
between God and the soul (GB, 166-9). There is, in fact, a perpetual 
interchange between grace and effort. A person must do what is possible, 
but the instants of turning, enlightenment and rapture granting vision and 
transformation fall upon a person from above, like flashes of lightning or 
sunlight. It is ultimately through the simple inshining (inlichtne) of God, 
and the transport (ontvlotenheit)'through love, that the' spirit is united 
to God and taken over (overghevoert) into, -rest (GB, 534-5). 
It is also touched for action and enlightened and enkindled in love 
at every moment (GB, 534-5). Ruusbroec speaks often of this 'touch' of 
God, i. verborgen gerinen ochte berueren ['a hidden touch or motion'] which 
both enlightens the understanding and enflames the will. It takes place at 
the point where the spirit meets God, they point within the soul where it 
is conjoined to God (SS, 166-9). It both enlightens the understanding and 
fires the love necessary for reaching God. Anyone who wishes to 
contemplate God with God, Ruusbroec claims, moet van binnen Bode 
aenhanghen met toevoeghender meyninghen, ende minnen, rechte else een 
ontsteken gloeyende vier dat . nummermeer, gheblust en mach werden ['must 
cleave to God within by devoted intention and love, just like a kindled, 
blazing fire that can no longer be extinguished' (GB, 580-1). 
The most striking and beautiful way in which Ruusbroec describes the 
contest between the soul and God arising through this inextinguishable 
fire of love is in the image of the 'storm of love': 
In desen storms van minnen stridentwee gheeste, die 
heest gods ende onzen gheest. I,. God, overmids den geilighen 
gheest, neyghet hem in one, ende hier' of werde 
wij in minnen gherennen. Ends, onse'gheest, overmids gods 
werc ende de minnende cracht, druct' ende neyghet. hem in 
gode, ende Her of wert god gherenen. Van äesen tween 
ontspringhet der minnen s rijt: in dat diepste ghemoeten 
ende in dat innichste ende scaerpate bezuken wert elc 
gheest van minnen <meest> ghewont. Dese twee gheeste, 
lat. es onse gheest ende gods gheest, blicken ende lichten 
die een in 
den 
anderen, ende elc toent anderen sijn 
aenschijn. 
[In this storm of love, two spirits' contend: the Spirit of 
God and our spirit. God, through the Holy Spirit, inclines 
himself towards us, and thereby we are touched in love, 
And by God's operation and the faculty of loving, our 
spirit presses into and inclines itself towards God, and 
thereby God is touched. From these, two, there arises the 
strife of love: in the depths of the encounter and in 
that innermost and most intense Visit, each spirit is 
wounded the most by love. These two spirits, that is, our 
spirit and God's Spirit, flash and shine each into the 
other, and each shows the other its face. ] (GB, 464-5) 
Through this mutual inclination, touching, wounding, flashing, inshining and 
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glimpsing of one another, a person is so possessed by love dat hi sijns 
selfs ende gods moet vergheten, ende niet en weet dan minne ('that he must 
forget himself and God, and he knows nothing but love']. The spirit is 
thus burned up in the fire of love, overcome, and reduced to nothing in all 
of its acts (GB, 464-6), and the strife of love is ended only in this 
overcoming and annihilation. 
Like the in-flash of God's light, the touch that both gives and 
enkindles love is not something constant, and not within a person's own 
control. Ruusbroec speaks of a 'dark night type of experience in which 
love is withdrawn, and in which God hides so that a person seems to be 
abandoned: 
Meer wanneer dat die waaghescale der minnen neder sleet, 
ende hem god verberghet met alle siere ghenaden, dan valt 
de mensche weder in mestroeste ende in qualen ende in ene 
donkere eilende, else ochte he nemmermeer vercoveren 
en[de] soude. 
[But when the scale of love sinks and when God hides 
himself with all his grace, then man falls again into 
desolation and affliction and in a dark misery as though 
he might never recover ... ] (BV, 124-125) 
In this condition of forsakenness, reason is of no avail. It rather mocks 
the person from whom God seems to have fled: 
Ende hier toe sprect sijns selves redelecheit in heme: 
'Weer es nu dijn god? - Weer es di ontbleven al dat du van 
gode is ghevoe es. ' 
[And in addition his own reason speaks within him: 'Where 
is thy God now? Where has all thy experience of God 
fled? '] (BV, 124-7) 
The solution to this condition of abandonment is self-abandonment, a 
letting go of the self and submitting entirely to God. That means 
recognizing oneself as a possession of God, as belonging to God rather 
than to oneself, thereby abandoning self-will to God's will. Such self- 
abandonment brings healing to the misery of a person's forsaken condition, 
and with it one brings heaven into hell and hell into heaven (BV, 126-7). 
The self-abandonment of which Ruusbroec speaks is not just any form 
of simple resigntion. It is a resignation with love, a joyous, whole- 
hearted and free surrender, possible only for someone who remains steady 
and at peace throughout all, suffering without resentment, and with a free 
and undisturbed spirit (BV, 126-7). There are, then, two moments of 
ghelatenheit or abandonment, a moment of forsakennes and a moment of 
releasement or surrender. Self-abandonment is the correct response to the 
abandonment by God, and it prepares 
for the return of God to the soul and 
the cure of the soul's distress. Through surrender, a person becomes 
gesonde in being and works (BV, 126-7). 
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Ghelatenheit in the sense of forsakenness is figured in Christ's 
moment of abandonment on the cross, when he cries, 'Mijn god, mijn god, 
waer omme hebdi mij ghelaten? ' ['My God, my God, why has thou forsaken 
me? '] (GB 188-9). Forsakenness means here the withdrawal of God. While 
Christ's divine nature is eternally conjoined to God, and so cannot suffer 
such a withdrawal, his human nature can, and the moment on the cross at 
which it does so corresponds to the moment in the soul's spiritual life 
when the presence of God, with its gifts and consolations, abandons the 
soul to need and distress. The second moment of ghelatenheit is figured 
in Christ's attitude upon approaching the Passion, when he says: Di<n>en 
wille ghescie in allen dinghen, niet de mine ['Thy will, not mine, be done 
in all things'] (GB, 500-1). If a person willingly stays in the 
ghelatenheit in which het schijnt ochte hi ghelaten ende versmadet ware 
van gode ende van allen creatueren ['it appears as though he were forsaken 
and disdained by God and by all creatures'] (GB, 502-3) with the 
ghelatenheit of self-surrender or submission, he is capable of being 
enlightened (verclaert), of receiving the gift of illumination that heralds 
the return of God (GB, 504-5). 
Die vrocht gelatens willen es altoes meerdre ende edelre dan the 
vrocht eygens willen ['the fruit of a resigned will is always greater than 
the fruit of self-will'] (SS, 128-9), says Ruusbroec, and the action of 
being ghelaten is perfect when all self-will is abandoned into the free 
will of God to such an extent that one cannot and may not will anything 
other than what God wills. Like Tauler, Ruusbroec says that through this 
free surrender into a kind of bondage, the will is vri willens gevaen ende 
besolten met liefden inden wille gods sonder wederkeer ['voluntarily 
emprisoned and enclosed with love in God's will, without turning back'] (SS, 
158-9). Self-abandonment in love means giving up security and trusting 
instead in God, for love is not perfect alsoe lange else wi lever hadden 
seker to sine dan Bode to betrouwene, ende onse wille niet gode geenecht 
en es in wilne ende in niet wilne ['as long as we would prefer to be 
secure rather than trust in God, and do not unite our will with God in 
willing and in not willing'] (SS, 158-9). 
Surrender springs from obedience, for out of obedience comes 
vertijnghe [des] eiyghens willen[s] ende eyghens goetduncken ['renunciation 
of one's own will and of one's own opinions'] (GB, 218-21). Through 
vertijinghe eyghens willen in doene, in latene ende in lijdene 
('renunciation of one's own will in action and omission and in endurance'], 
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a person's will is united to God's will so that God is enabled to take 
control (GB, 220-21). From such ghelatenheiden van wille, in which the 
will is subject to the will of God and of all mankind, comes patience, 
eene ghesaette verdrachlijcheit alle der dinghe the opden mensce vallen 
moghen van Bode ende van allen creaturen ['a quiet endurance of all the 
things can befall one from God and from all creatures'] (GB, 222-3). From 
this patience comes meekness and mercifulness, and from mercifulness 
springs compassion and a common shared suffering with all mankind (GB, 
228-9). Free surrender is, moreover, perfect freedom and security, for the 
hem overghevet in minnen dat es the vrijste the levet; ende hi levet 
sonder sorghe ['he who surenders himself in love is the freest (person) 
alive; and he lives without care'] (GB, 502-3). 
Those who remain resigned through all things, and who suffer the 
storms of love and unquietness, yearning for unity but biding the time 
that God has ordained for them without impatience or impetuousness, will 
in the fullness of time receive their reward, for als men des tijts 
verbeidet ende met allen duechden volleidet, so mach men contempleren ende 
vlieghen in gods verborgenheit ['when a person bides his time and time is 
brought to its term with all virtues, then he can contemplate and fly into 
God's hiddenness'] (SS 362-3). Essential to biding the time is being 
without care and anxiety (SS, 156-7). This means being like God in a 
purity of spirit, onbecommert van creaturen, in Bode gheneyghet ende met 
hem vereenicht ['undisturbed about creatures, inclined towards God, and 
united with him'] (GB, 250-1). 
To be always inclined and united to God is to 'mean' (meyne) God in 
all things, and that means to have God constantly present (jeghenwoordich), 
to be intent on God alone (GB, 264-5). For such a person, a person who 
only means God, all the modes and names under which God is represented 
are right: 
Neemt hi gode behoudere, verlossere, sceppere, ghebiedere, 
salicheit, moghentheit, wijsheit, waerheit, goetheit, alle 
onder eene grondelose redene godlijcker natueren, hem es 
recht. Als es der namen vele, die wie gode toe eyghen, die 
hoghe natuere gods es een eenvoldich een, onghenaemt van 
creatueren. aer om sine ombegripelijcke edelheit ende 
hoocheit gheven wij hem alle dese namen om dat wine niet 
ghenoemen noch volspreken en connen, bit es die maniere 
ende dat kinnisse hoe wij Bode jeghenwoordich hebben seien 
Inder meyninghen. Want gode meynen, dat es gheestelijcke 
god sien. 
[If he considers God as savior, redeemer, creator, ruler, 
beatitude, majesty, wisdon, truth, goodness, all under the 
fathomless aspect of divine nature, he does right. Though 
the names which we attribute to God are many, the sublime 
nature of God is a simple unity, unnamed by creatures, 
But because of his incomprehensible nobility and sublimity, 
we give him all these names, since we can neither name him 
321 
nor fully express him in words. This is the manner and 
the science of how we should have God present in our 
intention. For to be intent on God means to see God 
spiritually. ] (GB, 264-7) 
A person who is right to God, in the sense of only meaning God, sees the 
spiritual significance of the names which both utter and conceal God, for 
that person sees God spiritually in and through all the names. None of 
these names are genuinely adequate to the truth of God, since that truth 
cannot be named adequately at all. But for a person who means God, the 
meaning of these words is nonetheless clear. The being-righted to God, 
therefore, is what gives the rightness of the names. 
The truth of God is thus not beheld in the external names. It is 
beheld within, in the hidden unity of the spirit corresponding to the 
hidden unity of God. That unity is without image and mode, but if it is 
to be externally revealed, it must be expressed in image and mode: 
Al eest dat, wij senlijcke ghelijcke setten om grofheit der 
senne dien wijt van buyten toenen, dit wert doch inder 
waerheit van binnen ghemerket ende aen<ghe>sien een 
rondelloes goet zonder wise. Mael alsment van uten 
oenen sal, soe ghevet men hem ghelijcken ende wise in 
menigher wijs na dat des menschen redene verclaert es 
diet toent ende voertbrinct. 
[Even though we set down sensible images on account of 
the coarseness of the senses, to which we show (such a) 
marvel from without, it is nevertheless examined and 
beheld within, in truth, as a fathomless good without mode, 
But if it is to be shown from without, it is clothed in 
images and modes in many a way, depending upon the 
enlightenment. of the persons reason which shows and 
produces it. ] (GB, 406- ) 
Not only does the rightness and degree of truth mediated to the 
understanding by image and mode depend upon the rightness of the one who 
understands, but also the appropriateness of the images and modes 
themselves depends upon the appropriateness of the person who produces 
them, upon the enlightenment of the reason which invents the image. How 
true the sensible clothing is depends upon how close to truth its source 
is, where closeness to truth means being near and within the fathomless 
and modeless brightness that cannot be named in itself at all. 
While unity with this truth is a complete passing away into the 
'dark luminosity' (doncker claer) (BV, 152-3) of the divine essence, 
Ruusbroec's ideal, like that of Eckhart and Tauler, is not a wholly static 
resting in this inwardness, but a combination of contemplation and action 
where a person flows in and out with God and like God. This flowing in 
and out can also be described as an ascending and descending. Ruusbroec 
uses the analagy of an eagle's flight: 
Ende alsoe else die aer vlieecht boven alle <vogele, alsoe 
vliecht meininge ende minne boven alle> dogede toe den 
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enen die men meint ende mint. Ende die aer heeft oec een 
scaerp subtijl gesichte, deer hi mede scout in die 
claerheit der sonnen sonder vermiden. Also doet die gene 
die gode meint ende mint: hi scout in die rayen der 
eweger <sonnen> sonder wiken; want hi mint Bode ende alle 
doechde die Gieren ende leiden mogen to gode. Ende hier 
omme es hi gerecht ende vliecht op deer hi mint, ende 
altoes weder neder daer he heure oefent in dogeden ende 
inne goeden werken. Ende aldus es he gaende ende kerende 
else die blixeme des hemels. Want in opgange ende in 
nedergange es sijn leven ende sine spise. 
[And just as the eagle flies above all birds, so also 
intention and love soar above all virtues to the person 
whom one loves and has in view. The eagle also possesses 
a sharp, keen vision, with which he gazes into the 
brightness of the sun without flinching. It is the same 
for the one whose intention and love are for God; he gazes 
in the rays of the eternal sun without flinchin , for he loves God and all virtues which enrich (the soul and can 
lead (it) to God. Therefore, he is just and flies up to 
where he loves and always back down again where he 
exercises himself in virtue and good works. Thus he goes 
forth and returns like lightning from heaven. His life and 
his nourishment consist in ascent and descent. ] 
(SS, 180-1) 
The person who loves and means God alone soars beyond all that is to the 
simple brightness of the unnameable truth, and returns from that high and 
simple region like lightning, carrying the brightness of that region back 
into the world, and translating what is simple, eternal, and modeless into 
division, time, and mode. The highest good, the good that best conforms to 
the nature of God, consists in this ascent and descent, in the flight to 
the still and imageless essence, a flight which does not consider itself 
too lofty to go down again to the place where that essence may be 
hiddenly revealed in act and image. 
2. Being and Man at the End of Metaphysics. 
While Heidegger makes few explicit references to love in his 
writings, many aspects of what he describes as being, or as the essence of 
being, or as Ereignis are comparable with Ruusbroec's notion of God as 
love. Some of these aspects were discussed in the last chapter. There, it 
was demonstrated that being is in a sense both self-diffusive and 
attractive, like Bonaventure's highest good and, it may now be added, like 
Ruusbroec's God as minne. The attractive nature of being is also apparent 
in Was heißt Denken? # where the to-be-thought, which 'is' being as 
possibility, draws thinking towards it, and along with it. Moreover, in the 
notion of Ereignis, Heidegger thinks being itself in terms of giving, '- and 
being is, also, for Heidegger, gathering together and unifying, as is love 
for Ruusbroec. With respect to the relation between being and beings, 
Heidegger's conception of the unifying of being displays a clear affinity 
with his interpretation of the Greek harmonia. As a gathering into an 
323 
identity in which distinction and order are not destroyed but preserved 
(see e. g. MAL, 84/68; B, 66), this conception of unification is much like 
Ruusbroec's account of the action of love in the world. 
In addition, being itself Was Seyn selbst), considered independently 
of beings or what-is Was Seiende), is a form of perfect unity, as is the 
alre wesen overwesene for Ruusbroec. In the Beiträge zur Philosophie, as 
has been pointed out, Heidegger maintains that being is not to be 
understood in the sense of the common, the universal and the empty, nor 
as a highest being which causes and encompasses all others. For 
Heidegger, such determinations belong to the history of the metaphysical 
understanding of being as beingness. That being is not to be understood 
in these terms, however, does not exclude from Heidegger's account that it 
is the innermost, simple, highest, richest, unique and inexhaustible abysmal 
ground of beings. The unity 'of' being must then be rooted in this 
understanding of, being, which is post-metaphysical. I argued in the last 
chapter that it is not obvious that what Bonaventure means when he uses 
metaphysical terms in reference to ipsum esse is what Heidegger claims all 
thinkers in the tradition (before Heidegger himself, that is) must have 
meant, i. e. the beingness of beings. If Heidegger, in his transitional 
(Ubergänglich) thinking, is capable of employing and understanding 
metaphysical terms in a way that is no longer metaphysical in the sense of 
onto-theo-logical, there is no a priori reason to assume that no thinker 
before him could also have been able to do so, especially a thinker whose 
metaphysics is not ultimately grounded in an uprooted or unrooted 
(entwurzelt) logic of mere empty concepts, but in an experience which, for 
lack of any better word, may be termed 'mystical'. 
If this is a possibility for Bonaventure, how much more so for 
Ruusbroec, in whose writings the use of metaphysical vocabulary, which, in 
any case, is much rarer than in the works of Bonaventure or Eckhart, is 
never for a moment divorced from the experience of what is being spoken 
about. Love is not itself a metaphysical term. But the notion of love as 
describing the God who not only flows out and draws in, but also holds all 
in the stillness of the overweselike wesen does involve elements of 
metaphysical speculation. The term 'metaphysical speculation', however, is 
problematic in this context, and it could be argued that the Dionysian 
origin of such notions points to their rootedness in a form of thinking 
which is 'metaphysical' and 'speculative' only in a profoundly ambiguous 
sense. Ruusbroec's own thinking contains metaphysical speculation only in 
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this ambiguous sense. That is to say, while he sometimes uses a 
vocabulary that can also be employed in the kind of speculation which is 
no more than a mere juggling of empty concepts according to the rules of 
a questionable (perhaps 'dialectical') logic, he is not himself, when using 
this vocabulary, playing any such metaphysical game. The fruitful unity of 
the superessential essence, which forms one aspect of the God who may be 
called love, is not, in Ruusbroec's thought, a logical construct, but an 
experienced other. As such, it may be compared to the inexhaustibility of 
the simple (B, 278) which, for' Heidegger, is being not as the being 
(beingness) of what-is, but as the absolutely other to what-is, an other 
that also makes possible all that is. 
In the Humanismusbrief, the way being makes possible is explicitly 
associated with lieben, and lieben is interpreted as a Mögen which is 
Vermögend, a liking that 'possibilises'. This kind of liking is in turn a 
Wesenschenken, a granting of essence. In the Ereignis where thinking is 
appropriated and eventuated (ereignet) by being and therefore belongs and 
listens (is gehörend) to being, being itself, as a kind of loving and 
wanting, makes thinking possible. It thereby makes possible the essence of 
human being as a relation to being. In the loving that makes thinking 
possible, therefore, being constitutes the essence of human being in its 
relation to itself, to being. It is as this Vermögend-Mögende, Heidegger 
says, that being , 
is truly das »»Mög-lichec and not in the sense of 
possibility as understood by logic and metaphysics. Being is the element 
in which thinking, and so the essence of man, is held and preserved. This 
element is, for Heidegger, the' possible that makes possible by granting 
itself (Hb, 57-8/196-7). 
For Ruusbroec, the essence of human being is granted by God as love, 
where love is that unity which flows forth into the powers (trachte) and 
makes them possible as what they are, while holding them within itself and 
binding them to itself. This same creative love is also indrawing. The 
fruitful unity of love that gives rise to what is essential in being human 
at the same time recalls human being back to itself as the simple source 
of that being. It thus also constitutes human being as a relation to 
itself, while being what makes human being possible at any time. 
Love is not, for Ruusbroec, merely an attribute of God, and it is not 
the 'action' of God, as if God were something apart from such action. It 
is, rather, a name of God. It is God, for it names the outflowing, 
indrawing and embracing unity of the divine essence. It names the way the 
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divine essence is, and names that essence itself. In the Beiträge, the way 
being (Seyn) itself is, is Wesung, 'essencing' or 'coming to presencing', and 
Wesung is itself beyng (B, 484). Wesung, that is, like minne for Ruusbroec, 
is not something that stands apart from being as a property or act, but 
names the Wesen of being as its Weise zu sein. It names the fact that, 
strictly speaking, das Seyn »ist« nicht, but west. Moreover, just as the 
divine essence, for Ruusbroec, does not equal simple presence, but 
comprehends actuality, potentiality and becoming within its productive 
triune unity, so Wesung names the unity of being in all of its modalities. 
Being as das Seyn, rather than as das Sein des Seienden, is not only the 
actuality (Wirklichkeit) of the actual, and not only the possibility 
(Mdglichkeit) of the possible, and certainly not only the being of any 
specific (Jeweilig) being, but is original Wesung in the totality of its 
'fissuring' (Zerklilftung) (B, 75). 
This Wesung and Wesen Is Ereignis, and Ereignis is the event in which 
Dasein happens, the event in which it is brought into its own by being ap- 
propriated, er-eignet, into a reciprocal relation to being (B, 7). Being, 
as Ereignis, is this ap-propriating (Er-eignung), whose wealth is 
immeasurable and whose fullness is incalculable (B, 7). Ereignis, as has 
been said, is a kind of giving, and a giving that 'creates' by granting 
essence. The essence of being human is the 'product' of this 'creation', 
where these terms, are to be understood metaphorically, and not in the 
literal sense of manufacturing and making. Human being arises from the 
giving of Ereignis, in so far as it receives and accepts this giving, but 
human being is not itself apart from this reception, and therefore it can 
be said, with caution, that its essence is 'created' by the giving. 
But here an issue arises which we have often encountered before. 
Heidegger says that, although being is nothing human, the Wesung des 
Seyns, and that means Ereignis, 'needs' (braucht) Dasein (see, e. g. B, 265). 
For Ruusbroec, it could never be said that God 'needs' the creature, as 
this would make God dependent. However, the notion of a dependence 
(Abhängigkeit) of being upon Dasein needs to be qualified. It is a notion 
to which Heidegger himself objects: Wie dUrfen wir aber da von Ab- 
hängigkeit reden, wo dieses Brauchen gerade das Gebrauchte in seinen Grund 
umschafft and zu seinem Selbst erst Überwältigt ('how can we speak of de- 
pendence, where this needing first transforms what is needed in its 
ground, and overpowers it to itself'] (B, 251). This conception of the 
relation between being and Dasein recalls Heidegger's analyses of being as 
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overpowering power in his interpretations of early Greek thought. Being 
needs Dasein for its Wesung and it is for the sake of that Wesung that it 
'creates' or throws the Da, and throws human being into it, where it is in 
this throw that human being first becomes human. This suggests, though, 
that being first 'is' just there and then west in and through the Wesen of 
Dasein which it sends, and which it originates through the sending. 
Appropriate loquendo, however, this cannot be said, since being 'is' not, 
but west, and so only 'is' in the Wesung. On the other hand, a certain 
priority of being inescapably announces itself. 
The difficulties and ambiguities here can be located in Ruusbroec's 
thought, too, as they can in Eckhart's. The overweseleke wesen is wholly 
independent from all creatures, both in the order of things and in the 
order of ideas. But it is therefore also wholly unmanifest, so that what 
it is in itself, of that nothing whatsoever can properly be said. This is 
a Wesen that nicht west. Strictly speaking, such a Wesen is not a Wesen 
at all, or is so only in a special and extraordinary sense, in the sense, 
that is, of an overwesen. This wholly unknown God, however, is not 
different from the God revealed in the Son, and to the soul. While the 
superessential essence is modeless and nameless, the revelation, which 
takes place in modes and first permits naming, does require the creature, 
since it . 
is given to the creature. The creature, though, is not there 
before this giving. but comes about through it and for it. And, in a sense, 
'God', too, is not 'there' before this outflowing, as Eckhart says, although 
the outflowing is not other than God and could not come about without the 
'priority' of the God that cannot be named, not least because, with respect 
to this God, there is no one there to do the naming. 
The question about the finitude (Endlichkeit) of being can be 
properly raised only within a context where these difficulties are 
understood. Being is finite insofar as its Wesung in and through what-is 
is necessarily delimited. But the being that west is in Itself ab-gründig, 
is Ab-grand, and that also means that its Wesung, considered in itself, is 
never closed or ended. It is therefore never-ending, where this does not 
mean a mere constant continuation (Fortwähren) of the same, but the ever- 
possible return of the simple and unique (Eine-Einzige) (B, 371). This 
point about in-finitude was made with respect to Heidegger's 
interpretation of Anaximander's apeiron as Verweigerung der Grenze. In the 
Beiträge, the Wesung des Seyns also involves a Verweigerung that refuses 
any final grounding, any final naming which would constitute it as a 
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determinate ground or foundation, although it is at the same time an 
abgründiger Grund, and an Abgrund holding the original unity of space and 
time (B, 379). 
The Abgr(Jndigkeit of this Grund, the openness of the Abgrund, is not 
groundlessness (Grundlosigkeit) (B, 387). Rather, the abyss of the essence 
of being is an origin whose inexhaustible power consists in the 
endlessness (an endlessness that is never boring because it is constantly 
original) of the Wesung in which it appropriates what-is to itself, and, in 
so doing, sends what-is into the' truth of its own being, its own proper 
Wesen. Wesen in this instance is not 'essence' as opposed to 'existence', 
but is both Was and Wiesein in their original unity (B, 289). It is from 
this sense of being that it may be named as Möglichkeit, and it is a sense 
that, in truth, places it outside the traditional way of formulating the 
debate about finitude and infinitude. While Heidegger does say at points 
that being is finite, he qualifies this in the Beiträge by saying that the 
notion of the finitude of being is only meant as a transitional defense 
against idealism (B, 268). The notion of being as possibility is also' 
transitional (B, 475), since, as the passage from the Humanismusbrief 
discussed above demonstrates, possibility is also not meant in the sense 
that traditional metaphysics ascribes to it. In view of that sense, it 
must be added that Wesung comprehends actuality and becoming 'as well'. 
If the supereesential essence of God, according to Ruusbroec, is the 
absolutely prior (not in a temporal sense) of which nothing can be 
properly said, and if its outflowing into the Son is its openbarung, then 
similar points about finitude and infinitude can be made in reference to 
his thought. The superessence is not, in itself, finite, and its 
manifestation in the Son, which might be conceived as the totality of its 
Wesung, is not finite, either. The superessence is in-finite because 
modeless. Its revelation in the Son is in-finite because it proceeds 
according to a 'divine' mode, because this revelation is the manifestation 
of the whole of itself. However, the revelation of this essence to the 
creature qua creature is necessarily finite, a revelation 'in modes'. The 
infinite modelessness of the divine unity is then the simple and abysmal 
source that makes possible every revelation of itself in space and time, a 
revelation which is necessarily manifold and finite. 
As already indicated, the Ereignis in which being comes to presence 
is, for Heidegger, reciprocal. In the event of appropriation, Dasein is 
constituted in its proper relation to being. In works that have been 
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previously discussed, Heidegger speaks of this relation as a kind of 
accepting correspondence. It is a correspondence in which what is sent in 
the event is appropriately received, where appropriate reception is what 
constitutes Dasein in the essence proper to it. In the Beiträge, that 
essence consists in a being for the sake of Wesung itself, a being related 
to Wesung in a way that is proper to the relation to Wesung in which 
human being already stands. Just as, for Ruusbroec, the return to the 
origin upon which the soul is dependent is a realisation of what is 
already the case, so, for Heidegger, the event in which human being turns 
so as to stand appropriately within the event of appropriation is one 
where it realises the truth of its essence. In both cases, though, this 
realisation is a transformative one. 
For the Heidegger of the Beiträge, Dasein is not man as such, but the 
way human being is when transformed through this turn. Dasein is then 
not what it seemed to be in Sein and Zeit, but is the being which 
characterizes man in his possibility, a future Menschsein (B, 301). It is 
the being of human being in 'the other beginning' (das andere Anfang), a 
beginning in which the long night of metaphysics will end and a new 
history for the West will dawn. This suggests an essential change, and it 
does involve a change in what has been taken as the essence of man in the 
history of metaphysics. That history, as Heidegger reads it, is the story 
of the forgetting of being. It is a story in which thinking is taken, and 
in some sense mistaken, as the measure and guiding determination for being 
(B, 215). Through this error, an error that is nothing merely intellectual, 
being, which is unrepresentable (unvorstellbare), is misrepresented by 
being represented as the being "(beingness) of beings, and human being is 
mistaken in its essence by being constituted as the animal capable of 
reason, where reason eventually becomes the capability upon which the 
being of beings is grounded and to which it is delivered over. During the 
course of this mistaken relating to the relation between being and man, 
both are pushed out of their essence. Being is forgotten as the simple 
other to what-is, and falls into beingness, the most general and empty 
concept of reason. Because beingness is constituted by reason as a human 
faculty, this fall is a Vermenschung of being and its truth (B, 337). 
Human being, correspondingly, falls away from the truth of its essence as 
the 'there' of being, and asserts itself as the centre to which the being 
of beings is related, and on the basis of which it is constituted. The 
'true' relation between being and human being is thereby reversed and 
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perverted, verkehrt. 
The Kehre which rights this perverted relation does not involve 
correcting some logical mistake. The reversal that rights the relation 
cannot be prepared through some new doctrine about being, but only through 
Dasein (B, 98), only, that is, through the transposition of the essence of 
man into Dasein. In this transposition, what-is is not grounded on man, 
but man upon being (B, 184). Human being then 'stands' in a different way 
with respect to being. It stands in a way that understands itself in its 
genuine relation to being. It stands as the Dasein which is ereignet in 
Ereignung. Standing in this way means accepting the Wesung of being, but 
it is not as if, without this acceptance, the powers of which human being 
is possessed are not supported by being - no more than, for Ruusbroec, it 
is the case that a person who does not realise the inworking of, and 
dependency upon, God comes to be genuinely 'independent' of God. Without 
the Seinsverständnis granted to human being, it would not be human in any 
way at all, just as, for Ruusbroec, the creature, if it were ever parted 
from God, would fall into nothing. But there are different ways of being 
parted from the sustaining source. The parting that gives rise to the 
night of metaphysics in Heidegger's thought, like the parting that is 
possible in Ruusbroec's, is an ignorance of the source, an ignorance 
involving more than an intellectual mistake. It is a being in the wrong 
which, to put it in a non-Heideggerian way, is a function of the will 
rather than of the intellect. In this case, though, the will is not merely 
affective, - but also noetic, for it is because of the will that the relation 
is mistaken. The acceptance that reverses the relation is then a kind of 
conversion in which human being turns into the truth of itself. Turning 
into this truth means realising, in thought as well as in deed, the true 
relation to the origin. 
For Heidegger, this realisation consists in das inständliche Wissen, 
wie das Seyn west ('the knowledge of how being comes to presence, a 
knowledge that "stands within"'] (B, 6-7). When human being stands within 
this Wissen, where such Inständigkeit means being Dasein, it realizes the 
truth, and that means the Wesung, of being. It stands within that truth, 
within the event of the giving that appropriates; Ereignis. Heidegger 
describes this as Inständigkeit in der Mitte des Seyns, in der Wesung des 
Seyns (das Ereignis) als der Mitte ('standing-within in the centre of being, 
in the coming to presence of being (Ereignis) as the centre'] (B, 12-13). 
This is also Innestehen in der Wahrheit des Seyns (als Ereignis) 
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('standing-in in the truth of being (as Ereignis)'] (B, 467). The truth of 
being west only in this standing-within in Dasein, and so in der Erfahrung 
der Geworfenheit in das Da aus der Zugehörigkeit zum Zuruf des 
Ereignisses ('in the experience of thrownness into the "there" from out of 
belonging to the appeal of Ereignis'] (B, 233). In the other beginning, 
this experience constitutes 'understanding' the truth of being. 
Understanding is then in-standing, as the stand where der Mensch is 
situated within the sending of Ereignis. Verstehen, as the in-standing of 
this stand, is a performance (Vollzug) and an acceptance (Übernahme). It 
is a stand that withstands and stands out in (aussteht) the in-standing in 
the truth of being, a stand which accepts the ap-propriation of Ereignis 
(B, 260). Through this acceptance, Dasein as ek-sistere becomes: 
Eingerückt sein in und Hinausstehen in the Offenheit des Seyns ('being 
enraptured into and standing out in the openness of being'] (B, 303). 
The withstanding in-standing of this out-standing understanding is a 
suffering, Er-leiden (B, 260). It is a Sich-in-der-Wahrheit-halten, a 
holding-oneself-in-the-truth, where the 'holding' is not an assertion of 
human will and need, but an openness of the self to and within being as 
Ereignis. - This stand neither creates nor compels; it only opens the self 
for Ereignis. But not only is the giving of Ereignis, the coming to 
presence of being, not under the control of the self, neither is the 
transposition into. the inwardness which is capable of receiving, or at 
least not entirely, Rather, Heidegger says, Wenn ... das Ereignis in die 
Selbstheit hereinscheint, dann liegt darin the Weisung zur Innigkeit ('When 
.. Ereignis shines 
into selfhood, then lies therein the directive 
towards inwardness? (B, 265). The turning in towards and within the 
inwardness in which the truth of being hiddenly reveals itself (B, 286) is 
not effected by the self, but by the inshining of this truth, i. e. of 
Ereignis itself. 
Nonetheless, human being can 'attune' itself to and for this event. 
, The attunement for appropriation, which is the fundamental attunement 
(Grund-stimmung) of the other beginning, Heidegger names Verhaltenheit. 
Verhaltenheit is the stärkste und zugleich zarteste Bereitschaft des 
Daseins for the Er-eignung, das Geworfen werden in das eigentliche 
Innestehen in der Wahrheit von der Kehre Im Ereigni ['the strongest and 
at the same time most gentle readiness of Dasein for ap-propriating, for 
being thrown into the authentic standing-in in truth by the turning in 
Ereignis'] (B, 34). Appropriate attunement to the event of appropriation is 
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readiness to be turned by the turning that turns into the truth of being. 
It is readiness for the appeal (Zuruf) contained not in the being of man - 
as Sein and Zeit might mislead one to think - but in the essence of being 
(B, 51). Every authentic Entwurf is, as geworfen, a response to this 
appeal, and therefore an instance of the truth of being (B, 56,252)). In 
the other beginning, history (Geschichte) is this response. It is not the 
history of the great achievements of man, but the history in which 
Jegliches auf seine Einzigkeit sich zusammenzieht and als ein Lichtblick 
des Denkens eine Wahrheit des Seins in dessen eigenen undurchmessenen 
Raum verstrahlt ('each draws together upon his uniqueness and radiates, as 
a ray of thinking, a truth of being in its own unmeasured space'] (B, 432). 
The preparation for the turn in which the other beginning begins is, 
as has been suggested, a readiness that endures and suffers. What it 
endures is the truth of being. Turning into this truth, however, it must 
first endure the darkness of Seinsverlassenheit, of forsakenness by being. 
In this forsakenness, what-is is forsaken by the being that belongs to it. 
It then appears as object and as present-at-hand, als ob das Seyn nicht 
weste ('as if being did not come to presence'] (B, 115). The endurance in 
which this forsakenness is comprehended is not the night of metaphysics, 
but is the dawn of the other beginning, the dawn which first breaks that 
night: Die Seinsverlassenheit ist the erste Dämmerung des Seyns als 
Sichverbergen aus der Nacht der Metaphysik ('forsakenness by being is the 
first dawning of being as self-concealing out of the night of metaphysics'] 
(B, 293). Thus, the first moment of the turn lies in awakening to the 
night as night, but in that very awakening, the light of the new beginning 
has already begun to dawn. What the awakening awakes to is the need 
(Not) of being, the reciprocal need of man and being that constitutes the 
essence of being human as Dasein. It is when the awareness of this need 
begins to dawn upon man that the night of metaphysics, where the subject 
is the centre, begins to give way to the day of the centrality of being. 
The dawn of this awakening, however, as the first moment of the turn, 
is not' 'just' an awareness, but already an alteration in the way human 
being is situated, the way it situates itself. Being is realised as the 
centre only when Dasein stands within its truth as centre, only when the 
subject is de-centred. The decentering of the subject is at the some time 
the realisation of Dasein, and that means also the realisation of being not 
as perfect presence but as a lighting which conceals and shelters 
(verbirgt) truth within itself, a lighting that grants truth to Dasein, but 
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'in modes', one might say - according to the historical finitude proper to 
Dasein. That sich verbergen belongs to the coming to pass of truth then 
means both that it is sheltered within and granted by being, rather than 
grounded in the subject as the constitutive centre of all relations, and 
that its coming to presence is necessarily limited, where it is that very 
fact which gives it, as Ab-grund, the character of the never-ending which 
is both not boring and no cause for despair. Indeed, the stand where 
human being relinquishes the quest for truth as permanent presence and 
full clarity without either despair or resignation marks the completion of 
the turning that endures (see B, 397,412). 
The understanding characterizing this stand is, as in the 
Grundbegriffe, an Inbegriff. Because Dasein, as belonging to the appeal 
(Zugehdrigkelt zum Zuruf), as cor-responding to the truth of being, is 
grounded in Ereignis, the innermost element of this Inbegriff lies in a 
Begreifen of the turning itself. It lies in the knowledge which, 
withstanding the need and distress of Seinsverlassenheit, stands within in 
readiness for the appeal (B, 64). Standing within in such readiness is 
inbegriffliche Denken. In the lighting (Lichtung) that thus stands within, 
the fullness of the coming to presence of being hiddenly unveils Itself 
(sich ... verbergend enthUllt) (B, 
286). 
The thinking corresponding to this understanding is an unsupported 
and unprotected questioning in the abyss of the truth of being (B, 170). 
It is renunciation (Verzichtung) as an original standing that remains 
unsupported in the unprotected (B, 487). Those who are capable of the 
stand of this thinking do not attempt to escape the abyss. Rather, their 
quest (Suchen) loves the abyss, for in that abyss they know the oldest 
ground (B, 13). These relinquish the quest for the correctness 
(Richtigkeit) of absolute certainty (GewiBheit); they give up the quest for 
security that characterises the history of metaphysics (see B, 203). The 
relinquishment of this quest, a quest definitive for the essence of man in 
the history of Western metaphysics, is an Untergang, a setting and 
downfall, a going under. What goes under in this Untergang is the essence 
of man as centre, and with the setting of this essence, the corresponding 
constellation of being, being as beingness determined in orientation from 
thinking as Vorstellen and Vernehmen, sets as well. This Untergang 
gathers all that is great into the moment (Augenblick) of readiness for 
the truth of being (B, 228). The moment is the gift in the ripeness of 
time. It is the point at which the time is ready for the gift of the 
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giving (Verschenkung) in which Ereignis sends itself to' man and man is 
converted into Dasein. 
In this moment of conversion, then, the subject is no longer the 
relational centre which, as centre, constitutes the being (beingness) of 
what-is. The centre, rather, is Dasein as das ungeschützte Inmitten, das 
den Sturm der Er-eignung entfesselt ('the unprotected "in the middle", 
which unleashes the storm of ap-propriating'] (B, 243). When the question, 
who is man? is followed to the conclusion that surpasses and overcomes 
the dominion of reason and its logic, it leads into the unprotected, and so 
allows the storm of being to come over it and overcome it (und so den 
Sturm des Seins Uber sich kommen 1ä8t) (B, 300). It is through the mutual 
Er-eignung of this storm, in which being and Dasein catch sight of and 
belong to one another, that the essence of man as representing subject and 
the essence of being as represented object are extinguished. The moment 
of this turning, is the Erblitzen des Seyns aus dem Beständnis des 
einfachen and nie errechenbaren Ereignisses ['lightning-flash of being from 
the endurance of the simple and never calculable Ereignis'] (B, 409). 
Although the reversal (Umschlag) of this transformation (Wandlung) extends 
to all, it is not comprehended by all, for nur Wenige stehen immer in der 
Helle dieses Blitzes ['it is always only a few that stand in the brightness 
of this flash'] (B, 409). 
Heidegger's thought intends to be neither metaphysical nor mystical 
but seynsgeschichtlich, and this necessarily differentiates it from the 
thought of Ruusbroec, as well as Bonaventure, Eckhart and Tauler. For 
Heidegger, the moment of turning, while rooted in the decisive vision of 
only a few, is still a historical moment, one which founds a new history 
for the West. But there are a number of similarities between this world- 
historical journey and the individual mystical path described by Ruusbroec. 
Ruusbroec's emphasis on the need for grace at every step, for instance, 
which is one of the elements that differentiates his mysticism from that 
of Eckhart, finds a parallel in Heidegger's emphasis on the dependency of 
Dasein upon the gift of Ereignis, a gift beyond its control. The turning 
in to Inständigkeit is a response to the inshining of this gift, just as 
'the in-turning of the soul is, for Ruusbroec, a response to the in-flashing 
of God. In both cases, the turning is a conversion involving a 
simultaneous turning away and turning towards. And it is a conversion 
into truth, a truth which is itself granted and suffered, and into whose 
hidden brightness the one who turns is transposed. 
334 
There is also a parallel between Heidegger's account of 
Seinsverlassenheit and Ruusbroec's notion of ghelatenheit. The two 
moments of ghelatenheit, forsakenness and surrender or relinquishment, find 
an echo in Heidegger's notion of the forsakenness by being which may be 
overcome by a relinquishment of the centrality of the subject. For both 
Heidegger and Ruusbroec, this relinquishment is a willingness to endure 
absence, and an abandonment of the search for security. But while the 
Untergang which this reliquishment involves for Heidegger can be compared 
with Ruusbroec's conception of humility, there is, as usual, nothing in 
Heidegger's thought corresponding to the Christian notion of compassion. 
There is, however, in Heidegger's account of Ereignung, something 
corresponding to Ruusbroec's notion of love. The parallel between the 
giving of Ereignis and the out flowing of God as love as already been 
noted, but there is also a similarity between the ways Heidegger and 
Ruusbroec describe the response to this giving. For both, the inclination 
is a reciprocal one. For Ruusbroec, the response to the touch of love is 
love, while for Heidegger Ereignung involves a mutual giving over of being 
and Dasein. The similarity of some of the language in which they describe 
the event of this encounter is apparent, and what is important about this 
language is that it, once again in contrast with Eckhart, places the 
emphasis on moments of transformation, moments where something that 
transforms is suffered, something that can in no way be compelled or 
calculated. 
This emphasis on an overpowering power does not, for either 
Ruusbroec or Heidegger, take away self-responsibility. Just as grace and 
effort go hand in hand for Ruusbroec, so the turning, for Heidegger, 
requires a preparation. The giving of Ereignis is beyond human control, 
but while it, and only it, can enable an appropriate response, it does not 
inevitably compel that response. Correspondance to its sending requires an 
openness and dedication. It requires something much like the Denken, 
which. in Was heißt Denken., is said to be Meinen in the sense of minne. 
In comparing these features of Ruusbroec's and Heidegger's thought, 
it is important to steer a careful course between the Scylla of 'identity' 
on the one side and the Charybdis of 'analogy' on the other. Heidegger is 
not talking about a personal experience of God, and his thought is 
historical through and through. But the similarity between what he says 
and what Ruusbroec says is not a matter of some purely formal analogy, 
either, nor does it just involve that form of repetition which often 
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provides an amusing pastime for source-spotters and a certain species of 
literary critic, but is otherwise not of much interest. The matter hinges 
on the relation between what Ruusbroec calls God and what Heidegger calls 
being, and the question of this relation cannot be avoided if the 
comparison is to be anything more than wholly superficial. The differences 
between these two, Ruusbroec's Christian God and Heidegger's being, are 
clear but what is the same in this difference is that both are a 
sustaining ground, as well as an abyss of possibility. Unless one is 
willing to embrace wholeheartedly, some peculiar modern version of double 
truth, what is being talked about under these two names must be, in some 
sense, not identical, since what is being said is by no means identical, but 
the same. Unless 'the most abysmal unique ground of history' (B, 430) is 
something completely different from the abysmal unique ground of the 
individual? If not, then what is encountered in the experience where the 
self suffers the knowledge of the sustaining abyss to which it is always 
related, but to which it does not always know itself to be related, must 
be, in some sense, the same. It is then not surprising if the ways to this 
knowledge are described in terms that are similar in certain ways. 
But what, for Ruusbroec, is an individual way becomes, for Heidegger, 
a historical one, and, indeed, one involving the departure of the Christian 
God, and the absence, for a time, of all gods. The absence of God in this 
time can be compared with the absence of God in the first moment of 
ghelatenheit (forsakenness), and the preparation for the advent of a new 
God with the second (relinquishment), but here the absence extends to an 
age, and requires the conversion of an age. In itself, the transformation 
of what was once considered an individual progress into a historical one 
is not new. Hegel does something similar. Furthermore, the nature and 
product of this transformation, In the case of both Hegel and Heidegger, is 
markedly influenced by Christian eschatological thought. But, for 
Heidegger, the end of philosophy, which is also the end of the first 
history, does not mark the achievement of an ideal state (a notion which, 
he says, goes against the essence of history) but is a moment of turning 
into a new beginning (B, 415). And whereas Hegel tells the story of the 
progress of reason, Heidegger's story is one of the exhaustion of reason. 
This story reaches its conclusion with Nietzsche, who represents the 
completion of subjectivity in the metaphysics of will to power and the 
theory of truth which accompanies it, perspectivism. The reversal that 
Heidegger attempts to prepare might be seen as turning Nietzsche's thought 
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inside out. Where the centre is not the subject, but Dasein, a 
'perspective' is not a human view, but a view 'of' being, of being itself 
(cf. B, 447), which both is and is not the being of beings, and so of 
Dasein (B, 171). Inständigkeit names this reversal. What is then manifest 
in the works of Dasein, for instance, in a work of art, is the truth of 
being itself, a truth to which Dasein belongs as the being which it is. 
That a history is 'a style of Dasein' (B, 34) then means that it is a 
style of the being of beings, and so a mode of truth. The reversal, in 
founding a new style of Dasein, founds a new style of being, and so a new 
style of the coming to presence of truth. It might be thought at first 
that Heidegger's conception of truth here is rather like Kierkegaard's 
notion of truth as subjectivity, '' but because Dasein is not a subject, but 
the clearing for the unconcealment of being, and because being is not the 
being of man, but the being of what-is as a whole, Heidegger's thought is 
no less an overturning of Kierkegaard than of Nietzsche. While for both 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the way the subject stands determines the 
nature of the 'truth' which that subject either discovers or creates, for 
Heidegger the stand of Dasein is not a subjective stance, but a way of 
being within being, a way of being-in-the-truth. Kierkegaard conceives of 
subjectivity as a form of being in the truth, ' where faith is a matter of 
subjectivity, and Heidegger does himself describe what he calls Sich-in- 
der- Wahrheit-halten. as a kind of believing or faith (Glauben) as opposed 
to knowledge. In this case, though, 'holding' does not mean holding-for- 
true (Flfr-wahr-halten) in the form of adherence to a particular creed, and 
it is opposed to what Heidegger describes as an eigensuchtiges Erraffen 
einer selbstgemachten Sicherheit ['self-seeking snatching at a self-made 
certainty']. Placing itself out in the Wesung of being, and therefore 
experiencing the necessity of the ab-grundig, this holding gives up all 
certainty and security in favour of openness (B, 369-70). It questions, 
and is therefore always restless, although, in the restlessness of this 
constant questioning, there is also a kind of rest (B, 397). The 
steadiness of Dasein consists in this constant willingness for Wesung. 
What brings Heidegger into proximity with the strand of mystical 
'thought to which Ruusbroec, among others, belongs Is the notion of being 
as an Abgrund that refuses and denies any final conceptualization or 
expression, but which, at the same time, is the source of all the finite 
modes in which it reveals itself, a source that conceals and shelters the 
inexhaustible wealth of those modes within itself. 'Correspondence' with 
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this kind of source then has to mean withstanding the denial of a 
definitive and final expression in favour of an ongoing accordance, as it 
does for both Ruusbroec and Heidegger, each in his own way. It means 
withstanding the abyss while at the same time being 'attuned' to it in its 
self-manifestation. For Ruusbroec, the abyss is the superessential essence 
of God, from which the finite manifestations, and so the names, of God 
arise. For Heidegger, the abyss is being itself, from whose self- 
withdrawing giving (Ereignis) the epochs of history, each of which is a 
determinate truth of being, arise. ' This abyss, for Heidegger, is not God, 
but is that which lets God and gods be. 
Enduring the abyss means, for Heidegger, enduring the end, especially, 
of the God of reason, the God whom metaphysics presumes to understand. 
It means, also, enduring the end of the absolute, the end of all claims to 
absoluteness on the part of any creed or doctrine. Because 
Seinsverlassenheit names the condition in which man is abandoned by all 
such absolutes, it is the ground and more original determination of what 
Nietzsche first understood as nihilism (B, 119). Enduring the abyss as the 
end of all absolutes then means, first, enduring nihilism, and the 
accordance that endures this truth, this manner of the coming to presence 
of being (the manner, that is, of absence) involves terror (Erschrecken) in 
the' face of the abyss, as well as awe (Scheu) (B, 14). The submission that 
willingly endures these attunements prepares for'the reversal. 
Enduring the abyss, for Ruusbroec, means suffering the end of names, 
concepts and images, and that also means suffering the knowledge that no 
name is wholly proper to the overweselike and afgrondig essence of God. 
The devotion which corresponds to this essence must be willing to endure 
this knowledge. In the age of faith, this does not require enduring 
nihilism, although appropriateness to God does require enduring, at times, 
the distress of the absence of God, and submitting to that absence as a 
self-withdrawal on the part of God. ' In the present age, according to 
Heidegger, appropriate devotion to the abysmal and self-withdrawing truth 
of being cannot be faith but questioning. But this is faith in the sense 
of the holding-oneself-in-the-truth that endures the abyss as opposed to 
faith in the sense of the holding-for-true that refuses the abyss, and 
that is why, in one of his works, Heidegger makes the seemingly peculiar 
claim that, apart from Hölderlin, Nietzsche was the only faithful (gläubige) 
man of the 19th century. ° While such faith still requires, in the modern 
age, a kind of fervour, it also requires the coldness of a courage that can 
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endure the death of all gods, all absolutes, for the sake of the abysmal 
truth of being. Nur the Kälte der Kuhnheit des Denkens and the Nacht der 
Irre des Fragens leihen dem Feuer des Seyns Glut and Licht ('only the 
coldness of the courage of thinking and the night of the errance of 
questioning lend the fire of being heat and light'] (B, 430). To find this 
fire, one must be willing to wander, for a time, in darkness. One must 
withstand the night, and not run away from it into the 'false day' of 
everydayness, a day that does not truly end the night, but only attempts 
to escape from it (B, 487). It attempts to escape from the realization of 
the ultimate hiddenness (Verborgenheit) of being. The willful sleep of 
this false day opposes awakening to the truth of being, and therefore 
leaves being in its concealment, where Seyn in the Verborgenheit lassen 
and das Seyn als das Sich verbergende erfahren ist grundverschieden ('to 
leave being in its concealment and to understand it as what conceals 
itself are -fundamentally different'] (B, 255). 
While the abyss can be compared with the unmanifest and unnameable 
God, and the gods that arise from it with the always finite and specific 
(and that will mean, when extended to history, localized and regionalised) 
manifestations of it, God, for Heidegger, never means the abysmal Wesung 
of being, but is always an entity, and one that needs or uses (braucht) 
being. In the age of Seinsverlassenheit, no such entity is forthcoming 
because the essence. of man as subject and rational animal, and that means 
the way man stands in relation to being when standing within this essence, 
does not permit the experience of being from out of which a god may be 
born. That experience requires the turning, and therefore requires, first 
of all, the experience of Seinsverlassenheit itself, and in the two moments 
which have been compared with Ruusbroec's ghelatenheit. It requires a 
realization of abandonment and of dependency, a realization of belonging to 
being, where this is, at the same time a being ap-propriated by the Wesung 
of being (Ereignung). In this realization, the human is not diminished. 
Rather, Heidegger suggests, it is then that being human first achieves the 
true dignity and worth of its essence. 
In the turning, human being is joined to being, and it then stands at 
the disposal of the gods: Und fugend in the Fuge des Seyns stehen wir den 
Göttern zur Verfügung ('And joining into the ordering jointure of being we 
stand under the enjoinment of the gods'] (B, 18). Such Fügung is the rule 
(Gesetz) of thinking in the other beginning, in contrast with the 'system' 
at the end of the history of the first beginning (B, 310). Here, system 
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and logical derivation give way to historical readiness for the truth of 
being (B, 242). Because, in this beginning, thinking is outside the 
determination of truth as certainty, it is necessarily without system, un- 
systematic (B, 65). Therefore, according to Heidegger, alles Schulmäßige is 
impossible in the other beginning (B, 179), and there is neither ontology 
nor metaphysics (B, 59). This thinking is not a quest for certainty 
according to the familiar rules of logic, but a schaffende Aushalten Im 
Ab-grund ['creative holding out in the abyss'] (B, 36) and a schaffende 
Verwahrung des Gottes, der je nur in Werk and Opfer, Tat and Denken das 
Seyn durchgottet ['creative safekeeping of God, who divinizes being only 
in work and sacrifice, act and thought'] (B, 252). Through this creation, 
through the Wesung of being as the Wesung of truth, 'God' is first brought 
into being. It is for this reason that being is said to be what the God 
of gods and all divinization (Götterung) need (B, 243). Where God is a 
divine being for which human being reaches and against which it defines 
its existence, being is not God but the origin that dif-ferentiates (ent- 
scheidet) man and God and ap-propriates (er-eigenet) them one to another 
(B, 87). And It is that through which the God comes to ek-sist, and 
especially through the ones who suffer its truth by dwelling near it as 
abysmal origin. Within Heidegger's thought, too, it could be said that the 
flight of these, the ones who stand alone within the Wesung of being, 
involves a kind of, opgange and a nidergange, a reaching into the wealth of 
the abyss and a bringing of that wealth to birth in thought, work and act. 
This is the 'creative grounding' in which man becomes Dasein (B, 280). 
Through it, the ones who stand within Ereignis assist being in the birth 
of 'the last God'. 
This last God, who is said to be wholly different from all past gods 
and especially from the Christian one (B, 403), Is not the final in a 
series, but the possibility of a new history. It is the God corresponding 
to the style of Dasein/being in the other beginning (B, 411). In this 
style, this way of standing, historical man is given a goal once again, to 
become the founder and preserver of the truth of being, to be the Da, the 
ground used by the Wesen of being itself, a ground which, because of its 
relation to that Wesen, is itself abysmal. For this way of being, Sorge, 
which in sein and Zeit was named as the articulated whole of Dasein, is 
for the sake of being, not the being of man, but the being of what-is as a 
whole (B, 16). Sorge is then the fundamental trait of Dasein as the 
Sucher, Wahrer and Wächter ('seeker, keeper and guardian'] of being (B, 17). 
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As Dasein, man gives up his lostness in what-is in order to become der Er- 
eignete and Zugehörige zum Seyn ['the ap-propriated and adherent to being'] 
(B, 251), so that, in this new history, which cannot be calculated but is 
the gift or withdrawal of Er-eignung itself (B, 248), all that is (alles 
Seiende) is sacrificed (geopfert) to being, and receives its truth from 
this (B, 230). It receives its truth from the holding-in-truth that 
willingly suffers appropriation. 
The saying (Sagen) of being in this history does not have being for 
an object but springs from it as origin (B, 473). It speaks from the 
experience and knowledge of being. Since being, against all that is, is 
the Uh-gewöhnliche, the wholly unusual, the uncommonness of this 
experience and, knowledge is not surprising (B, 481). In its average 
everydayness, after all, Dasein is preoccupied with what-is, and das Seyn 
ist ... allem Seienden abgrtindig fern ['being is unfathomably distant from 
all that is'] (B, 479). Because of this, jedesmal wird das Denken »des« 
Seyns durch dieses selbst in seine Ungewöhnlichkeit gerissen and jeder 
Beihilfen aus Erklärungen von Seienden beraubt ['the thinking "of" being is 
in each case torn away into its unusualness by being itself, and robbed of 
every help of elucidation from what-is'] (B, 471). Thinking in the other 
beginning knows nothing about the elucidation of being through what-is, 
and nothing of the conditioning of what-is through being, a conditioning 
that always also conditions (verdingt) being through what-is (B, 480). To 
know being itself, therefore, we must step out of all habit and custom 
(Gewöhnung), out of all that Is usual, and although this is our part and 
work (Betrieb), we can never accomplish it ourselves. It must, rather, be 
accomplished by being itself (B, 481). Only this accomplishment can 
provide an answer to the question of how it could ever be possible to 
think the Westing of being itself without being oriented to what-is (B, 
429). 
Given the distance of being from all that is, the essence of being is 
never sayable in any finally valid (endgültig) fashion, but this does not 
indicate a lack. On the contrary, the knowledge that does not seek the 
finally valid holds fast to the abyss, and therefore to the essence of 
being (B, 460). Dasein is distinguished precisely by nearness to this 
abyss (B, 487), and the distinction of its saying consists in the 
renunciation which is ready for the refusal of all finality (B, 22), but 
ready, too, for the inventive thinking (Er-denken) of being, and naming of 
its essence, which helps the gods into being (B, 460). This inventive 
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thinking of being does not think up a concept, but achieves that freeing 
from what merely is which makes one suitable (ge-eignet) for the 
determination (Bestimmung) of thinking from being (B, 463). The 
Vielnamigkeit of this thinking in no way denies the simplicity of being, 
but is a function of das Ungreifliche alles Einfachen ['the 
incomprehensibility of all that is simple] (B, 21). So reich gefügt ... 
das Seyn west, es ruht doch in ihm selbst and seiner Einfachheit ['However 
richly formulated .., being comes to presence, it still rests in itself 
and its simplicity'] (B, 470). With respect to the task of knowing and 
naming this simplicity, the supposed 'strictness' (Strenge) of logic is of 
no help. In fact, in this context, logic may be the least strict (streng) 
way of all (B, 461), the way least angemessen to what needs to be thought. 
The lighting/clearing of the Da moves instead in the region of Einbildung, 
which is not the name of some faculty, i. e. 'imagination', but the happening 
of the lighting itself (B, 312). It is the event in which Dasein, 
appropriated by being and standing within it, transforms the forms of 
beings in an attempt to make them proper to the saying of being. 
But if being itself is unfathomably distant from all that is, and if 
all saying is in some way necessarily bound to what-is, how is the saying 
of being itself possible at. all? Can the truth of being be immediately 
(unmittelbar) said, when all language is the language of what-is? Or can 
a new language for. being be invented? Heidegger's answer is no; only one 
thing is possible; die edelste gewachsene Sprache in Ihrer Einfachheit and 
Wesensgewalt, die Sprache des Selenden als Sprache des Seyns sagen [@ (to 
use) the most finely evolved language in its simplicity and essential 
power, to say the language of what-is as the language of being'] (B, 78). 
In this saying, the word is not a sign (Zeichen) indicating something else. 
What it says is meant (gemeint), but this 'meaning' (Meinen) is only proper, 
only truly dedicated (eignet nur zu) to being as Da-sein (B, 80). What is 
said means being only when the thoughtful questioning and saying of Dasein 
are themselves oriented and bound to being, only when Dasein is thinking 
'of' being. As is the case for Ruusbroec, then, the word means the other 
to all that is when the one who speaks it means that other. And the 
'transformation of meaning is granted and preserved only by the 
transformation of the one who means. The word means truly only when it 
is formed and spoken (and heard) from within and out of the experience of 
that to which it refers. Since that is wholly simple, such meaning 
requires knowing the simple while saying the manifold, where knowing the 
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simple means standing within it, a standing which signals the end of all 
logic and which can only be effected by the simple itself. 
For Heidegger, this' transformation of meaning requires a procedure 
whereby thinking accompanies the usual understanding of a word, until, at 
the right moment, there is a sudden reversal (Umschlag). For instance, in 
the case of »: Entscheidung«, 'decision', it means an act of man until, 
suddenly, it means the essence of being itself (B, 84). It is then not an 
act on the part of man, but the dif-ferentiation of being from what-is, as 
well as the Ereignung in which Dasein is set apart from what-is in its 
belonging to being. Readiness for de-cision is then readiness for this 
dif-ference, not readiness for an act of self-assertive willing. This 
reversal of meaning does not mean that being is then interpreted in an 
anthropological way, but the opposite. Man is then placed back into the 
essence of being, and the chains of 'anthropology' are broken (B, 84). 
Heidegger consistently claims, in the Beiträge, that Sein and Zeit, as 
a transitional work, is on the way to this reversal, and that, because of 
the intermediate character it has as a consequence, much of what it says 
is ambiguous and therefore potentially misleading. The ambiguity rests in 
the fact that many of its key concepts can be read in either an 
existential-anthropological - way or in a being-historical one. 
Entschlossenheit, for instance, can be read as the resoluteness of an 
individual or as ecstatic openness to being. Entwurf can be read as a 
human projection, and Geworfenheit as the background of shared 
assumptions, handed down by the tradition, forming the basis of that 
projection, or geworfener Entwurf can mean the throw 'of' being, thrown by 
being. When thought in terms of this ambiguity, that Dasein is das Sein 
des Grundes (SZ, 285) would then mean either that man is the basis of all 
reasons, or that Dasein is the place of the Wesung, the coming to presence, 
of the ground, i. e. of being. 
These ambiguities, and many others, are involved in the essential 
ambiguity of metaphysics, which, for Heidegger, is subject-centred and 
thinks of being only in terms of what-is. For the sake of communication, 
Heidegger says, it is often necessary to go in the path of such 
metaphysical thinking, while yet always knowing the other (B, 430). 
Fundamental ontology, which founds but at the same time overcomes all 
ontology, is part of this path. Because it must start out from the known 
and current, it always stands in the half-light (Zwielicht) between the 
setting of the first beginning, whose history is governed by the Leitfrage 
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about the being of beings, and the dawning of the other one, governed by 
the Grundfrage of being itself (B, 305). The half-light of this way must 
be endured, because there is no immediate way leading from the being of 
beings to being itself. Rather, the transition from the one to the other, 
like the transition from one mode of existence to another for Kierkegaard, 
requires a leap (Sprung) (B, 75-6). This leap is a decision and, as such, 
it places man, and so history, before an either/or (Entweder-Oder) (B, 
101). " 
While metaphysical thinking- may be transitional in the sense of 
temporary, what Heidegger says about the nature of the saying of being 
suggests that all language, with respect to being, is in a sense 
necessarily übergAnglich, because language can only speak of being by 
speaking of beings while meaning being. For Ruusbroec, the situation with 
respect to naming the essence of God is the same. In the end, it may 
actually be the case that metaphysics can be part of this meaning, if it is 
spoken and heard in an appropriate way. To say that a certain metaphysics 
is grounded in mysticism would then be no slur, but would point to the 
highest possibility that a particular reading of it might set free. 
Perhaps that reading would be a 'poetic' one, and perhaps even, in some 
sense, a 'religious' one. - Is mysticism not, after all, the 'poetry of 
religion'? 1O 
Many of the points Heidegger raises in the Beitrage are repeated in a 
variety of ways in a number of his later works. In Der Spruch des 
Anaximander, for instance, which has already been discussed at some length 
elsewhere, Heidegger again discusses what he sees as the condition of 
being and man at the end of the first history of the West. This history 
stands at the eschaton of being as the beingness of beings, the outermost 
point of the essence of being hitherto, which is the point of complete 
departure (Abschied), of Seinsverlassentheit. In this outermost point, the 
destiny of the being of beings is gathered up (legesthai, logos). It is as 
a destiny drawn together at the end that being is inherently 
eschatalogical (Hw, 323/18). It is then inherently end-lich. Through the 
darkness of the night of metaphysics, the darkness of the history of 
errance in which the essence of being and man are misinterpreted, the 
destiny of being awaits the gathering lightning of this end. 
This destiny is an attempt which seeks itself and tries itself 
(versucht sich an); its end is by no means decided. Eschatology is not 
teleology. " The awaiting holds within it the possibilities of the 
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appropriately skilfull response, which brings with it the potential for a 
fortunate outcome, although it can never itself secure that outcome and so 
must not be secure about it, as well as of the improper and careless 
response, which might take the form of a lack of response and which 
precipitates the unfortunate. In short, the destiny of being, and 
therefore of human being, is not decided because it rests upon decision, 
and decision, if it is truly free (and freedom lies within the very nature 
of decision)'has to be a decision between possibilities. 
The decision that Western Dasein makes or fails to make in the 
twilight of its history, then, where such failure is itself a kind of 
decision, cannot decisively determine the nature of the end of the destiny 
of being to which its own essence belongs. Nor can Dasein guarantee the 
dawning of a new beginning for itself, since this lies, ultimately, in the 
self-destining, the granting, of being. But it can at least decide to 
prepare itself to receive the truth of being by turning itself towards it, 
as far as it can. Whether being will then turn towards Dasein in its 
truth, and end the night of the total absence of being, the night which is 
really only beginning to be in the twilight of being's departure, remains 
undecided, for Dasein's own decision cannot turn being. It can only turn 
to being and wait, and hope, for being to turn itself. 
Heidegger believes that poets may help to prepare this turning. In 
Wozu Dichter? # which was discussed briefly in Chapter Two (see p. 151), it 
is suggested that that may be what poets are for in this destitute time, 
the time of the world-night. The growing destitution of this time is 
marked not only by the 'default' of God (Fehl Gottes) and the extinction of 
the divine radiance, but, worst of all, by the failure to even discern this 
lack as a lack (Hw, 265/91). In this work, Abgrund means the failure of 
any ground for the world because of this default, a failure that must be 
withstood in preparation for the turning (Wende) of the age. The poets 
are the ones who experience and endure this failure of ground, this abyss 
of the world, and who willingly reach into it. In so doing, they help to 
prepare a fitting abode (Aufenthalt) for God. They help to prepare in the 
world a place appropriate to God (gottgemäBer), a place to which something 
like a god may return because it is suitable for the dwelling of such an 
entity. This requires that the radiance of divinity (Glanz von Gottheit) 
begin to shine once more over all that is (Hw, 266/92). The poets help to 
prepare this by remaining on the track of the gods who have fled (Hw, 
268/94). 
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Heidegger considers Hdlderlin to be the primary example of such a 
poet, but most of Wozu Dichter? is dedicated to an interpretation of Rilke, 
whose poetry Heidegger sees as a development from, but not an overcoming 
of, the completion of Western metaphysics by Nietzsche (Hw, 271/98). The 
extent to which this development at the same time helps to prepare a 
transition will also be, for Heidegger, the extent to which Rilke's poetry 
answers to the need of the age. Heidegger's interpretation and assessment 
of Rilke on this point also provides some clues for understanding a number 
of elements in his own transitional thinking. The comparison of these 
elements with corresponding ones in Ruusbroec's thought can, therefore, be 
extended through an analysis of this interpretation. 
In the age of the absence of ground, Rilke's poetry suggests 'nature' 
as the ground of beings, and therefore as the being of beings. Nature is 
not in this case a specific region of beings, but is the power that 
gathers and releases all beings. It is the being of beings as will and as 
life. This ground is an Urgrund because it is the ground of the beings 
that we ourselves are, as well as of what-is as a whole. It sets all 
beings loose, 'ventures' and so 'wills' them, into what they are. It thereby 
sets them free into the unprotected and exposes them to risk, but it does 
not abandon them. Rather, what is ventured is upheld by, and kept safe 
within, the venturing ground, so that it is actually sorg-Ios, 'care-less', 
sine cure, securum, safe and secure. Thus, the unprotectedness of what is 
ventured does not exclude, but includes, its being secure in its ground 
(Hw, 274-7/100-4). 
In this venture that sets free while keeping safe in the ground, 
being, the ground itself, draws all that is towards itself as the centre 
(Mitte). In its gathering release, being holds all particular beings in 
this drawing relation (Bezug) towards itself as an all-attractive 
gravitational centre, and this draw determines the draft, the relational 
design, as it were, of what-is. The whole of this draft is »das Offene(4 
the open, which does not name the unconcealedness of beings, but the 
drawing in which all beings fuse with the boundless (Schrankenlose) and 
infinite (Unendliche). The ambiguity that all metaphysical terms carry is 
evident, Heidegger claims, in this term, 'the open', as it is in the term 
'venture' (Wagnis). It rests in the fact that these terms name both being 
and what-is. The venture names both the venturing ground, or the venture 
itself which withdraws itself in the venture, and it names what is 
ventured as a whole. The open, the 'boundless', names both the releasing 
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from bounds and the whole of what is released, and so both the unbounding 
and the unbounded (Hw, 277-81/104-6). 
Man, for Rilke, is ventured in a special way by the being of beings 
as will. He is ventured so as to be, necessarily, more venturesome than 
any other being, but he can be more venturesome in one of two ways, in 
that he can relate himself to the venturesomeness of the ground in one of 
two ways. He can be more venturesome either through a self-assertive 
willing that parts against the open, against the will as the being of 
beings, or *through a willingness that turns into the open and accords with 
that will. In the former case, seeking absolute security and protection, 
he actually becomes insecure and unprotected. In the latter case, 
venturing beyond all protection into the abyss, he becomes secure, secures, 
sine cure. In the former case, he sets himself up as centre, thereby 
endangering his own essence; in the latter case, he reposes safely in the 
centre, thereby securing his essence (Hw, 294/120). As in the Beiträge, 
then, the creation arising from turning into the centre is not a 
production, but a bringing forth of what has been received. Es empfängt 
and gibt Empfangenes ('It receives, and gives what it has received']. It 
creates out of the source by giving what has been recieved from that 
source, by unfolding it in its fullness (Hw, 294/120). 
Such a willingness constitutes an inversion (Umkehrung) of the 
aversion (Abkehr) against the open, and this. turning (Wendung) requires 
having seen the danger threatening the essence of man. But in order to 
have seen this essential danger so as to be able to turn towards 
(zuwenden) the open, the open itself must first have have turned towards 
us (uns zugekehrt haben) in a certain way (Hw, 295-7/122). For Rilke, who 
speaks, Heidegger claims, innerhalb des Sphärischen der neuzeitlichen 
Metaphysik, d. h. innerhalb der Sphäre. der Subjectität als derjenigen der 
inneren and unsichtbaren Präsenz ('within the spherical structure of modern 
metaphysics, that is, within the sphere of subjectivity as the sphere of 
inner and invisible presence'], the turning is a conversion of consciousness 
into the innermost space of the heart, which is at the same time the inner 
space of the world (Hw, 302-3/129). It is an Er-innerung, an inner 
recalling in which the self-asserting will and its objects are converted in 
das Innerste Unsichtbare des Herzraumes Pinto the innermost invisible 
region of the heart's space'], a region in which wendet sich uns eines 
schrankenlos in das andere ('one thing turns, free of all bounds, into the 
other']. In this interiority, there is ein Sichersein auBerhalb von Schutz 
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('a safety outside all shielding'] (Hw, 305/130-131). 
Erinnerung is: the Umkehrung des Abschiedes zur Einkehr in den 
weitesten Umkreis des Offenen ('the conversion of the parting into an 
arriving at the widest orbit of the open']. It is a turning which reverses 
the turning against. For Heidegger, the truly more venturesome ones (die 
Wagenderenn) are the ones who, among mortals, are capable of this 
converting recall (umkehrende Erinnern) (Hw, 305/131). These are the ones 
who are not only sayers, but also actually venture saying: 
Wenn nun aber beim Schaffen eines Sicherseins der Mensch 
vom Gesetz des ganzen Weltinnenraumes angerührt wird, ist 
er selbst in seinem Wesen berührt, darin nämlich, daß er 
als der Sichwollende schon der Sagende ist. Insofern 
jedoch das Schaffen eines Sicherseins von den Wagenderen 
kommt, müssen die Wagenderen es mit der Sprache wagen. 
Die Wagenderen wagen das Sagen. 
[But when, in the creation of a safety, man is touched by 
the law of the world's whole inner space, he is himself 
touched in his nature, in that, as the being who wills 
himself, he is already the sayer. But since the creation 
of a safety comes from the more venturesome, these more 
venturesome ones must dare the venture with language. 
The more venturesome dare the saying. ] (Hw, 307-8/133) 
The more venturesome ones are not only touched in their nature so as to 
be sayers, they also dare the saying concerning the er-innernde Umkehrung 
des Bewußtseins ['the inner recalling conversion of consciousness'] (Hw, 
308/133). These are the poets and singers who, experiencing the unholy 
and unwholesome (Heillose, Unheil) as such, are on the track to the holy 
and wholesome, and so on the way to what may bring healing to the 
darkness and distress of the world-night (Hw, 315/141). 
Many of the themes raised in the Beiträge are clearly evident in this 
interpretation of Rilke. Although Heidegger attempts to overcome the 
metaphysics of will in his own thought, the relation between the being of 
beings and particular beings in Rilke's poetry, as Heidegger interprets it, 
can, if understood in a transitional manner, help to elucidate the relation 
between being and beings in Heidegger's own thought. Being is also a 
gathering which releases while withdrawing itself and drawing towards 
itself. As such, it is Wesung, and comparable to Ruusbroec's notion of 
love. To think this gathering release in a non-metaphysical way requires: 
1) that it be thought in itself, and not as the being of beings, not as the 
beingness of what-is as a whole, 2) that it be released from 
interpretation within the framework of subjectivity, of consciousness as an 
enclosed sphere, and 3) that any account of it be understood as not finally 
valid, because bound to speak the language of beings while meaning being. 
Being as attractive-diffusive centre is then not the unity of the whole of 
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beings, nor the way what-is is structured, nor an inner realm as opposed 
to an outer one. It is simply Wesung, where what that means can only be 
fully understood by standing within its own lightening giving. For 
Ruusbroec, God is love, where what that means is known only by the meaning 
that answers to it, only, that is, by the love which stands within the 
revelation of love. 
The themes of forsakenness, security and turning are also familiar 
from the Beiträge, and again parallel similar themes in Ruusbroec. The two 
moments of ghelatenheit are once more evident, the moment of distress in 
abandonment and the moment of relinquishment that brings healing. The 
latter moment is a turning towards which turns in, and which is only made 
possible by a prior turning towards on the part of that into which the 
turning turns. It would, perhaps, be going a bit too far to compare 
Heidegger's Erinnern with Ruusbroec's gherinen, but both do involve a being 
touched that converts into inwardness and is effected, and affected, by 
that which converts. The more venturesome ones, for Heidegger, are the 
ones who speak from, and of, this inner recalling. If their saying is a 
singing that beckons to the holy, and if the holy binds the divine which 
draws the god near (Hw, 315/141), then the sayings of these more 
venturesome ones may also be the poetry of religion. Religion, in this 
case, though, does not signify a particular set of beliefs, but the 
dimension of the holy as such. 
The essay Die Kehre further clarifies the nature of the turning 
required to heal the distress of the age. In this work, Heidegger says 
that what is required is Einblick in das was ist ('insight into that which 
is'] (TK, 44/47), where what truly 'is' is not this or that entity, but only 
being M. 43/46). This insight is a remembrance of what has been 
forgotten, namely, being. The forgetting of being (Seinsvergessenheit) is 
not merely a failure on the part of man, but a function of the self- 
concealing of the essence of being in its coming to presence in what-is. 
In the Beiträge, Heidegger had expressed this by saying that the source of 
Seinsvergessenheit is Seinsverlessenheit B, 114). The danger of the age 
lies in this forgetting of being, which is das in der Wahrheit seines 
Wesens sich gefährdende Sein selbst ('being itself endangering itself in 
the truth of its coming to presence'] (TK, 37/37). 
The 'self-endangerment' of being, which also exposes beings to danger, 
is the darkening of the essence of being in its lighting up of beings. It 
is the self-withdrawal of being in its revelation of itself in modes, the 
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self-withdrawal in the epochä of being. The mode of being (Seinswelse) of 
the present epoch is Gestell, and Gestell is the culmination and exhaustion 
of that Entwurf of being which has reigned over the first history of the 
West. That Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst/Das Rettende auch ('But where the 
danger is, grows/The saving power also'] means that in awakening to the 
danger as danger, the power that heals and saves is also awakened. 
Awakening to the danger as such is a remembrance of Seinsvergessenheit, 
and so the remembrance that the mode is a mode, and is not being itself. 
It is the knowledge of the hiddenness of being, as opposed to the 
ignorance that leaves being in hiddenness. 
As the danger, being turns away from (kehrt sich weg) its essence in 
its essence, and so at the same time turns against (kehrt sich gegen) the 
truth of its essence. That is to say, in its coming to presence, being 
hides the truth of that coming to presence itself, the truth of its own 
essence as both. concealing and revealing. But this danger hides and 
shelters within itself the possibility of another turning, a turning in 
which the forgetting of the essence of being so turns that the truth of 
its essence turns in (einkehrt) into what-is (TK, 40/41). Nobody knows the 
time of this turning, or the manner in which it may come to pass. Nor is 
such knowledge either necessary or desirable, for: Nur wenn der Mensch 
als der Hirt des Seins der Wahrheit des Seins wartet, kann er eine Ankunft 
des Seinsgeschickes" erwarten, ohne in das bloße Wissenwollen zu verfallen 
('Only when man, as the shepherd of being, attends upon the truth of being 
can he expect an arrival of a destining of being and not sink to the level 
of a mere wanting to know'] (TK, 41/42). Only the relinquishment of the 
quest for self-certainty in favour of a watchful and uncertain holding- 
oneself-in-the-truth is appropriately prepared for a second arrival of 
being. 
That in the self-endangerment of its essence, being withdraws in such 
a way as to expose beings to danger does not mean that it wholly abandons 
them. Rather, just as, in Wozu Dichter?, what is set free and thus 
ventured into risk is also kept safe in its ground, so here the danger 
which endangers holds within itself a certain safety. It harbours the 
'favour (Gunst), as yet ungranted, of the turning of the forgetting of being 
into the truth of being (TK, 42/43-4). When this turning comes to pass 
(sich ereignet), it can only do so without mediation (unvermittelt), for 
being, as in the Grundbegriffe, has no like to itself (hat nicht 
seinesgleichen) which either precedes it or follows it. It has no cause 
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and no effect, but only brings itself to pass from its own essence. 
Therefore: 
Die Kehre der Gefahr ereignet sich jäh. In der Kehre 
lichtet sich jäh die Lichtung des Wesens des Seins. Das 
jähe Sichlichten ist das Blitzen. Es bringt sich selbst in 
die mit- und eingebrachte eigene Helle. Wenn in der Kehre 
der Gefahr die Wahrheit des Seins blitzt lichtet sich das 
Wesen des Seins. Dann kehrt die Wahrheit des Wesens des 
Seins ein. 
[The turning of the danger comes to pass suddenly. In 
this turning, the clearingl belonging to the essence of 
being suddenly clears itse f and -lights up. This sudden 
self-lighting is the lightning-flash. It brings itself into 
its own brightness, which it itself both brings along and 
brings in. When, in the turning of the danger, the -truth 
of being flashes, the essence of being clears and lights 
itself up. Then the truth of the essence, the coming to 
presence, of being turns and enters in. ] (TK, 43/44) 
This in-turning (Einkehr) turns into being itself, that same being whose 
mode, in the present age, is the essence of technology as Gestell. In the 
flash in which the essence of being Is lit up, the truth of the Seinsweise 
of technology is comprehended as well. 
This flash is a glimpse, an inner glance: 
((Blitzen» Ist dem Wort und der Sache nach: blicken. Im 
Blick und als Blick tritt das Wesen in sein eigenes 
Leuchten. Durch das Element seines Leuchtens hindurch 
birgt der Blick sein Erblicktes in das Blicken zurück. Das 
Blicken aber wahrt im Leuchten zugleich das verborgene 
Dunkel seiner Herkunft als das Ungelichtete. Einkehr des 
Blitzes der Wahrheit des Seins Ist Einblick. 
['To flash', in terms both of Its derivation and of what it 
designates, is 'to glance'. In the flashing glance and as 
that glance, the essence, the coming to presence, of being 
enters into its own emitting of light. moving through the 
element of its own shining, the flashing glance retrieves 
that which it catches sight of and brings it back into the 
brightness of its own looking. And yet that glancing, in 
its giving of light, simultaneously keeps safe the 
concealed arkness of its origin as the unlighted. The in- 
turning that is the lightning-flash of the -truth of being 
is the entering, flashing glance - insight. ] (TK, 43/45) 
Once again, in comparing this moment with the one that Ruusbroec describes 
in rather similar terms, a careful route must be charted between complete 
identity and mere analogy. This flashing, illuminating, retrieving glance 
is, for Heidegger, a historical event, though not one that takes place in 
any network of cause and effect, and one in which, as the Beiträge 
suggests, only a few individuals may stand. But, as for Ruusbroec, what 
flashes and glances brings that into which it flashes and glances back 
into the brightness of its own light, a brightness that yet preserves the 
hidden darkness of its origin. It thus turns the one upon whom the glance 
falls into the one who sees the bright-dark origin of what-is. This 
seeing is insight, the coming to pass of the truth, the essence, of being, 
and it is granted in a turning whose dynamics, with respect to the 
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interplay between human effort and non-human grant, are described in 
similar terms by Ruusbroec and Heidegger. The influence of Christian 
eschatology upon Heidegger's being-historical thinking at this point is too 
obvious to require any comment. Ruusbroec's description of mutual 
glancing does not have an eschatological orientation, but it is oriented to 
a source which, as the simple and dark origin of all the manifold 
brightness that comes to pass in time, has to be the origin of the 
lightening turns of history as well as of the individual. This does not 
mean that those turns, or the opposite ones which turn away into darkness 
(not the hidden darkness, but the darkness that is all too evident in the 
course of history and in the lives of individuals) are determined by this 
source. The turns are enabled by the turning of the source, but what is 
thus enabled must also be chosen. 
For Ruusbroec, the hidden origin both contains and denies all that is 
manifest in the 'mirror of divine truth', in creation. This mirror is only 
a mirror for the one who can see, the one who mirrors God in mirroring the 
world. For Heidegger, for whom the source is not God but being, the truth 
of being, the coming to pass of its lighting/concealing, is the worlding of 
world in the mirror-play of the fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and 
gods. This world, the world in which a god may dwell, comes to pass 
through the in-flashing of the truth of being into the essence of Gestell, 
the essence of the, mode of being that places man in danger by exposing 
him to the risk of the denial of the mode as a mode, which is at the same 
time the denial of the truth of its source, the truth of being. Because 
this exposure holds within It the possibility of the turning, it does not 
throw man into a helpless abandonment, but ventures him into the hazard of 
freedom. 
When, through the interplay of freedom and gift, the forgetting turns 
itself about, the truth of being flashes into truthless being. The 
fourfold of world flashes into the reign of Gestell. This in-flashing is 
the Ereignis within being itself, where Ereignis ist eignende Eräugnis 
('disclosing coming-to-pass is bringing to sight that brings into its own'] 
(TK, 44/45). It is the appropriating 'eyeing' in which insight into that 
which is, into being, is accomplished. This insight (Einblick) is not any 
human looking into (Einsicht) what-is. It is, as Einblitz, the happening of 
the Ereignis within being Itself, and in the epoch of Gestell (TIC, 44/46). 
In spite of all the disguise belonging to this epoch, the ray (Lichtblick) 
of world still lights itself (lichtet sich); the truth of being still 
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flashes (blitzt), Since Gestell is still an essential destiny, a destined 
way of coming to presence (Wesensgeschick), and so a mode of the truth of 
being, a light from the flash of being (ein Licht vom Blitz des Seins) 
still comes to presence within it. Das Gestell ist, obzwar verschleiert, 
noch Blick, kein blindes Geschick im Sinne eines völlig verhangenen 
Verhängnis ['Enframing is, though veiled, still glance, and no blind destiny 
in the sense of a completely ordained fate'] (TK, 45/47). 
In insight into that which is, the flashing glance of the truth of 
being glances upon the essence of man, but it can only do so if man 
corresponds to it by turning away from himself towards it: 
Wenn Einblick sich ereignet dann sind die Menschen die 
vom Blitz des Seins in 
Ihr Wesen Getroffenen. Die 
Menschen sind die im Einblick Erblickten. 
Erst wenn das Menschenwesen im Ereignis des Einblickes als 
das von diesem Erblickte dem menschlichen Eigensinn 
entsagt und sich dem Einblick zu, von sich weg, ent-wirft, 
entspricht der Mensch in seinem Wesen dem Anspruch des 
Einblickes. 
(When insight comes disclosingly to pass, then men are 
the ones who are struck in their essence by the flashin 
of beireg. In insight, men are the ones who are caughh 
sight of: 
Only when man, in the disclosing coming-to-pass of the 
insight by which he himself is beheld, renounces human 
self-will does he correspond in his essence to the claim 
of that insight. ] (TK, 45/47) 
As in Ruusbroec's thought, then, the in-flashing flash of this glance looks 
into the essence of a person, and catches that person up into its own 
vision. But only those who are prepared to turn are capable of being 
caught up. And only the vision of those who are thus caught up 
corresponds to the insight of what no human power can master or discern. 
Finally, the fact that being, for Heidegger, is not God, but that upon 
which the death and resurrection of God depends, does not prevent him from 
ending this sermon - oops, essay, I mean, with a line bearing a striking 
resemblance to a very old formula for supplication to a deity, commonly 
termed a prayer: 
Daß Welt, weltend, das Nächste sei alles Nahen, das naht, 
indem es die Wahrheit des Seins den Menschenwesen nähert 
und so den Menschen dem Ereignis vereignet. 
[Ma world in its worldin be the nearest of all nearing 
that nears, as it brings 
the 
truth of being near to man's 
essence, and so gives man to belong to the disclosing 
bringin pto- 
K 4p 
ss that is a bringing into its own. ] 
Amen? 
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CONCLUSION 
The analyses and comparisons in the preceding chapters have pointed 
out some possibilities for 'God' suggested by a dialogue between Heidegger 
and medieval mystical theology. In the course of this examination, I have 
implicitly sought to demonstrate that Heidegger's thought is original 
precisely in being an authentic retrieval of the past, a repetition of the 
possibilities handed down by the tradition. Authentic repetition is 
transformative and critical, however, and, in looking at medieval thought 
through Heidegger's own confrontational appropriation of It, I hope that 
what has come to light is not merely the remains of what was once 
thought, but also some directions for how these past thoughts may be 
translated into the future. Like Heidegger's reflections on being, these 
are only a few suggestions. They do not articulate a doctrine, and I have 
no 'conclusion' to offer on what is to be called God. Indeed, one result of 
this dialogue is the suggestion that such a conclusion is neither possible 
nor desirable. 
But I do want to maintain, and have consistently argued, that 
Heidegger's insistence that God is an entity, and never to be equated with 
being, is highly questionable. Given a certain sense of 'being', some 
theologians might well want to say, et hoc dicimus deem, and many of 
Heidegger's own considerations of the Seinshrage actually help to open this 
possibility, in spite of his explicit attempts to close it. Because of 
this, it could even be maintained with some justice that, in many respects, 
Heidegger is himself a mystical theologian, as well as being a 
metaphysician. Whether or not one accepts this appraisal will depend, in 
part, upon what is considered as 'theology' and 'metaphysics'. As I have 
indicated, Heidegger's thought is not a mere copying of the past, but a 
transformative appropriation. To a large extent, the decision as to 
whether the product of this appropriation can still be called theology or 
metaphysics is a matter of individual judgement. I believe it can, and 
have attempted to employ certain aspects of Heidegger's thought as an 
original contribution to these forms of inquiry, rather than as a 
destruction of them. In so doing, I have also wanted to suggest that 
there are forms of metaphysics from which it is not necessary to run as 
before one smitten with the plague, and that these still have something to 
offer on the question of God. 
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Notes to Chapter One 
1. See Collationes in Hexa&neron, 6.2 - 6.6, Opera Omnia, V, edita studio et 
cura pp. Collegii a S. Bonaventura (Florentine, ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi: 
1891), pp. 360-1. Bonaventure sees Aristotle's rejection of the Platonic 
exemplary ideas as his cardinal error. It is not quite clear whether or 
not Bonaventure believes it is possible to demonstrate purely through 
reason that the world has a temporal beginning. However, philosophy 
unaided by faith can certainly, for Bonaventure, lead the mind to the 
notion of a first and exemplary cause. The issue of whether or not this 
cause is temporally prior to the world, as well as being logically and 
ontologically prior, is a separate one. 
2. Confessionum S. Augustini, IV. 12, PL, XXXII, col. 700. Confessions, 
trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1961), p. 82. 
3. See Ninian Smart, The Philosophy of Religion (London: Sheldon Press, 
1979), pp. 82-3,142-3. 
4. Saint Bonaventura: The Mind's Road to God, trans. with introduction by 
George Boas (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), p. xiv. 
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7. Confessionum, XII. 29, cola. 842-3. Confessions, p. 306 
8. Confessionum, XII. 29, col. 842. Confessions, p. 306. 
9. De Doctrina Christiana, II. 1, PL, XXXIV, col. 35. On Christian Doctrine, 
trans. D. W. Robertson (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), p. 34. 
10. Benjamin Minor, XVIII, col. 12. The Twelve Patriarchs, p. 70. 
11. Mysticism, 2 vols. (London: Methuen & Co., 1912), it, 305. 
12. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Ably, trans. John W. Harvey (O. U. P., 1928, 
p. 151. 
13. Frphe Schriften (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), p. 352. 
14. I prefer this rendering of Befindlichkeit to Macquarrie and Robinson's 
phrase 'state-of-mind'. It is employed by William McNeill in his 
translation of Heidegger's Der Begriff der Zeit (1924 Vortrag), in which 
Heidegger, it is interesting to note, translates Augustine's affectio as 
Befindlichkeit. See The Concept of Time, Bilingual edition, trans. William 
McNeill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), p. 6 and p. 24, p. 7. 
15. See Introduction above, p. 4. 
16. Plotlnus, The Enneads, 1.6.8, trans. Stephen MacKenna (London: Penguin, 
1991), p. 54. 
17. J. L. Mehta rightly aks, 'May it not be that, as man - Oriental or 
Occidental - he has the inherent tendency towards becoming forfeit to the 
world, losing himself in it, to interpret Being in terms of the essent ... 
7' The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 
252. 
18, Boas (see n. 4), p. xix. 
19. Frohe Schriften, p. 352. 
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Notes to Chapter Two 
1. I have taken the term 'dialectical theism' from John Macquarrie's rn 
Search of Deity. An Essay in Dialectical Theism (London: SCM Press, 1984). 
2. See also V. Lossky, Theologie negative et connaissance de Dieu chez 
Maitre Eckhart (Paris: Vrin, 1960), p. 127. 
3. See also Bernard McGinn, 'Meister Eckhart on God as Absolute Unity', in 
Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. D. J. 0' Meara (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1982), pp. 128-39. 
4. Sermones in Cantica canticorum, PL, CLXXXIII, col. 798. My translation. 
5. The fourfold, division of nature which I (not Eckhart) am employing 
here is John Scotus Eriugena's. See De Divisione Naturae, PL, CXXII, col. 
441. For a recent discussion of this point, see Dermot Moran, The 
Philosophy of John Scotus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle 
Ages (C. U. P, 1989), pp. 250-7, esp. p. 257, 'The reduction of the first and 
fourth divisions'. 
6. Seminar, 8 (1973), p. 160. 
7. This idea is an old one. Augustine, for instance, says in De Civitate 
Del that the earthly city is one quae cum dominare adpetit, etsi populi 
serviant, ipsa ei dominandi libido dominatur ('which, when it seeks for 
mastery, though the nations are its slaves, has as its own master that 
very lust for mastery']. The City of God Against the Pagans, Bilingual 
edition, Vol. I, trans. G. E. McCraken (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. P., 1957), 
p. 13. 
8. Mysticism, II, 255. 
'9. On this point, see John Caputo, 'The Nothingness of the Intellect in 
Meister Eckhart's Parisian Questions, The Thomist, XXXIX (1975), 619-23. 
10. Quint doubts the authenticity of this sermon. It is Sermon 3 in 
Pfeiffer. 
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11. Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay in Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1982), p. 120. 
12. Meister Eckhart: Mystical Theologian, p. 180. 
13. 'Heidegger Among the Theologians', New Blackfriars, 40 (1965), p. 403. 
14. Cf. Lossky: 'The median position of the creature - quasi medium inter 
Deum et nihil - supposes a double opposition of the created ens. opposed 
to God, the creature is nothing; opposed to nothing, it is the being 
(1'6tre) produced ex nihilo by the all-powerful action of God, the omnia 
which opposes itself to nihil' Theologie Negative et Connaissance de Dieu, 
p. 76. 
15. The Nachwort was first published in the fourth edition of 1943, and 
the Einleitung in the fifth edition of 1949. In this fifth edition, 
Heidegger also made some changes to the first version of the 'Postscript'. 
One of these is very important, and concerns the relation of beings to 
being. In 1943, Heidegger writes: zur Wahrheit des Seins gehört, daB das 
Sein wohl west ohne das Seiende, daB niemals aber ein Seiendes ist ohne 
das Sein ('it belongs to the truth of being that being may come to 
presence without what-is, but that what-is never is without being']. In 
1949, this line is revised to read: ... daß das Sein nie west ohne das 
Seiende, daß niemals ein Seiendes ist ohne das Sein ('that being never 
comes to presence without what-is, that what-is never is without being'] 
(WM, 46). It is actually the revised version which accords best with 
Eckhart's thought. 
16. Beyond Theism and A theism: Heidegger's Significance for Religious 
Thinking (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 70. 
17. Reiner Schürmann makes this point in 'Neoplatonic Henology as an 
Overcoming of Metaphysics', Research In Phenomenology, 13 (1983), p. 35. 
18. On the question of Heidegger's relation to metaphysics, see 
Heidegger's own comments in Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache, where it 
is said that by an 'overcoming' (Übez-windung) of metaphysics, Heidegger 
meant weder eine Zerstörung noch auch nur eine Verleugnung der Metaphysik 
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['neither a destruction nor even a denial of metaphysics'], but nur eine 
ursprüngliche Aneignung ['only an original appropriation']. To want the 
former, Heidegger says, w9re eine kindische Anmaßung und eine Herabsetzung 
der Geschichte ['would be a childish presumption and a demeaning of 
history'] (US, 109/20). 
19. The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton U. P., 1957), p. 
40. For Kierkegaard, it is. through such dread that sin first enters the 
world. 
20, The common root of 'mystical' and 'mystery' is muo, to close one's 
eyes. 
21. My translation follows the 1949 edition of the 'Postscript', while the 
one in Existence and Being follows the 1945 edition. 
22. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie, Erster Buch, Hrsg. Walter Biemel, Husserliana, Band III (Haag: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), pp. 70-3. 
23. ' Cf. W. J. Richardson, 'Heidegger and the Quest for Freedom', Theological 
Studies, 28 (1967), 286-307. 
24. Author of Martin Heidegger und Thomas von Aquin: Mensch, Zeit, Sein 
(Freiburg: Herder, 1975). 
25. This is a common distinction among many scholars of Eckhart, Oliver 
Davies, for instance, employs it in God Within, p. 66. 
26. These last two sentences allude to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicur, Bilingual edition, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1988). See Preface and Propositions 6.41 and 7. As is often 
noted, however, Wittgenstein's remarks here are offset by his later gloss 
on Augustine's Yee tacentibus de to ['woe to those who are silent about 
thee'], which runs: Was, du Mistviech, du willst keinen Unsinn reden? Rede 
nur einen Unsinn, es macht nichts' ('What, you cowpat, you don't want to 
talk nonsense? Go ahead and talk nonsense, it doesn't matter'], In F. 
360 
Waismann and B. F. McGuiness, Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), p. 69. 
27. Meister Eckhart: Thought and Language (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1986), p. 89. 
28. Realismus - Idealismus, V, Gesammelte Werke, Band 9 (Bern: A 
Francke, 1976), p. 283. 
29. Is. 45: 15. See Pensees (Paris: Garnier Freres, 1964), n. 242, p. 141. 
30. For a detailed analysis of this point, see Caputo, 'Heidegger's God and 
the Lord of History', New Scholasticism, 57 (1983), 439-64. 
31. Frankfurt: . Vittorio Klostermann, 1986, p. 4. 'The Pathway', trans. 
Thomas F. 0' Meara, in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas 
Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1981), p. 71. 
32. Deutsche Schriften, hrsg. Karl Bihlmeyer (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1961), p. 
332. 
33. Hegel, Preface. to Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (O. U. P., 
1977), p. 9. 
34. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, Propositions 6.41,6.45. 
35. 'Neoplatonic Henology as an Overcoming of Metaphysics. ' 
36. Heidegger. Through Phenemonology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1963), p. 300. 
37. Gesamtausgabe, 43 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1985), p. 126. 
'38. I am actually taking this from Nietzsche, who quotes this line from 
Stendahi, commenting, 'Perhaps I am even envious of Stendahl7 He robbed 
me of the best atheist joke which precisely I could have made ... ' Ecce 
hlomo, trans. R. I. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 58. 
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39, Der Feldweg, p. 7. 'The Pathway', p. 71. 
40. 'Heidegger and Wittgenstein: A Second Kantian Revolution', in 
Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays, ed. Michael Murray (New 
Haven: Yale U. P., 1978), p. 263. 
41. Meister Eckhart: Gedanken zu seinen Gedenken (Freiburg: Herder, 
1979), p. 35. 
42. I am thinking here of Caputo's Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought 
and Welte's Meister Eckhart: Gedanken zu seinen Gedanken, both of which 
have already been cited. 
Notes to Chapter Three 
1. See Gerard 0' Daly, Augustine's Philosophy of Mind (London: Duckworth, 
1987), p. 167. 
2. De Vera Religione, XXXIX. 73, Aurelii Augustini Opera, Pars IV. i, Corpus 
Christianorum, Series Latina, XXXII (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962), p. 235. Of 
True Religion, in Augustine: Earlier Writing:, trans. lohn H. S. Burleigh, 
Library of Christian Classics, VI (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), p. 
263. 
3. See De Vera Religione, XXXIX. 72, p. 234. Of True Religion, p. 262. 
4. Commentarii in quattuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, II, d. 39, 
a. 1, q. 2, Opera Omnia, II (Quaracchi, 1885), p. 903. 
5. Nietzsche's 'will to power', for instance, fits all of these criteria 
(which does not make it an actually and independently existing being). It 
is then a full-fledged metaphysical concept, in which case Paul Tillich 
makes a fair point in claiming that Nietzsche is not an atheist, but has a 
God which is very different from the Christian one. Perspectives on 19th 
and 20th Century Protestant Theology (London: SCM Press, 1967), p. 198, p. 
217. 
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6. Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, trans. Dom Illtyd 
Trethowan and Frank J. Sheed (Paterson, New Jersey: St. Anthony Guild 
Press, 1965), p. 362. 
7. It is not clear in this passage whether Bonaventure means an innate 
or a sensible species, or both. His doctrine on memory actually attributes 
to it not only the Augustinian functions of self-remembrance and retaining 
innate species, but also the Aristotelian function of retaining species 
abstracted from things known in the past. See J. F. Quinn, The Historical 
Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy (Toronto: Pontifical Institute, 
1973), p. 355. 
8. De Trinitate, Aurelii Augustani Opera, Pars. XVI. i-ii, Corpus 
Christianorum, Series Latina, L-La (Turnhout: Brepols, 1968), p. 324. The 
Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, The Fathers of the Church, 45 (Washington, 
D. C.: Catholic U. P., 1963), p. 305. 
9. De Trinitate, X. VIII(11), p. 325. The Trinity, p. 305. 
10. De. Trinitate, X. VIII(11), p. 325. The Trinity, p. 305-6. 
11. Helmut Fahrenbach, 'Heidegger und das Problem einer philosophischen" 
Anthropologie', in Durchblicke. Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag 
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1970), p. 108. 
12. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Jane Rubin, in their comparison of Heidegger and 
Kierkegaard in the Appendix to Dreyfus' Being-in-the-World: A Commentary 
on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (London: MIT, 1991; pp. 283-340) 
also note that Dasein has no concrete possibilities or fixed identity, and 
is therefore essentially nothingness (p. 310). However, I feel they 
misunderstand this point in saying: 'Heidegger shares with Kierkegaard the 
rejection of the Aristotelian and medieval views of the self as aiming at 
self-realization. There is no human potential' (p. 305). I would say 
rather that, for Heidegger, human existence as such is pure potential, 
where this does not indicate that it is 'meaningless', as the nihilistic 
reading of Heidegger claims, but that its meaning is inexhaustible and 
constantly open. 
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13. Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, God the Future of Man (London: Sheed and Ward, 
1969), pp. 167ff. 
14. Discours sur 1'origine et les fondements de l'in6galit6 parmi les 
hommes, in Les Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire land other works] (Paris: 
Librairie Jules Tallandser, 1969), p. 187. 
15. This point will be discussed in Chapter Four. See SZ, 274-80. 
16. For a discussion of this problem, see Ludwig Landgrebe, 'Husserl's 
Departure from Cartesianism', in The Phenomenology of Husserl, ed. R. O. 
Elveton (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 290-3. 
17. In the Schelling commentary, Heidegger remarks: Die Verständnis der 
Dingheft der Dinge Im Sinne des durch sich hindurch Deutens und Erdeutens 
des Urwesens erlaubt es, nun auch den Menschen ein pkig zu nennen, ohne 
Gefahr, jetzt noch von Anfang an sein Wesen zu mißdeuten ['The 
understanding of the thinghood of things in the sense of the referring- 
through-itself of the primal being permits us now to call man a thing, too, 
without the danger of misinterpreting his nature from the very beginning'] 
(SA, 214/123). 
Notes to Chapter Four 
1. I have here translated directly from the Middle High German as 
literally as possible. 
2. Matthias Lexer, Mittelhochdeutsches Handwdfrterbuch, 3 vols. (Leipzig; 
S. Hirzel, 1872). 
3. The terms of my commentary here are drawn from Kierkegaard. See The 
Sickness unto Death, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin. 1989), pp. 
1111 f f. 
4. 'La place des termes «Gemuete» et «Grunt» dens le vocabulaire de 
Tauler', in La mystique rh6nane: Colloque de Strasbourg, 1961 (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), p. 189. 
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5. 'Taulers Terminologie vom Seelengrund', in Altdeutsche und 
Altniederländische Mystik, hrsg. Kurt Ruh (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1964), p. 346. 
6. Cf. Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death, pp. 43-4. 
7. See, for instance, the letter from Heidegger in William Richardson's 
Through Phenomenology to Thought. 
8. Cf. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, pp. 59-65. For Kierkegaard on 
the 'moment' (0jeblikket) as the conjunction of time and eternity, see The 
Concept of Dread, pp. 78-80. Also, Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F. 
Swenson, revised Howard V. Hong (Princeton U. P., 1962), passim., for the 
moment as the fullness of time, and as a moment of decision. 
9. For a detailed analysis of this point, see Michael Zimmerman, 'A 
Comparison of Nietzsche's Overman and Heidegger's Authentic Self', Southern 
Journal of Philosophy, 14,1976,213-31. 
10, The most obvious example is Nietzsche's account of inspiration in Ecce 
Homo, pp. 102-3. 
11. An example is Frederick Olafson's account in Heidegger and the 
philosophy of Mind (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1987), p. 92. 
12, 'Liberation and Contemplativity', New Black friars, 50, p. 365. 
13. Op. cit. (see Ch. 2, n. 30), p. 445. 
14. Cf. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. 
Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton U. P., 1941), p. 321. 
15. I have attempted such an interpretation in my paper, 'Transcendence in 
Death: A Heideggerian Approach to via negativa in The Cloud of Unknowing', 
in The Medieval Mystical Tradition in England: Exeter Symposium V, ed. 
Marion Glasscoe (Cambridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1992), pp. 179-92. 
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Notes to Chapter Five 
1. See Vorlesungun Über die Philosophie der Religion, Werke, 16-17 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969), I, 163, II, 528ff. Also Enzyklopädie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften, Band 1, Werke, 8 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1970), p. 86. 
2. Cf. Gilson, p. 165. 
3. See Norman Kretzman, 'A General Problem of Creation', in Being and 
Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical 
Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald (London: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 
227). 
4. Sent. I, d. 45, a. 2, q. 1, resp.. Opera Omnia, I (Quaracchi, 1882), p. 
804. 
5, It was this realisation, I believe, that led Heidegger to make the 
aforementioned revision in the 'Postscript' to Was Ist Metaphysik? (see Ch. 
2, n. 15), and it is worth noting that the Grundbegriffe was delivered as a 
lecture course in 1941, prior, to the composition of the 1943 'Postscript', 
and so prior to the revisions in the second edition of 1949. Given the 
sense of the revised line about the relation between being and beings, to 
say that nothing needs being, that it is (west) not without being, would 
necessarily entail that it needs beings, since the line says that neither 
does being come to presence without beings, nor beings without being. 
6. Gesamtausgabe, 33 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981), pp. 46-7. 
7. See below, Chapter Six, p. 349. 
8. This distinction between ground and existence is drawn by Schelling. 
See SA. §17. I am also alluding here to Henry Vaughan's poem, 'The Night', 
which ends with the lines: '0 for that nightl where I in him/Might live 
invisible and dim. ' The Works of Henry Vaughan, ed. L. C. Martin, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), p. 523. 
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9. Karl Löwith points this out in Heidegger: Denker in Dürftiger Zelt, 3. 
Aufl. (Göttingin: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1965), pp. 33-6. 
10. In the Beiträge, Heidegger sees Plato's notion of epekeina tes ousias 
in the form of agathon as the beginning of the conditioning of being 
through what-is in the history of metaphysics (see p. 211, p. 480). But 
here Plato's notion is said to lie at the root of value-thinking, a thinking 
in which man is taken as the centre and source of value-positing. Where 
the posit (Entwurf) is actually sent by being, the situation is reversed, 
and the good is then no longer subjectively determined as the highest 
value. My interpretation moves within this reversal. What Plato himself 
may have meant, on the other hand, is a question I am in no position to 
address. 
11. Trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (C. U. P., 1982), p. 248. 
12. Quoted by Feuerbach in The Essence of Christianity, trans. George 
Eliot (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 122. 
Notes to Chapter Six 
1. Davies points out that Ruusbroec follows St. Thomas definition of this 
spark as 'the inclination towards the good'. God Within, p. 129. 
2. This, too, needs some qualification, though, since Eckhart does speak of 
rapture, although he does not place nearly as much emphasis on the 
activity of God as Ruusbroec does. See R. K. C. Forman's analysis of 
Eckhart's term gezucket, in Meister Eckhart: The Mystic as the Theologian 
(Rockport, MA: Element Books, 1991), pp. 95-131. 
3. On this point, see J. A. Wiseman, 'Minne in Die Gheestelike Brulocht , in 
Tan van Ruusbroer The Sources, Content and Sequels of his Mysticism, ed. 
P. Mommaers and N. De Peepe (Leuven University Press, 1984), pp. 97-8. 
4. J. R. Crean has compared Eckhart and Ruusbroec on the use of keren and 
its derivatives, and noted that Ruusbroec's use of the verb inkeren and its 
noun inkeer have no counterparts in Eckhart's language. 'Studies in 
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Fourteenth Century Mystical Terminology: The Middle High German of 
Meister Eckhart and the Middle Netherlandic of Jan van Ruusbroec', 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Yale University, 1966, p. 79. 
5. Maria Villela-Petit makes this point in 'Heidegger est-11 »idol3tre«c? ' 
in Heidegger et 1a question de Dieu, p. 95. 
6. As put forward in 11.2 of Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 169- 
224. 
7. Ibid., see p. 178. 
8. Nietzsche I, p. 192. 
9. Cf. The Concept of Dread, p. 76, p. 100; Either/0r, 2 vols., trans. Walter 
Lowrie (Princeton U. P., 1971), II, 162f f.; also Soren Kierkegaard's Journals 
and Papers, Vol. 1, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Bloomington: Indiana U. P., 1967), n. 261, p. 110. 
10. Patrick Grant, Literature of Mysticism in Western Tradition (London: 
Macmillan, 1983), p. ix. 
11. This is often not understood clearly enough. Charles B. Guignon, for 
instance, in 'On Saving Heidegger from Rorty', entirely conflates the two. 
See Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46 (1985-6), p. 407. 
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